Candace Fleck vs. Cooper Realty W2001-00465-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
Plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries at Mid Memphis Tower Building when she exited an elevator which failed to level. She and her husband sued the building's management company and the company that owns the manufacturer of the elevator. The suit against the elevator company alleges that the company was negligent "by failing to insure that the elevator in question was properly inspected, maintained, and repaired." The elevator company's interrogatories, inter alia, requested the identity of any expert witness the plaintiffs planned to use at trial. Plaintiffs answered this interrogatory in December, 1998: "Plaintiffs have not identified such individuals at this time." The interrogatories were never supplemented, and the case was set for trial on December 1, 1999. In October, 1999, the elevator company filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the lack of an expert witness prevented plaintiffs from proving essential elements of the case. Plaintiffs were granted additional time within which to obtain an expert witness and subsequently announced that plaintiffs did not intend to have an expert witness. The trial court granted summary judgment to the elevator company. Subsequently, the building's management company settled its case and upon dismissal of that suit, the grant of summary judgment became final. Plaintiff-wife appealed. We reverse.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Angela Phillips vs. William Phillips W2001-01685-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Daniel L. Smith
This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding wherein the parties had two minor children. While the divorce was pending, the trial court issued a temporary order outlining the custodial rights of the parties with respect to their children. The final decree of divorce adopted a permanent parenting plan and distributed the marital property and debts. The husband filed this appeal contesting the permanent parenting plan and the manner in which the marital debts were apportioned. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court
Indicted for the offense of premeditated first degree murder, defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-three years. In this appeal as of right, defendant presents the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when the state referred to defendant's being in jail pending trial; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting defendant's prior misdemeanor convictions for impeachment purposes; (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when the prosecutor misstated the evidence in final argument; (5) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when extraneous prejudicial information was present during jury deliberations; and (6) whether the sentence was excessive. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Madison
Court of Criminal Appeals
Debbie Risner vs. Nathan Harris W2001-01041-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: William B. Acree
This is an action to recover personal property. The plaintiff and defendant lived together for seventeen years. In November 1999, the plaintiff moved out. She left personal property in the trailer in which the couple was living, in the nearby convenience store owned by the defendant, and in a storage unit in another town. In August 2000, the convenience store caught on fire, and the plaintiff's personal property in the store was destroyed. Soon thereafter, the defendant took possession of the plaintiff's other personal property that had been held in the storage unit and called her to come get it. In November 2000, the plaintiff filed a warrant in general sessions court to recover her personal property from the defendant. She claimed that the defendant had prevented her from retrieving any of her personal property. She received a judgment which was appealed to circuit court. The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarded damages, and ordered the defendant to return certain items to the plaintiff. The defendant now appeals. We reverse the trial court's decision with respect to two of the items ordered returned and the property that the plaintiff had kept in the storage unit in another town, and affirm the remainder of the order.
This case involves a medical malpractice claim that was dismissed on summary judgment by the trial court. The plaintiff, Steffone McClendon, appealed to this Court, seeking a reversal of the trial court’s summary judgment. We affirmed the trial court’s decision based on the legislative history and our interpretation of Section 20-1-119 of the Tennessee code. The plaintiff sought a review of this Court’s decision with the Tennessee Supreme Court. Although the supreme court refused to hear the case, it remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co., Inc., 50 S.W. 3d 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) released this year by the middle section of this Court and recently published.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Harrison Driver v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. M2000-02944-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Gayden, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Don R. Ash, Judge
The employer argues that the employee's pre-existing condition was not advanced, progressed, or anatomically changed during his employment at Bridgestone. In the face of conflicting medical testimony, the trial court found in favor of the employee, awarding $13,766 for a 7% permanent disability to his body as a whole. Relying on the employee's own medical testimony as well as an opinion of one of the testifying physicians, concluding that the employee's injury more probably than not was a result of his employment, the Panel affirms the trial court's finding that the employee suffered a compensable injury while at work.
The defendant appeals the denial of probation for the five-year sentence he received for sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony. He asserts that the record fails to support a conclusion that the statutory presumption of his eligibility for alternative sentencing has been rebutted. We modify the term of confinement and order supervised probation forthwith and remand the case to the trial court for imposition of appropriate conditions.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Nathaniel Hampton v. Connecticut Indemnity Company W2000-02057-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr., Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee insists the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that he did not suffer a permanent injury. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (2) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed. JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and ROBERT L. CHILDERS, SP. J., joined. Steve Taylor, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Nathaniel Hampton Jeffery G. Foster, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Connecticut Indemnity Company MEMORANDUM OPINION On or about June 7, 1999, the employee or claimant, Hampton, strained his knee at work. He reported the accident to his employer, who provided medical care, including diagnostic testing and physical therapy. A Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan revealed no abnormality. Dr. James Varner viewed the test report and examined the claimant, but found no evidence of a permanent injury. Dr. Joseph Boals examined the claimant and found minimal tenderness over the injured knee and guessed the claimant's permanent impairment at 5 percent, based on subjective complaints. Accepting the medical testimony of Dr. Varner, the trial court found that the evidence failed to establish the probability of a permanent injury. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2). This tribunal is not bound by the trial court's findings but instead conducts an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance lies. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Serv., 822 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1991). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review, because it is the trial court which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and to hear the in-court testimony. Long v. Tri-Con Ind., Ltd., 996 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1999). The appellate tribunal, however, is as well situated to gauge the weight, worth and significance of deposition testimony as the trial judge. Walker v. Saturn Corp., 986 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tenn. 1998). The extent of an injured worker's vocational disability is a question of fact. Story v. Legion Ins. Co., 3 S.W.3d 45, 456 (Tenn. 1999). The claimant seeks an "in-depth review" of the evidence to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Shelby
Workers Compensation Panel
Town of Greeneville vs. Jack Cobble, et ux E2001-00869-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Kindall T. Lawson
Trial Court refused to grant partial summary judgment as to the extent of land taken. On appeal, we reverse.
Greene
Court of Appeals
E2001-01363-COA-R3-JV E2001-01363-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Tom Wright
Greene
Court of Appeals
Monroe Davis vs. State E2001-02032-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
The plaintiff, Monroe E. Davis is a prisoner in state custody. He filed a complaint with the Tennessee Claims Commission ("the Claims Commission") against the State of Tennessee and the warden of the facility at which he is incarcerated, seeking damages for the alleged detention and/or conversion of his personal property by the warden. The Claims Commission granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. We affirm.
Court of Appeals
Johnson vs. CCA W2001-00595-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
This is an appeal from an order of the trial court granting a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to ten counts of rape of a child. On appeal, the petitioner raises the issues of whether the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel and whether his guilty plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
The defendant appeals his premeditated first degree murder and abuse of a corpse convictions for which he received concurrent sentences of life imprisonment and two years, respectively, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in not enforcing a plea agreement; (2) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions; (3) hearsay evidence of the victim’s statements was erroneously admitted; (4) evidence obtained via wiretaps was erroneously admitted; (5) evidence regarding defendant’s alleged romantic relationship with a woman other than his wife was erroneously admitted; and (6) the trial court should have charged the jury regarding alibi. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I concur in all respects save one. I seriously question the conclusion that all of the victim’s statements to her mother were admissible as excited utterances. A declarant’s opinion about who caused an event would ordinarily not be admissible even if the declarant appeared and testified at a trial. Here, I do not believe that the victim’s opinion about who started the fire was admissible. However, given the location and timing of the fire, the inferences drawn by the victim as to the potential cause of it would be obvious to the jury in any event. Thus, I do not believe that the error affected the verdict.
The petitioner appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In his petition, he alleged that his conviction should be set aside because the victim had recanted his testimony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied relief and the petitioner appealed. After a thorough review, we affirm the court's order of denial.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Diana Noles v. Ameristeel Corporation W2001-00406-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: L. Terry Lafferty, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for a detailed analysis of the evidence in the trial record. The trial court in this cause found that Plaintiff sustained a thirty-five percent (35%) permanent partial disability to the right and left arm. Defendant, Ameristeel Corporation, appeals and asserts that the trial court's award of thirty-five percent (35%) permanent partial disability to each arm is excessive and not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. From our review of the entire record and applicable law, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed as modified. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed as Modified. L. TERRY LAFFERTY, SR. J., in which JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., and JANICE M. HOLDER, J., joined. John D. Burleson and L. Beth Williams, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ameristeel Corporation. Paul Todd Nicks, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Diana Noles. MEMORANDUM OPINION Diana Noles (Parker), age 43, a high school graduate, testified that she has a varied employment background since high school. Plaintiff has worked as an office employee as well as performing manual labor in factories. Prior to 1993, she lived in Addison, Illinois, and moved to Tennessee that year with her ex-husband.1 Prior to her employment with MRT and Defendant, who 1The Plaintiff was a single mother up and until her marriage three months prior to trial. took over MRT, Plaintiff worked for Johnson Controls in Lexington, Tennessee, testing seat tracks for cars. When Plaintiff went to work for MRT, she was a "B" operator. This work consisted of shoveling, squeegeeing off the floor, pulling samples, and driving a forklift and front end loader. She became an "A" operator in the control room, but when Defendant took over MRT, she was transferred back to a "B" operator. Plaintiff's primary work responsibility was to keep the seal pans clean, unload coal trucks, fill charge buckets, and shovel and hoe out the seal pans which would accumulate mud. Also, this cleaning process required the use of a three-inch vacuum hose. Twenty- five percent (25%) of her work consisted of this repetitive shoveling, hoeing and vacuuming of the seal pans. Prior to February of 1999, Plaintiff had no work-related injuries. In January 1999, she advised her supervisors that her right arm felt like dead weight and was numb. She saw her family doctor who advised her that she may have carpal tunnel and to advise her employer. The company sent her to see Dr. Kenneth Warren, who referred her to Dr. Ronald Bingham for carpal tunnel testing. As a result of the test, Dr. Warren referred Plaintiff to Dr. Claiborne Christian for carpal tunnel syndrome. Eventually, Dr. Christian performed surgery on her right arm on Friday, February 26, 1999. She returned to light duty the following Monday and remained on light duty for six weeks. During this six weeks, Plaintiff was still seeing Dr. Christian every couple of weeks until she was returned to full duty. Her shoulder pain and numbness went away after surgery. Plaintiff testified that in June 1999, she began developing numbness and pain in her left hand. The company referred her back to Dr. Christian. After seeing Dr. Christian a number of times and having another test, Dr. Christian performed surgery on her left hand. Plaintiff returned to full duty in April 2. Since both surgeries, Plaintiff testified that she has re-occurring numbness/tingling, more in the right hand than the left. The numbness has affected her work and home chores in that while performing shoveling or vacuuming, she must stop and rest. She has not complained to her supervisors, as she does not want to sound "whiny." On behalf of Defendant, Mr. Jimmy Sloop, plant superintendent, testified that Plaintiff is one of his best employees. She does a good job, does not complain and approximately twenty-five percent (25%) of her work is repetitive. He would be happy to recommend her for an "A" operator position, but there are no openings and none seem to be available in the immediate future. Mr. Sloop confirmed that Plaintiff worked a twelve-hour shift, three days a week and averaged 1.3 hours of overtime daily. MEDICAL EVIDENCE Plaintiff was seen, initially, by Dr. Warren on February 9, 1999, who referred her to Dr. Bingham for a nerve conduction test. As a result of the test indicating severe entrapment neuropathy of the median nerve in right wrist, Dr. Warren referred Plaintiff to Dr. Christian for possible carpal tunnel release. Dr. Christian, an orthopedic specialist, filed a C-32, Department of Labor Standard Form Medical Report for Industrial Injuries on October 16, 2. Utilizing the AMA Guidelines for evaluation of permanent impairment, Dr. Christian opined that Plaintiff sustained a two percent (2%) -2-
Carroll
Workers Compensation Panel
Chantal Eldridge v. Putnam County M2000-02963-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Vernon Neal
This is a case about the Open Records Act as applied to the telephone records of a Drug Task Force. After the Chancery Court of Putnam County ordered the County to produce the records, the County appealed, arguing that the records fit an exception to the Act or that the County should be able at the plaintiff's expense to redact the records to delete confidential information. We modify the chancellor's order to allow the County to redact the records at their own expense.
Putnam
Court of Appeals
Christell Staggs v. William Sells, et al. M2000-03095-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull
This case involves a claim of negligent misrepresentation in the sale of a home. The trial court found that Defendants' statements and actions constituted negligent misrepresentation of the condition of the property resulting in $25,000.00 in damages to Plaintiff. However, the trial court also found, applying principles of comparative fault, that Defendants were 60% at fault and Plaintiff was 40% at fault. A judgment of $15,000 was, thus, assessed against Defendants. Defendants appeal the court's finding of negligent misrepresentations, as well as the amount of damages determined by the court to be suffered by Plaintiff. We affirm.
Putnam
Court of Appeals
Christell Staggs v. William Sells, et al. M2000-03095-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull
This case involves a claim of negligent misrepresentation in the sale of a home. The trial court found that Defendants' statements and actions constituted negligent misrepresentation of the condition of the property resulting in $25,000.00 in damages to Plaintiff. However, the trial court also found, applying principles of comparative fault, that Defendants were 60% at fault and Plaintiff was 40% at fault. A judgment of $15,000 was, thus, assessed against Defendants. Defendants appeal the court's finding of negligent misrepresentations, as well as the amount of damages determined by the court to be suffered by Plaintiff. We affirm.
Putnam
Court of Appeals
Michael Bruce Harris v. Magotteaux, Inc., et al M2000-03201-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Gayden, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer appeals the trial court's calculation of the workers' compensation award of permanent partial disability benefits using the employee's total medical impairment rating, as opposed to using only the medical impairment rating arising from the most recent injury. In addition, the employer's previous insurance carrier challenges the trial court's finding that it is equally liable along with the current insurance carrier for the employee's most recent injury and the employee's future medical benefits. The Panel concludes the award should be modified in part and reversed in part. We modify the trial court's judgment, finding that the employee is entitled to workers' compensation benefits solely for his most recent injury and award a 12% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. An employee cannot combine a claim for a new injury with a claim for reconsideration of a pre-existing workers' compensation award when the employee sustains an additional injury. We reverse the trial court's judgment, finding that Home Insurance Company, the previous insurance carrier, is not liable for benefits arising from the second injury. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Modified in Part and Reversed in Part. GAYDEN, SP. J., in which DROWOTA, J., and LOSER, SP. J., joined. Joseph W. Henry, Jr., Henry, Henry & Speer, Pulaski, Tennessee, for the appellant, Magotteaux, Inc. 1 Rankin P. Bennett, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Michael Bruce Harris William M. Billips, Ortale, Kelley, Herbert & Crawford, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Home Insurance Company and Home Indemnity Company MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee/appellee, Michael Bruce Harris, is a forty-year-old high school graduate, with no further schooling. He is married and has one child who is in the 12th grade. Since graduating from high school in 1978, the employee has held and performed jobs requiring a great deal of physical exertion. The employee worked at his first job at Torrington/ Fafnir from 1978 until 1988 as a material handler and equipment operator. In 1988, he started work for Magotteaux, Inc., the employer/appellant, as a field services technician. This job required the employee to drive a truck to various and distant locations throughout the country, erect equipment for the customer, and be on standby around the clock until the customer was satisfied. The employee would dismantle the machinery once the customer was finished and transport the equipment to the next location. The employee worked for the employer for 9_ years until his dismissal on January 11, 1999. Some time after the loss of his job, the employee and a friend borrowed $85, to open a retail package liquor store. The employee is presently working at this liquor store. While on the job working for the employer, the employee suffered two injuries to the same place in his back. No dispute exists as to whether the employee was on the job at the time of the injuries. Both injuries resulted in a ruptured disc on the right side at the L4/5 level of the spine and required laminectomies. The first injury occurred on June 13, 1994. Dr. Verne Allen, the neurosurgeon who performed the first laminectomy, assigned a 1% medical impairment rating in accordance with the Fourth Edition of the American Medical Association (AMA) Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. After the first injury, the employee returned to his job at the same or greater pay. He received a workers' compensation award in the amount of 25% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The trial court reached this number by multiplying the 1% medical impairment rating 2_ times, as allowed in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 241(a)(1)(2). The employee suffered his second injury on March 21, 1998, on a job site in Pennsylvania. Dr. Vaughan Allen, a neurosurgeon, performed the second laminectomy and assigned an additional 2% medical impairment rating in keeping with the Fourth Edition of the AMA Guides. In his deposition, Dr. Allen agreed that the total physical impairment rating of these two laminectomies would be 12% medical impairment to the body as a whole. The employee returned to work, again at the same or greater pay. Dr. Vaughan Allen placed restrictions on the employee's physical activities; specifically, no lifting over thirty pounds on a repetitive basis, fifty pounds occasionally, no repetitive bending, and no driving a truck for two hours without getting out and moving around. Dr. Allen ordered the employee not to drive a truck in the capacity he had been doing before the second injury. The employee filed two complaints for workers' compensation following his second injury. 2
Giles
Workers Compensation Panel
State of Tennessee v. Ned Jackson W2000-02589-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft
The Defendant, Ned Jackson,1 was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that insufficient evidence of the Defendant’s identity as the culprit was presented to convict the Defendant of aggravated robbery and (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of theft and aggravated assault. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
A jury convicted the defendant of aggravated robbery, and the trial judge sentenced him to 12 years incarceration as a Range I standard offender. In this appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) his custodial statement should have been suppressed; (3) a juror failed to respond to a voir dire question concerning prior involvement in the legal system, thereby depriving the defendant of a fair and impartial jury; (4) the trial court erroneously disallowed admission of a crime scene report; and (5) his sentence was excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilt of aggravated robbery, I respectfully disagree with its conclusion that the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses. Currently, members of this court are divided concerning the correct interpretation of the two-step process set forth by our supreme court in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 469 (Tenn. 1999), for determining if the evidence adduced at trial justifies jury instructions on lesser-included offenses. See, e.g., State v. Linnell Richmond, No. E2000-01545-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1222247 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, October 15, 2001). I am largely in agreement with the position expressed by Judge Smith in his opinion in Richmond, No. E2000-01545-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1222247, at *21 (concurring in part and dissenting in part)(footnote omitted), that [a] reading of the recent cases of [State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69, 80 (Tenn. 2001), and State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 724-725 (Tenn. 2001),] leads one to the inescapable conclusion that our high court has mandated that lesser-included offense instructions be given anytime the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for these offenses. This means that anytime the proof is sufficient for a conviction of the indicted offense, the proof will a fortiori be sufficient for a conviction of the lesser-included offenses. . . . As a practical matter, this in turn means that it will almost always be error to fail to instruct the jury as to all lesser-included offenses of the indicted offense. Thus, the only real inquiry, in my opinion, in virtually all of the cases raising the lesser-included offense issue is whether the error in failing to instruct on the lesser offenses can be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendants James Whitelow and Robert Robertson appeal their convictions for possession of cocaine in an amount over 26 grams with intent to deliver. Both argue the evidence was not sufficient to support their convictions. Whitelow also argues the forensic report was erroneously admitted into evidence, and the jury's verdict was the result of passion and prejudice caused by the prosecutor's statements regarding Whitelow's alias nickname. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
