Cynthia E.Yebuah, Et Al. v. Center For Urological Treatment, PLC
This is a healthcare liability action involving the application of the statutory cap on noneconomic damages to loss of consortium claims. The issue before the Court is whether the statutory cap on noneconomic damages applies separately to a spouse’s loss of consortium claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102, thus allowing each plaintiff to receive an award of up to $750,000 in noneconomic damages. Here, the surgery patient filed suit for noneconomic damages resulting from the defendant physicians’ negligence, namely that a portion of a Gelport device was unintentionally left in her body after surgery. In the same suit, the patient’s spouse claimed damages for loss of consortium. The jury awarded the patient $4,000,000 in damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. The jury also awarded her husband $500,000 in damages for loss of consortium. The trial court initially applied the statutory cap on noneconomic damages by entering a judgment in favor of both plaintiffs collectively for a total judgment of $750,000. However, the trial court subsequently granted the plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend and applied the statutory cap to each plaintiff separately, thereby entering a judgment of $750,000 for the patient and $500,000 for her husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102 allows both plaintiffs to recover only $750,000 in the aggregate for noneconomic damages. We therefore reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals and the trial court. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Cynthia E. Yebuah, Et Al. v. Center For Urological Treatment, PLC - Dissenting
This case illustrates how the damages cap statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102, deprives injured plaintiffs of fair compensation by arbitrarily limiting their awards for noneconomic damages. Cynthia Yebuah and her husband, Eric Yebuah, suffered noneconomic damages because of the carelessness of Mrs. Yebuah’s surgeon. Based on the evidence at trial, a jury awarded Mrs. Yebuah more than $750,000 in noneconomic damages for her pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life and awarded Mr. Yebuah less than $750,000 for his loss of consortium. The issue here is whether the trial court must apply the $750,000 statutory cap on noneconomic damages separately to each of the Yebuahs’ awards or to the combined total of their awards. If the cap is applied separately to each award, the trial court must slash the jury’s verdict to Mrs. Yebuah by 81% and allow Mr. Yebuah to recover all of the damages the jury awarded him. If the cap is applied to the combined total of the awards, then the trial court must cut the total award to the Yebuahs by 83%. Neither application can withstand constitutional scrutiny. I decline to choose between these two alternatives; both are unconstitutional violations of the Yebuahs’ right to trial by jury. See McClay v. Airport Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 596 S.W.3d 686, 701–09 (Tenn. 2020) (Lee, J., dissenting). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Wayne Centers
The Appellant, Bobby Wayne Centers, was convicted by a jury in the White County Criminal Court of the sale of 26 grams or more of methamphetamine, the delivery of 26 grams or more of methamphetamine, the possession of 26 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell; and the possession of 26 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. The trial court merged the sale of methamphetamine conviction and the possession with intent to sell methamphetamine conviction into a single conviction and merged the delivery of methamphetamine conviction and the possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine conviction into a single conviction. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eighteen years as a Range II, multiple offender with release eligibility after service of thirty-five percent of the sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing Agent Eaton to narrate the video of the drug transaction. Upon review, we conclude that the case must be remanded to the trial court for the correction of the judgments to reflect the merger of all of the convictions into the sale of methamphetamine conviction. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rico Huey v. State of Tennessee
Rico Huey, Petitioner, filed a pro se petition seeking post-conviction relief from his 2016 aggravated robbery conviction. Appointed counsel filed an amended petition. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ritchie Phillips, Et Al. v. Mark Hatfield
The issue in this case is whether restrictive covenants executed and recorded by the developers of a subdivision after they had sold the parties’ lots apply to the Defendant’s property. The developers platted a subdivision and sold the vast majority of lots with time-limited restrictions against non-residential use expressly stated in the deeds that conveyed the lots. Thereafter, the developers recorded a declaration of more fulsome, non-time-limited restrictive covenants—including a restriction against non-residential use—that purported to apply to all lots in the subdivision. Decades later, well after the expiration of the time-limited deed restrictions, the Defendant purchased lots and proposed to build a structure for the operation of a retail business. The Plaintiffs, who reside in a home on lots adjacent to the Defendant’s property, brought a declaratory judgment action to enforce the non-time-limited restriction against non-residential use contained in the recorded declaration. The trial court enjoined the Defendant’s proposed commercial use, concluding that the Defendant’s property was—through the declaration—subject to an implied negative reciprocal easement that prohibited non-residential use. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that the developers lacked the authority to impose the declaration’s restrictions upon the Defendant’s property because they did not own those lots when they executed and recorded the declaration. We further hold that the developers’ mere re-acquisition and re-sale of some of the Defendant’s lots after the recording of the declaration did not retroactively restrict the Defendant’s property through the declaration. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyrone E. Murphy
The Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Tyrone E. Murphy, with one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of tampering with evidence in the death of Ashley Cates, the victim. The State proceeded solely on the count of first degree premeditated murder. The jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude post-mortem photographs of the victim and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Douglas M. Ferguson
The Defendant, Douglas M. Ferguson, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to five years’ probation. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2018). Subsequently, the trial court found the Defendant violated conditions of his probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patrick L. Moore v. Russell Washburn, Warden
Patrick L. Moore, Petitioner, appeals from the dismissal of two petitions for habeas corpus relief which were consolidated by this Court on appeal. After a thorough review, we affirm the dismissal of the petitions. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Ashlynn H.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court determined that there were statutory grounds for terminating the father’s parental rights and that termination was in the child’s best interest. On appeal, we conclude that the father was given sufficient notice of three statutory grounds: abandonment by failure to visit or support the expectant mother, abandonment by wanton disregard, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of his child. The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support two of the grounds for termination. But, because the trial court’s order lacks sufficient findings regarding the child’s best interest, we vacate and remand. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Xavier Montelious Riley
Xavier Montelious Riley, Defendant, entered a best interest guilty plea with the length and manner of the service of the sentence to be determined following a sentencing hearing. The trial court denied an alternative sentence and imposed an effective sentence of ten years and six months to be served in confinement. After a review of the record and applicable law and finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jasper Lee Vick
The petitioner, Jasper Lee Vick, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cedarius J. Robertson
The Appellant, Cedarius J. Robertson, was convicted in the Madison County Circuit Court of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a Class B felony; tampering with evidence, a Class C felony; driving under the influence (DUI) and DUI per se, Class A misdemeanors; possessing a handgun while under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor; and failing to maintain his lane of travel, a Class C misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the DUI convictions and ordered that he serve an effective thirteen-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a handgun while under the influence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lynn Inman
Defendant, Christopher Lynn Inman, was convicted by a jury of introduction of contraband into a penal facility and possession of marijuana. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of six years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by admitting the marijuana into evidence because the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for introduction of contraband into a penal facility. Following our review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Gilliam
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Gregory Gilliam, of four counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of forty-two years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Ray Pennington, Jr.
The Bradley County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Donald Ray Pennington, Jr., for two counts of rape of a child. Following a trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of rape of a child in count 1 and the lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery in count 2. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for rape of a child; (2) he is entitled to relief under plain error due to prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aaron Reinsberg v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Aaron Reinsberg, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of rape, assault, and official misconduct, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darius Jones v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Darius Jones, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harpeth Financial Services, LLC v. Jim Clay Pinson, Jr. Et Al.
A collecting bank sued the drawer of a check, claiming that the drawer stopped payment on the check with fraudulent intent. The general sessions court, as well as the circuit court on de novo appeal, ruled in favor of the drawer. The bank argues that, because it was a holder in due course, the drawer was still liable on the check despite the stop-payment order. And it seeks an award of interest, court costs, attorney’s fees, and treble damages from the drawer, contending that the proof showed the drawer acted with fraudulent intent. We affirm the dismissal of the claim based on the drawer’s alleged fraudulent intent, but we vacate the dismissal of any claim based on the drawer’s obligation on the check. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa McCain v. Saint Thomas Medical Partners
Plaintiff employee appeals the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment on her claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. We affirm, as modified, the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Devin Buckingham v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, Et Al.
An inmate filed a complaint alleging theft against the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction and against the prison Warden. The Commissioner and the Warden moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). The trial court granted the motion. We have determined that the trial court failed to provide reasons for the dismissal of the complaint. Therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Broyles
The Defendant, Michael Broyles, was convicted by a Greene County Criminal Court jury of four counts of cruelty to animals, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-14-202(a)(2) (2018). The trial court denied judicial diversion and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction and imposed the sentences concurrently. The court ordered split confinement consisting of ninety days’ jail service followed by probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the animal cruelty statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally vague, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (3) the court erred in denying judicial diversion, (4) the court erred in imposing a sentence involving confinement, and (5) the court erred in imposing fines and restitution without making the appropriate factual findings. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nelson E. Bowers, II v. Estate of Katherine N. Mounger
This appeal concerns a real estate transaction that fell through. The Estate of Katherine N. Mounger (“the Estate”), as well as executors Katherine M. Lasater and E. Jay Mounger (“Defendants,” collectively), seek reversal of the judgment of the Circuit Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”) whereby they were ordered to return $150,000 in earnest money to Nelson E. Bowers, II (“Plaintiff”), successor in interest to would-be purchaser of the property at issue, McKenzie Loudon Properties, LLC (“MLP”). Defendants appeal to this Court, arguing, among other things, that MLP first materially breached the contract for sale (“the Agreement”) by failing to perform a title examination and failing to notify it of a defect in title stemming from oral claims of ownership made by Charles Mounger. However, we find, as did the Trial Court, that the Estate had actual notice of the defect in title. Further, it was the Estate, rather than MLP, that materially breached the Agreement by failing to provide marketable title. Aside from an award to Plaintiff of attorney’s fees incurred on an earlier appeal in this matter which Plaintiff did not request from this Court in that earlier appeal, which we reverse, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for an award to Plaintiff of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on this appeal as requested. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
The Law Offices of T. Robert Hill, PC f/k/a Hill Boren, PC v. Lewis Cobb, et al.
Following the dissolution of the law firm formerly known as Hill Boren, PC, Appellant brought, inter alia, the following claims: (1) Count 1: “Joint Enterprise/Venture/Aiding and Abetting Fiduciary Breach;” (2) Count 2: “No Derivative Cause of Action: Negligence and/or Fraud;” (3) Count 4: “Attempted Cover Up: Punitive Damages;” (4) Count 6: “Strict Liability in Tort for Misconduct of a Lawyer;” and (5) Count 7: “Liability of Lawyer Misconduct Causing Harm/Damage to a Foreseeable Non-Party Non-Client Ethical Differentiation Standard.” The trial court dismissed Appellant’s lawsuit on grant of Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss and on grant of Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. In part, the dismissal was based on a final judgment in the underlying lawsuit, Boren v. Hill Boren, PC, No. W2019-02235-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 1109992 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 23, 2021). Subsequently, however, this Court dismissed the appeal of the underlying lawsuit on the ground that the order appealed was not final. As such, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of a portion of Count 2 and Count 4 on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court’s orders are otherwise affirmed, and the Appellant’s request for stay is denied. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio D. Blaylock
The Defendant, Antonio D. Blaylock, entered an open plea to multiple charges resulting from a high-speed chase through Jackson, which culminated in an automobile crash injuring the other driver, a collision with a telephone pole, and damage to the front porch of a house. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying him probation. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we reverse the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alexander Mhlanga v. State of Tennessee
An inmate filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari seeking review of the Tennessee Department of Correction’s disciplinary decisions. Because the inmate’s petition failed to comply with constitutional and statutory requirements, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals |