Sentry Select Insurance Company v. Tennessee Farmer's Mutual Insurance Company, Et Al.
This is an action to declare the rights and responsibilities of Sentry Select Insurance Company (“Sentry”) and Tennessee Farmer’s Mutual Insurance Company (“Farmer’s Mutual”). At issue is the meaning of the “other insurance” clauses in the respective policies—whether one of the carriers is the primary insurer or whether the coverage should be prorated. When the insured filed claims against both carriers for a loss in excess of one million dollars in farm equipment, each carrier insisted the other was the primary insurer. Following a hearing on cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court reasoned that the two-year gap between the insured’s purchase of the Sentry policies and subsequent purchase of the Farmer’s Mutual policy demonstrated that the Sentry policies were intended to be primary, and the Farmer’s Mutual policy was intended to be excess, “particularly in light of the clear unambiguous language of the [Farmer’s Mutual] ‘Other Insurance’ clause.” Thus, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmer’s Mutual and this appeal followed. Having realized, as other courts have, that “other insurance” clauses are problematic, in that, they have elevated hair splitting and nit picking to a new art form, and having done some hair splitting and nit picking ourselves, we affirm the trial court but on other grounds. Reading the Sentry and Farmer’s Mutual “other insurance” clauses together, we have determined that the Sentry policies were intended as primary and the Farmer’s Mutual policy was intended as excess. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Sentry is the primary carrier. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Brooke Tigart v. Charles Shannon Tigart
Appellant/Father and Appellee/Mother’s Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) and agreed permanent parenting plan (“PPP”) were incorporated into the final decree of divorce. In the PPP, the parties agreed to an upward deviation in Father’s child support obligation. Mother subsequently petitioned the trial court to modify the parenting plan, to hold Father in contempt for failing to comply with certain provisions of the MDA, and to award her attorney’s fees and costs under the MDA. The trial court initially modified the PPP to lower Father’s child support obligations to comport with the child support guidelines; however, the trial court later granted Mother’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment and reinstated the original upward deviation. The trial court denied Mother’s petition for contempt and her request for attorney’s fees. For the reasons discussed herein, we vacate the trial court’s denial of Mother’s contempt petition and reverse the trial court’s denial of Mother’s request for attorney’s fees and costs under the MDA. The trial court’s orders are otherwise affirmed. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William C. Austin, Jr.
Defendant, William C. Austin, Jr., appeals from his guilty plea and resulting conviction for driving as a motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”), for which he received a sentence of four years and six months. Defendant does not challenge the other convictions or sentences he received as a result of his guilty plea. On appeal, Defendant argues that after his arrest, but before his guilty plea and sentencing, the Tennessee Legislature amended the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act and that as a result of the amendment he was entitled to the lesser penalty under the criminal savings statute of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-112 with respect to his conviction for driving as a MVHO. After a review, we agree with Defendant. As a result, we reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court with respect to Defendant’s conviction for driving as a MVHO. We remand the matter for entry of sentences in Counts 2 and 3. The remaining convictions and sentences are affirmed. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodger Dale Prince and Amanda Beaty
A Morgan County jury convicted Defendant Rodger Dale Prince (“Defendant Prince”) and Defendant Amanda Beaty (“Defendant Beaty”) of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect. Additionally, the jury convicted Defendant Beaty of aggravated child endangerment. The trial court imposed an effective life sentence with the possibility of parole for Defendant Prince’s convictions and an effective life sentence with the possibility of parole plus fifteen years for Defendant Beaty’s convictions. On appeal, the defendants assert that: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to amend the indictment; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support their felony murder convictions; and (4) the trial court erred when it failed to grant a mistrial based upon improper testimony. Defendant Beaty also asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence instances of prior abuse. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments and remand for correction of the judgments consistent with this opinion. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Homer Alson Maddin, III
A jury convicted the Defendant, Homer Alson Maddin, III, of four counts of aggravated rape in 2004, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of twenty-five years in confinement. After discovering in 2020 that it mistakenly marked the Defendant as a violent offender rather than a multiple rapist on the judgment forms in counts two through four, the trial court entered an order amending the judgment forms under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court failed to provide proper notice under Rule 36 and that his classification as a violent offender was not a clerical error. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Kaisona B., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the two minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii); (2) substantial non-compliance with the requirements of the permanency plans, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A); and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(g)(14). Appellant/Father appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of: (1) substantial non-compliance with the requirements of the permanency plans; and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness of ability to assume custody. Both Mother and Father also appeal the trial court’s determination that termination of their respective parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Wayne Hughes v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jeffrey Wayne Hughes, entered open guilty pleas to one count of theft of $250,000 or more, one count of theft of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, and six counts of money laundering, and he received an effective twenty-seven-year sentence. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that his pleas were involuntary because the aggregation of the theft offenses violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws and asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and he appeals. We conclude that the Petitioner’s pleas were not involuntary because there was no ex post facto violation and that he has not established that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Masterfit Medical Supply v. Samuel Bada D/B/A Primecare, D/B/A New Primecare
This is an appeal from a trial court’s grant of summary judgment. In a dispute involving unpaid invoices for medical supplies, the trial court ruled in favor of the appellee, finding that the appellant was personally liable for the indebtedness. In so doing, the trial court relied upon the unpaid invoices that were previously found to be admitted by the court pursuant to Rule 36.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure after the appellant failed to respond to the appellee’s request for admission. The appellant now appeals. Based on the record on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
James Dominic Stevenson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, James Dominic Stevenson, was convicted by a jury of attempted first degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon after he shot his ex-girlfriend in her car in the presence of her child. His aggravated assault convictions were merged into the attempted first degree murder conviction, and he received an effective twenty-seven-year sentence. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, and his petition was denied after a hearing. On appeal, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Dale Baker
The Defendant-Appellant, Jerry Dale Baker, appeals from the revocation of his probationary sentence for possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred by fully revoking Defendant’s probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jennifer King v. Delfasco, LLC Et Al.
This appeal concerns an alleged violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304, the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), as well as common law retaliatory discharge. Jennifer King (“King”), a former shipping and receiving coordinator for Delfasco, LLC, a company that manufactures defense-related products, sued Delfasco, LLC and related entity Delfasco Finance, LLC (“Delfasco” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) alleging she was wrongfully fired for refusing to share with Delfasco owner Jack Goldenberg (“Goldenberg”) her government-issued password to the Department of Defense (“DOD”) Wide Area Workflow (“WAWF”) system. King had consulted a DOD representative who advised her not to reveal her password. After a trial, the Trial Court found in favor of King and awarded her damages. Delfasco appeals, arguing among other things that King was not asked to perform an illegal act. King raises her own issues concerning damages. We find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual findings, and we leave undisturbed the Trial Court’s credibility determinations. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Angela Montgomery v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Angela Montgomery, was convicted in the Rutherford County Circuit Court of six counts of rape of a child and received an effective sentence of forty years in confinement to be served at one hundred percent. After this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions, she filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that she received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing and granted relief. In this appeal by the State, the State contends for the first time that the post-conviction court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition on its merits because the petition was untimely and that the post-conviction court incorrectly determined that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the case should be remanded to the post-conviction court to afford the Petitioner an opportunity to show whether the limitations period for filing the petition should be tolled based on due process concerns. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Deshun McAlister
Aggrieved of his Madison County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated assault and unlawful possession of a firearm, the defendant, Brandon Deshun McAlister, appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jalean Robert Williams and Markeil Linskey Williams
After a jury trial and subsequent retrial on two of the charges, the defendants, Jalean Robert Williams and Markeil Linskey Williams, were convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, felony murder, possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, possession of Alprazolam with intent to sell or deliver, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus fourteen years on each defendant. On appeal, both defendants assert the evidence is insufficient to sustain their convictions. In addition, Defendant Markeil argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to ask leading questions, and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences violates the prohibition against double jeopardy. Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Allen McNew
Jeffrey Allen McNew, Defendant, entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of aggravated burglary, one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated kidnapping, one count of carjacking, and four counts of aggravated assault. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced as a Range III, Persistent Offender, and the trial court determined the length and alignment of the sentences. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of 135 years. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant and affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of corrected judgments merging the aggravated assault conviction in Count 7 into the aggravated robbery conviction in Count 3 and merging the aggravated assault conviction in Count 8 into the aggravated robbery conviction in Count 4. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carl Prince v. Warden, Trousdale Turner Correctional Center
The Petitioner, Carl Prince, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Maurico Grandberry v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Maurico Grandberry, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
City of Memphis, Tennessee v. Beale Street Development Corporation
After counsel announced that the parties had settled their differences, the trial court entered a consent judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice. One year later, one of the litigants moved to set aside the judgment arguing lack of consent and fraud. The moving party claimed that it never approved the settlement or consented to entry of the dismissal order. The trial court denied the motion. Because the trial court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Sealey v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Matthew Sealey, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel prior to and during his guilty plea hearing. Upon our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Roosevelt Bigbee v. Johnny Fitz, Warden
The pro se petitioner, Roosevelt Bigbee, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court for Lauderdale County, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition as the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his conviction. After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Scott Hunley v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, William Scott Hunley, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marc Baechtle v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Marc Baechtle, was convicted of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and rape. The trial court dismissed the aggravated sexual battery and rape convictions due to statute of limitations and ultimately imposed a 25-year sentence for the rape of a child conviction. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that trial counsel advised him not to testify and failed to impeach a witness. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Khamphonh Xayyasith
The Defendant, Khamphonh Xayyasith, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102 (2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault); 39-13-111 (2018) (domestic assault). The trial court merged the aggravated assault convictions and imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years for aggravated assault and eleven months, twenty-nine days for domestic assault. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated assault convictions, (2) the trial court erred by admitting a recorded jail telephone call, and (3) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronald Whitford Et Al. v. Village Groomer & Animal Inn, Inc.
A property owner filed suit against the owners of a neighboring property, alleging that the neighbors had created a nuisance and trespassed by diverting surface water onto his property and causing a sinkhole to develop. After a trial on the matter, a jury returned a verdict finding that the neighbor had not created a nuisance and had not trespassed. The trial court judge confirmed the jury’s verdict and dismissed all claims against the neighbor with prejudice. Because the record contains material evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah H. Richardson v. Benjamin N. Richardson
Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to change the parties’ permanent parenting plan to designate Father as the primary residential parent of the children. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |