APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding. The mother appeals, arguing, among other things, that the trial court failed to properly apply the statutory best interest factors when making its parenting plan determination. Because of the lack of findings in the final decree, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

This is an action for abuse or neglect, exploitation, or theft of money or property of Christine Joy Koczwara during her life, as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 71- 6-120(b) of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. The complaint seeks to recover assets as well as compensatory and punitive damages. After the defendant failed to file a timely responsive pleading to the complaint, the trial court entered a default judgment on the issue of liability. Prior to the trial on damages, the defendant moved to set aside the default judgment on the ground of excusable neglect. The claimed excuse was based on the contention that the defendant was the named executor and sole beneficiary under a purported 2020 will. The trial court rejected that argument because there was no pending will contest and the defendant had not filed a petition to admit the purported will to probate. The trial court also denied the motion to set aside upon the finding that the defendant’s failure to file a responsive pleading was willful. After a trial on damages, the court invalidated a quitclaim deed, ordered the return of personal property, and awarded $48,500 in compensatory damages and $97,000 in punitive damages against the defendant. The court also ordered the sale of the decedent’s real property. This appeal followed. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

Defendant, Love T. Anderson, was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of one count of aggravated child abuse, one count of aggravated child neglect, and two counts of aggravated child endangerment. The trial court imposed an effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights for abandonment by an incarcerated parent, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of his child. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A crime victim filed a tort action against a city under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, alleging police misconduct. Arguing that it was immune from liability for the alleged misconduct, the city moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. We conclude that the city is immune from liability for the asserted negligence under the public duty doctrine and that the allegations in the complaint do not support application of the special duty exception. So we affirm the dismissal.

In this appeal from the trial court’s 2024 final order disposing of her untimely motion, Appellant fails to properly cite to the record or legal authority and offers no argument that does not stem from alleged errors in the trial court’s 2008 child custody modification or 2012 child support order. Because these procedural and substantive deficiencies prevent effective appellate review, this appeal is dismissed.

In 2013, a Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Demarcus Keyon Cole, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a life sentence. The Petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, and this court affirmed his convictions. State v. Cole, No. W2013-02850-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 2859196 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 22, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2015). The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and multiple petitions for writ of error coram nobis, which alleged the discovery of various forms of new evidence. Cole v. State, No. W2024-00697-CCA-R3-ECN, 2025 WL 884073 (Tenn. Crim. App., March 21, 2025). The Petitioner filed two more petitions for error coram nobis, both of which were denied by the coram nobis court and which have been consolidated for the purposes of this appeal. The Petitioner also filed a motion to recuse, which was not heard by the coram nobis court. The Petitioner appeals, arguing that the coram nobis court erred by denying relief and by failing to rule on the motion to recuse. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court in case number C-24-132. In case number C-24-151, the coram nobis court did not rule on the Petitioner’s motion to recuse, and accordingly, we remand the case to the coram nobis court for a ruling on the Petitioner’s motion.

Defendant, Kevin R. Newman, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions
of aggravated burglary and vandalism of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than
$2,500, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony, by refusing to
declare a mistrial, and by providing a jury instruction on flight. He also challenges the
sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Upon review, we find no error and, accordingly,
affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Leslie K. Jones (“Mr. Jones”), an at-will support staff employee of Tennessee State University (“TSU”), appeals the termination of his employment. His at-will employment agreement provided for fourteen days-notice prior to termination of his employment. When he received a termination notice on March 1, 2012, Mr. Jones filed a grievance. TSU responded advising Mr. Jones that he could not grieve his termination because he was terminated under the terms of his at-will employment agreement “without cause.” Following extensive delays and a declaratory judgment action in a related proceeding, TSU was ordered to afford Mr. Jones a grievance hearing pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8- 117(a)(1). Following an evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer found that “[TSU] was not obligated to provide a reason for termination under the terms of the employment contract;” nevertheless, he found that good cause for his termination had been established. Therefore, the Hearing Officer ruled that his termination should be upheld. After TSU’s President upheld the Hearing Officer’s decision, Mr. Jones filed a petition seeking judicial review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-322. The chancellor affirmed and dismissed the petition with prejudice. Mr. Jones appeals. On appeal, TSU insists that its compliance with the notice provision of the employment agreement is the substantial and material evidence needed to uphold the Hearing Officer’s ruling. We disagree. As this court explained in Lawrence v. Rawlins, No. M1997-00223-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 76266, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2001), “[w]hen the General Assembly enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8-117 in 1993, it modified the employment-will-relationship between the educational institutions in the . . . State University and Community College System [which includes TSU] and their ‘support staff.’” The statute requires these educational institutions to establish a grievance procedure for their support staff, which “must cover employee complaints relating to adverse employment actions[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8- 117(b)(2)(A). Finding that Mr. Jones’s employment could only be terminated “for cause” or as part of “a bona fide reduction in force,” neither of which was the basis of Mr. Jones’s termination, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court and the Hearing Officer and remand with instructions for the Hearing Officer to, inter alia, ascertain the relief and benefits Mr. Jones is entitled to receive.

This case concerns a dispute regarding attorney’s fees. Appellee is the next of kin of the attorney who represented Appellants for a period of time in the underlying wrongful death action. After Appellants terminated his representation, the attorney filed a notice of attorney’s lien. A few years later, while represented by their new counsel, Appellants settled their claims against the underlying defendants. While pursuing the attorney’s lien, the attorney died. Thereafter, the attorney’s estate was substituted as a party. In a previous appeal, we reviewed the trial court’s $133,333.33 attorney’s fee award to the attorney’s estate. We affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that Appellants owe the attorney’s estate fees and that the result the attorney obtained for Appellants was a $400,000.00 settlement offer. In the first appeal, we vacated the $133,333.33 attorney’s fee award and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to make findings consistent with Rule 1.5(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. Following remand, the attorney’s estate was closed, and Appellee sought to be substituted, individually, as a party to this action. The trial court allowed the substitution, over Appellants’ objections. Concerning the amount of attorney’s fees, the trial court referred the parties to a special master, who disregarded this Court’s prior opinion, wherein we affirmed that the “results obtained” by the deceased attorney was a $400,000.00 settlement offer. Rather, the special master concluded that the “results obtained” was a $450,000.00 settlement offer and awarded attorney’s fees of $150,000.00 based on that amount. The trial court adopted the special master’s findings. Although we affirm the trial court’s substitution of Appellee as a party, we vacate the award of $150,000.00 in attorney’s fees as this amount is in conflict with the law of the case, i.e., this Court’s previous conclusion that the results the attorney obtained was a $400,000.00 settlement offer.

Petitioner seeks accelerated review of the denial of his motion to recuse the trial judge in two separate cases. After a de novo review, we affirm.

Appellant, who pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and is currently serving two life sentences, filed a complaint in the Hamblen County Chancery Court, alleging that he was not given proper credit for time served. Appellant specifically sought credit for the time he was confined in Texas while fighting his extradition to Tennessee. In his complaint, Appellant requested that the trial court compel the Defendants to enforce the judgments to give him credit for time served and further requested that the Defendants be found in contempt for failure to do so. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint based on collateral estoppel, finding that the criminal court that entered the judgments previously denied Appellant’s request for pretrial jail credits. Appellant appeals the dismissal of his complaint. We conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; thus, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Markhayle Jackson, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his second motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, arguing that his agreed-upon sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is an illegal, indeterminate sentence for his conviction of first degree murder. He also contends that he should be permitted the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) by failing to ensure his guilty plea was both voluntary and intelligent. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Elijah Garrison, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) argue to the jury that an eyewitness’s testimony was unreliable because the eyewitness’s initial statements to police were “essentially coerced” and (2) failing to present and argue to the jury additional evidence that, in his view, contradicted the State’s proof. After review, we affirm.

David Fletcher, Petitioner, was convicted of aggravated burglary, first degree murder, and felony murder for his role in a gang-related shooting. He was sentenced to life plus ten years. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Fletcher, No M2018-01293-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 995795, at *26 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2020), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner filed an untimely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, Petitioner complains that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition as untimely and that the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner a continuance. After a review, we affirm the dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the Defendant, Forrest Durham, pleaded guilty to six counts of aggravated statutory rape. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an agreed-upon six-year sentence, suspended to supervised probation. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion and by requiring him to register as a sex offender. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s judgment finding the respondent guilty of forty-one counts of criminal contempt of court for violating an order of protection issued on February 23, 2024. The respondent timely appealed from the trial court’s order finding her in contempt. However, due to significant deficiencies in the respondent’s appellate brief, we conclude that she has waived consideration of all issues on appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

Petitioner, Quaddariontae Burnom, appeals the denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his 2022 guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder, for which he is serving an agreed twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to adequately explain to him the significance of our supreme court’s decision in State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022), before he entered his plea. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this appeal, we examine the privilege provided under Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-11-272, commonly referred to as the quality improvement committee or “QIC” privilege, and its application. Plaintiff filed this healthcare liability action asserting that CHI Memorial Hospital and other entities and physicians were negligent in providing care for her husband, who passed away shortly after being discharged from the hospital’s emergency room. Defendants sought a protective order based on the QIC privilege to prohibit inquiry into a meeting held by the hospital and the decedent’s family. The trial court denied Defendants’ motion. On interlocutory review, the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that statements made in the meeting were not protected by the QIC privilege. Defendants appealed, arguing that the information sought related to QIC activities and therefore was privileged from direct or indirect discovery. We hold the QIC privilege applied to statements made during the meeting that were based on information obtained during the QIC process, but Memorial waived the privilege when hospital management voluntarily disclosed that privileged information.

Defendant, Thomas Mack Arnold, appeals as of right from his conviction for first degree
premeditated murder, for which he is serving a life sentence. On appeal, Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the prosecutor
made improper statements during the State’s rebuttal argument such that a mistrial was
necessary. After a thorough review of the evidence and applicable case law, we affirm.

A kennel technician filed a personal injury action against the owners of two dogs, asserting a claim under the statute governing dog owners’ liability for injuries caused by their dogs and a claim for common law negligence. The technician alleged that the dogs attacked and injured her while they were boarded at her place of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the dog owners on both claims. We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the statutory claim, but we reverse the court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the common law negligence claim.

In 2014, a Sevier County jury convicted the Defendant, Jamie Paul Click, of alternate
counts of selling or delivering one-half gram of heroin within 1,000 feet of a public
elementary school, Class A felonies, in addition to other offenses. The trial court merged
the two drug-free zone convictions and sentenced the Defendant to forty years as a Range
II, multiple offender with mandatory one-hundred percent service of the minimum sentence
in the range. In 2022, following amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act, the Defendant
filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section
39-17-432(h), which the trial court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The
Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court’s ruling was a plain and palpable abuse of
discretion. Upon our review of the oral arguments, applicable law, and the briefs of the
parties, we deny the Defendant’s request for a writ of certiorari and affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

Defendant, Philip Cavitt, appeals as of right from his jury conviction for aggravated sexual battery, for which he was sentenced as a Range II offender to twenty years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm.

In 2015, a Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Jamie Paul Click, of conspiracy to
possess with the intent to sell or deliver 150 grams or more of heroin in a drug-free zone,
a Class A felony. Following amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act, the Defendant, in
2022, filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h), seeking
resentencing of his Range II sentence of twenty-five years, which included a mandatory
minimum service requirement. The trial court found that it could not resentence the
Defendant to a lower release eligibility because such was not authorized by the statutory
language and denied the motion. We grant certiorari to vacate the trial court’s order and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Tommy Gayden, filed a single pro se pleading titled “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, Motion for Plain Error Review, and Petition for Extraordinary Writ on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.” The trial court summarily denied the motion to correct illegal sentence portion of the pleading for failure to state a colorable claim under Rule 36.1. Treating the two remaining claims as a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings, the trial court summarily denied the claims because they did not satisfy any of the criteria to reopen a post-conviction proceeding, they were previously waived, and they were raised outside the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of all claims.