APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

While initially indicted on three counts of attempted first degree murder, the defendant, John Mark Burns, was convicted on three counts of attempted second degree murder. The trial court imposed sentences of eleven years for each offense, all of which are to be served concurrently. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, he argues that the trial court erred in several of its instructions to the jury, and he contends that the sentence is excessive. Because the trial court erred in its application of certain enhancement factors, the defendant’s sentences are modified to three concurrent nine-year terms. Otherwise, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This is an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's refusal to grant a summary judgment to the defendants in a negligence case. We find that the defendants have not affirmatively negated an element of this negligence claim and that reasonable minds could differ on the allocation of fault between the parties. Consequently, the defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We therefore agree with the trial court and affirm the denial of summary judgment.

The Appellant, Tony Harp, was convicted in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court of one count of theft of property valued between $ 1,000 and $ 10,000, a class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a thirty-month community corrections sentence, with service of ninety days in the county jail. On appeal, Harp asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction and (2) the trial court erred in denying him full probation. After review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of conviction and resulting sentence.

The Trial Court held purchaser of land responsible for prior owner’s violations of the Tennessee
Water Quality Control Act. On appeal, we reverse in part, vacate in part and remand.
Tenn. R. App. P.3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed in Part,
Vacated in Part, and Remanded.
 

The Defendant, Sean Anthony, was tried and convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery. On appeal he contends that: (1) the trial court improperly refused to accept his guilty plea; (2) the trial court should have suppressed his statement to police; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Tony O. Johnson, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder. Following the appellant’s conviction, the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the trial court’s application of certain enhancement factors. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves a dispute between a widow and the personal representative of her husband’s estate. The parties differ as to the correct interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-4-101 (2001), the statute setting forth the criteria pursuant to which a surviving spouse’s elective share is computed. The trial court adopted the estate’s construction of the statute and subtracted the widow’s exempt property, homestead allowance, and year’s support allowance from the value of her percentage share of the net estate in arriving at the elective-share amount to which she is entitled. We disagree with the trial court’s interpretation of the statute. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of that court.
 

This appeal arises from a claim filed in Van Buren County Circuit Court alleging breach of contract, outrageous conduct, and assault. At the close of the plaintiff's proof, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the outrageous conduct claim. At the close of all the proof, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim, and the parties then stipulated that the assault had occurred. The case went to the jury for consideration of the damages resulting from the breach and the assault. The jury returned a verdict of $57,500 for the breach of contract and specifically found that the assault did not cause injury to Carl Shockley for which compensatory damages should be awarded. Nonetheless the jury did find that Joseph Crosby acted in such a way that punitive damages should be awarded. The trial court refused to submit the punitive damages issue to the jury and granted a remittitur of $7,500 on the contract claim. Both parties appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Dorian Soriano Bautista, appeals from the Bedford County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for theft over one thousand dollars, a Class D felony. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to explain to him the adverse consequences that his guilty plea and conviction could have on his resident alien status, which led to his deportation. We affirm the trial court.

This is a suit brought by a school teacher against the Hamilton County Board of Education under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act wherein the teacher alleges negligence on the part of the Board of Education as a result of an assault on her by a student who was re-enrolled in school and re-placed in her classroom despite the fact the student had assaulted her the previous month and been suspended from school. The trial court granted the Board of Education's motion for summary judgment. We hold that the decision to place the student back in the teacher's classroom, despite the previous assault, was a discretionary action for which the Board of Education was immune from liability. Accordingly, we affirm and remand to the trial court.

Wife appeals the trial court's distribution of marital property as inequitable in of her contribution to the acquisition of the only significant asset, the marital home. The trial court clearly recognized that without Wife's contribution from her separate property, the parties would have been unable to buy the house. We modify the trial court's award of the equity in the house and affirm as modified.

Holli Thacker Haney ("Plaintiff") had two children who attended Michigan Avenue Elementary School (the "School") in Bradley County. Plaintiff's husband, Tracy Thacker ("Thacker"), was not the biological father of the oldest child, but he was the biological father of the youngest child. Thacker filed for divorce, and he and Plaintiff were in sharp disagreement over custody matters. Apparently believing he was going to lose on the custody issues, on the morning of December 12, 2000, Thacker went to the School and signed out both children. The School required Thacker to provide a written explanation as to why the children were being signed out. Thacker wrote "Keeping Promise by Mother" and "Pay Back" as his reasons for signing out the children. School employees did not read what Thacker had written prior to allowing him to leave the premises with the children. Tragically, Thacker then murdered both young children. Plaintiff sued the Bradley County Board of Education asserting claims of negligence and negligence per se based on the School's allowing Thacker to sign out the children and leave the School with them on December 12. The Trial Court granted the Board of Education's motion for summary judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of both Mother and Father, and both appealed. Because statutory grounds were proved by clear and convincing evidence and it was also shown by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this Declaratory Judgment action, the Trial Court established the purchase price of property pursuant to a right of first refusal, awarded interest and denied a request for attorney's fees. On appeal by Seller, we Affirm.

The defendant appeals her resentencing following the revocation of her eight-year community corrections sentence for vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering her to serve twelve years in the Department of Correction, following her arrest for DUI. Based on the subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we remand this matter to the trial court for reconsideration in light of its holding.

The Trial Court awarded possession to purchaser of property at foreclosure sale and dismissed possessor's action to rescind foreclosure. On appeal, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for Plaintiff/Appellee.  Plaintiff/Appellee was taken hostage by a prisoner who escaped from the control and custody of Defendant/Appellant, a private corporation contracting with the State of Tennessee to provide prison security. Defendant/Appellant asserts that it is entitled to immunity under the Public Duty Doctrine, that there was no material evidence on which the jury could have based its verdict, that the award of compensatory damages was excessive and not supported by the evidence, that Defendant/Appellant cannot be held responsible for the actions of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial. We affirm.

In this action to contest a Will, the Trial Court granted proponent summary judgment. On appeal, we vacate and remand.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for Plaintiff/Appellee. Plaintiff/Appellee was taken hostage by a prisoner who escaped from the control and custody of Defendant/Appellant, a private corporation contracting with the State of Tennessee to provide prison security. Defendant/Appellant asserts that it is entitled to immunity under the Public Duty Doctrine, that there was no material evidence on which the jury could have based its verdict, that the award of compensatory damages was excessive and not supported by the evidence, that Defendant/Appellant cannot be held responsible for the actions of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial. We affirm.
 

In this divorce case, Teresa Lynn (Hurst) Fugate ("Wife") appeals the trial court's decision to set aside the parties' marital dissolution agreement (MDA) and a quitclaim deed to the marital residence executed by the Husband shortly after the parties separated. The trial court found the residence to be marital property and equally divided the equity in the property between the parties. Wife argues that the trial court should have found the residence to be a gift from husband, and thus separate property, and that the trial court erred by not enforcing the quitclaim deed. Wife also appeals the trial court's award of $187.00 in attorney fees to Husband. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.

Because of questions regarding the trial court's denial of appointed counsel in this proceeding that resulted in the termination of parental rights, the Department of Children's Services has acknowledged that the trial court's judgment must be vacated. We agree.

This appeal involves a dispute between the owners of a convenience store and the Lewis County Beer Board over a permit to sell beer. After the Beer Board denied their application because their store was within two thousand feet of a church, the owners filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court for Lewis County asserting that the Beer Board was selectively enforcing its distance rule. The owners appealed after the trial court granted the Beer Board's motion to dismiss. We have determined that this appeal is now moot because the persons applying for the permit sold the store while this appeal was pending.

The defendant, Robin McNeal Vanhoose, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to correct illegal sentence. The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, to affirm the dismissal by the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon reviewing the record, the defendant’s brief, and the State’s motion and brief, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s motion to correct illegal sentence.

Seanise Shaw, the petitioner, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for
post-conviction relief. The lower court found her allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel
unsupported by the evidence and denied relief. Because we are unpersuaded of error, we affirm.