APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The sole determinative issue on appeal is whether an agreement which mandates arbitration in the event of claims or disputes "arising out of or relating in any way to the relationship of the parties or this Agreement, or the breach thereof," requires arbitration of tort claims including acts arising after the parties' contractual relationship ended. We hold that arbitration of claims of tortious interference with contracts or business relations is required under the terms of the parties' agreement and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Glen Bernard Mann, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In 1994, the petitioner was sentenced to death by a jury for the premeditated first degree murder of Anne Lou Wilson, a sixty-two-year-old widow. He was also convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years for aggravated rape and six years for aggravated burglary of the same victim. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by both this Court and the Tennessee Supreme Court. The petitioner is seeking post-conviction relief for, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and penalty phase of his trial. The post-conviction court, after a hearing, found the petitioner failed to carry his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that his trial counsel was ineffective. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Dedric D. Phillips, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his post-conviction relief petition. The petitioner entered guilty pleas to possession with intent to deliver less than .5 grams of cocaine and simple assault, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years as a Range III persistent offender. On appeal, the petitioner contends: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of first degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole. The Defendant now appeals, contending the following: (1) that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial based upon a witness's non-responsive statement; (3) that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to assert matters not in evidence during closing arguments; and (4) that the trial court committed plain error by incorrectly instructing the jury with respect to the culpable mental state of "knowingly." Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Brian Larice Cureton, was convicted of one count of first degree felony murder and one count of aggravated child abuse. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years imprisonment for the aggravated child abuse conviction as a Range I offender and ordered the sentence for aggravated child abuse to run concurrently with Defendant's life sentence. Defendant now appeals his convictions and sentencing alleging (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support Defendant's convictions for first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) that the trial court erred in not allowing Defendant to cross examine Kinoltra Ewing about her willingness to take a polygraph test; (3) that the trial court erred in not redacting portions of Defendant's statement to the police; (4) that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on facilitation of aggravated child abuse and felony murder as lesser included offenses; (5) that the trial court erred in permitting the State's expert witness to offer opinions outside her area of expertise; and (6) that Defendant's sentence for aggravated child abuse was excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the arguments and briefs of counsel, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Fred Taylor Smith, entered pleas of guilt to driving under the influence and driving under the influence per se. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401(a)(1)-(2). The trial court merged the two convictions and imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days with a requirement of service of 75%. As a part of the plea agreement, the defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the validity of the investigatory stop. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Lonnie Walter Hurd, appeals from his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of driving under the influence (DUI) and possession of cocaine. On appeal, he claims that the convicting evidence is insufficient, that certain evidence was improperly admitted, that the testimony of a state's witness violated the witness sequestration rule, and that the trial court erred in permitting a defense witness to be cross-examined about her prior drug convictions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Brian L. Woods, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of second degree murder and received a twenty-four-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, Woods raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by permitting a witness to testify in violation of the rule of sequestration; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; and (3) whether his sentence of twenty-four years is excessive.  After a review of the issues presented, we conclude that Woods’ challenges are without merit. The judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.

The Defendant, Jamie Dewayne Reed, filed for post-conviction relief. The trial court summarily denied relief on the basis that the petition was time-barred. The Defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals the revocation of his probation contending that the trial court abused its discretion. We hold that the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that a violation had occurred, and there was no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated child abuse. The trial court imposed a
nine-year sentence for each conviction and ordered concurrent service of these sentences. The
defendant appealed, raising numerous issues, but the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
convictions and sentences. We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal and,
after thoroughly reviewing the record, conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
consolidating the two indictments for trial. Furthermore, we have concluded that the erroneous
consolidation of the indictments, in conjunction with the erroneous admission of evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts, affirmatively appears to have affected the verdict of the jury.
Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals are reversed, and
these cases are remanded for new trials at which evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
committed by the defendant against the victim or others shall not be admitted unless relevant to a
material issue. Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Reversed and Remanded for New Trials
 

Action to collect rent owed by surety was dismissed by the Trial Court. On appeal, we affirm.

The majority has concluded that the trial court committed reversible error by consolidating
the offenses of March 1, 1998 and April 9, 1998, and by admitting evidence of prior abuse
committed by the defendant, Anderson Toliver. In my view, however, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by consolidating the two offenses and the admission of prior acts of abuse did not affect the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Although I concur in the analysis and holding of the majority, I write to address an issue of concern: whether in today’s society a parent’s right to corporally chastise a refractory child survives, and, if so, how does one reconcile that right with the child abuse statutes as currently written and interpreted. It is my intention by this concurring opinion to raise the level of discussion and to provide, perhaps, a measure of guidance for the trial court on remand.

The Defendant, Chett Allen Walker, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder, setting fire to personal property, and abuse of a corpse. Prior to trial, the Defendant expressed his intent to plead guilty to setting fire to personal property and abuse of a corpse, which he did. However, the trial court submitted those charges to the jury, along with the charge of first degree murder, to which the Defendant pled not guilty. Following the jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of all three charges. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises six issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his confession; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the charges of setting fire to personal property and abuse of a corpse to be determined by the jury after the Defendant expressed his desire to plead guilty to those charges; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view certain photographs and the car that the Defendant burned; (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to display a photograph of the remains of the victim to the jury during his closing argument; (5) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion with respect to the jury instructions; and (6) whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Pamela J. Moses, pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to aggravated assault and numerous misdemeanors. The plea agreement encompassed the length of the sentences, but left the manner of service for the trial court's determination. The trial court denied an alternative sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve her terms in confinement. The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with her plea. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief and this appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from the Father's post-divorce petition to set child support and to terminate previously ordered alimony in futuro. From an adverse decision of the trial court denying child support and termination of the alimony obligation, Father appeals. We affirm the portions of the trial court's ruling regarding alimony and reverse the award of attorney's fees and denial of support.

The Putnam County trial court revoked the probation of the defendant, James Cravens, and ordered him to serve his original sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's probation revocation order; (2) his sentence is excessive; and (3) the trial court erred in placing certain conditions on his bond pending appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.