APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted review in this workers’ compensation appeal to determine whether an employee who was less than age 60 on the date of injury, but who reached maximum medical improvement and permanent total disability status after age 60, is entitled to a minimum of 260 weeks of benefits under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003). The Chancellor determined that because the employee was less than 60 years of age when the injury occurred, he was entitled to permanent total disability benefits for only 232 weeks until he was eligible for full benefits under the Social Security Act. The employee’s appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel hearing argument and issuing its decision. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the Chancellor properly construed the statute in awarding the employee 232 weeks of permanent total disability benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i). We therefore affirm the Chancellor’s judgment.

The Defendant, Dennis James Varner, entered a conditional plea of guilty to driving under the influence following the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence attendant upon his stop at a roadblock. The Defendant reserved for this Court's ruling a certified question of law regarding the constitutionality of his stop by law enforcement officers. Upon our review of the record and pertinent legal authority, we have determined that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and dismiss the charges against the Defendant arising out of his stop at a roadblock conducted in contravention of Tennessee's constitution.

This case involves the attachment of a mobile home and its subsequent transport to a storage facility. The Appellee sued out an attachment on the Appellants’ mobile home to secure payment of past rent due on a tenancy at Appellee’s trailer park. Appellee had the mobile home transported after it was attached and Appellants sued Appellee for damages to the mobile home. The Shelby County General Sessions Court found in favor of Appellants, and Appellee appealed to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court found in favor of Appellee, and Appellants now appeal to this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
 

We granted this appeal to determine whether a third-party beneficiary who seeks to enforce a contract between a hospital and an insurance carrier may be bound by an arbitration provision in the contract. The trial court denied the hospital’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the thirdparty beneficiary was not a party to the contract between the hospital and the insurance carrier. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the arbitration provision could be enforced against the third- party beneficiary in this case. After reviewing the record and authority, we conclude that an arbitration provision in a contract is enforceable against a third-party beneficiary who has filed a cause of action seeking to enforce the contract.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Robert L. Stevenson, of burglary of a building, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a career offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) that the trial court erred by allowing the state to impeach him with prior convictions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael R. Lewis, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he claims that ineffectiveness of trial counsel resulted in an invalid, 2001 jury conviction of reckless aggravated assault and that post-conviction relief from the conviction is warranted. Because the record supports the post-conviction court’s findings and conclusion, we affirm.

The petitioner, John W. Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

Stefan Olaru filed an action for malpractice against his former attorney, Steven D. Brown. The trial court dismissed the complaint based upon the defendant's plea of a discharge in bankruptcy. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

On August 1, 2001, Defendant, Anthony Charles Henderson, entered guilty pleas to two counts of sale of cocaine in an amount less than .5 grams, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417. Defendant received concurrent sentences of five years for his convictions with ninety days to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on supervised probation. Defendant was also ordered to pay $2,000 in fines. On July 24, 2002, a violation of probation warrant was issued. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Defendant violated the conditions of his probation and ordered Defendant to serve his original sentences in confinement. Defendant appeals the trial court’s revocation of probation, arguing that there was no substantial evidence to support the revocation. Defendant also argues that the sentences imposed following the revocation were excessive. After reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Defendant’s probation and ordering Defendant to serve his original sentences in confinement.

The appellant, Joseph Chi-Choi Wong, was convicted by a jury on three counts of promoting prostitution and three counts of money laundering. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-four (24) years. In this direct appeal, the appellant challenges: (1) the trial court's decision to admit certain evidence that was found in the appellant's apartment; (2) the trial court's failure to dismiss the indictment due to the asserted unconstitutionality of the Tennessee prostitution and money laundering statutes; (3) the trial court's failure to sever the prostitution counts from the money laundering counts; (4) the trial court's failure to suppress the evidence procured from the appellant's apartment as a result of the search warrant; (5) the trial court's imposition of an excessive sentence; and (6) the trial court's failure to mitigate the appellant's sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Kewan Jackson, was found guilty by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of criminally negligent homicide and reckless aggravated assault. The appellant received a total effective sentence of three years in the Shelby County Workhouse. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the refusal of the trial court to remove a juror. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, James Edward Dicken, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder, Class A felonies. He was also convicted of one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The defendant contends on appeal that (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite intent required for committing first degree murder, (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on diminished capacity, and (3) the sentence was excessive. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

At his first trial, the defendant, Steven A. Meyer, was convicted of first degree murder and the trial court, sua sponte, overturned the jury verdict, concluding that it was against the weight of the evidence. At the second trial, the jury again found the defendant guilty of first degree premeditated murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Terry Shropshire, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction is void or his term of imprisonment has expired. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner appeals from his denial of post-conviction relief. He alleges ineffective counsel and error by the post-conviction judge. After careful review, we conclude that the petitioner failed to prove ineffective counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief.

The Trial Court held defendant’s purchase money security interest in cattle had priority over
plaintiffs’ prior security interest. On appeal, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Christopher A. Davis, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner failed to file his petition within the applicable statute of limitations, failed to assert a claim that is cognizable in a petition for writ of error coram nobis, and the statute of limitations should not be tolled. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Steven Gass, was convicted by a jury in the Rutherford County Circuit Court of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and attempted rape of a child. The petitioner received a total effective sentence of thirty-two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, citing several instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Carl E. Leggett, Sr., was indicted by the Franklin County Grand Jury for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of facilitation of possession with intent to sell over .5 grams of cocaine. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to serve nine years in confinement and ordered to pay a $70,000 fine. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. The Defendant also challenges his sentence. After a careful review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court on sufficiency grounds and dismiss the charges against the Defendant.

Conservator brought action to recover assets for the Estate of Carolyn Brown which had been given to defendant by Brown. The Chancellor invoked the constructive trust doctrine and ordered assets returned to the Estate. On appeal, we affirm.
 

I concur with the portion of the majority opinion which would affirm the trial court’s judgment regarding sentencing. However, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion which holds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction of facilitation of possession with intent to sell over .5 grams of cocaine.

In 2001, the trial court entered an order ("the 2001 order") awarding the State of Tennessee ex rel. Laura Fabrizio ("the State") a child support arrearage of $9,785. Subsequently, the same court, by order entered March 25, 2003, confirmed a referee's "Findings and Recommendations" adding interest of $2,152.70 to the original award. Richard R. Cadmus ("Father") seeks to go behind the 2001 order in an attempt to invalidate it on a number of grounds. The State, on the other hand, complains that the interest calculated by the referee and approved by the trial court is incorrect. We find no basis in the record submitted to us for disturbing the trial court's last order. Accordingly, we affirm.

The petitioner, Jimmy Leslie Sluder, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus without an evidentiary hearing. The judgment is affirmed.