State of Tennessee v. Roger Staples
M2003-01433-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

The appellant, Roger Murel Staples, was convicted by a jury of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to nine years as a Range I, Standard Offender. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. In this direct appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, his sentence, statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument, and the trial court's decision to admit evidence of activity at the appellant's residence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Joy Kennedy
M2003-01745-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Graham

The Defendant, Joy Kennedy, was found guilty by a jury of vehicular homicide, two counts of reckless aggravated assault, and reckless driving. However, the trial court granted the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, concluding that she had established the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence. The State appealed on the ground that the trial court erred by granting the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The sole issue on appeal is whether a reasonable juror could have concluded that the defense of insanity had not been established by clear and convincing evidence. We hold that no reasonable juror could have failed to find that the Defendant was legally insane at the time of the crimes. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Mary Murr Turner
E2004-00225-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II

The defendant, Mary Murr Turner, pled guilty to accessory after the fact, and the Cocke County trial court sentenced her to one year incarceration as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Anna Miller v. Eduardo Miller
W2003-00851-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Joe C. Morris

This appeal arises from a divorce action. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; and Remanded.
 

Ronnie Gale Martin v. Deborah Elaine Kent Martin
W2003-01968-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Martha B. Brasfield

Husband filed present divorce action against Wife alleging irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. Wife answered denying the inappropriate marital conduct and subsequently counter-complained for divorce alleging adultery. Wife amended her countercomplaint to request a legal separation or in the alternative an absolute divorce. The trial court granted Wife an absolute divorce based upon its finding of Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court awarded Wife alimony by requiring Husband to pay for Wife’s health insurance for three years and, thereafter, pay Wife $50.00 a month. The trial court ordered a property division and required Husband to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees. We affirm the award of divorce, distribution of marital property and debt, and award of attorney’s fees. We affirm the award of alimony in the amount of $50.00 a month but vacate the award of health insurance and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

Carol Knittig Hazen v. John Thurston Hazen
W2003-00778-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Russell

Wife filed the present divorce action seeking, inter alia, alimony. The trial court awarded Wife alimony in futuro based upon a perceived need rather than a demonstrative need. For the following reasons, we reverse.

State of Tennessee v. Kenneth H. Laws
E2003-01463-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

Defendant, Kenneth H. Laws, was indicted by the Washington County Grand Jury for aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and acquitted of false imprisonment. Defendant was sentenced to serve ten years in confinement. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. After reviewing the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Barbara Ann Rodgers (Riggs) v. Charles D. Rodgers, Jr.
E2003-01902-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William H. Inman, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Dale Young

Appellant filed a petition to reduce his child support obligation following his loss of employment as a mechanical engineer and his inability to find other employment. Relief was denied, notwithstanding that two children had attained their majority, and the petition was dismissed. Judgment reversed and case remanded.

Gary Baker v. Roane State Community College, et al.
M2003-01163-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This case involves the timeliness of a grievance filed by Appellant, an employee of Roane State Community College. The hearing officer determined that such grievance was not filed within the limitations period. Appellant appealed this decision to the Chancery Court of Davidson County, which affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. Appellant now appeals to this Court and we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Randy James
M2003-01599-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Allen W. Wallace

The Defendant, Randy James, pled guilty to felony possession of marijuana. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The issue before us is whether the trial court erred by not suppressing the fruits of a search where there were alleged false statements in the affidavit supporting the search warrant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Joann Mallinak Glassell v. Richard Lee Glassell
E2003-01602-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Sharon J. Bell

Joann Mallinak Glassell ("Plaintiff") was represented by attorney James M. Crain ("Crain") throughout divorce proceedings she filed against Richard Lee Glassell ("Defendant"). After a trial, the Trial Court ordered the equity from the sale of the marital residence to be divided equally between the parties. The Trial Court then applied various off-sets to the amount awarded Plaintiff, thereby reducing the net amount of Plaintiff's recovery to $0.00. The Trial Court concluded that Crain's attorney's fee lien was lower in priority to the various off-sets. Crain appeals, claiming the Trial Court improperly subordinated his attorney's fee lien to the off-sets and that his lien should be given priority. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court and affirm as modified.

State of Tennessee v. Brian Douglas Williams
W2003-00803-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roger A. Page

The Appellant, Brian Douglas Williams, appeals the decision of the Madison County Circuit Court revoking his probation. In August 2002, Williams entered “best interest” pleas to stalking, harassment, and aggravated assault and received an effective eight-year sentence. These sentences were suspended, and he was placed on supervised probation. On October 18, 2002, a warrant was issued, alleging that Williams had violated a condition of his probation by contacting the victim. After a hearing, Williams was found to be in violation of his probation, and his original consecutive sentences to the Department of Correction and the County Workhouse were reinstated. On appeal, Williams argues that the evidence fails to establish that he violated his probation. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Allen Blankenship, D/B/A Skullbone Music Park, Inc., v. Gibson County and county Commissioners, et al.
W2003-00735-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Michael Maloan

This is a zoning case. The property owner applied to re-zone the property from agricultural to business. The Tennessee Department of Economic and Community Development and the county planning commission recommended that the County Commission deny the property owner’s application. The County Commission voted to deny the application. The plaintiff/appellant property owner filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in chancery court, seeking to overturn the decision. The defendant/appellee County Commission filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. The property owner now appeals. We affirm, finding no genuine issue of material fact and that the County Commission had a rational basis for its decision.
 

Albert Thompson v. Johnny W. Sanders, Melinda Thompson, Gayle Sanders, and Ez Cash I, II, III, IV, and V, L.L.C.
W2003-00139-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Russell

The issue in this case is whether we have subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. The plaintiff sued the defendants for, among other things, breach of contract, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On July 15, 2002, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Thirty-two (32) days later, on August 16, 2002, the plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend, and the plaintiff now appeals. This Court, sua sponte, asked the parties for supplemental briefs regarding whether the appeal was timely. In light of the undisputed facts, we must hold that the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend was untimely and, consequently, that the plaintiff’s notice of appeal was untimely. Therefore, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction
 

SUSAn J. Smith v. S-R of Tennessee
W2003-01733-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Janice M. Holder, J.
Trial Court Judge: Martha B. Brasfield, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-225(e) (3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, Employer argues that the trial court's award of benefits based on 55% permanent partial disability to the right upper extremity and 45% permanent partial disability to the left upper extremity is excessive and is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. We conclude that the evidence fails to preponderate against the trial court's award, and therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed JANICE M. HOLDER, J., in which ROBERT L. CHILDERS, SP.J., and WILLIAM B. ACREE, SP. J., joined. William B. Walk, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, S-R of Tennessee. J. Thomas Caldwell, Ripley, Tennessee, for the appellee, Susan J. Smith. MEMORANDUM OPINION FACTUAL BACKGROUND At the time of trial, the appellee, Susan J. Smith ("Employee"), was fifty-nine years old. She has a high school education. Employee has been a housewife and has performed secretarial work. She also has worked on a conveyor line, built furniture, and stocked and packed compact disks. In December 1999, Employee began working at S-R of Tennessee ("Employer") as an inspector on an inspection line. In April 2, Employee saw Dr. Salman Saeed with complaints of neck pain and pain in the hands. He performed a nerve conduction study, and the results were consistent with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. In November 2, Employee saw Dr. Michael Heck, a panel physician, complaining of bilateral wrist pain. Dr. Heck performed a carpal tunnel release on Employee's right wrist in November 2, and in January 21, he performed a carpal tunnel release on her left wrist. Dr. Heck found no permanent impairment as a result of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Employee was later diagnosed as having a separate injury to her right wrist (a tear of the triangular fibrocartilage complex ("TFCC ")), and Dr. William L. Bourland performed surgery for this problem in August 21. He assigned a 5% anatomical impairment rating for this injury. Dr. Joseph Boals, III, who performed an independent medical evaluation of Employee, assigned an anatomical impairment rating to each upper extremity based upon bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and assigned an additional impairment rating to the right upper extremity for the TFCC tear. He rated Employee's anatomical impairment at 19% to the right upper extremity and 1% to the left upper extremity. Dr. Boals explained that he assessed Employee's impairment using the most recent edition of the AMA Guides. In February 23, Dr. Saeed performed another nerve conduction study, and it showed that although Employee evidenced "mild improvement" from the earlier study in 2, she continues to have symptoms of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. He opined that these injuries are permanent. Employee returned to full-duty work for Employer. However, Employer later laid off a substantial number of people, including Employee. Employee testified that she continues to have pain, numbness and weakness in her right hand, despite the surgery. She said that she wears a brace on her hand while driving but that she still experiences pain when turning or twisting her arm. She stated that she has difficulty squeezing, cutting, grasping, using power tools and doing fine needlework. Employee also said that she cannot take the top off a soda bottle or a jar and cannot lift heavy plates. In addition, she explained that she is unable to cast a fishing rod or throw a Frisbee with her dog. She still hurts "all the time." The trial court found that Employee sustained a vocational impairment of 55% permanent partial disability to the right upper extremity and a 45% permanent partial disability to the left upper extremity.1 1An injury to both arms is a scheduled injury. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-27 (3)(A)(ii)(w) (1999). To conform to the statute, a trial court should average the disability rating to each upper extremity in order to make a single award for both arms. Scales v. City of Oak Ridge, 53 S.W .3d 649, 651 n.1 (Tenn. 21); Drennon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 897 S.W .2d 243, 247 (Tenn. W orkers' Comp. Panel 1994). W e note, however, that properly calculated, the total number of weeks of benefits would remain the same. -2-

Catina L. Fason v. Spherion
W2003-02406-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Janice M. Holder, J.
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-225(e) (3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, Employer argues that the trial court's finding that Employee's injury was causally related to her October 2, 2 accident is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. We conclude that the evidence fails to preponderate against the trial court's award, and therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed JANICE M. HOLDER, J., in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, J., and ALLEN W. WALLACE, SR. J., joined. Joshua M. Booth, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Spherion. Christopher L. Taylor, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Catina L. Fason. MEMORANDUM OPINION FACTUAL BACKGROUND Catina L. Fason ("Employee") was 23 years old at the time of trial. She has a high school diploma, and her work history consists mainly of positions as cashier, hostess, and waitress. In August 2, Employee began working for Spherion ("Employer"), a temporary service. On October 2, 2, Employee was involved in an accident at work during which she injured her right arm when she unplugged a computer and was shocked. Employee complained of pain, tingling, numbness, and discoloration in her right arm following the electrical shock. She filled out an incident report with her left hand and then was taken to an emergency room. Employee was later seen by a panel physician who referred her to Dr. Cape, a neurologist, for a nerve conduction study. Dr. Cape examined Employee on November 9, 2. He opined that although Employee had "very, very mild carpal tunnel syndrome," her injury on October 2, 2, did not have any causal relationship to the carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Cape noted that Employee did not exhibit hypersensitivity in her right arm and hand, that Employee's skin did not have any changes to indicate a severe shock, and that the nerves that would have been expected to be affected by receiving an electrical shock while unplugging an electrical cord, the nerves of the index and middle fingers, were completely normal. He testified that Employee was not a candidate for carpal tunnel surgery when he saw her and that he could not have assigned Employee an anatomical impairment rating based upon the results of his examination. Employee continued to experience problems with her right arm, so she sought treatment from her family physician, Dr. Faulkner. Dr. Faulkner referred her to Dr. Lindermuth, who performed a carpal tunnel release in January 22. Employee said that although she experienced some relief following the surgery, she has had ongoing problems with pain and numbness. Dr. Joseph C. Boals, III, performed an independent medical examination of Employee in August 22. He noted that Employee had a positive Phalen's test, decreased sensation, and swelling in her right hand. Dr. Boals opined that Employee's carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by the electrical shock she received on October 2, 2. He admitted that a diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of a shock injury is "rare," that he made the diagnosis "simply by association," and that he is unfamiliar with any medical literature that documents this phenomenon. However, Dr. Boals stated that he has personally seen about ten other patients who had no carpal tunnel syndrome symptoms until after receiving an electrical shock. Dr. Boals assigned Employee a 2% permanent physical impairment rating to her right upper extremity. Employee stated that she had no significant problems with her right arm prior to receiving the electrical shock at work. She testified that pain, numbness, and tingling in her right arm continues. Employee said that she has difficulty cooking, cleaning, driving, lifting her child, combing her hair, and opening jars. She also said that her sleep has been affected because she awakens at night with numbness and pain. The trial court found that Employee's injury was causally related to her employment and awarded Employee benefits based upon a 5% permanent partial disability to her right arm. ANALYSIS Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (Supp. 23). Where medical testimony differs, it is within the -2-

In Re: B.B. & T.S.B.
M2003-01234-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald P. Harris

This appeal involves a petition filed by the Department of Children’s Services to terminate the parental rights of Mother to two of her minor children. The trial court granted the petition and Mother appeals the decision. Because we find there was not clear and convincing evidence of a ground for termination, we reverse the judgment.

In Re: B.B. & T.S.B. - Concurring
M2003-01234-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald P. Harris

I concur in the judgment that grounds for termination of parental rights in this case are not
established by clear and convincing evidence.

Jeffrey P. Hopmayer v. Aladdin Industries, L.L.C.
M2003-01583-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Plaintiff filed suit alleging Defendant breached its employment contract by failing to provide Plaintiff with phantom units when Plaintiff was terminated without cause. Defendant denied that Plaintiff's phantom units had vested, and therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to any phantom units at the time of his termination. The trial court found that the letter memorializing the Defendant's offer of employment was sufficiently definite and met the other requirements for a valid contract, including mutual assent. The trial court also found that the terms of the employment contract did not include any vesting requirements for Plaintiff's phantom units. As a result, the trial court found that Defendant had breached its employment contract and awarded Plaintiff the value of his phantom units contained in the employment agreement plus pre-judgment interest dating back to Plaintiff's termination. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

Venessa Baston v. State of Tennessee
E2003-02471-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Eugene Eblen

The petitioner appeals the denial of her post-conviction relief petition relating to her guilty plea to felony murder for which she received a life sentence. On appeal, the petitioner contends: (1) she received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) her guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Jason Walker
E2003-01954-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

On December 17, 2001, Defendant, Jason D. Walker, entered a guilty plea in the Blount County Circuit Court to statutory rape. Defendant was sentenced as a Range I offender to two years to be suspended on supervised probation. Defendant was ordered, as a condition of his probation, to attend a sex offender treatment program, establish paternity of the child resulting from the offense, and pay child support. A probation violation warrant was issued. Following a revocation hearing, Defendant was sentenced to serve thirty days of his sentence in confinement and the remainder on probation. Additional probation violation warrants were subsequently issued. Following another revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation and ordered that Defendant serve the balance of his original sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals the trial court's revocation of probation. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Hein
E2003-01793-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

The defendant, Christopher Kevan Hein, was charged with the first degree murder of his girlfriend and convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to two years in the Department of Correction, which had already been served by the conclusion of the trial. In this timely filed appeal as of right, he raises the following five issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in precluding the defense from introducing taped statements that an unavailable witness, Thomas Hendrix, made to an undercover informant and to a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation ("TBI") agent in which he described his participation in the burning of the victim's body and stated that the murder was committed by George Cate; (2) whether the trial court erred in precluding the defense from introducing Cate's statements to law enforcement officers; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing an officer who was not qualified as an expert witness to express his opinion regarding the tendency of suspects during interrogation to minimize their involvement in crimes; (4) whether the trial court erred in precluding the defense from calling an expert witness to rebut the officer's opinion; and (5) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence of the defendant's application for food stamps, in contravention of state and federal law. Having reviewed the record and found no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State Resources Corporation v. Thomas E. Talley
W2003-01775-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor George R. Ellis

Appellee purchased Appellant’s overdue Note from FDIC, who was receiver of The Bank
of Alamo. Appellee sought to enforce the Note and trial court entered Judgment for Appellee.
Appellant contends that Appellee had no right to enforce the Note because Appellee was not a holder in due course. Since no defenses to enforcement were raised by Appellant, the question of whether Appellee is a holder in due course is irrelevant. We affirm.
 

Lilliam E. Griffis, et al., v. Davidson County Metropolitan Government, D/B/A Davidson County Board of Education
M2003-00230-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carol L. Mccoy

This is an appeal from the grant of Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, involving the interpretation of a 1908 Deed, which created a fee simple determinable with a possibility of reverter. Finding that the reversionary language was triggered upon the property ceasing to be used as a classroom facility, we reverse and grant summary judgment to the non-moving Appellants.

Raymond E. Rollins, Jr., et al., v. The Electric Power Board of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davison County, et al.
M2003-00865-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. L. Rogers

This appeal concerns a complaint of negligence filed by the appellants Raymond and Sharon Rollins against the Electric Power Board of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County (NES). The alleged negligence involved the cutting and removal by NES of three trees on the appellants' property. The Rollins appeal the trial court's final order in favor of NES. We affirm.