APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a child custody case. Bryan L. Greene (Father) and Tammy Rushing Greene, now Harris (Mother), were divorced by decree entered June 2, 1988. The decree incorporated a prior Marital Dissolution Agreement, which granted custody of the parties' minor child, Sara Ann 1This Court granted Mother’s Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, pursuant to T.R.A.P. 7. 2 Greene, to Mother, with liberal visitation rights to Father. On September 15, 1994, Father filed a petition seeking custody, alleging a material change in circumstances. After an evidentiary hearing on March 10, 1995, the trial court granted Father's Petition for Change of Custody. 1 Mother has appealed, and the only issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering a change of custody.

This case presents for review the decision of the probate court, affimred by the Court of Appeals, that the personal representative in this case may, in his discretion, distribute certain corporate stock in kind rather than sell the stock and distribute the proceeds. The decision miscontrues applicable law and is reversed.

This case involves an award of guardian ad litem fees. Appellant, Martha J. Moses, conservator of the person of Susiana Dixon, appeals the trial court’s order made final pursuant to Rule 54.02 awarding a money judgment against her in the sum of $3,127.00 in favor of 2 appellee Robert C. Irby, guardian at litem for Susiana Dixon.

This divorce litigation involves the dissolution of the twenty-one year marriage between Appellant, Scott James Kepler (Husband) and Appellee, Carol Louise Kepler (Wife). Their union produced two children, ages 17 and 14 at the time of trial. The final divorce decree granted an absolute divorce and custody of the children to Wife. Husband now appeals from the decree, challenging the trial court’s valuation of the marital residence, award of rehabilitative alimony and attorney’s fees to Wife and failure to establish an “ascertainable standard” by which to measure Wife’s progress towards completion of her educational goals. For reasons to be discussed, we affirm the trial court.

This appeal stems from a declaratory judgment action filed by Appellant, Atlanta Casualty Company (Atlanta Casualty), seeking a determination of whether an automobile insurance policy issued by Atlanta Casualty to Damon P. Fuson, now deceased, affords uninsured motorist coverage to the appellees, Margie Etta Fuson, surviving spouse of the deceased, and their two minor children, Damon Lee and Shannon Nicole Fuson (hereinafter “the Fusons”). The trial court entertained motions for summary judgment filed by both parties. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion, but entered summary judgment in favor of the appellees, finding that the insurance policy in question affords them coverage. For reasons hereinafter detailed, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This action for negligent hiring results from the alleged burglary of the home of Appellants, John and Sandra Phipps, by Randall Wayne Walker, son and employee of the appellee, Robert Wayne Walker.1 Appellee is the owner of Walker Electric which, in 1994, sub-contracted with Shore Builders, Inc. to perform the electrical work on the Appellants’ home, then under construction. Randall Walker was an employee of Walker Electric at this time.

This action was instituted as a complaint for a declaratory judgment and for a partition of real estate. The appellant sought a declaratory judgment that she was the owner of an undivided interest in a tract of land located in Sevier County as a tenant in common with the appellee. She further sought to have the court partition the property in question. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court sustained the defendant's motion for summary judgment, denied plaintiff's motion and fond that the appellant held no interest in the property. This appeal resulted. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this legal malpractice case, the trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant because he found that the plaintiffs failed to prove that but for the defendant’s negligence they would have won their lawsuit. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

The appellant, Ralph Avery Smith, was convicted of the sale of cocaine, a class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I standard offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues (a) that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, (b) that a prospective juror was improperly removed by the prosecution in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), (c) that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, and (d) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial.

The determinative issue on appeal as framed by the appellant is: [Whether] the defendants were deprived of a fair and impartial jury because of Juror Rankin's failure to respond truthfully on voir dire and further, because Juror Rankin and plaintiffs' counsel both failed to reveal a recent attorney/client relationship and an upcoming trial wherein plaintiffs' counsel would be a crucial witness on behalf of Juror Rankin.

In this declaratory judgment action, plaintiff, insurance company, sought a declaration that its insured, John H. Rasnic, was not an insured under its policy for the accident occuring between the Rasnic and Davis motor vehicles. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Rasnic had violated the policy provision:

We must be notified promptly of how, when, and where the accident or loss happened. Notice should also include the names and addresses of any injuried persons and of any witness. Allstate would assert that while the accident occurred on December 1, 1993, they did not receive notice until June 24, 1994.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and attempted second-degree murder in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1) and §39-12-101(a). Judgment was entered and following a sentencing hearing, the appellant was sentenced to death by electrocution for the first degree murder and to thirty (30) years imprisonment for the attempt to commit second-degree
murder, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: