Cher Lynn Hogue v. Joseph Hogue
Chancellor found father of minor child, who told child he is gay, in contempt for violating restraining order which prohibited father "from taking the child around or otherwise exposing the child to his gay lover(s) and/or his gay lifestyle." Father appeals, asserting the restraining order was overbroad and/or vague, not issued pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.03, and had expired prior to the alleged offense. While we find the restraining order was issued properly and not overly broad, we find the father's act of telling child he is gay did not violate the restraining order as written. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David C. Beats
The defendant, David C. Beats, was convicted of theft over $10,000.00 and received a ten-year suspended sentence. After a positive drug screen, the trial court revoked probation and ordered service of the original sentence. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. The judgment is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Wilkerson v. Ifeatu Ekelem
This case involves a dispute between a Williamson County property owner who decided to oversee the construction of his own house and the masonry contractor he hired to do the brick work on the project. The brick mason filed suit in the Williamson County Chancery Court claiming the property owner had breached the parties' oral agreement by failing to pay the balance due under the agreement. The property owner responded by claiming it was the brick mason who had breached the contract, accusing the brick mason of failing to finish the work in a professional manner, and charging the brick mason with slander. The trial court found in favor of the brick mason on his breach of contract claim, rejected the property owner's claims, and entered a $29,268.99 judgment in favor of the brick mason. The property owner appealed. We concur with the trial court's finding that the property owner breached the contract and, therefore, affirm the judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wilbur Deck, Jr.
A Dickson County jury convicted the Defendant, Wilbur Leon Deck, Jr., of Driving Under the Influence of an Intoxicant ("DUI"), second offense. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, which it suspended after the Defendant served ninety days in jail. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the presentment because the caption of the presentment stated the incorrect term of the grand jury. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Phillips. v. United Services Automobile Association
Charles C. Phillips, Jr. sued United Services Automobile Association ("USAA") under his homeowners insurance policy. His suit was prompted by USAA's denial of coverage for water damage to the plaintiff's house. The plaintiff claims that the damage was due to water seepage as a direct result of the faulty design or negligent installation of the synthetic stucco system applied to the exterior of his house. The plaintiff amended his complaint, seeking class certification for all other USAA insureds who had sustained similar losses caused by the failure of synthetic stucco material and whose claims had been denied by USAA. Following a bench trial on the issues of coverage and class certification, the trial court determined that the plaintiff's policy provided coverage for the water damage that ensued as a result of water penetrating the stucco exterior. In addition, the trial court ordered that a class of plaintiffs be conditionally certified. USAA appeals the finding of coverage. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Danny R. Blalock v. Carolyn S. Blalock
A mediated agreement provided that Husband would sell his one-half interest in Pigeon Forge property to Wife for $500,000.00, but if the purchase price was not paid in one year, the property would be sold at auction and the net proceeds divided. The property was sold at auction for $244,429.00, net. Wife claims this amount plus $255,271.00 and the trial court agreed. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Fred M. Leonard v. Knox County, Tennessee, et al.
This is an inverse condemnation claim brought by Fred M. Leonard ("Plaintiff") against the City of Knoxville (the "City") and Knox County (the "County"). Plaintiff sought damages to his property resulting from flooding which occurred during and after construction to Gleason Road in Knoxville. The Trial Court granted the County's motion for summary judgment because the County had no involvement with the road construction and because the construction occurred solely within the City's limits on a city street. The Trial Court granted Plaintiff's motion seeking to prohibit the City from introducing evidence at trial pertaining to the deed between the City and Plaintiff's predecessor in title, which the City claimed estopped Plaintiff from pursuing this litigation. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff for $50,000 and concluded that Plaintiff's action was not barred by the applicable one year statute of limitations. We affirm the grant of summary judgment to the County and the jury's verdict that this action was filed timely. We conclude, however, that the Trial Court erred when it prohibited the City from introducing the deed and evidence concerning whether that deed operated to estop Plaintiff from pursuing this action. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Gabriel Antonio Clark v. State of Tennessee
Gabriel Antonio Clark appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas Brandon Booker v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the Hardin County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) due process violations as to the jury venire. We conclude that the petitioner was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, and the petitioner’s other claims have been waived. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dexter Lineberry
The defendant, Dexter Lineberry, was convicted by a Wayne County jury of assault, a Class B misdemeanor, and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six months with all but ninety days suspended for the assault conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days with all but ninety days suspended for the evading arrest charge, with the sentences to be served concurrently. In this appeal as of right, the defendant presents two issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for assault; and (2) whether the ninety-day jail sentence was appropriate. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas Edward Reddick v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Thomas Edward Reddick, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to second degree murder and received a sentence of twenty-eight years imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which petition the post-conviction court dismissed for failure to state a colorable claim for relief. The petitioner appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we dismiss the petitioner's appeal as being untimely. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Curtis E. Duke v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Curtis E. Duke, was convicted of two counts of the sale of crack cocaine, one count of possession of crack cocaine with the intent to sell, two counts of criminal impersonation, and one count of failure to appear. As a result, he was sentenced to 39 years in the Department of Correction. See State v. Curtis Emery Duke, No. M2000-00350-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 252080 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Mar. 14, 2001), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Mar. 27, 2001). In this pro se post-conviction petition, the petitioner presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in finding that the petitioner waived the amendment of the indictment regarding variance; (2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the petitioner's convictions were not obtained in violation of double jeopardy; (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the petitioner; and (4) whether the petitioner received effective assistance of counsel. Because the first three issues should have been addressed on direct appeal, we conclude that they are waived. Further, petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel. We therefore affirm the trial court's dismissal of the post-conviction petition. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marc Adolph Lewin
The appellant, Marc Adolph Lewin, pled guilty to obtaining a controlled substance by fraud, for which he received an eight-year suspended sentence. He was ordered to serve eight years of supervised probation with the conditions that the probation be supervised for a minimum of four years, completion of three hundred hours of public service work, and payment of costs on a schedule prepared by a probation officer. After the issuance of a probation violation warrant based on the appellant's failure of a drug screen, the appellant was ordered to serve his sentence in incarceration. He appeals the revocation of probation arguing that the trial court erred by basing its decision on allegations that were not supported by the evidence and an unsubstantiated laboratory report. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marquez Crenshaw v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Marquez Crenshaw, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his five especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, his especially aggravated robbery conviction, and his aggravated burglary conviction and resulting effective sentence of twenty-seven years. He claims he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, primarily regarding the failure to present alibi evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby R. Posey, and wife, Sabrina Posey, and Dale Teague, v. Dryvit Systems, Inc.
In this class action, the Trial Court refused to permit Homebuilders and individual claimants to intervene. On appeal, we reverse as to Homebuilders, but affirm as to the individual claimants. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Blake Burton and Michael Burton, v. Hardwood Pallets, Inc., Robert McKenzie and Edwin Reeves
The Trial Court granted defendants Summary Judgment on claims of fraud in the inducement to contract. On appeal, we Affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of B.E.D.
The biological, custodial parent of a minor child appeals the juvenile court’s award of visitation rights to the child’s adult half-sister. We find no authority granting an adult sibling visitation rights to a minor child. We accordingly vacate the juvenile court’s order. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chris Cawood
The controversy here concerns certain audio and videotapes which were introduced in a bench trial and marked as exhibits. Following this Court's rejection of the State's application for Rule 11 review, the Court of Criminal Appeals, on motion of the appellee, entered an order returning this evidence to the "permanent possession" of the appellee. The issue framed and briefed by the parties requires us to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' order returning the tapes to the appellee was consistent with statutes and regulations applicable to the retention and disposal of such evidence. At the threshold, however, we are confronted by an issue neither raised nor briefed by the parties: whether the Court of Criminal Appeals had subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the motion in the first place. Upon consideration, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the motion for the following reasons: 1. The Supreme Court was the last court to exercise jurisdiction (prior to the motion) in its rejection of the State's Rule 11 application; 2. The case was not remanded; and 3. The mandate had issued. Additionally, in response to the issue raised and briefed by the parties, we hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 18-3-111 and Records Disposition Authorization (RDA) Number 1672, which control the disposition of the evidence at issue here, do not authorize the method of record disposition sought to be accomplished in the case under review. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is vacated. |
Roane | Supreme Court | |
Charles Crenshaw, pro se., v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Reginald D. Hughes, pro se., v. David Mills, Warden
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. A review of the record reveals that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Jolly v. Lynette Jolly
This appeal arises out of divorce proceedings brought in the District Court of Johnson County, Kansas, and the Chancery Court of McNairy County, Tennessee. In dividing the parties' real property, the chancery court reduced Husband's share by the amount of the child support arrearage and discovery-related sanction assessed by the Kansas court in its decree of divorce. We granted permission to appeal. We conclude that the chancery court erred in enforcing a decree that was not properly registered under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the chancery court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
McNairy | Supreme Court | |
Larry E. Parrish et al. v. Robert S. Marquis et al.
We granted this appeal to determine whether the one-year statute of limitations for filing a new action under Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-105(a) commenced on the date of the appellate court's judgment remanding the cause to the trial court for further proceedings or on the date of the trial court's order of dismissal following the remand. We hold that the statute of limitations commenced on the date of the trial court's order of dismissal and that the plaintiffs' re-filing of their action was therefore timely under the savings statute. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of issues pretermitted by its ruling. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael W. Maples
A Blount County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Michael W. Maples, of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent twenty-five-year sentences for the two convictions. In this appeal, the defendant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) that his sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: UpperCumberland Development District, Conservator for Alvie Puckett, Gloria Evins v. Helen Puckett
Administrator Ad Litem for estate of deceased-grantor appeals trial court's finding that deceased grantor was competent at the time he executed a deed of real property to his daughter, and that he was not acting under undue influence at the time of execution. We affirm. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Joyce Hardaway, et al., v. Board of Education of the Hamilton County Schools
The City of Chattanooga abolished its school system which was then integrated into the Hamilton County system. Two and one-half years later the Plaintiffs, who were administrators in the City system, filed this action claiming that under Tennessee law their compensation was unlawfully reduced by the Board of Education of Hamilton County. The County insisted that the Commissioner of Education of Tennessee approved the Personnel Plan proposed by the Superintendent of Education of Hamilton, as required by law, and that the Plaintiffs were paid in accordance with the Plan. Moreover, the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the City and its teachers expired concurrently with the abolition of the school system, and the Plaintiffs’ salary agreement also expired. Further, the salary of Ms. Hardaway, paid by the City, was in excess of the negotiated amount, and the duties of Ms. Settles were substantially less burdensome in her new position. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |