Shawn Farien vs. Regina Farien W2000-00656-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
This is a child custody case. The parties and their minor child lived in Tennessee with the father's parents. The mother moved to Georgia with the child to live with her parents. Custody was awarded to the mother, and the father was granted broad visitation rights. The father appeals. We affirm, finding that the custody award is based in large part on the trial court's determinations of credibility and assessment of the parties' demeanor, and finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the award of custody to the mother.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Shawn Farien vs. Regina Farien W2000-00656-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
This is a child custody case. The parties and their minor child lived in Tennessee with the father's parents. The mother moved to Georgia with the child to live with her parents. Custody was awarded to the mother, and the father was granted broad visitation rights. The father appeals. We affirm, finding that the custody award is based in large part on the trial court's determinations of credibility and assessment of the parties' demeanor, and finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the award of custody to the mother.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Lorrie Barnes vs. Richard Barnes W2000-01285-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Don H. Allen
Father filed a petition for change of custody of the parties' three minor children. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that there had been a material change of circumstances and that a change of custody to Father was in the best interest of the children. Mother has appealed. We affirm.
Madison
Court of Appeals
Jeffrey Ward vs. Valarie Ward W2000-01081-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
This appeal arises from a change of child custody action. Mother was awarded custody of Child pursuant to a marital dissolution agreement. Thereafter, Mother had sexual relations with a minor. This relationship led to an assault on minor by a third party in the presence of Child. This assault revealed the relationship of Mother and minor to the minor's parents. Pursuant to a deal with the minor's parents, Mother was forced to relocate to another state. When Father discovered the circumstances surrounding this relationship, he petitioned for a change of custody on the basis that Mother had exposed Child to criminal activity. In addition, Father cited Mother's refusal to grant him visitation and charged that she was improperly caring for Child. The trial court found a material change of circumstances requiring a comparison of the fitness of the parents. The court found Father more fit and granted a change of custody. We affirm.
Crockett
Court of Appeals
Phillip Page vs. Lucille Page W2000-01314-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
William Wilson vs. Patricia Wilson W2000-01384-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers
This is a divorce case in which alimony is in dispute. At trial, the parties stipulated to the grounds for divorce, and the issue of fault was not considered. The trial court awarded the wife alimony in solido of $750 per month until she reached the age of sixty, and specified that it was non-modifiable upon the wife's death or remarriage. The husband appeals. On appeal, we affirm the trial court's decision awarding the wife alimony in solido, and modify the amount to $500 per month until she reaches the age of sixty.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Phillip Page vs. Lucille Page W2000-01314-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
William Fann vs. Annette Fann W2000-02431-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon
Husband sued for divorce, alleging inappropriate marital conduct. Wife filed an answer and counter-complaint, but later dismissed the counter-complaint and chose to contest the divorce. Trial court granted divorce to husband. Wife appeals, alleging that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the divorce on grounds of inappropriate marital conduct without evidence to corroborate husband's allegations and that husband had failed to carry his burden of proving cruel and inhuman treatment. We affirm.
Carroll
Court of Appeals
State vs. Scott Houston Nix E1999-02715-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Ray L. Jenkins
Knox
Supreme Court
State v. Campbell E2000-00373-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Lynn W. Brown
Washington
Supreme Court
Jehiel Fields vs. State E1999-00915-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: R. Steven Bebb
The sole issue in this appeal is whether our decision in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999), changed the standard by which appellate courts review denials of post-conviction relief based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals in this case affirmed the denial of the appellant's post-conviction petition, although it expressed concern that this Court inadvertently changed the standard of appellate review in Burns to require a de novo review of a trial court's factual findings regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. While we reaffirm that such claims are mixed questions of law and fact subject to de novo review, we emphasize that Burns did not change the standard of review in this context. Consistent with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, our language in Burns meant only that a trial court's findings of fact be reviewed de novo, with a presumption that those findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. A trial court's conclusions of law are also reviewed under a de novo standard, although the trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no deference or presumption of correctness on appeal. Because the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly applied the appropriate standard of review in this case, the judgment of that court is affirmed, and the appellant's petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed.
Gary Willingham vs. Gallatin Group, Inc., et al M1998-00990-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This appeal involves a dispute between a secured creditor and two local governments regarding the priority of their claims against the proceeds from the sale of the assets of a judicially dissolved corporation. Following a bench trial, the Chancery Court for Sumner County held that the local governments' claims for delinquent business taxes had priority over the claim of the secured creditor. We have determined that the secured creditor's claim should have been given priority over the local governments' claims and, therefore, reverse the judgment.
State ex rel Debbie Whitfield vs. Michael Honeycutt M1999-00914-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol A. Catalano
Appellant, who was married to the mother at the time of the child's birth, responded to a petition for contempt regarding past due child support with a request to determine paternity of the child. A paternity test is irrelevant in this case because even proof that he is not the child's father would not be a defense to contempt for failure to comply with a valid court order. We affirm the trial court's denial of the request.
The Defendant was charged with rape and convicted of that offense after a jury trial. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of statutory rape. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The Defendant pleaded guilty to rape. After a hearing, he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years and six months in confinement. The Defendant appealed and asks this Court to shorten his sentence. He contends that the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor and failed to apply at least two mitigating factors. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Ernest Frye vs. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Center, et al E2000-02155-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John S. Mclellan, III
Plaintiff sued Defendants on November 25, 1998, alleging medical malpractice. Summonses were issued but never served on Defendants or returned to the court. Process was never reissued on the first Complaint. A voluntary nonsuit was entered by the Trial Court on June 8, 1999. On November 22, 1999, Plaintiff refiled a similar lawsuit, process issued, and Defendants were served the next day. Defendants filed summary judgment motions claiming that the statute of limitations had run because Plaintiff failed to have process reissued on the first Complaint as required by Rule 3 of the Tenn. R. Civ. P. Plaintiff claimed compliance with Rule 3, and, therefore, that the second lawsuit was filed within the statute of limitations. The Trial Court denied the summary judgment motions after determining that Defendants had actual notice of the first lawsuit and thus the spirit of the rules had been complied with. The Trial Court granted Defendants' request for an interlocutory appeal. We granted this interlocutory appeal to decide whether Plaintiff can comply with Rule 3 of the Tenn. R. Civ. P. not by obtaining issuance of new process in his original lawsuit within the one year period provided for in Rule 3, but instead by voluntarily dismissing the first lawsuit and refiling a similar lawsuit with the issuance of process in the second lawsuit within the one year period. Our answer is "no." We reverse the decision of the Trial Court.
Sullivan
Court of Appeals
Cynthia Coppage vs. Grady Coppage E2000-01630-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: L. Marie Williams
At issue in this divorce case is the trial court's valuation and division of two parcels of real property and the court's decree with respect to the parties' credit card debt. The husband appeals, arguing that the trial court erred (1) in its valuation and division of the two properties; and (2) in denying his post-trial motion to sell the two parcels and divide the proceeds equally. The wife asserts as an additional issue that the husband should be required to place in his sole name the credit card debt assigned to him by the trial court. We find and hold that the wife's request is a reasonable one, and, accordingly, modify the trial court's judgment so as to require the husband to convert the debt over into his name by no later than December 31, 2001. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Debra Cissom, et al vs. Al Miller, et al E1999-02767-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant
The Plaintiffs sue the Defendants, alleging a nuisance created by chicken houses owned and operated by them in close proximity of the Defendants' property. The Trial Court found a temporary nuisance was created and that, although T.C.A. 44-18-102 was a complete bar to any claims the Plaintiffs might have insofar as three older chicken houses were concerned, is not a bar to their claim as to five new chicken houses. We affirm.
Bradley
Court of Appeals
Ernest F. Phillips vs. County of Anderson, et al E2000-01204-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: William E. Lantrip
The defendants, Anderson County and the City of Clinton, entered into an agreement to jointly finance the development of an industrial park to be owned and operated by the City. The plaintiff, Ernest F. Phillips, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the County's financing of a portion of the industrial park is illegal and unconstitutional and that the defendants violated various statutory requirements for the development of industrial parks. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals, arguing: (1) that the County's use of bond proceeds to finance its portion of the industrial park's infrastructure costs constitutes a lending or giving of credit to or in aid of a corporation within the meaning of Article II, Section 29 of the Tennessee Constitution; (2) that the agreement between the County and the City is not legally sufficient under the Industrial Park Act; (3) that the County obtained a statutorily-required certificate of public purpose and necessity by fraud and misrepresentation; and (4) that the County's bond resolutions are fatally defective and call for prohibited expenditures. The City argues (a) that the plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the City's actions and (b) that the plaintiff's appeal is frivolous. We affirm the grant of summary judgment to the defendants but do not find the plaintiff's appeal to be frivolous.
Anderson
Court of Appeals
Jonathan Wilson vs. Sandra Wilson E2000-01374-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: William H. Russell
This appeal from the Loudon County General Sessions Court questions whether the Trial Court erred in awarding a change of residential custody from Appellant, Sandra Kay Wilson to Appellee, Jonathan David Wilson. Ms. Wilson appeals the decision of the General Sessions Court. We affirm the decision of the Trial Court and remand for such further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion. We adjudge costs of the appeal against the Appellant, Ms. Sandra Kay Wilson and her surety.
Defendant challenges his conviction for premeditated first degree murder for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. He presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior bad act; and (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
