Opinions
In Re Krystopher C. et al.
In this case involving termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights to their two minor children, the trial court determined that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven as to each parent by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father and mother have each appealed and have proceeded pro se upon waiving their rights to appointed counsel. Having determined that clear and convincing evidence did not support the trial court’s finding of the statutory abandonment ground of failure to support as to the mother, we reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to this ground as to the mother. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
Celeste Lachapelle as the beneficiary of the will of James Russell Pace v. Blanchard E. Tual, et al.
Appellant sued the law firm that prepared a will on behalf of her fiancé for professional negligence after an out-of-state will contest resulted in the invalidation of the will. The trial court concluded that Appellant’s claim accrued when she was forced to respond to the will contest and not when the will was actually held to be invalid. Thus, Appellant’s action was filed after the one-year limitations period had expired, and the trial court granted summary judgment for the law firm. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Jason Burdick v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert Jason Burdick, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order denying his three post-conviction petitions, seeking relief from his convictions of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated burglary and his effective sentence of forty-six years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, that the cumulative effect of counsel’s deficient performance warrants new trials and sentencing hearings, and that the consecutive sentencing statute is void for vagueness. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shanessa L. Sokolosky
This case is about mootness. Ms. Sokolosky appealed a probation revocation order and the denial of her motion to dismiss a violation arrest warrant. During the pendency of that appeal, Ms. Sokolosky’s probation was fully revoked, she served her sentence, and she was released. The Court of Criminal Appeals then dismissed her appeal as moot because no active controversy existed for resolution. We respectfully disagree. Because Ms. Sokolosky’s probation violation “may have adverse consequences after the completion of [her] term of commitment, the doctrine of mootness does not apply.” State v. Rodgers, 235 S.W.3d 92, 93 (Tenn. 2007). We reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for consideration of Ms. Sokolosky’s appeal. |
Smith | Supreme Court | |
CHARLES J. BEARD ET AL. v. WILLIAM ODOM ET AL.
This appeal arises from the purchase of a residential home. The plaintiff homebuyers asserted claims against the defendant sellers for intentional or negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act (“TRPDA”). The plaintiffs’ claims were based solely on the defendants’ TRPDA disclosure statement, which said there were no known defects in the home’s floor structure. The trial court summarily dismissed all claims on the basis that the plaintiffs knew or should have known about the alleged defects because the plaintiffs had every opportunity to discover the defects and were made aware of the defects by their own observations and inspection reports. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they reasonably relied on the defendants’ misrepresentation. But the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof on summary judgment to establish that they actually or reasonably relied on the disclosure statement. For this reason, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Xingkui Guo v. State of Tennessee
Professor appeals from the Tennessee Claims Commission’s Rule 41.02(2) involuntary dismissal of his breach of contract action against Tennessee State University. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Victor Valle v. Robert Adams, Jr., Warden
Petitioner, Victor Valle, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief, arguing that he was entitled to and did not receive juvenile proceedings before the trial court admitted evidence of prior bad acts committed while Petitioner was a minor; the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts; he received ineffective assistance of counsel; his indictment was insufficient to provide the trial court with subject matter jurisdiction; the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; the trial court improperly instructed the jury; and the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kelly M. Et Al. v. Agness M.
Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Asata Lowe
Pro se Petitioner, Asata Lowe, filed a “Petition for Delayed Appeal,” which was treated as a motion for a delayed appeal and summarily dismissed by the Blount County Circuit Court. In this appeal, Lowe argues that the post-conviction court erred when it “failed to consider whether [he] was denied ‘the right to an appeal from the original conviction’ and that the court made ‘erroneous findings of fact and legal conclusions.’” After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Tameka Hamilton
The Defendant, Tameka Hamilton, entered guilty pleas to various offenses including reckless endangerment, evading arrest, theft, identity theft, fraudulent use of a credit card, and forgery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years and placed the Defendant in a community corrections program. The Defendant subsequently violated her probation based on failure to complete the special conditions of the drug court program. In this appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred in ordering her to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Fred Beal v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Fred Beal, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted first degree murder, two counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-two years. This court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. In this appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate a witness and to properly communicate with Petitioner, and that cumulative error prejudiced Petitioner. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Monoleto Delshone Green v. State of Tennessee
Currently before the Court is the Petitioner’s pro se application for an extraordinary appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 10. It is not entirely clear what the Petitioner is seeking to appeal, but he failed to attach to his application a copy of any trial court order appealable under Rule 10. An extraordinary appeal may be granted from an interlocutory order of a trial court if the appellate court determines the trial court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review or if necessary for complete determination of the action on appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a). Thus, Rule 10 is utilized to gain interlocutory appellate review of a trial court order. Again, the Petitioner failed to attach a copy of any trial court order which demonstrates how the trial court has acted in an “arbitrary fashion” necessary to warrant an extraordinary appeal at this juncture of the trial court proceedings. Tenn. R. App. P. 10, Advisory Commission Comment (“[t]he circumstances in which review is available . . . are very narrowly circumscribed to those situations in which the trial court . . . has acted in an arbitrary fashion, or as may be necessary to permit complete appellate review on a later appeal”). Accordingly, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied. Because it appears the incarcerated Petitioner remains indigent, costs are taxed to the State. However, the State has the authority to recoup the costs associated with this appeal from the Petitioner’s trust fund account, if appropriate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-143. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ridgeview Partners, LLC d/b/a Ravelle at Ridgeview v. Michelle Okoreeh-Baah Keister
In this unlawful detainer action, the landlord obtained judgment in the general sessions court against a tenant for failure to pay rent. The tenant, who remained in possession of the subject property, appealed the judgment to the circuit court without posting a bond for possession as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-18-130(b)(2)(A). In the absence of a bond, the landlord sought immediate possession of the property. The tenant moved to proceed on appeal without a bond, arguing that the affidavit of indigency she had filed with the general sessions court sufficed in lieu of a surety bond for her appeal. The circuit court ordered the tenant to either surrender possession of the property or post a possession bond. After the tenant failed to surrender possession or post a bond, the circuit court issued a writ of possession in favor of the landlord, which the landlord executed shortly thereafter. Having regained possession of the property, the landlord filed a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01. The trial court accordingly entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice. The tenant has appealed the dismissal to this Court, arguing that because she had filed an affidavit of indigency in the general sessions court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-5-103, she should have been permitted to retain possession of the property pending resolution of her appeal to the circuit court without posting a bond. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
E2025-00260-CCA-R9-CO
The Defendant has filed an application for interlocutory appeal, see Tenn. R. App. P. 9, seeking review of the trial court’s September 23, 2024 order and November 6, 2024 amended order denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment and granting the State’s motion to have the Defendant involuntarily judicially committed pursuant to the Tennessee Disability and Aging Act of 2024 (“the Act”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 52-5- 404 (specifically regarding involuntary commitment for intellectually disabled defendants). The Defendant argues that interlocutory review of the trial court’s orders is required to prevent irreparable injury, to prevent needless and protracted litigation, and to develop a uniform body of law. Tenn. R. App. P. 9(a)(1), (2), and (3). The State has filed an answer in opposition to the Defendant’s application, arguing that three of the issues certified by the trial court ask for advisory opinions and that the three remaining issues do not satisfy the criteria for interlocutory appeal. Following our review, we grant the Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal, in part, and deny the application, in part. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Tylor Mulac
After the Defendant, Brandon Tylor Mulac, was arrested in Smith County with 396 grams of methamphetamine in his vehicle, law enforcement executed a search warrant on his home in DeKalb County and found another 425 grams of methamphetamine. The Defendant subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the DeKalb County search and a motion to exclude evidence from his Smith County arrest based on Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, both of which were denied by the trial court. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver over three hundred grams of methamphetamine and received a sentence of sixty years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court erred based on the following three grounds: (1) in denying his motions to suppress because the search warrant and affidavit did not establish probable cause and because the affidavit contained false information in violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); (2) in admitting evidence from the Smith County traffic stop in violation of Rule 404(b); and (3) in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction.1 Upon review, we affirm. |
DeKalb | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lamar Fletcher
Lamar Fletcher, Defendant, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marshall Turley v. John Mendez
The trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint with prejudice, and he appeals. Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we do not reach the substantive issues. Appeal dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Wayne Gardner v. Grady Perry, Warden
The Petitioner, Robert Wayne Garner, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the trial court failed to explicitly order he serve his life sentence for felony murder in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) and failed to indicate the same on his felony murder judgment form. Additionally, the Petitioner alleges two procedural errors occurred in these proceedings: (1) the State was without authority to attach a proposed dismissal order to its motion to dismiss the habeas corpus petition, and (2) the habeas corpus court erred by simply signing the State’s dismissal order without providing extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law for its decision. After review, we affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alphonso Elexander
After a bench trial, the Defendant, Alphonso Elexander, was convicted in the Rutherford County Circuit Court of aggravated burglary, misdemeanor vandalism, and possession of drug paraphernalia and received an effective six-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, he claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated burglary conviction. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Springer
Defendant, Paul Springer, was charged with two counts of forgery in an amount $60,000 or more but less than $250,000 and one count of theft in an amount $60,000 or more but less than $250,000.1 Defendant’s jury trial ended in a mistrial after Defendant “violat[ed] a court order” by referencing an alleged victim’s prior criminal record. During the trial, Defendant was twice held in contempt of court, once for arriving late to court and again for violating the court’s order. Nearly three years after judgments were entered against Defendant for two counts of direct contempt of court, Defendant filed a “Motion to Dismiss Contempt of Court,” which the trial court denied.2 Defendant appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of contempt. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone
This emergency conservatorship action was litigated along with an action to establish a permanent conservatorship. The trial court’s judgments in both actions have been appealed. Because the appeal in the permanent conservatorship action has resolved the issues raised in this appeal, we dismiss the appeal as moot. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rosalynn (Victor) Addis v. Ryan Keith Addis
This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding in which the trial court adopted the wife’s marital property division and the wife’s proposed permanent parenting plan, found the husband willfully unemployed and imputed his income at $252,850.50 per year for child support purposes, and awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony, alimony in futuro, and a judgment in the amount of $43,407.50 for attorney’s fees. Husband appeals. We affirm in part and vacate in part. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone
This is a conservatorship action. Appellants are attorneys who prepared estate planning documents for Susan Davis Malone in 2014 and 2018. Ms. Malone’s 2018 documents included a durable power of attorney and power of attorney for healthcare (“DPOAs”) in favor of Appellants. In that 2018 healthcare DPOA, Ms. Malone appointed Appellants to serve as her conservator should the need arise. In 2021, Ms. Malone suffered a disabling healthcare event, and Appellants provided for her care pursuant to the 2018 documents. In 2022, Ms. Malone purportedly revoked the 2018 DPOAs and executed DPOAs in favor of her daughter, Appellee Lisa Malone Jackson. Appellants filed a petition to be appointed conservator; Ms. Jackson filed a counter-petition. The proceedings in the trial court initially focused on whether Ms. Malone had the capacity to revoke the 2018 DPOAs and to execute the 2022 DPOAs. During the proceedings, Appellants filed two motions to recuse the trial judge. The trial court denied both motions. On appeal, this Court affirmed. While Appellants’ second motion to recuse was pending, the trial court found good cause to hold an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the competing conservatorship petitions. Attorneys did not participate in the hearing, and the trial court appointed a neutral interim conservator. Shortly after it denied Appellants’ second motion to recuse, the trial court determined that an additional hearing was not necessary. The trial court found that the 2022 documents were valid and concluded without an evidentiary hearing that it was in Ms. Malone’s best interest to appoint Appellees to serve as co-conservators. Upon review of the record, we determine that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. We vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Additionally, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the guardian ad litem. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Sue Speranza v. Scott Michael Speranza
In this divorce case, Appellant/Wife appeals the trial court’s denial of her Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 motion to alter or amend the final decree of divorce. Although Wife and Appellee/Husband tendered proposed final decrees and orally announced their consent to be divorced and to divide the marital estate, they did not file a written property-settlement agreement. In her Rule 59.04 motion, Wife asserts, inter alia, that the parties did not come to an agreement concerning the division of two marital assets, i.e. stock in Husband’s company, and funds held by the trial court Clerk. In the absence of such agreement, Wife contends that the trial court erred in entering its final decree and in the division of the disputed assets. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Korey DeJuan Dupree
This appeal arises from a probate matter in which the trial court, inter alia, granted by default a motion for substitution of the original personal representative. The original personal representative filed a motion to vacate the default order and later filed a “Verified Petition for Temporary Restraining Order without Notice” to prevent the disbursement of funds received from a related wrongful death suit. While the motion and petition were pending, the successor personal representative petitioned to close the estate and discharge personal representative, which the trial court granted. The original personal representative appeals, contending that it was error to grant the substitution of personal representative by default due to a lack of proper notice and hearing. After a review of the record, we find that there has been no adjudication of the motion to vacate the order removing the original personal representative or the petition for temporary restraining order. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is not final, and we must dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |