APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This suit involves a commercial lease agreement entered into by Agmark Foods, Inc., Defendant-Appellant, with Ideal Products, Inc. Plaintiff-Appellee, for container chassis used in transporting commodities and bulk products. Agmark Contends that the Chancellor improperly granted a summary judgment in favor of Ideal.

This is an attack on the service of a summons. The Chancery Court of Davidson County refused to set aside a default judgment based on the sheriff’s return. We affirm.

This is a medical malpractice case where in Ronnie Dale Netherton, Jr., sustained severe brain injury incident to his birth at Baptist Hospital, Inc. The Trial Judge granted a partial judgment in favor of Baptist as to any negligence alleged against it in connectin with the post-natal care of Plaintiff Ronnie Netherton, Jr. Although the Trial Judge overruled themotion for summary judgment alleging negligence by Baptist preceding Ronnie's birth, the Trial Judge, when ruling on the Plaintiff's motino to reconsider his orfer of partial summary judgment, overruled the motion and made the partial summary judgment final pursuant to Rule 54 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, resulting in this appeal.

The appellant, Brian Roberson, appeals the denial of a Rule 35(b) “Motion for Correction of Sentence” by the Williamson County Criminal Court. This motion arose from a plea entered on January 14, 1998, by the appellant pursuant to an agreed disposition under Rule 11(e)(1)(C), Tenn. R. Crim. P. After pleading guilty to two counts sale of cocaine, a Class B felony, and one count sale of cocaine, a Class C felony, the trial court, in accordance with the plea agreement, imposed a sentence of eight years for each Class B felony and a sentence of three years for the Class C felony. Apparently, the appellant was serving outstanding sentences of 17.5 years at the time he pled guilty to the current charges. The instant eight year sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other and concurrently with the outstanding sentences of 17.5 years. However, the three year sentence for the Class C felony was ordered to run consecutively to the outstanding sentences for an effective sentence of 20.5 years. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to correct or reduce his three year sentence for the sale of cocaine.
 

Based upon our review of the entire record, i.e., the video transcripts, briefs, and argument of counsel, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R.

This is an unemployment benefits case. The claimant’s employment was terminated, based on alleged misconduct. His application for employment benefits was denied. After administrative appeals, the chancery court affirmed the denial of benefits. The claimant appeals. We affirm the decision of the chancery court based on the claimant’s failure to timely file his petition for a writ of certiorari.

In this Declaratory Judgment action, the Trial Judge entered summary judgment against Employers Mutual Casualty Company, in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring “[t]he defendant owes the plaintiffs a duty of defense of the action pending in the Circuit Court for Sevier County, Tennessee, captioned Devin Phillips v. Toby Barnes . . . and further owes indemnity coverage respecting such claim , pursuant to the policies of insurance in question . . .”. The judgment was entered pursuant to T.R.C.P. Rule 54.02, and the insurance company has appealed that decision to this Court.

I agree with the majority that the jury’s reliance on the felony murder aggravating circumstance in this case violated article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution and that a harmless error analysis must be applied under our decision in State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1993). I disagree, however, with both the majority’s application of the Howell analysis and its conclusion.

Paul Farnsworth, a pro se inmate, has appealed the trial court’s dismissal of this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action that was brought against numerous individually named defendants. Based upon the following, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.
 

In this post-conviction capital case, we granted this appeal to determine whether the jury’s reliance on an invalid felony murder aggravating circumstance was harmless error. Upon review, we hold that the jury's consideration of the invalid felony murder aggravating circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the strength of the remaining valid aggravating circumstances and the relative weakness or absence of any mitigating circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeals' decision affirming the trial court's dismissal of the post-conviction petition is affirmed.

We granted this appeal by Ronnie William (Billy) Taylor, the appellant, in  order to address issues pertinent to the sentences he received in the trial  court. In our review, however, we notice as plain error an invalid conviction  that was imposed upon appellant for an offense that was not charged in the indictment.1 Accordingly, for the reasons outlined below, we vacate the invalid burglary conviction and affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified. The cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant physician caused
the death of the decedent in the course of childbirth. The jury found in favor of the defendant physician. The plaintiff appeals, asserting error in the jury instructions and juror misconduct. We
affirm.

The Petitioner, James E. Martin, appeals as of right the trial court’s dismissal of his petition fo r writ of habeas corpus relief. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgm ent of the trial court.

This case tests the power of the trial court to order an adult, slightly handicapped child to visit his father. The Chancery Court of Rutherford County held that it was the duty of the court to require the visitation. We hold that under the circumstances of this case the court exceeded its jurisdiction.

This is an appeal from a chancery decree awardingspecific performance to the purchasers of a tract of real estate and denying a counterclaim for rent. The lower court rendered the decree after a full evidentiary hearing on the merits. The appellant has not furnished this court with a transcript of the evidence heard at the trial.

The defendant was charged with vandalism, three counts of aggravated assault, and two counts of assault. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to vandalism and two counts of aggravated assault, receiving a sentence of one year on the vandalism count and four years on each aggravated assault count, to be served concurrently. Following a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service, the trial court denied probation. The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying probation because it perceived inconsistencies in the defendant’s statements and did not allow the defendant to clarify the evidence through his statutory right of allocution prior to sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a reduction in ordered child support.

The Defendant, Otis J. Wickfall, ap peals as of right his conviction for first degree murder in the Shelby County Crimina l Court. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, Defendant raises the following issues:  I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal based on the evidence presented by the State;  II. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of the victim’s blood-staine d shirt to show the trajectory and angle of the bullet;  III. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of a photograph of a recording label depicting the slang term for murder;  IV. Whether the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of California Penal Code section 187 defining murder; and V. Whether the trial court erred in its jury ins tructions.  After a careful review of the reco rd, we affirm the judgm ent of the trial court.

The court has correctly affirmed the summary judgment dismissing Mr. Darnall’s Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (Supp. 1998) claim. Even though I concur with the court’s decision, I have prepared this separate opinion to state my understanding of the elements of a Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 claim. I find this restatement necessary because of the Western Section’s reliance on Johnson v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 759 S.W.2d 925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) in Merryman v. Central Parking Sys., Inc., No. 01A01-9203-CH-00076, 1992 WL 330404 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1992) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from summary judgment granted to the Defendants in a complaint asserting retaliatory discharge with the action based solely upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1-304.

The issue presented by this appeal is whether an amendment to T.C. A.50 -1-304, (commonly knownn as the Whistle Blower Statute), which brough employees of the State of Tennessee within its purview, should be given retrospective effect.

The appellant states the issue before this Court thus:

A single, narrow issue is presented for consideration in this appeal: Does material evidence within the meaning of Rule 13d, appear in the record which suports the jury’s verdict of $140 ,000.00 in compensatory damages, and, if so, did the trial court erroneously grant a new trial?

The case history demonstrates that this issue is not properly before the Court for consideration.

The appellant, Charles R. Brown, appeals as of right from his conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) by a Blount County jury. The defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. He was ordered to serve forty-eight hours in the county jail before being placed on supervised probation for eleven months and twenty-seven days. The defendant was also fined $350. In this direct appeal, the defendant presents two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) whether the trial court erred in charging the jury.

This is a personal injury slip and fall case. The plaintiff was injured when she fell in the defendant’s restaurant due to a tray negligently left on the floor. The defendant restaurant admits liability but asserts that the evidence does not support the amount of the trial court’s award and seeks a remittitur. We affirm the trial court’s decision as modified.

The controversy giving rise to this appeal had its genesis in a service contract for washers and dryers entered into between Plaintiff Bill Jennings and Defendant Lawler-Wood, Inc., which manageg Maple Oak apartments for the owners.