Monsieur Shawnellias Burgess v. Bradford Hills HOA Et Al.
A homeowner sued his homeowners’ association in general sessions court. Upon motion of the homeowner’s association, the case was removed to circuit court. After the case was removed to circuit court, the homeowner amended his complaint to add an attorney for the homeowner’s association as a defendant. The homeowner’s association and the attorney sought to dismiss the amended complaint. The circuit court granted the motions to dismiss but allowed to the homeowner to file a second amended complaint against the attorney in order to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation. Ultimately, the circuit court granted the attorney a judgment on the pleadings after concluding that the second amended complaint failed to allege facts satisfying all of the elements of a claim for negligent misrepresentation. The homeowner appealed. Discerning that the circuit court erred in granting the homeowner’s association’s motion to dismiss, we vacate that portion of the court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Reginold C. Steed v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Reginold C. Steed, appeals the error coram nobis court’s summary dismissal of |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re J.S. et al.
A Father appeals the termination of his parental rights, asserting his due process rights were |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Patsy Hensley
Defendant, Patsy Hensley, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and received |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carrie Joann Hamlin
The Defendant, Carrie Joann Hamlin, was convicted by a McMinn County Circuit Court |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bryan College v. National Association Of Christian Athletes
This appeal concerns the ownership of property following the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff college. We vacate the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tavares Tobin
Following convictions for unlawful possession of a weapon and a felony drug offense, the
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Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sharrad Sharp v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Sharrad Sharp, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Walter Joshlin, et al. v. Hollis H. Halford, III, M.D., et al.
This appeal involves a failure to timely move for substitution of parties after the death of |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Mathes v. N.J. Ford and Sons Funeral Home, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves an action filed against a funeral home and a cemetery for alleged |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Miranda Cheatham
Miranda Cheatham, Defendant, was convicted of second degree murder for the shooting |
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Joshua E. Webb v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Joshua E. Webb, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, |
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Benjamin McCurry v. Agness McCurry
Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roosevelt Pitts, III
In this delayed appeal, the Defendant-Appellant, Roosevelt Pitts, III, challenges his |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darius Mack
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Darius Mack, of first-degree premeditated murder and tampering with evidence for which he received an effective sentence of life plus three years in prison. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He also contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County v. Paramjeet Singh
As a result of a traffic accident, a Metropolitan police officer issued a driver a Metropolitan traffic citation. The general sessions court found that the driver violated a traffic ordinance, and on appeal, the circuit court also found that the driver violated the ordinance. The driver challenges the jurisdiction of the courts, the legality of reporting the violation to the Tennessee Department of Safety and the severity of the penalty he may receive from California. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Carole J. Boyd Et. Al. v. Town of Morrison
The issues in this appeal arise from protracted litigation in three courts involving several property owners (“Plaintiffs”) who contend the Town of Morrison, Tennessee, (“the Town”) is estopped, for various reasons, from collecting property taxes on their properties. Although the dispute initially involved a challenge to whether the Town lawfully annexed Plaintiffs’ properties, it is no longer disputed that the Town annexed the properties with the passage of Ordinances 01-01 and 01-02 on second and final reading on November 5, 2001. The genesis of the dispute occurred in 2017 when Plaintiffs were cited to the Municipal Court for violating the Town’s zoning ordinances. During the hearing, the Town was required to establish that Plaintiffs’ properties had been annexed. To prove it had annexed the properties, the Town erroneously relied upon Ordinance 01-03, instead of Ordinances 01-01 and 01-02. The Municipal Court found that the Town had not lawfully enacted Ordinance 01-03 to annex Plaintiffs’ properties; therefore, the court dismissed the citations. The Town did not appeal that decision. Two years later, the Town filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court, arguing that it had properly annexed the subject properties. The Chancery Court dismissed the petition concluding that the Town was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue because “the relevant issue was litigated and determined by the Municipal Court . . . , [which] was a court of competent jurisdiction, and therefore, this Chancery Court will not disturb that Court’s findings.” The Town appealed the Chancery Court decision; however, it voluntarily dismissed the appeal. Nevertheless, the Town continued to send delinquent tax notices to Plaintiffs. As a consequence, Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking a declaration that their properties had not been properly annexed by the Town. In its Answer, the Town asserted, for the first time, that it had annexed Plaintiffs’ properties in 2001 pursuant to Ordinances 01-01 and 01-02. Although Plaintiffs argued that the Town was collaterally estopped from relying on these ordnances, the chancellor ruled otherwise. Specifically, the chancellor held that Ordinances 01-01 and 01-02 were not at issue in the Municipal Court proceedings and because the issues raised in that proceeding were not identical to those raised in the prior court proceedings, collateral estoppel did not apply. Further, the chancellor ruled that the Town had lawfully annexed the properties in November 2001 pursuant to Ordinances 01-01 and 01-02. However, the chancellor also ruled that the Town was equitably estopped from collecting delinquent taxes owed prior to 2022. This appeal followed. We have determined that the Municipal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the Town had lawfully annexed Plaintiffs’ properties; therefore, the judgment of the Municipal Court is a null and void judgment that may not constitute a basis for collateral estoppel. For this and other reasons, we affirm the chancellor’s decision to deny Plaintiffs’ Petition for Injunctive Relief. However, we reverse the chancellor’s ruling that the Town is equitably estopped from collecting delinquent property taxes from Plaintiffs. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Mantis Funding LLC v. Buy Wholesale Inc. Et Al.
Plaintiff filed a petition to have a New York confession of judgment enrolled as a judgment in Tennessee. Defendant claimed the Tennessee circuit court had no jurisdiction because the confession of judgment was not permitted by Tennessee law, violated Tennessee public policy, and was fraudulent and usurious. The trial court enrolled the judgment. Defendant appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael White v. Martin Frink, Warden
In 2005, Petitioner, Michael White, was convicted of multiple counts of rape. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of 55 years. After several failed attempts, Petitioner again sought habeas corpus relief, which the habeas court denied. He appeals. Because Petitioner failed to follow the statutory procedure for filing a petition for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.
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Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Yancy N.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to one of his children. The juvenile court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of seven statutory grounds for termination. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. After a thorough review, we agree and affirm.
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Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Lorelai E.
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services sought to intervene in a private-party termination of parental rights and adoption proceeding concerning a minor child. The trial court permitted the intervention. The child’s mother appealed. Because the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the Department of Children’s Services permissive intervention pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.02, we affirm.
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Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Benjamin McCurry v. Agness McCurry
The Appellant takes issue with the trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself from the litigation assigned to him pursuant to designation by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Cochran
The Defendant, Jeffrey Cochran, was convicted by a McMinn County Criminal Court jury of aggravated kidnapping, for which he is serving a nine-year sentence. See T.C.A. § 39- 13-304(a)(5) (2018). On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying, in part, his motion to suppress, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance, (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mustafah Brummell
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Mustafah Brummell, of two counts of aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-eight years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. We affirm.
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Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rodger E. Broadway v. State of Tennessee
Rodger E. Broadway, Petitioner, sought relief from his 2003 convictions for first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated rape, which were the result of guilty pleas, claiming that trial counsel told him he could not file for post-conviction relief and that the trial court deprived him of his fundamental right to represent himself. The post-conviction court found that the petition was not timely filed and that Petitioner was not entitled to due process tolling and summarily dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |