Richard May v. Liberty Mutual Insurance & Southern Manufacturing 01S01-9709-GS-00193
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Barry Medley
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Richard May filed this complaint alleging permanent partial disability after a mold dropped on his left hand at work, causing a crush injury. The trial court found he had sustained 45% permanent partial disability to the left arm and awarded temporary total, permanent partial, mileage and medical benefits, as well as discretionary costs. Southern Manufacturing Group ["Southern"] appeals and presents for our review the issues of (1) whether the preponderance of the evidence supports a lesser amount of permanent partial disability, and (2) whether the weekly benefit rate should be $24.76 rather than $226.52. On May 6, 1996, Mr. May was injured while working for Southern when his hand was crushed between two halves of a large metal mold weighing approximately 15 pounds. He notified his employer immediately and went to see Dr. Gregory Wiley, whom he selected from the employer's list of approved physicians. After a brief period of conservative treatment, Dr. Wiley referred Mr. May to Dr. Ramotsumi Makhene, a board-eligible plastic surgeon who also practices reconstructive surgery with a subspecialty in hand surgery. Dr. Makhene saw Mr. May on July 31, 1996 and noted swelling of his left hand and a nodule on the back of his hand above the knuckle, along with limited range of motion. He diagnosed tendinitis and prescribed a splint, anti- inflammatory medication, and occupational therapy. 2
Warren
Workers Compensation Panel
Danny E. Ray v. The Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Company 01S01-9710-CH-00223
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Lee Russell
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. I The plaintiff seeks an enlargement of a prior award for workers' compensation benefits, as allegedly provided by T.C.A. _ 5-6-241(a)(2). The defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. Appeal from a summary judgment order in a workers' compensation case is not controlled by the de novo standard of review, but is governed by Rule 56, Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S.W.2d 523 (Tenn. 1991). Further, no presumption of correctness attaches to decisions granting summary judgment because they involve only questions of law; thus on appeal the reviewing court must make a fresh determination concerning whether the requirements of Rule 56 have been met. Gonzales v. Alman Constr. Co., 857 S.W.2d 42 (Tenn. 1993). II The petitioner suffered a sprained shoulder on November 11, 1994, during the course of his employment by Kantus Corporation. He sustained a seven percent permanent partial impairment as a result of the accident and returned to work after recuperation. His claim for benefits for partial permanent whole body disability was settled on the basis of 17.5 percent, or seventy weeks, arrived at by multiplying his anatomical impairment by 2.5, as directed by T.C.A. _ 5-6-241(a)(1). The settlement was approved on June 3, 1995, upon the joint petition of Kantus Corporation and its insurer, The Yasuda Fire 2
Marshall
Workers Compensation Panel
Kenneth M. Ward v. Tangent Industries 01S01-9710-CH-00235
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Don R. Ash
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issues are whether the leg injury suffered by the plaintiff was properly apportioned to the body as a whole and whether the Court correctly ordered the award to be paid in a lump sum. A non-issue is whether the trial judge properly awarded interest on the judgment.1 The plaintiff is a 41-year-old single man whose testimony that he finished eighth grade was so suspect as to move the Chancellor to observe "I don't mean to disrespect you Mr. Ward, [but] you probably don't have an eighth grade education," and who is by virtue of that fact and other limitations capable only of basic manual and menial labor. On December 8, 1993 during the course of his job, a heavy bundle of steel fell from a forklift and crushed his left leg and foot. He was initially treated by Dr. Charles Emerson of Murfreesboro, and later by Dr. Joe Luna of Maryville, which was made necessary because he moved to the home of his sister in Blount County. Dr. Luna referred the plaintiff to Dr. Turner, under whose care he remains. To comply with an order to prosecute, the plaintiff was evaluated by an independent medical examiner, Dr. Steven C. Weissfield, on July 28, 1997, who graphically described the crushing injury. Reduced to the necessary, the leg bones were multi-fractured, refused to heal, pieces of them were removed subsequently, screws and pins were inserted; the lower portion of his leg filled with fluid which the experts could not alleviate. Four or more 1Much of the oral argum ent was given over to the propriety of the Court's action in awarding statutory interest on the "full amount," which the Court did not do. The issue of interest was neither raised nor addressed by the trial Court. The subject appeared, for the first time, in the brief of the appellee. 2
Liberty Mutual Ins. v. Larry Brinton, Jr. 03S01-9706-CH-00072
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Sharon Bell,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal presents a novel issue arising from the provisions of T.C.A. _ 5- 6-238(b), which is one of the 1992 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act. The appeal was perfected by the defendant, The Tennessee Department of Labor Second Injury Fund, from a ruling of the trial court awarding plaintiff, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, a judgment in the sum of $6,526.52. The complaint alleged plaintiff was the workers' compensation insurance carrier for Macawber Engineering, Inc. and one of their employees, Lonnie D. Roberts, contended he sustained a work-related injury (heart attack) on July 19, 1993, as a result of stress due to overtime work and excessive heat at his workplace; that upon reviewing the claim plaintiff denied the heart attack was work- related and declined to pay benefits and medical expenses; that the claim was reviewed by a workers' compensation specialist who ordered plaintiff to pay temporary total disability benefits of $6,526.52 for a period beginning July 2, 1993 to January 17, 1994, and plaintiff complied with this order; that sometime after February 14, 1994, the Department of Labor determined the claim was not compensable as the heart attack was not work-related; that plaintiff made a demand upon the state Second Injury Fund for a refund which was declined. The complaint alleges that a copy of the state department's order to pay, drafts issued by plaintiff in satisfaction of the order and a copy of the department's order denying plaintiff's claim were attached to the complaint as exhibits but the certified record does not contain any of these documents. Defendant answered the complaint by alleging it was without sufficient information or knowledge to form a belief as to the allegations and strict proof of same was demanded. For further answer it was alleged that T.C.A. _ 5-6-238 allowed a workers' compensation insurance carrier to receive a refund under circumstances as alleged in the complaint when the Defendant was furnished a copy of a court order finding the claim was not compensable and since no such order had been submitted to it, the claim for a refund was premature. 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
State vs. McCarter 03C01-9707-CC-00238
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
