APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, John Parnell Yaugher, appeals as of right pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Defendant was convicted following a jury trial in Anderson County of the offense of rape of a child. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the allegations in the indictment to charge an offense. Also, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction and specifically argues that his confession was uncorroborated, that there was no proof of penetration, and that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane at the time of the offense. Furth er, the Defendant argu es that the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress his statement to investigators and by charging in the jury instructions the lesser grade offense of aggravated sexual battery. Finding no
error, and that the indictment and the evidence are sufficient, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Hollis G. Williams (defendant), was convicted of first-degree felony murder by a jury of his peers. The State of Tennessee sought the extreme penalty of death. However, the jury set his punishment at life without the possibility of parole. The defendant presents three issues for review. He contends (a) the evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support his conviction for a murder committed during an attempt to commit robbery, (b) the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions by ruling his two convictions for attempt to commit robbery could be used to impeach him if he opted to testify in support of his defense, and (c) the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions by permitting the state to introduce victim impact testimony during the sentencing hearing. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law governing the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

This lawsuit involves the breach of a lease agreement. The corporate lessee vacated the premises and stopped paying rent; consequently, the lessor filed suit. The trial court found the lessee in breach of the lease, but found the lease agreement unconscionable, held that the lessor failed to mitigate its damages, and held that the president of the corporate lessee could not be held personally liable. We affirm the trial court’s finding of a breach, but reverse its remaining findings and award the lessor damages for the entire term of the lease.

In this appeal,1 we must determine whether a false response from an individual to an inquiry made by a law enforcement officer constitutes a false report within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-502(a)(1) (1991). After careful review, we hold that § 39-16-502(a)(1) applies to statements volunteered or initiated by an individual but does not apply to statements made in response to inquiries by law enforcement officers. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

The defendant, Merlin Eugene Shuck, was convicted of one count of solicitation to commit first degree murder and two counts of solicitation to commit especially aggravated kidnaping. The defense theory at trial was entrapment, and in support of that defense, Shuck sought to introduce expert testimony from a neuropsychologist that he had suffered a cognitive decline and significant
deterioration of his cognitive abilities which rendered him more susceptible to inducement than the average person. The trial judge refused to admit the testimony finding that it would invade the province of the jury. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial. Thereafter, we granted the State permission to appeal to consider whether expert psychological testimony about a defendant’s susceptibility to inducment is admissible under Tennessee law to establish entrapment.

This court entered an order on 13 August 1997 in the above styled case. Defendant/appellee, Outdoor Entertainment, Inc. (“OEI”), filed a petition for rehearing on 25 August 1997. It is the opinion of this court that the petition should be denied.

This matter appears appropriate for consideration pursuant to Rule 10(a) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.1

This action was filed October 15, 1992 before the Tennessee Claims Commission. The plaintiff sought two-fold relief: (1) benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Law, TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-101 et seq., and (2) damages for the tort of alleged retaliatory discharge for filing a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, as allegedly authorized by TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-301 et seq. The claims were bifurcated.

This is a child custody case. The parties had entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement in which they had joint custody of the minor child. After the father’s remarriage, both the mother and father filed petitions seeking custody. The father now appeals the trial court’s order awarding sole custody of the parties’ child to the mother. We affirm.

NancyReneeMcReynolds Delbridge (Mother) appeals the trial court’s order denying
her counterpetition to modify the joint custody arrangement previously agreed to by the
parties and set forth in their final divorce decree. For the reasons stated hereinafter, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Olen Eddie Hutchison, appeals as of right from the Campbell County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. He was convicted in 1991 for the first degree murder of Hugh Huddleston and received the death penalty. He was also convicted of conspiracy to take a life and solicitation to commit first degreemurder for which he received a total sentence of twenty-two years. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. 1994), cert. denied, U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 137 (1995). We affirm the denial of postconviction
relief.

This matter appears appropriate for consideration pursuant to Rule 10(b) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.1 The plaintiffs in this case, Billy Frank Henley (“Henley”) and Joe H. Marlow (“Marlow”), own tracts of farm land in Coffee County, Tennessee. Henley acquired his land in 1992 from his brother, Clarence Henley, and his sister-in-law, Nona Mae Henley. Clarence and Nona Mae Henley had acquired the property from his parents in 1974. His parents had owned the property since 1957. Marlow acquired one tract of land at issue in 1973 and another tract of land at issue in 1975. The plaintiffs claim that a road separates their land from that of the defendants, Dale and Elsie Dotson (“Dotson”).

V. R. Mason died testate on October 29, 1995. The executor, Richard F. LaRoche, Jr., propounded the will for probate; in the ease of language it provided for the payment of debts and taxes and created a trust for a family cemetery, with the remainder to pass under the laws of intestate succession.

This is an action for damages against the Metropolitan Government and other Defendants, alleging that they are liable for the death of Plaintiff’s son, Terrance Murray, who was shot and killed by a fellow student while attending J. T. Moore Middle School in Nashville, Tennessee, on April 21, 1994.

On February 10, 1995, Appellant Telly Slayton was found guilty by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of murder in the perpetration of robbery in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-13-202(2) (Supp. 1996). The trial court ordered a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant raises three issues for review: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient as a matter of law to sustain the conviction ; (2) whether the trial court erred in overruling Appellant’s motion to suppress his statement given to police officers; and (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting, over Appellant’s objection, a photograph of the victim taken while the victim was alive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, John C. Tomlinson, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. In April 1983, the appellant was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of aggravated kidnaping and two counts of robbery with a deadly weapon. For these convictions, he was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. In December 1983, the appellant was convicted in the Wilson County Criminal Court of aggravated rape and armed robbery resulting in sentences totaling 35 years. The appellant is currently confined at the Northeast Correctional Center where he is serving an effective sentence of 65 years for the convictions from both counties. The appellant now appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, the appellant contends that the trial court’s summary dismissal denied him his right to due process of the law.

The captioned plaintiff, a prisoner in custody of the Department of Correction awaiting execution has appealed from a decision of the Board of Paroles denying his request for parole. His death sentence has been stayed by a federal court which ordered a retrial of the issue of punishment. This retrial has not yet taken place.

This complaint was filed July 17, 1978, by a Conservator seeking an accounting from a Trustee - Executrix.
 

The plaintiff and the defendant entered into a “Contract Services Agreement” in 1994 which provided, as pertinent to this case, that either party might terminate it at any time by giving 30 days notice to the other. On May 19, 1995, the defendant informed the plaintiff by letter that “ . . . we are discontinuing our relationship with you for Physical Therapy services, effective May 19, 1995. Normal procedure warrants a 30 day notice, however, in light of numerous complaints regarding your services, we feel it is necessary to cease services immediately.” This suit was filed in the General Sessions Court to recover compensation for 30 days. The plaintiff insists that because he was entitled to 30 days notice of termination of the contract, he is entitled to recover compensation during this period in accordance with his earnings history.

This consolidated appeal of three separate proceedings involves the efforts of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. to take advantage of the 1995 legislation easing the traditional regulatory burdens on telecommunications service providers. After making significant adjustments in BellSouth’s reported operating results, the Tennessee Public Service Commission determined that BellSouth’s current earned rate of return exceeded its authorized rate of return and that BellSouth was receiving $56.285 million in excess revenues. The Commission directed BellSouth to reduce its rates by $56.285 million and set the initial rates in the company’s price regulation plan accordingly. On this appeal, BellSouth and another intervening party take issue with the procedures employed by the Commission to consider and act upon BellSouth’s application for a price regulation plan. We have determined that these proceedings were not preempted by the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996. We have also determined that the General Assembly did not give the Commission authority to adjust BellSouth’s reported operating results and that the Commission should have convened a contested case hearing when BellSouth took issue with the Commission’s decision to adjust its reported operating results. Accordingly, we vacate the Commission’s January 23, 1996 order and all earlier related orders.

Issac Lydell Herron appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus.  The complaint alleges that Mr. Herron is the president and incorporator of the Church of God at Cold Creek, Inc., a Tennessee corporation.  Jimmy Harrison is the warden of Cold Creek  Correctional Facility (CCCF) and Elizabeth T. Rice is the District Attorney General of the 25th Judicial District.  Although not specifically stated in the complaint, it is apparent from the exhibits to the complaint that Mr. Herron is incarcerated at CCCF.

The petitioner, William David Clapp, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court dismissed the petition, concluding that it was barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this suit, the Plaintiff seeks a determination that he owns a right-of-way from his property located in the Fourth District of Hancock Counter over the adjoining property of the Defendants.
 

Peggy McCann Patterson Weathers appeals the trial court’s order which granted the petition of Appellees Anthony Earl McCann and Cynthia McCann to adopt the two minor children of Weathers’ daughter, Virginia Darlene McCann Wills. We affirm the court’s final order of adoption.