APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Juan Cerano, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of certiorari or supersedeas. Specifically, he contends that he is entitled to relief because he was twice punished for a single act in violation of double jeopardy and that merger of his convictions for aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child was improper. The Petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed almost two and one-half months late; an issue pointed out by the State on appeal. Following our review, we conclude that the interest of justice does not require waiver of the timely filing requirement because the Petitioner has given no explanation for the untimely filing, and the nature of his double jeopardy issue does not warrant such. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Lee Cross, appeals as of right from the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He argues that his probation was revoked at a January 4, 2023 “furlough termination” hearing without counsel and without a valid waiver, rendering the judgment void. The habeas corpus court denied relief, finding noncompliance with statutory filing requirements and concluding the petition failed to state a cognizable habeas corpus claim. Based on our review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition.

Defendant, James Andrew Paige, appeals from his three convictions for rape, for which he is serving an eleven-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred (1) by admitting the victim’s hearsay statements; (2) by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) by failing to inquire into defense counsel’s unintentional contact with a juror or declare a mistrial. Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of these errors entitles him to a new trial. Because we find that Defendant has failed to timely file his notice of appeal and the interest of justice does not support waiver of that requirement, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Byron Becton, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The juvenile court magistrate denied Appellant/Father’s petition for custody of the minor child on its finding that Tennessee was not the child’s home state under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Father filed a timely request for review by the juvenile court judge under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107(d)(1)(A). Because the trial court’s order denying review fails to comply with section 37-1-107(d)(1)(E), it is vacated.

This case involves the application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1206(d) in a personal injury lawsuit in which the plaintiff seeks to proceed directly against her uninsured motorist insurance carrier. The trial court granted summary judgment to the carrier. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The pro se Petitioner, Sean William Lee, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his guilty plea to multiple child sex offenses was involuntarily and unknowingly entered. Specifically, he submits that he was misinformed the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation would be supervising him while he was on the sex offender registry, instead of the Tennessee Department of Correction, the entity actually supervising him, rendering his plea constitutionally infirm. Because this particular issue was not first properly presented in the post-conviction court, this court is without authority to engage in plenary review. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

I agree with the underlying facts of this dispute as stated in the majority opinion. I disagree with the trial court and the majority in their application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-17-1206 (“UM statute”). My disagreement is two-fold. First, the trial court should not have looked any further than the plain language of section (d) of the UM statute. Second, although I would hold section (e) of the UM statute inapplicable here, I also take issue with the trial court’s findings that led to its grant of summary judgment under section (e).

The Defendant, Mario Reed, was convicted in the Montgomery County Circuit Court of evading arrest involving risk of death or injury, a Class D felony; attempted tampering with evidence, a Class D felony; and reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the reckless endangerment conviction into the evading arrest conviction and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent seven-year sentences for evading arrest and attempted tampering with evidence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the indictment due to a violation of Article IV of the Interstate Compact on Detainers (“ICD”), (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of attempted tampering with evidence and the jury rendered an inconsistent verdict for that offense, and (3) his seven-year sentence for evading arrest is excessive. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case to the trial court for sentencing on the reckless endangerment conviction.

Great-Grandmother appeals the denial of her petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The trial court found one ground for termination but concluded that termination of Mother’s parental rights was not in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

Defendant, Albert Dejuan White, appeals his Tipton County Circuit Court trial convictions of possession with intent to deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence and statements obtained during the search of his residence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an interpleader action filed by a trustee of a trust who held funds that were to be distributed to a beneficiary but were subject to claims by other parties. The trial court granted the trustee permission to deposit the funds, discharged him from liability, and ordered some of the funds to be disbursed in accordance with settlement agreements the beneficiary had entered into in other litigation involving his children. The trial court proceeded to consider the claims of various other parties to determine who was entitled to the remainder of the interpleaded funds. Law firms who had represented the beneficiary in separate litigation filed an answer and claimed that they had an attorney charging lien against the trust distributions. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that the law firms presented no proof of an attorney lien against the trust distributions. As such, the trial court ordered the remaining funds to be distributed to other parties. After an additional hearing on motions to revise, the trial court again found that no attorney lien existed. The law firms appealed. For the following reasons, the decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed and remanded.

I write separately from the well-reasoned majority opinion because I would reach a different conclusion regarding whether law enforcement officers violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as explained below. In all other respects, I agree with the opinion and concur in the results.

The Petitioner, Jerome Barrett, has filed an application for permission to appeal the trial court’s order denying his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117; Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, Sec. 10(B). The State responds by asserting the application is incomplete and, thus, should be denied. For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees with the State.

In this dispute between members of a limited liability company, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached her fiduciary duty through the unilateral sale of company assets. The trial court referred the matter to a Special Master, who determined the assets were significantly undervalued in the sale and recommended a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant filed no objections to the Special Master’s report. The trial court subsequently adopted the findings and recommendations. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s adoption of the report, asserting that the trial court failed to make independent findings. We affirm.

Petitioner seeks accelerated review of the denial of her motion to recuse the trial judge. The motion to recuse was filed after the entry of a judgment and the denial of a motion under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Because issues related to the denial of the motion to recuse may be raised in petitioner’s appeal of the final judgment, we dismiss this appeal.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because Appellant’s application for appeal is untimely under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, §2.02, this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal, and it is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Gregory Ryan Webb, has filed a Motion for Appointment of
Counsel. The Petitioner alleges that he “does not have the financial means to retain
private counsel in this appeal.” He, therefore, requests “that this Court enter an
Extraordinary Attorney to represent [him] Pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Rule 10, Requesting Application for Extraordinary Appeal that requires
urgency.” The Petitioner further states that he is “additionally requesting an Attorney
who will not allow political influence, blackmail, and ‘other,’ to interfere with effective
assistance of counsel.” Because the Petitioner cited to Rule 10 in his pleading, the
appellate court clerk has entered this pleading as an application for an extraordinary
appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 10. Following our review, we deny the requested relief.

The Defendant, Marvin M. Green, has filed a pro se application for extraordinary
appeal seeking dismissal of the indictment “on due process and equal protection grounds.”
Tenn. R. App. P. 10. Alternatively, the Defendant seeks the appointment of conflict-free
counsel and a speedy trial. Following our review, we deny the pro se application for
extraordinary appeal.

The trial court entered an agreed order dismissing some of Appellant’s claims with prejudice, an order granting Appellant’s voluntary dismissal of all of his claims in two consolidated cases without prejudice, and an order awarding discretionary costs to Appellees. Appellant later sought relief from each of these orders pursuant to Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In litigating the Rule 60 motion, Appellant filed a motion to disqualify Appellees’ counsel and a motion to compel compliance with subpoenas he issued against his own prior counsel, and the parties filed cross-motions for sanctions. The trial court denied Appellant’s Rule 60 motion, motion to disqualify, and motion to compel. The trial court also denied both motions for sanctions; however, Appellant was awarded his attorney’s fees in opposing Appellees’ motion. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling in all respects. Appellees are also awarded their attorney’s fees for defending this frivolous appeal.

Because the orders from which the appellant has filed an appeal do not constitute a final, appealable judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

As permitted by statute, the plaintiff in a personal injury action amended his complaint to add a nonparty as a new defendant based on the original defendant’s allegations of comparative fault in an amended answer. The new defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the claims against him because the original defendant lacked permission to file the amended answer. The trial court struck the amended answer and dismissed the claims against the new defendant on statute of limitations grounds. Because the original defendant had written consent to file the amended answer, we reverse.

Defendant, Anthony D. Dean, Jr., was convicted by a Knox County jury of possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, (count two) and possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell a Schedule V controlled substance (Gabapentin), a Class E felony (count five), along with other charges not at issue in this appeal. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-five years’ incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the trial court erred in admitting prior convictions involving possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, and the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to testify as both a fact witness and an expert witness. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Husband/Appellant failed to answer Wife/Appellee’s complaint for divorce. On Wife’s motion, the trial court granted default judgment against Husband. Husband moved to set aside the default judgment, and the trial court denied his motion. Husband appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, through counsel, has filed a “Notice of Appeal” seeking review of the post-conviction court’s order denying a motion for recusal. The one-page pleading informs the court that on February 13, 2026, the post-conviction court “declined to recuse but granted permission to appeal for an interlocutory order.” The pleading further indicates that the “[a]ppeal herein is taken under TRAP 9 and under TRAP 10B (2.01).” The appellate court clerk entered the pleading as an application for interlocutory appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 9. Following our review of the Petitioner’s pleading, we have determined that a response from the State is not necessary and summarily deny relief.