APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a suit on a guaranty agreement. Defendant, Douglas Sarmento, appeals from the trial court's order granting plaintiff, Mid-State Advertising, d/b/a "The Nashville Scene," summary judgment. The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.

The petitioner, Edward Rabie, appeals from the trial Court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The single issue presented for review is whether the extradition documents were legally sufficient to authorize the governor of this state to detain and return the petitioner to Kentucky.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff, Cynthia D. Gentry, appeals from the order of the chancery court that affirmed the final administrative order of the Department of Human Services (DHS). The controversy in this case arose from the receipt by Mrs. Gentry's husband of a lump sum social security disability payment in July, 1991. At the time of the payment, Mrs. Gentry was the recipient of Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits. DHS determined that the lump sum payment constituted income sufficient to render Mrs. Gentry ineligible for AFDC benefits for a period of four months. Mrs. Gentry was notified by DHS that her benefits would be terminated for four months because of the receipt of the lump sum social security payment.

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether defendant, Frank Dean Owens, is entitled to share with plaintiff, Sherri Mangrum, the proceeds of a settlement for the wrongful death of their minor daughter,  Lisa Michelle Owens.

This matter concerns the custody of Wayne Nicholas Thompson, II, the minor son of Appellee, Sheryl Lynne Hooke (Thompson) ("Mother") and Appellant, Alan Richard Thompson ("Father"). Both parties sought custody pursuant to separate petitions for divorce.1 The final divorce decree awarded custody to Mother, but stated that Father was to have physical possession of the child during the time period in which Mother underwent treatment for alcoholism. The decree provided that upon Mother's completion of a treatment program, physical possession of Nicholas would revert immediately to her. Father has appealed from the trial court's judgment, challenging both the custody award and the trial court's denial of his request to discover Mother's psychiatric records. For reasons hereinafter expressed, we affirm the judgment.

This is a suit by Charles William Coulter and Donna Lee Coulter, brother and sister of Linda Diane Rose Hendricks, who died in an automobile accident on April 24, 1994, seeking to have her marriage on April 1, 1994, to Richard Anthony Hendricks, annulled. The Chancellor granted Mr. Hendricks' motion under Rule 12.02( 6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, which contended the complaint failed "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."

Earl Maney, the Plaintiff, and Paul J. Parker, the Defendant, were the parties to a written five-year lease for commercial property in Cleveland. Mr. Parker, who operated a woodworking/machine shop on the premises, took possession of the property on September 8, 1989. Late in 1990, after occupying the property for slightly more than one year, he vacated the premises. On May 6, 1993, Mr. Maney, the landlord, filed suit in the Chancery Court of Bradley County seeking back rent and damages for repairs to the building. After a trial, the Chancellor determined that Mr. Parker "had a right to abandon the premises, " but awarded damages to compensate Mr. Maney for expenses he incurred making repairs to the property. Mr. Maney appeals and presents the following issues for review.

I concur wholeheartedly in the majority opinion. I write separately to address the plaintiffs' contention that their sister married Richard Anthony Hendricks "in jest." Even assuming, for the purpose of argument, that the common law requirement of mutual intent to be bound is still a requirement for a valid marriage in Tennessee, an allegation that the parties married in jest is conclusory in nature. Furthermore, it is not supported in the complaint by factual allegations and hence not conceded to be true by the defendant's motion to dismiss. Such a
pleading admits well-pled facts, not conclusions of the pleader. See Swallows v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 543 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tenn. 1976); Dobbs v. Guenther, 846 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tenn. App. 1992). Therefore, the conclusory allegation of a marriage in jest does not render the trial court's action of dismissal inappropriate. The well-pled facts, liberally construed in favor of the plaintiffs, do not make out a cause of action.

This is a suit by Bonnie Jo Miller against Thomas A. Parker seeking damages for personal injuries as a result of her being struck by an automobile being driven by him.

This appeal involves a suit to recover damages for personal injury and property damage arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiffs, Ollie H. Davis and R. D. Davis, appeal from the judgment of the trial court on a jury verdict for the defendant, Horace Hall.

North American Rayon Corporation appeals a judgment of the Chancery Court for Carter County which upheld a Board of Review determination that Judy Howell was entitled to unemployment benefits incident to her termination by North American Rayon.

Eddie Wililams, Jr. ("petitioner") filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Circuit Court of Laderdale County against the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC" or respondent"), seeking court review of actions taken by a prison disciplinary board, prison warden, and the department commissioner. Due process violations resulting therefrom were also alleged. The trial court granted summary judgment to respondent and petitioner has appealed. On appeal, a single issue was presented for review: whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. For the reasons stated hereinafter, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

First Tennessee has filed a petition for rehearing. The petition basically argues two points: first, that the undisputed material facts show that the defendants did not timely assert their claims of misrepresentation, and hence waived them; and second, that we erred in construing the parties' "First Modification, Renewal, and Extension Agreement and Apointment of Successor Trustee."

The Appellant has appealed from a judgment denying its "Application for Execution." We affirm.

This is a post-divorce proceeding involving the custody of the parties' one minor child, Rex M. Massengale, Jr., whose date of birth is September 20, 1985. The parties were divorced by the "Final Judgment and Decree" of the Dade County, Georgia, Superior Court entered on October 19, 1993. That document approved and adopted the parties' agreement that the child's custody should be vested with his mother, Audrey L. Williamson1 (Mother2). The instant controversy was initiated by the child's father, Rex M. Massengale, Sr. (Father), on November 16, 1994, not quite 13 months after the divorce, when he filed a petition to change the child's custody. After a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the Father's petition. Father appeals, raising two issues:

This suit was brought against the City of Johnson City(Johnson City) pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), T.C.A. § 29-20-101, et seq. The plaintiff, 1 The wife's claim was for loss of services, companionship, consortium, etc. 2 Alfred Carroll Jones (Jones), was injured while working at the Towne Acres Elementary School, a facility owned and operated by Johnson City. At the time of the injury, the school was closed while an addition was being built to the existing structure. The trial court granted Johnson City's motion for summary judgment, holding that Jones expressly assumed the risk of his injury and "as a matter of law that [Johnson City] owed no legal duty to" Jones based on the undisputed facts. Jones and his wife, the
plaintiff Betty Jones1, appeal, raising the following issues:

The Plaintiffs, Rick Haynes and his wife Karen Haynes, initially sued their adjacent landowners, Defendants John Walker and wife Rosa Mae Walker and Harold Woods. The Plaintiffs sought a declaration that they were entitled to a right-of-way to gain access to tract 8 of the Clint Jones property, a 15.72-acre tract owned by them in Jefferson County. Thereafter, Michael Woods and his wife Paula Young Woods, who acquired a portion of Harold Woods property, were added as party Defendants by an agreed order.

This is a suit to determine the boundary line between the Plaintiffs' and the Defendants' property and to confirm that the Plaintiffs have a right-of-way over the property of the Defendants.