APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Devon Wells, appeals his convictions of two counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substan ce following a jury trial in the Lincoln County Circu it Court. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II Multiple Offender to two consecutive sentences of nine (9) and seven (7) years. He was also fined a total of $100,000 for the two convictions. In this appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the sentence imposed was excessive and contrary to law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Donald Gene Brooks, stands convicted of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, theft of property valued over $1,000, and setting fire to personal property, all related to the robbery and killing of Joseph J. Wisniewski. He received his convictions following a jury trial in the Montgomery County Criminal Court. Brooks is incarcerated in the Department of Correction serving his effective sentence of life plus 27 years. In this direct appeal, Brooks challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of sentence imposed. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the Circuit Court of Chester County entered an order which revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered her to serve her original sentence of four (4) years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant, Amanda Treece, appeals from that action of the trial court. W hile Defendant does not challenge the revocation of probation, she argues in her sole issue on appeal that the trial court erred by requiring her to serve her entire sentence by incarceration in the Department of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Anthony P. Geanes, appeals as of right from his conviction in the Circuit Court of Hardeman County. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of delivery of a Schedule II con trolled substance. He was sentenced to serve fifteen (15) years as a Range II Offender. In this appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficien cy of the evidence and the length of his sentence. We affirm the judgm ent of the trial court.

Judith Ann Taylor (“Wife”) filed a complaint for divorce against Michael Raymond Taylor (“Husband”) and also sought an injunction prohibiting Husband from dissipating marital assets. Husband filed an answer and counter-complaint for divorce. The trial court granted Wife the divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and awarded her rehabilitative alimony, partial attorney fees, and 60% of the marital assets. Husband appeals and raises the following issues:whether the trial court erred (1) in awarding Wife rehabilitative alimony of $1,300 per month for 60 months; (2) in ordering Husband to pay $20,000 as alimony in solido for Wife’s attorney fees; (3) in ordering Husband to pay a portion of Wife’s health insurance coverage; (4) in requiring Husband to maintain a life insurance policy which exceeds the total amount of child support owed; and (5) in dividing the marital property of the parties. Wife submits the additional issue of whether she is due attorney fees on appeal. For the reasons stated below, we find no error and affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

This case comes to us on a certified question of law. The plaintiff, General Electric Company ("G.E."), filed this action for contribution against Process Control Company ("Process Control"). Process Control filed a motion to dismiss and/or motion for summary judgment arguing that Tennessee law does not permit a right of contribution in this case. The district court entered an order requesting this Court to address the following certified question of law: In actions that accrue after the decision in McIntyre v. Balentine, under what circumstances is a claim for contribution appropriate under Tennessee Law? We accepted certification of the question. We hold that under the facts as certified an action for contribution may be viable.

This appeal results from a suit brought by Normal Mayes and his wife, Ruth Mayes, against Claude Yow and his wife, Frances Yow, Willard Scarbro and his wife, Cleo Scarbro, who was added as a party Defendant subsequent to the filing of the original complaint, and Partners & Associates, Inc.

Michael A. Thompson, a prisoner in the custody of Tennessee Department of Correction has appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his petition for certiorari for judicial review of a decision of the Tennessee Board of Paroles denying parole.

Plaintiffs/Appellants, Holland D. Lane, Cynthia Lane, Bobby Joe Knight, and Kay 2 Grimes, appeal the judgment of the trial court dismissing their complaint, finding that appellants lacked standing to bring an action under Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208(a)(2) and that the use of their land by defendants/appellees, Willie and Dorothy Barr, as a tire landfill was a prior non-conforming use. For reasons stated hereinafter, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal involves the enforcement of the restrictive covenants in a Nashville subdivision. After two residents began to construct improvements on their property without first obtaining approval of the subdivision’s architectural committee, the homeowners association filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking injunctive relief to enforce the architectural control provisions in the subdivision’s restrictive covenants. The trial court heard the case without a jury and issued an injunction directing the residents to cease the construction and to restore their property to a condition consistent with the subdivision covenants. The residents have appealed. Since neither party has filed a verbatim transcript of the proceedings or a statement of the evidence, we have reviewed the papers filed in the trial court and have determined that they contain no basis for reversing the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

This is the second appeal concerning a husband’s support obligations following the dissolution of a 23-year marriage. The Chancery Court for Williamson County originally directed the husband to pay $1,731 per month in child support and $5,500 per month in spousal support for five years and then $5,000 per month thereafter. On the first appeal, this court remanded the case to the trial court to revisit the child support and spousal support awards. Even though the trial court concluded that the husband’s income had decreased significantly, it increased the husband’s child support to $2,000 per month and left its original spousal support order unchanged. It also awarded the wife judgments for a sizeable spousal support arrearage and a nominal child support arrearage. On this appeal, the husband again takes issue with the amount of his spousal support and child support obligations and also insists that he is entitled to retroactive relief on his spousal support arrearage and to the lifting of the injunction with regard to his 401k plan. We vacate the child support and spousal support awards and remand them to the trial court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Eric M. Florence, entered pleas of guilt in the General Sessions Court of Benton County to possession of marijuana and unlawful possession of alcohol. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail; all but two days were suspended on each count. The sentences were to be concurrently served. The defendant incurred additional charges and his probation was revoked. He served a portion of his general sessions sentence and then moved the court to suspend the remainder. The general sessions court denied the motion. The defendant appealed to the circuit court. That court affirmed the decision of the general sessions court.

The defendant, William Waylon Jackson, was convicted by a Decatur County jury of three (3) counts of the sale of marijuana over one-half (½) ounce, Class E felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to concurrent terms of three (3) years for each count and denied alternative sentencing. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment as it violated the mandatory joinder provision of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(a). He further argues that the trial court imposed excessive sentences and improperly denied alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an automobile personal injury case. The defendant, David Shorter, Jr., appeals
from the judgment of the trial court in a bench trial awarding plaintiff, Sylvia Hudson, $9,000.00
damages. Shorter’s responsibility for the accident was stipulated, and the trial concerned only
the issue of damages.

The appellant, Lemont E. Blair, appeals as of right the Knox County Criminal Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

This is a libel suit brought by a physician against a health maintenance organization and related health insurance entities. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants based on the statute of limitations. The lawsuit involves allegedly false information reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank. In an issue of first impression, we hold that each dissemination of the allegedly defamatory information by the Data Bank gives rise to a separate cause of action. The grant of summary judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded.

This is a suit brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act. It was brought by Plaintiff Barbara J. Hand, Administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Charles D. Hand, against his employer, Defendant Norfolk Southern Railway Company. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and assessed damages in the amount of $3,250,000. The Defendant appeals, raising nine separate issues. Although many do not merit a protracted discussion, others raise substantial questions.

Plaintiff  Raymond Mitchell sues Defendant Camelot Utility District of Hawkins County, Tennessee. He alleges that Camelot, in acquiring a quit claim deed from him conveying two tracts of land, one that contains an artesian well and the other equipment in connection with distribution of water to the adjacent area.  He contends that as a consideration for the quit claim deed, John Valetta, President of Camelot, represented to him that Camelot would provide water taps for two of his lots free of charge and, upon acquisition of an alternate water source, would re-convey the quit claimed lots to him.