Thomas Newt Moore v. Universal Furniture Limited
E2003-00913-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: H. David Cate, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Vance, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends the trial court erred in finding circumstantial evidence of permanent physical restrictions on employee's ability to work; and in its determination that the employee sustained a 7 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole because it was excessive. We hold that the trial court was not in error in finding circumstantial evidence of permanent physical restrictions on the employee's ability to work, nor was its conclusion that the employee was 7 percent permanently partially disabled to the body as a whole excessive.

Sandra W. Duncan v. State of Tennessee
E2003-01898-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Vance W. Cheek, Jr., Commissioner
The claim of the Appellant for workers' compensation benefits was rejected upon a finding that she was injured as the result of her own misconduct when she became embroiled in an altercation with a fellow employee. We hold that summary judgment is inappropriate and remand the case for a merit trial

Christopher A. Eadie v. Complete Co., Inc.et al.
M2002-02010-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge R.E. Lee Davies

We granted review in this case to consider whether an employee is barred from seeking workers’ compensation benefits in Tennessee because the employee made a binding election of remedies by pursuing benefits for the same injury in another state. We hold that the employee’s filing of a claim in South Carolina, his request for a hearing there, and the taking of depositions in that matter constitute affirmative acts to obtain benefits in another state sufficient to constitute a binding election of remedies that bars the employee’s Tennessee claim. Therefore, we reject the conclusion of the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel on this issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee v. Edward Slavin, Jr.
M2003-00845-SC-R3-BP
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Richard E. Ladd

We have this case on direct appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, from an order of the Chancery Court suspending Edward A. Slavin, Jr., Esq., from the practice of law for three years. Slavin appeals, raising the following issues: (1) whether Chancellor Richard E. Ladd erred in refusing to recuse himself; (2) whether Slavin's in-court speech is protected by the First Amendment; and (3) whether the sanctions imposed by the Chancellor are excessive. Upon careful review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that Chancellor Ladd did not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse himself and that the speech at issue does not fall within the protective ambit of the First Amendment. After a thorough examination of the sanctions, we impose a two-year suspension. Slavin may, however, apply for reinstatement pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 19.3, at the expiration of one year from date of this opinion.

Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee v. H. Owen Maddux
M2003-01136-SC-R3-BP
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William M. Dender

A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility found that H. Owen Maddux had wilfully and deliberately converted funds from his law firm. In addition to other sanctions, the hearing panel suspended Maddux from the practice of law for a period of thirty days. The Chancery Court for Hamilton County affirmed the judgment of the hearing panel but imposed additional sanctions. Disciplinary Counsel appealed to this Court, contesting only the sufficiency of the thirty-day suspension. We hold that the thirty-day suspension is appropriate. We affirm.

Helen Gleason v. Daniel P. Gleason, III
M2003-01580-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. S. Daniel

The trial court awarded Petitioner alimony arrearages of $7,250 plus interest. Respondent appeals, asserting the statute of limitations and the defense of laches. We modify the judgment of the trial court and remand.

State of Tennessee v. Marvin Glenn White
M2003-02299-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Graham

A Marion County jury convicted the defendant, Marvin Glenn White, of two counts of premeditated first degree murder for which he received concurrent life sentences. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in admitting statements which constituted double hearsay. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Kenneth Snell v. City of Murfreesboro
M2003-02716-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Corlew, III

Plaintiffs appeal from trial court's dismissal of complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiffs allege that trial court erred in finding that Plaintiffs had no standing to challenge annexation ordinance passed by City of Murfreesboro. Finding that the trial court was correct in determining that Plaintiffs were not entitled to challenge the annexation ordinance under Tennessee declaratory judgment statute, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Bruce Franks, Jr. - Concurring
W2003-01673-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. However, I disagree with its conclusion that a sentence of split confinement fulfills the requirement of an alternative sentencing presumption. I believe an alternative sentence means one that is an alternative to confinement, as explained in my dissent in State v. Christina B. Jones, M2002-02428-CCA-R3-CD, Williamson County (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2003), app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2003).

State of Tennessee v. Bruce Franks, Jr.
W2003-01673-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

The defendant, Bruce Franks, Jr., pleaded guilty to arson, a Class C felony, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-301(a)(1) (2003), and agreed to a three-year, Range I sentence. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing to determine themanner of service of the sentence and ordered split confinement.  The defendant appeals the confinement component of his sentence. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Robert "Bobby" Powell
W2003-02723-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clayburn L. Peeples

The defendant, Robert “Bobby” Powell, pled guilty to statutory rape and sexual battery, Class E felonies, in exchange for an effective two-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Finding that a sentence less serious than confinement would depreciate the seriousness of the offenses, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for probation or other alternative sentencing and ordered that he serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The court subsequently denied the defendant’s motion to reconsider, and the defendant appealed to this court. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Carlos Haynes v. State of Tennessee
W2004-00081-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roger A. Page

The petitioner, Carlos Haynes, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to one count of possession of over one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. He received a total effective sentence of two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel was ineffective and the trial court erred in failing to pursue the issue of the identity of the confidential informant whose tip led to the search of the petitioner’s home. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Timothy E. Ballard
W2003-01627-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

The defendant, Timothy E. Ballard, was convicted of DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor, and was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended except for sixty days, with the balance to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, he argues that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred in denying full probation or alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In the Matter of: D.A.H., DOB 12/11/00, A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age, et al.
W2002-00733-SC-R11-JV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold W. Horne

We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A), effective June 2, 2003, applies retroactively to this parental termination case. Prior to the 2003 amendment, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) (2001) provided as follows:

State of Tennessee, Ex Rel. Anne. B. Pope v. United States Fire Insurance Company, et al.
E2002-01092-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Frank Brown, III

We granted permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine whether the liability of a surety company that issues bonds to self-insured employers under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-405(b) is limited to the penal amount listed on the face of each bond. Because section 50-6-405(b) requires that bonds be of a single, continuous term, we conclude that a surety company’s liability is limited to the penal amount on the face of the bonds. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Michael Mitchell v. William Henegar, D/B/A Henegar Realty Company; and Geneva Brown, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Fred Brown
E2003-01885-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge William E. Lantrip

Plaintiff sought rescission of a purchase of real property, and damages pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act. The Trial Court held plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof on the issues presented. On appeal, we affirm.

Luke N. Gibson, et al. v. Chrysler Corporation, et al.
W2002-03134-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kay S. Robilio

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for Defendant/Appellee. Plaintiff/Appellant, a minor, was allegedly injured when an integrated car seat in a vehicle manufactured and sold by Defendant/Appellee malfunctioned. Plaintiff/Appellant asserts that: (1) the jurors conducted unauthorized experimentation with certain exhibits, which constituted extraneous prejudicial information under Tenn. R. Evid. 606(b); (2) that there is no material evidence on which the jury could have based its verdict; (3) that the trial judge failed to properly perform her duty as thirteenth juror; (4) that the trial court erred in allowing an expert to testify outside the scope of his expertise in violation of McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997); and (5) that the trial court erred, either under Tenn. R. Evid. 702 and 704 or on the theory of judicial estoppel, in excluding a portion of the testimony of a second expert. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Robert Page - Concurring and Dissenting
W2003-01342-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Fred Axley

I am unable to join with the majority in concluding that the waiver provision of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-18-110 is unconstitutional. Because the Defendant did not request that the jury be instructed as to facilitation, he has waived his right to challenge this issue on appeal.  Accordingly, I would affirm the conviction.

State of Tennessee v. Robert Page
W2003-01342-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Fred Axley

The Defendant, Robert Page, was convicted by a jury of the second degree murder of Roosevelt Burgess. The Defendant was subsequently sentenced as a Range II offender to thirty-eight years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: 1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict; 2) whether the trial court improperly limited the impeachment of State witness Carrie Jones; 3) whether the trial court properly admitted a photograph of the victim; 4) whether the trial court committed error in providing supplemental jury instructions; 5) whether comments by the trial court compromised the Defendant’s right to a fair trial; and 6) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation to commit second degree murder. Because the trial court committed reversible error in omitting a jury instruction on facilitation of second degree murder, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand this matter for a new trial.

Victor Rivera v. Jeld-Wen, Inc.
M2003-01651-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull, Judge
In this case, the plaintiff whose arm was amputated as a result of a work-related injury had entered into a settlement agreement with his employer. The plaintiff claims this agreement obligated his employer to pay for an expensive, state-of-the-art myoelectric prosthesis. The trial court agreed and expressly found that the provision of the myoelectric arm was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of the agreement and compelled the employer to pay for it. The Panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Samuel L. Rowe v. Sverdrup Technology, Inc. and
M2003-01467-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Roger A. Page, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: John E. Rollins, Judge
. In this appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee's hip replacement surgery and subsequent disability were due to an injury that arose out of his employment. Specifically, the issue is whether the employee's injury resulted from a pre-existing cancerous condition of the right hip. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Rachel Stephens v. John Manville International, Inc.
E2003-01068-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor
The trial court awarded the Plaintiff an additional 5 percent for an injury to her left arm for which she had been compensated. This award was supported essentially by the Plaintiff's testimony. She was also awarded benefits for an injury to her right arm and neck. The award for an additional 5 percent to the left arm is vacated. Otherwise, the judgment is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Davis
M2001-01866-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The defendant, Christopher A. Davis, was convicted of two counts of premeditated first degree murder,¹ two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. The jury imposed death sentences for both counts of premeditated first degree murder after finding that evidence of three aggravating circumstances, i.e., (1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person, (2) the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest of the defendant, and (3) the murders were knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit a robbery or kidnapping, outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent 25-year sentences for the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions to run consecutively to concurrent 25-year sentences for the especially aggravated robbery convictions.

After the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences, the case was automatically docketed in this Court. We entered an order specifying seven issues for oral argument, and we now hold as follows: (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts; (2) the trial court did not err in refusing to disqualify the District Attorney General; (3) the trial court did not err in refusing to allow defense counsel to withdraw; (4) the death sentences were not invalid on the ground that the aggravating circumstances were not set out in the indictment; (5) the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to establish the “prior violent felony” aggravating circumstance by relying on an offense committed as a juvenile; (6) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and its determination that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; and (7) the death sentences were not arbitrary or disproportionate. We also agree with the Court of         Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues, the relevant portions of which are included in the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Davis - Concurring and Dissenting
M2001-01866-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho E. Birch
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The City of Humboldt, et al. v. J.R. McKnight, et al.
M2002-02639-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

This lawsuit is about the operation and funding of public schools educating the children in Gibson County. Since 1981 the county has not operated a county school system, and all K-12 students have been in schools operated by the municipal and special school systems. The county ceased operating schools when a 1981 Private Act created the Gibson County Special School District. This arrangement was ratified by a 2002 Public Act stating that where all K-12 students are eligible to be served by city and special school systems, the county is not required to operate a separate county school system or have a county board of education. The trial court held that the 2002 Act was unconstitutional as special legislation and that the 1981 Act, though constitutional, was illegal. It ordered the dissolution of the Gibson County Special School District and that the county undertake operation of the schools not included in the other municipal or special school systems within the county. The court further found that the county was required to levy a countywide property tax to fund the local share of education costs and divide the proceeds among all school systems in the county. We hold that the 2002 Act does not violate Article XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution and, consequently, there is no obligation for the county to operate a county school system. We also conclude that the facts do not establish any disparity of educational opportunity among the school systems in the county and, consequently, the principles and holdings in the Small Schools cases do not apply to require a specific organizational structure and do not preclude the method used in Gibson County. Finally, we conclude the county is not required to levy a countywide property tax for schools. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment.