APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This interlocutory appeal presents for determination the principles of comparative fault applicable to the assessment of liability among joint tort feasors and the application of those principles to this transitional case, in which the cause of action accrued prior to the decision in McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d52 (Tenn. 1992). The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified and the case is remanded to the trial court.

This is a suit by two high school students and their parents seeking damages resulting from alleged assaults by a high school coach.

This appeal involves a constitutional challenge under the Tennessee Constitution to Tennessee's Homosexual Practices Act, T.C.A. § 39-13-510 (1991). On May 26, 1993, plaintiffs Penny Campbell, John Doe, Jane Doe, James Tallent, and Christopher Simien,1 filed a "Verified Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief" in the Circuit Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, against defendants Don Sundquist, Governor of the State of Tennessee,2 Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of the State of Tennessee, and Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General for Davidson County, each in his official capacity. The complaint, as amended, seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to T.C.A. § 29-14-101, et seq., (1980) that the Homosexual Practices Act (HPA),acriminal law, violates plaintiffs' right to privacy under Article I, Sections 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 19, and 27 of the Tennessee Constitution and their right to equal protection of the laws under Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin the enforcement of the HPA.

The Travelers Insurance Company ("Travelers") filed an interpleader in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. It alleged that both defendant/appellee, Maudine Y. Lancaster Webb ("Ms. Webb"), and defendant/appellant, Vicky Austin Lancaster ("Mrs. Lancaster"), claimed the proceeds of an insurance policy which covered the life of decedent, Charles S. Lancaster.

The only issue raised in this paternity action is whether there is any material evidence to support the jury's verdict that the appellant was the father of the child. We affirm.