State of Tennessee v. Michael Davis
The Appellant, Michael Davis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Davis raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury with regard to criminal responsibility for the conduct of another; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Willis B. Amos, et al. v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the lump-sum payments made to Appellants upon their retirement were not for performing personal services; but instead, were in lieu of the employee using his/her accrued vacation time. Although the payments were indeed made in lieu of the employee using his/her accrued vacation time, the payments were compensation for the employee performing personal services during his/her employment.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Willis Bruce Amos, et al. v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
This appeal involves a declaratory judgment on the issue of whether pursuant to the Metro Code, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, should have included lump-sum payments for accrued vacation time in the calculation of pension benefits for retired employees, or in the alternative, whether the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee should be estopped from excluding lump-sum payments for accrued vacation time from the calculation of pension benefits for retired employees. On appeal, the Appellants claim that the trial court erred in finding that: 1) pursuant to the Metro Code, lump-sum payments should be excluded from the calculation of pension benefits for retired employees, 2) the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee is not estopped from excluding the lump-sum payments from the calculations, and 3) denying certification of this matter as a class action. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cassandra Rogers v. State of Tennessee
Following a car accident, Claimant/Appellant filed a Complaint with the Tennessee Claims Commission. The Complaint stated that Claimant/Appellant did not have sufficient facts to state definitively a claim for negligence against a Tennessee State Trooper. The State filed a motion to dismiss, which the Commission granted. Claimant/Appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of: M.A.W.
The trial court dismissed Father’s petition to modify child custody upon determining no material change in circumstances had occurred. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ann M. Honeycutt v. Wilkes, Mccullough & Wagner, and Barbara McCullough, Individually
This appeal involves a legal malpractice claim that a client brought against her former attorney after this Court issued a decision terminating the client’s receipt of alimony. The attorney had represented the client in her divorce case. When the parties executed their marital dissolution agreement, the attorney allegedly provided erroneous advice to the client about a provision that would terminate her alimony if she cohabited with an unrelated male. Subsequent to the divorce, the client’s ex-husband filed a petition to terminate his alimony obligation because the client was living with another man. Although the client initially retained this same attorney to defend against the petition, she later discharged her and retained other counsel. The trial court ruled in the client’s favor, but on appeal, we reversed and terminated the alimony obligation. The client then sued her former attorney, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the attorney based upon the one year statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Accredo Health Incorporated, et al. v. David Patterson
The trial court dismissed this lawsuit upon determining that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant, a Texas resident. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
David Lane Goss v. State of Tennessee
Wilson County- The Defendant, David Lane Goss, was convicted by a Wilson County jury of driving under the influence. On appeal, the Defendant alleges the trial court erred when it: denied his motion to suppress certain oral statements he gave during the traffic stop; denied his motion to dismiss based on his claim that he was not properly taken before a magistrate; and denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mike Campbell v. Country Homes, Inc., et al.
On this appeal, it is alleged the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing appellant’s complaint for failure to obey an order compelling discovery and for refusing to vacate that order. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Terre Jo Fields v. James R. Fields, Jr.
Husband was found in civil contempt and incarcerated. He was further enjoined from being selfemployed. He appeals only the injunction which we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Ann McCracken Sizemore v. Steven Douglas Sizemore and Nancy Ann McCracken Sizemore v. Steven Douglas Sizemore
Nancy Ann McCracken Sizemore (“Wife”) initially sued her spouse, Steven Douglas Sizemore (“Husband”), for divorce in the Washington County Circuit Court. She subsequently filed a notice of voluntary dismissal in that case. On the day the notice of nonsuit was filed in Circuit Court, Wife filed a divorce complaint in the Chancery Court for Washington County. The parties proceeded to trial in that court. The Chancery Court granted Wife a divorce, divided the parties’ marital property, and ordered Husband to pay Wife child support and alimony. Following the entry of the Chancery Court’s judgment, Husband filed a counterclaim in the Circuit Court proceeding – the one that had been dormant since Wife filed her notice of voluntary nonsuit some two years earlier. He argues that the case in Circuit Court was still pending because that court had not entered an order dismissing Wife’s complaint. The Circuit Court dismissed Husband’s counterclaim, stating (1) that Husband had waived his right to have the parties’ divorce case tried in Circuit Court by fully participating in the trial in Chancery Court; and (2) that Wife’s notice of nonsuit had “effectively dismissed the case” in Circuit Court. On appeal from the Chancery Court case, Husband contends that (1) the Chancery Court “never had jurisdiction” because the complaint in Circuit Court was pending when the -2- Chancery Court purported to assume jurisdiction; (2) the Chancery Court erred in not allowing him to obtain a transcript of the divorce hearing; (3) the Chancellor was biased against him and should have recused himself; (4) the Chancery Court erred in ordering him to pay child support for the parties’ disabled adult son; (5) the Chancery Court erred in its division of the parties’ marital property; (6) the Chancery Court erred in awarding Wife alimony; (7) the Chancery Court erred in imputing $100,000 per year of income to Husband; and (8) the Chancery Court erred in finding him in contempt. On appeal from the Circuit Court, Husband argues that the court lacked authority to dismiss his counterclaim. We affirm the judgments of both courts. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scotty Henry Pace, Jr.
The appellant’s former girlfriend obtained an order of protection against the appellant in June of 2003. In August of 2003, the former girlfriend filed warrants alleging two separate violations of the order of protection by the appellant. The general sessions court found the appellant guilty of criminal contempt for both violations and sentenced the appellant to ten days in jail for each offense. The appellant appealed to the circuit court, which held a hearing and affirmed the convictions. Because the appellant has failed to include in the appellate record the June 2003 order of protection which he was found to have violated, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gerald Wells
Appellant, Gerald Wells, was indicted for one count of aggravated robbery. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range II multiple offender to seventeen years for the conviction. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for aggravated robbery, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deddrick Parker, Taurus Driver, and Tremaine Roberson
The defendants, Deddrick Parker, Taurus Driver, and Tremaine Roberson, were indicted for two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and five counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Each defendant was convicted of both counts of aggravated robbery, and Roberson was also convicted of all five counts of aggravated assault, Parker of two counts, and Driver of two counts of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of aggravated assault. Roberson, Parker, and Driver were sentenced as Range I, standard offenders to consecutive sentences totaling thirty-five, twentyfour, and twenty years, respectively. In this consolidated appeal, they raise three issues: (1) the evidence is insufficient; (2) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors and in imposing consecutive sentencing; and (3) the trial court erred by not timely disclosing its prior relationship with an assault victim. Following our review, we remand for resentencing as to those sentences imposed on each defendant which exceed the minimum, affirm the remaining judgments, and remand to the trial court for a determination as to whether the sentences should be served concurrently or consecutively. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tommy Lee Watson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tommy L. Watson, pled guilty to vehicular homicide (Class B felony) and reckless endangerment (Class E felony) in exchange for a sentence of twelve years. On appeal, he contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and submits that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory O. Cherry
Appellant, Gregory O. Cherry, was found guilty by a jury of possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, delivery of under .5 grams of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. As a result, he was sentenced to a total effective sentence of eight years. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve the effective eight-year sentence consecutively to sentences in case numbers 8395 and 8396.1 Appellant filed a motion for new trial. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress Appellant’s confession and improperly refused to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search of Appellant’s car. Appellant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions. Because the record does not indicate that the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for new trial, we determine that we lack jurisdiction to hear the case and dismiss the appeal. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Teresa McWherter v. JACOA Alcoholism Center
This is a negligence case. The defendant is a treatment facility for drug and alcohol addictions. The plaintiff was an inpatient at the defendant facility, undergoing substance abuse treatment. The plaintiff was admitted on referral from her probation officer. As part of her treatment, the plaintiff participated in experiential therapy designed to teach through experiences. For one exercise, a group of patients were organized into a team and a rope was tied between two posts, with a mattress on one side. The team was asked to devise a plan for getting all team members over the rope, without touching it. The plaintiff’s team decided to “toss” the female members of the team over the rope. The plaintiff was thrown over the rope once without injury. However, the team had to repeat the exercise. During the second attempt, the plaintiff was tossed over the rope, but this time her foot missed the mattress and she broke her ankle. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit against the defendant facility. The facility moved for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be held liable because the plaintiff voluntarily chose to engage in the exercise despite an obvious risk of injury. The trial court granted the motion. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse and remand, finding that the defendant facility had a duty of care to the plaintiff and that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the extent to which the plaintiff felt compelled to participate in the exercise and as to whether the fault attributable to the plaintiff is greater than the fault attributable to the defendant facility. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Conaway v. U.S. Pipe and Foundry Company, et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee, Kenneth Conaway, was permanently and totally disabled. The employer has appealed that ruling, contending that the Mr. Conaway’s work as a minister precludes a finding of total disability. We agree and modify the award of the trial court to seventy-two percent permanent partial disability of the body as a whole. |
Marion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Lee Marise
The defendant, Gary Lee Marise, was convicted by a Carroll County jury of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class D felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to four years in the Department of Correction. He raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing his request for special jury instructions; and (3) whether he was denied a fair trial and the effective assistance of counsel due to the poor acoustics in the temporary courtroom, which prevented some jurors from hearing his trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, v. P.W.K., In Re: J.B.K. DOB: 11/25/02
The parties stipulated statutory grounds for termination of parental rights, and the Trial Court found that it was in the child’s best interest that the father’s parental rights be terminated. On appeal, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Lilliane Kambu v. Jean Katera
The Trial Court granted the parties a divorce, ordering the husband to pay child support and alimony in futuro. The husband has appealed arguing the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding the wife alimony. We modify the alimony award and otherwise affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Keshun Goods v. Tony Parker, Warden
The State appeals the habeas court’s grant of a petition for habeas corpus relief filed by the Petitioner, Anthony Keshun Goods. The Petitioner alleged in his petition that his sentence was illegal because he was sentenced to concurrent terms when the law required him to be sentenced to consecutive terms. On appeal, the State contends the statutory requirement of consecutive sentences does not apply to the Petitioner, his petition is not yet ripe, and the remedy set out by the habeas court is improper. Finding no error in the judgment of the habeas court, we affirm the grant of habeas corpus relief and remand the case to the Shelby County Criminal Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Keshun Goods v. Tony Parker, Warden - Dissenting
The majority, relying upon the authority of McLaney v. Bell, affirms the grant of habeas corpus relief. However, relying upon the authority of the Tennessee Supreme Court cases discussed below, I must respectfully dissent. My reasons are two-fold. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William T. Carter
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, William T. Carter, of premeditated first-degree murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (2006), felony murder, see id. § 39-13-202(a)(2), and aggravated robbery, see id. § 39-13-402(a)(2). On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding all three convictions. He also asserts that the trial court erred in finding that he qualified as a dangerous offender regarding the aggravated robbery conviction and that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve the aggravated robbery sentence consecutively to his firstdegree murder conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court; however, we remand for the execution of a proper merger of the first degree murder findings of guilt. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dennis Jarrett v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Dennis Jarrett, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel as grounds for relief. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as timebarred. The petitioner appeals the dismissal, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals |