APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a contract dispute between the plaintiff, an incorporated municipality, and the defendant, a nonprofit water systems corporation that supplied water to residents living outside the city limits. The parties entered into several agreements for the sale of potable treated water from the plaintiff to the defendant, the specific terms for which varied under each agreement. In particular, a 1981 agreement placed limits on the defendant's ability to assign its rights under the contract and required that the defendant purchase all its water requirements up to eight million gallons per month from the plaintiff, while an agreement executed in 1994 contained no minimum purchase requirement for the defendant and expressly provided that successors to the defendant, "whether the result of legal process, assignment, or otherwise," succeeded to the rights of the defendant under the contract. In 2002, the defendant entered into negotiations for the sale of its assets to a third party water company. In response, the plaintiff filed a petition for injunctive relief, alleging, inter alia, that the contract between the parties did not allow the defendant to assign its rights without the plaintiff's prior consent and that the City would suffer irreparable harm if deprived of the income generated by its water sale to the defendant. Following an injunction hearing and a subsequent trial, the trial court ruled, inter alia, that the 1994 contract superceded the previous agreements between the parties and the defendant was free to transfer its assets to the third party water company without the plaintiff's consent. The plaintiff appeals, arguing the 1994 contract was ultra vires because its mayor lacked the authority to execute it, there was no meeting of the minds to form a valid contract between the parties, and the trial court abused its discretion in dissolving the temporary injunction and denying the City's request for a permanent injunction. Having reviewed the entire record in this case, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Russell Dale Oliver, was convicted by a jury in the Johnson County Circuit Court of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life in prison. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by overruling his motion to dismiss the indictment based on the violation of his right to a speedy prosecution and trial and that the evidence is insufficient to convict him of murder in the first degree. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a divorce case involving the division of marital property. In 1988, the husband moved into the wife's house. The parties married in 1992 and remained married for ten years. During that time, the parties sold the wife's house and bought a new home with the proceeds. The new home was purchased in the names of both the husband and the wife. In 2002, the parties divorced. The trial court found that the parties' property had become so commingled that virtually none of it could be considered separate property, and divided the marital assets evenly. The trial court also allocated to the wife a larger portion of a marital debt to the wife's mother. From that decree, the wife now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence clearly supports the trial court's finding of commingling and transmutation of property, and finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's allocation of the marital debt.

The post-conviction petitioner, Kelvin Wade Cloyd, was convicted of two counts of vehicular homicide and possession of a controlled substance. After appointment of counsel and a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal of right, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal and that the state withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Knox County jury convicted the juvenile defendant, Edward L. Williams, of premeditated first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life for the premeditated murder conviction and twenty-two years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for premeditated murder; and (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We remand for entry of an amended judgment reflecting a sentence of life with the possibility of parole and deleting any reference to a merger of the premeditated murder count and the felony murder count. We further order that the sentences run concurrently rather than consecutively. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Christopher Lovin, was convicted of felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient and submits that the trial court erred by failing to exclude cumulative medical testimony. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was found guilty of driving under the influence, fifth offense. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the roadblock, contending that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant, the roadblock guidelines are unconstitutional, and the police did not substantially comply with the roadblock guidelines. The defendant also made a motion in limine to keep out testimony regarding the defendant's use of a racial slur. Both motions were denied. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as to all issues.

We granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to decide whether attempted aggravated criminal trespass is a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated burglary, and, if so, whether the trial court in this case committed plain error by failing to so instruct the jury. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that attempted aggravated criminal trespass is not a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated burglary and thus found no error in the trial court's failure to so instruct the jury. The defendant appealed to this Court. After a thorough review of the record and the relevant case law, we conclude that attempted aggravated criminal trespass is a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated burglary. However, we hold that the failure to instruct the jury on this lesser-included offense was not plain error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The appellant, Clay A. Thompson, pled guilty to theft of property valued over $1,000. The McNairy County trial court sentenced him as a Range II multiple offender to seven years incarceration. On appeal, the appellant contends his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Although the defendant, James A. Mellon, raises numerous issues on appeal, the dispositive issue is whether his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary, and the subsequently imposed death sentence in violation of due process, when he was not adequately informed of the consequences should he breach the plea agreement. Prior to trial, the defendant pleaded guilty to felony murder and especially aggravated robbery as part of a plea agreement with the prosecution. The agreement provided that, in exchange for his pleas of guilty, the State would recommend a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole on the felony murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, with the trial court to decide the actual length of the sentence. Pursuant to the agreement, sentencing would be reserved until after testimony by the defendant in any related proceeding or at the conclusion of such proceedings. The defendant reneged on the agreement and instead moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. The trial court denied the defendant's motion and empaneled a jury. A sentencing hearing was conducted, resulting in a sentence of death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and death sentence for the felony murder. On automatic appeal to this Court, we conclude that the defendant was not adequately informed of the consequences if he should breach the plea agreement. We are constrained to hold that the defendant's pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and thus the subsequent sentence denied him due process of law. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a direct appeal from an attorney disciplinary proceeding originating in the Board of Professional Responsibility ("Board"). After the appellant, Mark Henderson, disagreed with an initial proposal for a public censure, Disciplinary Counsel filed a petition for discipline. Henderson entered a conditional guilty plea before the Board in exchange for a public censure, but upon review, this Court rejected that plea. The Board ultimately recommended that Henderson be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. Henderson then filed a petition for certiorari in the Chancery Court for Sumner County alleging several procedural defects, including the allegation that the Board did not have authority to pursue the disciplinary petition because he had not demanded a formal hearing. The trial court dismissed Henderson's petition for certiorari due to his failure to file a complete transcript with the court. On direct appeal to this Court, Henderson argues that the Board lacked jurisdiction to pursue the petition for discipline, that the Board failed to follow the required procedure when it submitted the conditional guilty plea to this Court for review, and that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari. We affirm the decision of the trial court, holding that it properly dismissed the petition for certiorari, that the Board had authority to initiate a formal petition for discipline, and that this Court had the authority to review and reject the conditional guilty plea.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Leonard Franklin, of simple assault. The trial court sentenced him to seven months in the Shelby County Correctional Center with sixty days incarceration followed by eleven months and twenty-nine days probation. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in: (1) denying the defendant’s motion for a continuance; (2) limiting the defendant’s cross-examination of the victim concerning her civil lawsuit against him; (3) admitting evidence of the defendant’s suspension from his place of employment; (4) improperly commenting on the evidence; and (5) imposing a period of confinement. We reduce the probationary term to ten months but otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in ruling that the appellant's prior felony drug convictions would be admissible for impeachment purposes if he testified. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the prior convictions were relevant to the issue of the appellant's credibility and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any unfair prejudicial effect. We granted the appellant's application for permission to appeal. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court erred in allowing the State to use the appellant's prior felony drug convictions for impeachment purposes. However, because the appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the trial court's erroneous ruling, we hold that the error was harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

This appeal arises out of a condemnation proceeding brought by Rutherford County against the appellees. The appellant, claiming an interest through her deceased husband in the property to be condemned, filed a motion to intervene in the proceeding. The trial court denied the appellant's motion to intervene and dismissed her cross-claim for declaratory judgment, finding that she held no interest in the property under the provisions of the granting instrument. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the granting instrument conveyed a contingent remainder to each member of the class. As such, the conveyance to the appellant's husband lapsed when he predeceased the life tenant, leaving appellant without an interest in the property. We granted review, and we now hold that each class member held a vested, transmissible interest in the property prior to the death of the life tenant and that the appellant holds no interest in the property. We remand this cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The issues in this case are whether the lien for attorney's fees was properly preserved, and if so, whether a separate action was required to enforce that lien. The trial court found that the lien had been properly preserved and enforced it in the amount of $37,332. On direct appeal, the intermediate court reversed that judgment and held that the attorney's failure to note the lien in the final judgment as required by Chumbley v. Thomas, 198 S.W.2d 551 (Tenn. 1947), or to amend the judgment to include a notation of the lien, was fatal to the preservation and enforceability of the lien. We granted permission to appeal to revisit and reconsider the "notation" requirement of Chumbley. After careful consideration, we now overrule Chumbley to the extent that it requires an attorney's lien be noted in the final judgment. We also hold that the lien in this case was properly enforced in the court in which the matter was litigated. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for enforcement of the lien and a determination of attorney's fees on appeal.

The Henry County Grand Jury indicted the fifteen-year-old Defendant for first degree murder for the stabbing death of his aunt. The Defendant was tried as an adult and convicted of the charged offense, after a jury rejected his insanity defense. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. The Defendant appealed, arguing that his insanity defense was established by clear and convincing evidence. In an opinion filed August 9, 2002, a majority of this Court reversed the judgment of conviction, modified the judgment to “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity,” and remanded the case for further proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-7-303. State v. Ramon, No. W2001-00389-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1841608, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 9, 2002). The State filed an application for permission to appeal with the Tennessee Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On December 23, 2002, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for the purpose of remanding the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of State v. Flake, 88 S.W.3d 540 (Tenn. 2002). On remand, we find that a rational jury could have found that the Defendant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, as a result of a severe mental illness or defect, the Defendant was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act of stabbing his aunt to death so as to entitle him to the insanity defense. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction for first degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment.

On October 29, 1997, the Hamblen County Grand Jury returned an indictment against the appellant, Christopher Allen Harris for rape of a child in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-522. On January 19, 2000, the appellant entered a guilty plea to attempted rape of a child. He received a sentence of eight years to be served as a work-release sentence for 11 months and 29 days in the county workhouse with the balance on intensive probation. The appellant raises the following issues in this appeal: (1) whether he was properly subject to revocation of a Community Corrections sentence, and (2) whether the record preponderates against a determination that he had violated the terms of his Community Corrections sentence. After a review the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Paul Charles Carnahan, was indicted by the Grand Jury of Morgan County for unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally failing to provide support for a minor child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15-101. After the Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, the trial judge found him guilty of the Class E felony "Flagrant Nonsupport" and sentenced the Defendant to one year imprisonment and six years of probation. Further, the court ordered that the Defendant pay $64,041.19 in restitution. The Defendant now appeals that order contending: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) that the indictment contained a fatal flaw. Finding reversible error in the judgment of the trial court below, we reverse the Defendant's conviction and dismiss the indictment.

The Defendant, John M. Johnson, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Finding that denial of the petition was appropriate, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jerry Worley, pled guilty to nine counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine and one count of possession with intent to sell over .5 grams of cocaine. For these offenses, the Defendant received an effective sentence of twenty years. The Defendant did not perfect an appeal of his sentence, but petitioned for post-conviction relief on the grounds that his guilty plea was not valid; was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel; and that his sentence offends constitutional due process. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief, and this appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.