Gilbert Lee Smith v. Betty Darmohray
In this appeal a father seeks review of the juvenile court's refusal to modify his child support obligation. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcin Mikolajczak
The appellant, Marcin Piotr Mikolajczak, pled nolo contendere to a charge of rape. As part of the plea agreement the appellant was sentenced as a standard offender for a Class B felony with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to serve eight years with the Department of Correction at 100% as a violent offender, without probation, split confinement or other alternative sentencing. The appellant now appeals alleging that the trial court erred in not granting alternative sentencing. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Jay Hooker v. Don Sundquist, de Facto Governor of Tennessee, in His Individual Capacity, in His Capacity as Candidate
This case involves Rule 11 sanctions. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit challenging the practice of serving meat and drink at political fund raisers, alleging that the practice violates Article X, section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, based in part on the fact that the plaintiff had previously filed similar lawsuits against other defendants upon the same constitutional grounds, and that these prior lawsuits had been dismissed. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants then filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure. This motion was denied. The defendants appealed, and this Court reversed the denial of sanctions and remanded the case to the trial court. On remand, the trial court imposed as a sanction a screening mechanism whereby any complaint filed by the plaintiff within the next two years must be reviewed by a special master to ensure that it is not legally frivolous or duplicative. The plaintiff now appeals that order, claiming that the sanction imposed violates his constitutional rights. We affirm, concluding that the sanction imposed is reasonable and does not deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: B.N.S.
This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a twelve-year-old child. The Hamilton County Juvenile Court placed the child in the custody of her uncle and aunt because she was chronically absent from school. The uncle and aunt later moved to Marion County. After the uncle and aunt decided that they no longer desired to have custody of the child, the Marion County Juvenile Court placed the child in the custody of the Department of Children's Services. Approximately fifteen months later, the Department filed a petition in the Marion County Juvenile Court to terminate the biological parents' parental rights. The juvenile court granted the termination petition after overruling the mother's objection that the petition should not have been filed in Marion County. The child's mother has appealed. We have determined that the order must be reversed because venue for this termination proceeding does not lie in Marion County. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
John W. Johnson v. Bernice Wade
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of certain real property abutting the parcels of two neighboring landowners in Gibson County, Tennessee. The trial court rendered a judgment for Appellee finding that Appellee owned the disputed property. Additionally, the trial court awarded Appellee her attorney’s fees incurred in defending against and counter-suing the Appellant. We affirm the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Chris Birdwell, and wife Virginia Birdwell, v. David Psimer and Patty S. Psimer
Action for Judgment on loan was defended on grounds defendant sold note to plaintiffs. The Trial Court held agreements violated statute of frauds and plaintiff failed to prove loan. On appeal, we reverse.Action for Judgment on loan was defended on grounds defendant sold note to plaintiffs. The Trial Court held agreements violated statute of frauds and plaintiff failed to prove loan. On appeal, we reverse. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
James Kelley v. Middle Tennessee Emergency Physicians
We granted review to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants in this medical malpractice lawsuit. The trial court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that, as a matter of law, no physician-patient relationship existed. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. After careful review of the record before us and the applicable authorities, we conclude that there are disputed issues of fact as to the existence of a physician-patient relationship, and we therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Castleton Capital Company, LLC. v. Lucius E. Burch, III
The Plaintiff filed suit seeking to recover a deficiency on a loan executed by the Defendant and another left owing after foreclosure upon real estate. The Defendant had purchased a parcel of real estate from a company in which he was a director, and had assumed responsibility for repayment of a loan secured by that real estate. The Defendant denied liability, and alleged mutual mistake and negligent misrepresentation surrounding the loan against the lender because the loan documents he signed contained language regarding cross-collateralization involving a separate parcel of real estate formerly owned by the company in which the Defendant was a director, which real estate was sold two days prior to assumption of the loan obligations by the Defendant. Following a bench trial, the Chancellor granted judgment for the Plaintiff for $134,127.65 and attorneys' fees totaling $73,417.37, for a total judgment of $207,545.02. The Defendant appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Great River Insurance v. Edison Automation, Inc.
The Plaintiff filed suit for Declaratory Judgment seeking the order of the Court declaring that losses suffered by the insured were not covered losses under a general policy of business insurance. At issue is the interpretation of the insurance contract and a determination as to whether insurance coverage existed where the insured expended money and time fabricating parts for a custom project upon the mistaken belief that it had obtained a sub-contract, but where no such agreement existed inasmuch as the purchase order upon which the insured relied was forged by an employee of the insured. Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by each party. The Trial Court granted the insurance company's motion for Summary Judgment, from which the insured appealed. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the Trial Court, and also determine that Declaratory Judgment should be granted in favor of the insurance company, determining that no coverage exists for the loss suffered by the insured. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William W. York v. Tennessee Board of Parole
Appellant is an inmate of the Department of Corrections serving two life sentences for two first degree murder convictions with sentences imposed in 1978. He became eligible for parole, and on July 3, 2001, a hearing was held before the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole. His application for parole was denied on July 3, 2001 and review of parole was set for July of 2011. Final disposition denying parole was entered October 2, 2001. On October 29, 2001, Appellant petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, which petition was dismissed by the trial court on January 10, 2003. We affirm the trial court Order of Dismissal relative to the merits of the denial of parole but hold that postponement of parole review until July of 2011 was an arbitrary exercise of power by the parole board and, therefore, reverse the Order of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Matthew Stalcup
The defendant, Matthew Stalcup, pled guilty in the Union County Criminal Court to reckless vehicular homicide, a Class C felony, and driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent for the DUI conviction and prohibited him from driving for one year. After a sentencing hearing for the reckless vehicular homicide conviction, the trial court sentenced him to five years to be served as one year in jail and the remainder suspended upon his serving ten years on supervised probation. The trial court also prohibited him from driving for ten years, ordered that the five-year sentence be served consecutively to the eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence, and ordered that the ten-year driving prohibition be served concurrently to the one-year prohibition. The defendant appeals his sentence for reckless vehicular homicide, claiming (1) that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion, (2) that the trial court erred by denying his request for full probation, (3) that the trial court improperly weighed enhancement and mitigating factors, (4) that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the five-year sentence consecutively to the eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence, and (5) that the trial court's prohibiting him from driving for ten years is excessive. We affirm the sentence, except we conclude that the defendant should be prohibited from driving for five years. |
Union | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert James Yoreck, III and State of Tennessee v. Renne Efren Arellano AND State of Tennessee v. Mario C. Estrada
We granted permission to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals had the authority to vacate convictions arising out of plea agreements when the defendants sought sentence review only. We hold that while the Court of Criminal Appeals had the authority to review issues beyond the sentencing issues raised on appeal, the court erred by finding plain error and vacating the convictions. Additionally, we find that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to accept the guilty plea agreements in these cases. Accordingly, we reinstate the convictions imposed by the trial court and remand the cases to the Court of Criminal Appeals for consideration of the defendants’ sentencing issues. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee and Department of Children's Services v. Woodrow Wilson, Jr. and Debra Wilson
We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-151 bars the State from recovering retroactive child support more than forty-five days prior to the filing of a petition seeking such support. We hold that section 37-1-151 unambiguously requires a trial court to set child support retroactive to the date a child is placed in State custody. The statute does not include any limitation on the length of time for which retroactive support may be due, and a trial judge has no discretion to deviate from the statutorily imposed period of retroactive support. Retroactive child support is to be set according to the child support guidelines, but deviation from the guideline amount is allowable if based upon a finding that applying the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court. |
Warren | Supreme Court | |
Gloria Windsor v. DeKalb County Board of Education, et al.
This appeal involves an attempt by a dismissed tenured teacher to obtain common-law certiorari review of her dismissal. After voluntarily dismissing her own Petition for Review properly filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-513, she challenges the chancellor's Order dismissing her Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari. We affirm the action of the trial court. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
William Patrick Robinson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, William Patrick Roberson, pled guilty to first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life without the possibility of parole. The Petitioner did not appeal his convictions or his sentence and later filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily given. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, holding that it failed to state a factual basis for the grounds alleged. Based upon our de novo review, we conclude that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition because the petition adequately states a factual basis for ineffective assistance of counsel and the involuntariness of his guilty plea. Accordingly, we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand to the post-conviction court for appointment of counsel and the opportunity for counsel to amend the petition. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patrick N. Lawson v. Bridget O'Malley
This case involves the subject matter jurisdiction of Juvenile Court. The mother and the father were divorced by final decree entered in Chancery Court in 1990. The final Chancery Court decree provided that the mother would have custody of the parties’ two children, and that the father would pay child support to the mother. Subsequently, the father filed a dependency and neglect action in Juvenile Court, and he was awarded permanent custody of the children. Subsequently, he filed a petition in the Juvenile Court below for child support. The Juvenile Court granted the father’s petition, ordering the mother to pay child support to the father. The mother now appeals. We reverse, finding that the Juvenile Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide matters of child support between these parties, because the Chancery Court had previously assumed jurisdiction over such issues. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charlie Spell, III D/B/A CNS Management, et al., v. Patti Labelle, et al.
Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based upon an arbitration provision contained in the parties’ contract. The trial court entered an order staying litigation pending arbitration but found the site provision, providing that all disputes shall be settled by arbitration in Chicago, Illinois, unconscionable. The trial court reformed the parties’ contract so that the arbitration would be governed by Tennessee law and occur in Memphis, Tennessee. Defendants appealed this decision. We reverse in part, affirm in part and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Monumental Life Insurance Company v. Linda Elain Donoho, et al.
In this interpleader action, two former spouses of the decedent who are mothers of the decedent's three surviving children filed conflicting claims under two marital dissolution agreements alleging beneficial interests in a $50,000 life insurance policy. One claimed an interest for herself; the other claimed an interest for her two children. The matters in dispute arise from inconsistencies in marital dissolution agreements resulting from the decedent's two divorces, and pertain to the duty of the decedent to maintain life insurance and the beneficiary designations. The trial court granted one of two competing motions for summary judgment ruling against the second wife by dividing the proceeds equally among the decedent's three children. We reverse and modify holding that the second wife, not the decedent's third child, was the designated beneficiary of the disputed policy pursuant to the second marital dissolution agreement and that the decedent's first two children had vested interests in the insurance proceeds as mandated by the first marital dissolution agreement. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Howard Fisher v. State of Tennessee
An inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction filed a claim in the Tennessee Claims Commission for the loss of seventy-eight cartons of cigarettes, which he alleged were removed from his prison cell during a search. The Commission denied his claim. We affirm the Claims Commission. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Carla Prince
Following a jury trial, the defendant, Carla Juanita Prince, was convicted of DUI, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor. She was sentenced, respectively, to eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended except for forty-eight hours, and six months, suspended except for forty-eight hours. The two forty-eight-hour jail terms were ordered to be served consecutively, and the probationary terms were ordered to be served concurrently. Additionally, her driver's license was revoked for one year and she was fined a total of $360. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for DUI. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: A.M.F and Z.T.F, State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Lisa Frazier, et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The parents appeal from the order of the Juvenile Court of Maury County, terminating their parental rights. Specifically, the parents assert that the grounds cited for termination are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Abernathy
The Defendant, Jonathan Abernathy, Jr., was convicted by a jury of tampering with evidence. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not suppressing testimony of police officers regarding the actions they witnessed the Defendant take during their search of his residence. He contends that the search was illegal because the search warrant that the officers executed at his residence was invalid; therefore, the officers should have been precluded from testifying as to what they witnessed while they were at the Defendant's residence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dept of Children's Srvcs v. Juanita Culbertson; In the Matter of W.J.R.C. and S.D.H.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals from the order of the Juvenile Courtof Marshall County, terminating her parental rights. Specifically, Mother asserts that the grounds cited for termination are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
The Lauderdale County Bank v. Lisa Wiggins, et al.
Plaintiff Lauderdale County Bank filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the obligations of the parties arising from its payment of a forged check. The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendant Newcourt Financial, holding Newcourt Financial was entitled to the proceeds of the check. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Eldridge
The defendant appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing there was no substantial evidence he violated the terms of his probation, the trial court erred in allowing his probation officer to testify that he failed a drug screen, and the reinstatement of his original sentence resulted in too harsh a punishment under the circumstances of his case. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals |