APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Richard Cole, pleaded guilty to one count of vandalism of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to eight years to be served on supervised probation. A probation violation warrant was subsequently issued. Defendant admitted to the violation and after a hearing, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered his sentence to be executed. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns service of process. Vernon Lowe (“Plaintiff”) sued Elisha Harvey (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) for personal injuries sustained in a car accident. Defendant lives out of state. Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendant via the Tennessee Secretary of State. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss asserting insufficient service of process. The attempted service on Defendant occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic, when the signature requirement for return receipt mail was suspended by the postal service. The signature space on the proof of delivery shows “E Harvey” handwritten with “MRC1C19” underneath. Plaintiff does not argue that this represents Defendant’s signature. Instead, Plaintiff argues that his service upon the Secretary of State was sufficient in itself. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Timothy Aaron Baxter, Defendant, appeals from the summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because Defendant failed to attach a copy of each judgment order at issue, we affirm the summary denial of the motion.

After the death of Calvin Leroy Whitehead, his daughter, Regina Whitehead, petitioned to probate the decedent’s December 2015 will and for permission to sell the decedent’s residence. The probate court admitted the will to probate and letters testamentary were issued to Ms. Whitehead as the executrix. The court also granted permission to sell the residence. Thereafter, the decedent’s step-niece, Elizabeth Otto, filed an intervening petition to probate a purportedly more recent will, from March 2016. The estate answered the petition, alleging fraud and, in its amended answer, requested attorney’s fees in defending the petition. The estate then filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the proffered will was a copy, with no explanation as to the absence of the original, that the post-death affidavits were not valid. The day before her scheduled deposition, Ms. Otto filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit of her petition. The estate responded by moving for an assessment of attorney’s fees and costs against Ms. Otto. The trial court then issued an order that dismissed Ms. Otto’s petition and denied the estate’s motion for attorney’s fees in defending the intervening petition. The estate appeals, arguing that the request for attorney’s fees in its motion to dismiss is a claim for affirmative relief that survives the dismissal. The estate also requests attorney’s fees under alternative legal grounds. For the reasons below, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the intervening petition and, finding no abuse of discretion, affirm the denial of attorney’s fees. We also deny the estate’s post-appeal Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 motion for sanctions, as well as Ms. Otto’s claim for attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal.

Defendant, Lorenzo Romell Brown, was convicted by a Warren County jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed an effective twenty-year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that the State failed to prove that venue was proper in Warren County, his convictions for aggravated assault must be merged, and the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following our review of the entire record, briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments of conviction but remand for a new sentencing hearing and for merger of Defendant’s aggravated assault convictions.

The Defendant, Verdell L. Williams, Jr., was convicted in a Davidson County Criminal Court bench trial of four counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators of the crimes. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Jonathan Smith, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

To facilitate the sale of two closely held companies, an employee signed a restrictive covenant agreement containing a release provision. After the sale, the employee filed suit against the buyer, the seller, and others involved in the sale, alleging that he had been defrauded out of his ownership interest in the companies. Later, the employee dismissed the corporate defendants and filed an amended complaint reasserting claims against his alleged former co-owners for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the sale. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the release provision. Concluding that the language of the release was broad enough to encompass the claims in the amended complaint, the court granted the motion to dismiss. We affirm.

A Madison County jury convicted Defendant, Demarqushon Marquis Hinton, of evading arrest in a motor vehicle with risk of death or injury, two counts of attempted second degree murder, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, theft of a firearm valued at less than $2,500, reckless driving, failure to obey a traffic control device, and failure to stop at a stop sign. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-four years to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his attempted second degree murder and firearm convictions, and he argues that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, Danny Young, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court revoking his probation and ordering the execution of his original sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to place on the record its reasons for revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Clay Stuart Gregory, was convicted of aggravated robbery, first-degree felony murder, and premeditated first-degree murder, for which he received an effective sentence of life in prison. State v. Gregory, No. M2012-00546-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6187919, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2013), perm app. denied (Tenn. May 14, 2014). The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, which was denied. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on the following nine grounds: (1) trial counsel’s failure to lodge a pretrial objection to a note found in the Petitioner’s truck and the failure of the post-conviction court to permit juror testimony under Rule 606(b) regarding the impact of the same; (2) trial counsel’s failure to object during the State’s closing argument; (3) trial counsel’s failure to prepare for trial; (4) trial counsel’s failure to investigate, call, or cross-examine key witnesses; (5) trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); (6) trial counsel’s failure to present a shooting incident reconstruction and a firearms expert; (7) trial counsel’s failure to ensure the Petitioner could hear during trial; (8) trial counsel’s failure to secure the presence of the Petitioner and Jacqueline Peek for a court ordered deposition; and (9) trial counsel providing the jury with a report that contained inflammatory information about the Petitioner. The Petitioner also argues that trial counsel violated an ethical duty of loyalty by simultaneously representing the Petitioner and two potential defense witnesses. Finally, the Petitioner contends that he is entitled to relief based on the cumulative error doctrine. Upon review, we affirm.

Petitioner, Shamika Fifer, was indicted on charges of first degree murder (Count 1), attempted first degree murder (Count 2), and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 3). At trial, a Shelby County jury convicted her of Count 2 but could not reach a verdict as to Counts 1 and 3. During a subsequent hearing, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of second degree murder in Count 1 and Count 3 was dismissed by the State. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-one years’ confinement. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner maintains that her guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that trial counsel was ineffective. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Curtis D. Staggs, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis as time-barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. He contends that the coram nobis court should have held a hearing on his petition because the newly discovered evidence he intended to present would have established that he was innocent of the conviction offenses. After review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

This Tennessee Public Records Act (“TPRA”) dispute concerns emails and documents (the “Materials”) requested by Kathleen Marquardt (“Ms. Marquardt”) from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville (“UTK”). Ms. Marquardt argued that the Materials, which include emails pertaining to an article authored by a part-time UTK employee that was published in the Huffington Post, were public records because they were created as a part of the official business of the university in furtherance of its goal of becoming a top-25 university. Following an in camera review of the Materials by the trial court only and a show-cause hearing, the trial court ruled in UTK’s favor, holding that “the requested records do not meet the definition of the [TPRA] statute; that these records were made or received pursuant to law or ordinance, or in [connection] with the transaction of official business by any governmental entity.” Ms. Marquardt challenges this ruling as well as other rulings including the denial of her motion for “an attorney’s eyes only” review of the Materials and the denial of her discovery requests. We affirm.

This is an appeal of the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her children. The Juvenile Court for Sullivan County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Angela B. (“Mother”) to her two children, Meadow L. and Greyson L. (“the Children”).1 Mother appeals, contesting the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination was in the Children’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In the first appeal of this parental termination case, we affirmed the trial court’s findings that three grounds for termination were sufficiently proven, but we vacated one ground and the trial court’s best interest determination due to insufficient findings in the termination order. On remand, the trial court entered an amended order containing additional findings. The mother appeals. We affirm the termination of parental rights.

The Defendant, Barry McRae, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s probation revocation of the effective eight-year sentence he received for his guilty-pleaded convictions for two counts of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance. On appeal, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, John Todd, filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that due process required the tolling of the statute of limitations because of his alleged mental incompetence. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding the Petitioner had failed to present a prima facie case of mental incompetence to warrant an evidentiary hearing on the issue of due process tolling. The Petitioner appeals, claiming the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing on the tolling issue because he presented a prima facie case of his mental incompetence. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the Petitioner is entitled to a tolling of the statute of limitations.

The Defendant, Parvel Gudger, was convicted by a Cocke County jury of aggravated sexual battery, continuous sexual abuse of a child,[1] rape of a child, and incest, for which he received an effective sentence of fifty-two years’ incarceration.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession, (2) the trial court erred in admitting a recording of the victim’s forensic interview, (3) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and (4) his sentence is excessive.  We ordered supplemental briefing to address whether the State’s elections of offenses were sufficient to protect the Defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict for the charges of rape of a child and incest.  Following our review, we conclude that the State failed to elect an offense as to the rape of a child and incest charges and that this failure resulted in plain error.  Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s convictions for rape of a child and incest and remand for a new trial on those charges.  We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellants fail to identify an error of fact or law for our review, and their brief fails to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. Appellee’s request for damages for a frivolous appeal is granted.

This appeal concerns subject matter jurisdiction. Saad Al Qaragholi (“Petitioner”) filed a petition against the Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee (“Respondent”) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) challenging tax assessments against him.  Petitioner opted not to pay the tax before proceeding with his challenge.  However, Petitioner failed to timely sign his petition under penalty of perjury as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1801(b)(2).  Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the oath requirement was jurisdictional and could not be corrected after the 90 days in which to file a petition expired.  The Trial Court denied Respondent’s motion to dismiss and granted Petitioner leave to amend, citing the legal principle that leave to amend is freely granted.  This interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, followed.  We reverse.  

The Defendant, Corbin Ramon Hightie, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s probation revocation of his ten-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider alternative sentencing and by denying his request to award sentence credits for time he successfully served on probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jonathan Duncan, Defendant, was indicted for first degree murder, felony murder, and aggravated robbery by the Wilson County Grand Jury for his involvement in the death of Ellis Sanders, the victim. After a jury trial, he was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to an effective sentence of life imprisonment. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals, arguing: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; 2) Defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury was violated because jurors slept during trial, the trial court required the jury to work “extensive and unreasonable hours,” and the trial court interfered with the jury by holding ex parte meetings; and 3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence of uncharged bad acts in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the matter to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect merger of the first degree murder and felony murder convictions.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Harry Raymond Coleman, Jr., of second degree murder, among other offenses. The trial court sentenced him to an effective eighteen-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his trial. More specifically, the Petitioner argued that his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and present a mental health defense centered around his post-trial diagnosis of Bipolar I disorder. He also claimed that trial counsel failed to call witnesses who would have supported his claim of self-defense. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.