APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal by the defendant, Michael George Long, from that portion of the trial court’s judgment which awarded alimony in futuro to his former wife, Diana Sue Long, who was the plaintiff below.

Defendant, Joseph L. Fletcher, appeals as of right a jury conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), second offense. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days and fined $610. Fletcher presents four issues for our review: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; 2) whether the state is required to prove a culpable mental state for a DUI conviction; 3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing testimony about certain drugs; and 4) whether the sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal by petitioner/appellant, Mary Jane Bohlen Duggan, from the decision of the trial court modifying the child support obligation of respondent/appellee, Frederick Louis Bohlen, III, and interpreting the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) and a later amendment to the MDA. The court concluded Mr. Bohlen was not in contempt and required him to pay $860.00 per month for the parties’ youngest child, $250.00 per month for each child over eighteen and under twenty-two provided the child is receiving a postgraduate education, andone-half of the children’s postgraduate education expenses. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Williamson County Chancery Court. Plaintiff/appellant, Susanna Gregg, claims the chancery court erred when it denied her claim to attorney’s fees, and defendant/appellee, Steven D. Graham, claims the chancery court erred when it failed to dismiss the claim as outside the statute of limitations. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows: Defendant and his ex-wife, Lori G. Graham, entered into an agreement with Plaintiff and her husband, Donald Kanatack, for the lease/purchase of a piece of real estate. Defendant executed a note and a deed of trust in favor of Plaintiff and her husband on 15 March 1986. In exchange for the note, Plaintiff and her husband gave Defendant and Ms. Graham $10,477.17, which they used to pay real estate commissions and to set up an escrow account for repairs. The note listed the date of maturity as “on or at closing,” and the lease/purchase agreement listed the date of closing as 17 February 1988. Both the note and the deed contained provisions allowing Plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees if Plaintiff had to file suit to recover under each agreement. At the time of execution, however, the parties modified the note by drawing an “X” over five consecutive paragraphs. One of these paragraphs included the provision allowing the note holder to recover costs and expenses under certain circumstances.1 The parties failed to pay the note on 17 February 1988. The parties extended the original lease/purchase agreement for an additional year by executing an addendum on 27 May 1988. The new closing date passed without incident and both parties continued as they had in the contract for two additional years. A fire occurred on the property in 1990 while Plaintiff still occupied it.  After the insurance company paid the settlement to Defendant, he evicted Plaintiff from the property.

The Defendant, Clinton Darrell Turner, appeals as of right his conviction and sentence for DUI. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and driving on a revoked license in the Cocke County Circuit Court. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days on the charge of driving while under the influence and six months for the charge of driving on a revoked license. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The trial court suspended the entire sentence for the conviction of driving on a revoked license. On the DUI, the Defendant was ordered to serve seven days in jail with the balance to be served on probation. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Defendant also argues the trial court erred by allowing an officer to testify as to field sobriety tests when the officer was not trained to administer those tests. The last issue the Defendant raises is that the trial court erred by sentencing him to serve seven days rather than the two (2) day minimum provided by law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.