APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Phillip Mangrum, pled guilty in the Criminal Court of Sumner County to aggravated burglary, a class C felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-403 (1991). The trial court sentenced the appellant as a multiple offender within range II to eight years incarceration in the Department of Correction. The appellant appeals from this sentence, contending, in essence, that (1) the appellant’s status as a multiple offender is not supported by the record; (2) the State’s notice of enhanced sentencing was inadequate under the Sentencing Act and Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.3; and (2) his sentence is excessive.

This appeal represents three consolidated cases. The defendant pled guilty to three counts of forgery, one count of theft over one thousand dollars ($1000), two counts of passing a forged check, and one count of passing a worthless check. For each count of forgery and passing a forged check, the trial court sentenced the defendant to three years in the Department of Correction as a Range II multiple offender. For the theft offense, the trial court sentenced her to three years in the Department of Correction as a Range I standard offender. For passing a worthless check, the trial court sentenced her to eleven months and twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent (75%) to be served in the Sumner County jail. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

In this case, the defendant, The Krystal Company (Krystal), appeals a jury verdict holding it liable for personal injuries received by the plaintiff, Ali Agha Batebi (Batebi), from a criminal assault by a third party while on Krystal's property. We affirm.

The sole issue in this case is whether a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action may recover from a defendant health care provider the amount of plaintiff’s medical expenses paid by the Tennessee Medicaid program which is a part of the federal social security program.

The sole issue in this case is whether a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action may recover from a defendant health care provider the amount of plaintiff’s medical expenses paid by the Tennessee Medicaid program which is a part of the federal social security program.

The Court below held defendant in civil contempt for violating a permanent 2 injunction that prohibited him from obstructing the right-of-way on a state highway. Defendant has appealed and takes issue with the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss and with the sufficiency of the judgment. We have determined that the record supports the trial court’s finding of civil contempt and, therefore, we affirm.

The original plaintiff in this case, Billy Gwin Mitchell (“plaintiff” or “Mitchell”) filed suit in the Chancery Court of Shelby County seeking to enjoin the foreclosure of a deed of trust. Named as defendants were Sam F. Cole, Jr., Substitute Trustee  f the Estate of Prudence Reynolds, and Gerald W. Pickens, Administrator CTA (“defendants” or by name). Defendants filed an answer and a counter-complaint in which they contended, among other things, that the records of Mitchell’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case reflected Mitchell’s confirmed amended plan of reorganization mandated that Mitchell pay the mortgage indebtedness to Ms. Reynolds in accordance with the terms of the promissory note. As counter-plaintiffs, Cole and Pickens sought a money judgment for the principal balance due and owing on the note, plus accrued interest and attorney’s fees and costs. At the conclusion of all the proof, the case was submitted to a jury, and after issues of fact had been resolved, the special chancellor entered a judgment in favor of the Reynolds estate in the amount of $41,101.64 on the promissory note and attorney’s 2 fees in the amount of $21,900.00.

The original plaintiff in this case, Billy Gwin Mitchell (“plaintiff” or “Mitchell”) filed suit in the Chancery Court of Shelby County seeking to enjoin the foreclosure of a deed of trust. Named as defendants were Sam F. Cole, Jr., Substitute Trustee of the Estate of Prudence Reynolds, and Gerald W. Pickens, Administrator CTA (“defendants” or by name). Defendants filed an answer and a counter-complaint in which they contended, among other things, that the records of Mitchell’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case reflected Mitchell’s confirmed amended plan of reorganization mandated that Mitchell pay the mortgage indebtedness to Ms. Reynolds in accordance with the terms of the promissory note. As counter-plaintiffs, Cole and Pickens sought a money judgment for the principal balance due and owing on the note, plus accrued interest and attorney’s fees and costs. At the conclusion of all the proof, the case was submitted to a jury, and after issues of fact had been resolved, the special chancellor entered a judgment in favor of the Reynolds estate in the amount of $41,101.64 on the promissory note and attorney’s 2 fees in the amount of $21,900.00.

The gravamen of this appeal is child support. Nina Alice Kimble and Michael Wayne Kimble were married in 1985, divorced in 1992 and will be referred to as Wife and Husband, respectively. When  hey married, Wife had a son from a previous marriage and Husband a daughter. Husband adopted the son but Wife did not adopt the daughter.

Appellant has filed a Motion to Rehear Pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. In the Motion, Appellant contends that the Opinion of this Court was based on an incorrect application of the law. Noting that the Opinion states that neither Appellant’s original Complaint or the proposed Amended Complaint allege negligence with respect to laboratory tests conducted on the deceased, Appellant asserts that he was erroneously required to state a legal theory, not simply “facts from which a legal theory can be inferred.”

This appeal involves a twelve-year-old boy who became paralyzed when he lost control of an all-terrain vehicle and crashed into a utility pole. The boy sued the manufacturer of the all-terrain vehicle in the Circuit Court for Sumner County, alleging that its advertisements falsely and misleadingly depicted all-terrain vehicles as safe enough to be operated by children. The jury returned a verdict for the manufacturer following a lengthy trial, and the child and his mother appealed. We have determined that the trial court’s instructions did not fairly appraise the jury of the plaintiff’s theory of the case and that its supplemental instructions confused the jury about the significance of their verdict. Therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.

The Plaintiff, Jennifer Frank, has appealed from summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, American Realty Company, Terry Stephens, Lee  Ann Hoffman, Shirley Adkins and Alan Saturn; and from a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against the Defendant, Ali Noureddini in the amount of  $50,000. Other captioned Defendants are not involved in this appeal.

A convicted burglar in the custody of the Department of Correction filed a petition with the Chancery Court of Davidson County for an order directing  the Department to award him additional credits against his sentence for time spent in jail before and after trial, and for sentence reduction credits he allegedly earned during the same period of incarceration. The Chancellor found that Mr. Johnson had already received all the credits to which he was entitled. We affirm-

This is a governmental tort liability case arising out of an automobile collision. Defendants, James P. Mixon; Gene Barksdale, Sheriff of Shelby County, Tennessee, and Shelby County, Tennessee, appeal from the judgment of the trial court awarding plaintiff, Lisa Griggs damages for personal injury. Under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act as it existed in 1985, governmental entities could not be tried by a jury, T.C.A. § 29-20-307. Subsequently, prior to the 1994 trial, the case was bifurcated to allow the nongovernmental defendant a jury trial. Thus, Worsham is not a party to this appeal.

The appellee, Graple Simpson, was indicted for possession of a schedule II narcotic with the intent to sell. Following a summary administrative forfeiture, the appellee moved the trial court to dismiss the criminal charge. She argued that the double jeopardy clause prohibited further criminal prosecution. The trial judge granted the appellee's motion and the state appealed. We reverse and remand.

The plaintiff, Scarlett Lay Love, appeals from the denial of her motion to dismiss, the motion being predicated upon the alleged failure of the defendants, College Level Career Services, Inc., and Nursing Careers, Inc., to perfect an appeal from the general sessions court to the circuit court within the ten-day period provided for in Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108. The sole issue for our determination is as follows: whether a facsimile (fax) transmission of a notice of appeal and appeal bond, sent by the defendants to the clerk of the general sessions court on the final day on which an appeal could be taken, is sufficient to perfect the appeal. For the following reasons, we conclude that the facsimile transmission was not sufficient to perfect the appeal; therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
 

In this post-divorce action for modification of alimony the appellant asserts that the appellee failed to prove that she had experienced a material change of circumstances since the original award. We agree and reverse the order modifying the award.

This suit was originated by a petition for certiorari to review the administrative order of the Metropolitan Board of Housing Code Appeals requiring the demolition of substandard improvements on six tracts belonging to Plaintiffs. The Trial Court reversed the order as to three of the tracts which are not involved in this appeal. The Trial Court affirmed the demolition order as to three of the tracts, and Plaintiffs appealed and have presented the issues for review in the following form:

Petitioner, David Randall Safer, and respondent, Micki Jo O'Fiel Safer, divorced in January 1994 after eleven years of marriage. The court granted respondent the divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. The parties had entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement ("MDA") which the Final Decree of Divorce incorporated. The MDA provided that petitioner and respondent would have joint custody of their two minor children, Joseph ("Tyler") age five and Samuel age two, and that the primary placement of the children would be with respondent.

The defendant, Derek C. Denton, appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, Class C felonies, and criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony. As a Range I, standard offender, he received six-year sentences and was fined $10,000 for each of the aggravated burglary and aggravated assault convictions and a two-year sentence and $2,500 fine for the criminally negligent homicide conviction. The defendant was ordered to serve each sentence consecutively, for an effective sentence of fourteen years, in the local workhouse. The defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions; (2) whether the trial court properly charged the jury on circumstantial evidence; (3) whether the trial court properly charged the jury on the prosecution's burden of proof; and (4) whether the defendant's sentence was excessive.  We conclude that the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to serve his sentences consecutively. The trial court did not make sufficient findings, and the record does not support consecutive sentences. There is no indication from the circumstances surrounding the offenses that consecutive sentencing is necessary to protect society from the defendant or that upon release he will be unwilling to lead a productive life and resort to criminal activity. See id; Gray v. State, 538 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tenn. 1976). In consideration of the foregoing, the defendant's convictions and sentences for aggravated burglary and criminally negligent homicide are affirmed. His conviction for aggravated assault is modified to assault, and a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with a seventy-five percent release eligibility date imposed. All three sentences, though, shall be served concurrently to each other.