John W. Gray, Iii v. Gray and Williams, Inc., et al
02S01-9706-CH-00054
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Neal Small,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The trial judge awarded the plaintiff 6 percent permanent partial disability. The defendants say the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the trial court's award of 6 percent permanent partial disability to the plaintiff's body as a whole as a result of his work related accident. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Joey Sweat v. Superior Industries, Inc.
03S01-9701-CH-00006
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Thomas J. Seeley, Jr.,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. I This is a psoriatic arthritis1 case, an on-going debilitating condition, which pre-existed the plaintiff's employment. He alleges that he was asymptomatic prior to his employment by the defendant and that the nature of his job triggered his symptoms and worsened the underlying disease. The defendant says that only the symptoms, i.e., pain and swelling, were exacerbated by employment (as any physical activity would do) but that the disease per se was not worsened. Dr. David Lurie testified by deposition. The precise issue of whether the plaintiff's employment caused a progression of the disease or whether it merely aggravated the symptoms was not sufficiently articulated by Dr. Lurie in the opinion of the trial judge, and he requested that Dr. Lurie elucidate the point either by a supplemental deposition or by letter. Counsel agreed to the latter. He was asked: In your opinion, based on a reasonable medical probability, did Sweat's activities . . . advance and result in an actual progression of his underlying psoriatic arthritis? To which Dr. Lurie responded: "In my opinion, based on reasonable medical probability Sweat's work . . . advanced and resulted in actual progression of his underlying psoriatic arthritis." He testified that the allocation of the progression of the disease from physical activity as contrasted to spontaneous progression was not quantifiable, but that the "repetitive, strenuous, weight-bearing activities resulted in some permanent joint injury." 1A connective tissue arthritis, not curable, and highly debilitating. 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Bruce O. Tibbs, Jr. v. City of Humbodlt, Tn
02S01-9706-CH-00057
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. George R. Ellis,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial judge awarded the plaintiff 33 percent vocational impairment for injuries occurring on October 27, 1995. We affirm the judgment. The plaintiff was employed as an officer with the defendant. The plaintiff finished nine years of formal education and subsequently obtained a G.E.D. He was trained and worked as a machine mechanic prior to becoming employed as an officer with the defendant. At the time of trial, the plaintiff was 33 years of age. Prior Injury On October 9, 1994, the plaintiff injured his back in the course of his employment with the defendant. In February 1995, a lumbar laminectomy at L5-S1 was performed. The treating physician, Dr. John W. Neblett, concluded the plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement from this injury on June 14, 1995 and found the plaintiff suffered a ten percent permanent medical impairment to the body as a whole. The plaintiff was released with restrictions of not repeatedly lifting more than 2 pounds at a time nor ever lifting as much as 4 pounds at a time and that he should not sit more than one hour at a time whether standing or walking. On July 18, 1995, the plaintiff returned to Dr. Neblett and reported he had significantly improved. Dr. Neblett, upon the request of the plaintiff and upon the 2
Gibson
Workers Compensation Panel
Teresa Woody v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
02S01-9976-CH-00052
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the plaintiff benefits based on a finding of 25 percent permanent partial disability to her whole body. The defendant appeals, asserting the excessiveness of this award and the bar of the statute of limitations. An in-depth discussion of her employment history with the defendant is necessary for an adequate assessment of her claim. She was 34 years old at the time of trial and lives in Obion County, Tennessee. She completed high school and attended Vanderbilt University for a short period of time. At the time of trial, she was a senior at the University of Tennessee at Martin majoring in English, lacking approximately three hours before graduation. Following graduation, she plans to attend graduate school, seek a Masters Degree in English, and ultimately teach. Her work history includes a work study program at Vanderbilt University, primarily clerical in nature. She has worked for Baptist Hospital in Union City as an admission clerk, a clerical position, and in 1988, she began working for Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, in the gift shop. Shortly thereafter, she moved into the factory, working on a bias unit, which involved repetitive overhead lifting, twisting and turning. In June of 1989, she began having pain and problems with her shoulders, and informed her supervisor, David Stephenson, of these problems and filled out an incident report in July, 1989. She was initially seen by Dr. David St. Clair who diagnosed impingement syndrome. Her claim for workers' compensation benefits was eventually denied. She continued to work on the bias machine and her shoulder problems progressively worsened. In 199, she resigned her position with the defendant to attend school, and worked part-time for Baptist Hospital in Union City, again 2
Obion
Workers Compensation Panel
Janet Wynn v. Tecumseh Products Co.
02S01-9709-CV-00081
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Creed Mcginley,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court awarded the plaintiff a 3 percent permanent partial disability to her right leg, a 4 percent permanent partial disability to each of her arms, and medical expenses in the amount of $77.. The trial court noted that the plaintiff is very bright and capable of expressing herself. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: "1. Does the evidence preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that Plaintiff sustained a thirty (3%) percent permanent partial disability to her right leg. 2. Does the evidence preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that Plaintiff's condition to each of Plaintiff's arms was caused by the work activities performed at Tecumseh Products Company. 3. Does the evidence preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that Plaintiff sustained a forty (4%) percent permanent partial disability to each of her arms. 4. Did the Trial Court err in finding that Tecumseh should pay Dr. James Spruill's medical charges in the amount of $77.." We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The issue with which we are confronted is whether the State may be liable to a county employee for employment discrimination under the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA") when the county employee is under the supervision of a state judge who commits quid pro quo sexual harassment against the county employee. The trial court answered the question in the negative holding that the State was not the plaintiff's employer under the THRA. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the THRA imposed liability on the State under an economic realities test. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm as modified the appellate court's reversal of the trial court's judgment.
This is an action to recover profits the plaintiff contractor alleges he would have made had he been allowed to construct an additional four warehouses similar in design and usage to a fifth warehouse he constructed and for which he was paid.
In this boundary line dispute the defendants appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, insisting that the evidence established their right to the disputed area by adverse possession.
During a wide-ranging investigation, law enforcement officers located and seized several items of property thought to be used in the conduct of an illegal drug enterprise. Criminal charges followed the several seizures, and Page Stuart, the appellant, pleaded guilty to offenses involving delivery and conspiracy to deliver large quantities of marijuana. The State thereafter instituted administrative proceedings under Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-11-201 et seq. (1991 & Supp. 1992) for the forfeiture of the property seized. Although Stuart challenged the forfeiture of some of the property,1 he was not successful, and both the Chancery Court and the Court of Appeals upheld the forfeiture. We granted Stuart’s application for review under Rule 11
