APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Quantreal Underwood, was convicted of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated robbery.1 The trial court imposed a Range I, twenty-five-year sentence for second degree murder and two concurrent eight-year sentences on each count of aggravated robbery.

James C. Hise, Jr. and wife, Brenda L. Hise sued the State of Tennessee, the Department of Transportation and its commissioner for damages in an inverse condemnation action. The complaint alleges that, after conveying a portion of their property to the state, they learned that the project adversely impacted their commercial property. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity. The motion was granted and the plaintiffs appealed.

The defendant was convicted by jury of two counts of rape and two counts of incest. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve (12) years for each rape conviction and to six (6) years for each incest conviction to the custody of the Department of Correction. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve the rape convictions consecutive to each other and consecutive to prior unserved sentences but concurrent with the incest convictions. The trial court also imposed fines in the amount of $25,000 for each rape conviction and $10,000 for each incest conviction.

The defendant, Lester Lee Doyle, was convicted by a Benton County jury of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, second offense, and driving on a revoked license. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. We affirm the conviction.

This lawsuit involves the breach of a lease agreement. The corporate lessee vacated the premises and stopped paying rent; consequently, the lessor filed suit. The trial court found the lessee in breach of the lease, but found the lease agreement unconscionable, held that the lessor failed to mitigate its damages, and held that the president of the corporate lessee could not be held personally liable. We affirm the trial court’s finding of a breach, but reverse its remaining findings and award the lessor damages for the entire term of the lease.

The appellant, Hollis G. Williams (defendant), was convicted of first-degree felony murder by a jury of his peers. The State of Tennessee sought the extreme penalty of death. However, the jury set his punishment at life without the possibility of parole. The defendant presents three issues for review. He contends (a) the evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support his conviction for a murder committed during an attempt to commit robbery, (b) the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions by ruling his two convictions for attempt to commit robbery could be used to impeach him if he opted to testify in support of his defense, and (c) the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions by permitting the state to introduce victim impact testimony during the sentencing hearing. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law governing the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

The Defendant, John Parnell Yaugher, appeals as of right pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Defendant was convicted following a jury trial in Anderson County of the offense of rape of a child. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the allegations in the indictment to charge an offense. Also, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction and specifically argues that his confession was uncorroborated, that there was no proof of penetration, and that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane at the time of the offense. Furth er, the Defendant argu es that the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress his statement to investigators and by charging in the jury instructions the lesser grade offense of aggravated sexual battery. Finding no
error, and that the indictment and the evidence are sufficient, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal,1 we must determine whether a false response from an individual to an inquiry made by a law enforcement officer constitutes a false report within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-502(a)(1) (1991). After careful review, we hold that § 39-16-502(a)(1) applies to statements volunteered or initiated by an individual but does not apply to statements made in response to inquiries by law enforcement officers. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

The defendant, Merlin Eugene Shuck, was convicted of one count of solicitation to commit first degree murder and two counts of solicitation to commit especially aggravated kidnaping. The defense theory at trial was entrapment, and in support of that defense, Shuck sought to introduce expert testimony from a neuropsychologist that he had suffered a cognitive decline and significant
deterioration of his cognitive abilities which rendered him more susceptible to inducement than the average person. The trial judge refused to admit the testimony finding that it would invade the province of the jury. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial. Thereafter, we granted the State permission to appeal to consider whether expert psychological testimony about a defendant’s susceptibility to inducment is admissible under Tennessee law to establish entrapment.

NancyReneeMcReynolds Delbridge (Mother) appeals the trial court’s order denying
her counterpetition to modify the joint custody arrangement previously agreed to by the
parties and set forth in their final divorce decree. For the reasons stated hereinafter, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This matter appears appropriate for consideration pursuant to Rule 10(b) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.1 The plaintiffs in this case, Billy Frank Henley (“Henley”) and Joe H. Marlow (“Marlow”), own tracts of farm land in Coffee County, Tennessee. Henley acquired his land in 1992 from his brother, Clarence Henley, and his sister-in-law, Nona Mae Henley. Clarence and Nona Mae Henley had acquired the property from his parents in 1974. His parents had owned the property since 1957. Marlow acquired one tract of land at issue in 1973 and another tract of land at issue in 1975. The plaintiffs claim that a road separates their land from that of the defendants, Dale and Elsie Dotson (“Dotson”).

V. R. Mason died testate on October 29, 1995. The executor, Richard F. LaRoche, Jr., propounded the will for probate; in the ease of language it provided for the payment of debts and taxes and created a trust for a family cemetery, with the remainder to pass under the laws of intestate succession.

This is an action for damages against the Metropolitan Government and other Defendants, alleging that they are liable for the death of Plaintiff’s son, Terrance Murray, who was shot and killed by a fellow student while attending J. T. Moore Middle School in Nashville, Tennessee, on April 21, 1994.

This court entered an order on 13 August 1997 in the above styled case. Defendant/appellee, Outdoor Entertainment, Inc. (“OEI”), filed a petition for rehearing on 25 August 1997. It is the opinion of this court that the petition should be denied.

This matter appears appropriate for consideration pursuant to Rule 10(a) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.1

The petitioner, Olen Eddie Hutchison, appeals as of right from the Campbell County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. He was convicted in 1991 for the first degree murder of Hugh Huddleston and received the death penalty. He was also convicted of conspiracy to take a life and solicitation to commit first degreemurder for which he received a total sentence of twenty-two years. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. 1994), cert. denied, U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 137 (1995). We affirm the denial of postconviction
relief.

This action was filed October 15, 1992 before the Tennessee Claims Commission. The plaintiff sought two-fold relief: (1) benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Law, TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-101 et seq., and (2) damages for the tort of alleged retaliatory discharge for filing a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, as allegedly authorized by TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-301 et seq. The claims were bifurcated.

This is a child custody case. The parties had entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement in which they had joint custody of the minor child. After the father’s remarriage, both the mother and father filed petitions seeking custody. The father now appeals the trial court’s order awarding sole custody of the parties’ child to the mother. We affirm.

The appellant, John C. Tomlinson, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. In April 1983, the appellant was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of aggravated kidnaping and two counts of robbery with a deadly weapon. For these convictions, he was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. In December 1983, the appellant was convicted in the Wilson County Criminal Court of aggravated rape and armed robbery resulting in sentences totaling 35 years. The appellant is currently confined at the Northeast Correctional Center where he is serving an effective sentence of 65 years for the convictions from both counties. The appellant now appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, the appellant contends that the trial court’s summary dismissal denied him his right to due process of the law.

On February 10, 1995, Appellant Telly Slayton was found guilty by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of murder in the perpetration of robbery in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-13-202(2) (Supp. 1996). The trial court ordered a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant raises three issues for review: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient as a matter of law to sustain the conviction ; (2) whether the trial court erred in overruling Appellant’s motion to suppress his statement given to police officers; and (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting, over Appellant’s objection, a photograph of the victim taken while the victim was alive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This litigation concerns dissolution of a marriage 24 years in duration. The appellant, Lawrence Edward Norton, Sr. (“Husband”), has appealed from the final decree of divorce, challenging the correctness of the trial court’s decision to award the appellee, Brenda Kay Norton (“Wife”), one-half of his railroad retirement benefits, rehabilitative alimony and attorney’s fees. For reasons expressed below, we affirm and remand.

Issac Lydell Herron appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus.  The complaint alleges that Mr. Herron is the president and incorporator of the Church of God at Cold Creek, Inc., a Tennessee corporation.  Jimmy Harrison is the warden of Cold Creek  Correctional Facility (CCCF) and Elizabeth T. Rice is the District Attorney General of the 25th Judicial District.  Although not specifically stated in the complaint, it is apparent from the exhibits to the complaint that Mr. Herron is incarcerated at CCCF.

This appeal stems from a decision of the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals to grant a conditional use permit for a medical office building and parking garage adjacent to St. Thomas Hospital. The homeowners’ association of a neighboring condominium development and other parties who opposed the project filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The trial court heard the case without a jury and upheld the Board’s decision to grant the conditional use permit. On this appeal, the project’s opponents take issue with the procedures followed by the Board in granting the conditional use permit and also assert that the project does not comply with the Zoning Ordinances for the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. We affirm.