Cannon vs. Cannon
03A01-9702-CV-00059

Shava Lynn Kendrick vs. Larry Bert Kendrick
M2004-00540-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Leonard W. Martin
This case involves a father's efforts to protect his children from their mother's sexually abusive relatives. When the mother filed for divorce in the Chancery Court for Houston County, she also filed a notice of intent to relocate with the children to the State of New York to be closer to her family, including a stepfather who had sexually abused and raped her when she was a child. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced, designated the mother as the primary residential parent, and permitted the mother to move to the State of New York with the parties' children. The father has appealed, arguing first that the trial court's custody and relocation decisions have exposed the children to an unreasonable risk of sexual abuse and second, that the trial court erred by refusing to designate which of the parties should be permitted to claim the children as tax exemptions. We have determined that the trial court erred by allowing the mother and the children to move to the State of New York without sufficient proof regarding their safety. We have also concluded that the court erred by refusing to address the parties' tax exemption issues.

State vs. Sepulveda
03C01-9402-CR-00069
Trial Court Judge: Rex Henry Ogle

State vs. Dale Nolan
01C01-9511-CC-00387
Trial Court Judge: Buddy D. Perry

State vs. Ronnie Turner
01C01-9602-CR-00077
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

State vs. Philip Kevin Cook
01C01-9604-CR-00146

State vs. Robert Vaughn
01C01-9605-CR-00219

State vs. Steven A. Bush
01C01-9605-CC-00220
Trial Court Judge: J. Curwood Witt

State vs. James Lemacks
01C01-9605-CC-00227

Jessie James House vs. State
01C01-9607-CR-00309
Trial Court Judge: Ann Lacy Johns

01CO1-9606-CC-00280
01CO1-9606-CC-00280

State vs. Jimmy Mathis
02C01-9605-CC-00177

State vs. Christopher Barham
02C01-9606-CC-00205

State vs. Weaver
03C01-9607-CC-00263
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.

State vs. Hayles
03C01-9603-CR-00113
Trial Court Judge: Ray L. Jenkins

State vs. Wesemann
03C01-9404-CR-00144
Trial Court Judge: Edgar P. Calhoun

State vs. Houston
03C01-9608-CR-00297
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Baumgartner

State vs. Roy Gibson
02C01-9604-CC-00117
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood

Will v. Doran, Judge
02C01-9505-CR-00136
Trial Court Judge: Wil V. Doran

Diane Watters vs. William Watters & General Mills
02A01-9511-CH-00254
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.

State vs. Booker
03C01-9607-CC-00273

State vs. Moates
03C01-9610-CR-00383
Trial Court Judge: Mayo L. Mashburn

Calsonic Yorozu Corp., et al. v. Sulay Lamin
01S01-9608-CH-00163
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon.

Empire Berol , U.S.A. v. Nancy Lee Estes
01S01-9610-CH-00205
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Tyrus H. Cobb
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The posture of this case is somewhat unusual. The plaintiff is Empire Berol U.S.A., the employer of the defendant Nancy Lee Estes. It sought a declaratory judgment on March 11, 1993 of the respective rights of the parties under the workers' compensation law, alleging that Estes was asserting a job-related accident resulting in physical injury. Estes filed her answer, admitting that she was injured, but that her condition was one that progressively occurred and was not diagnosed as carpal tunnel syndrome until December 28, 1992. About four months later, Estes filed another answer, coupled with a counter-claim, through different counsel, in which she alleged that she sustained an injury by accident on or about November 17, 1992 during the course of her employment by the plaintiff. All this was followed by the filing of another complaint, by the plaintiff, on May 2, 1994, against Estes and Golden Corral, alleging as a result of discovery, that the injury to Estes arose out of her employment at the Golden Corral, which was designated as a third-party defendant. Golden Corral filed a motion to dismiss, alleging, in effect, procedural errors. The plaintiff thereupon amended its complaint, alleging that Golden Corral was a necessary party under RULE 19, but the procedural problem was unaddressed. Before the motion to dismiss was heard, the parties agreed that it was well- taken, and Estes averred her intention to file a complaint against Golden Corral, which soon followed, in which she alleged that a "gradual injury did occur and that [she] was employed by Golden Corral during a time frame in which the injury may have begun" and that she "sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment while performing work at the place of business of Golden Corral in Shelbyville, Tennessee." Golden Corral denied that Estes was injured as alleged, but if so, her suit was time-barred under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-21. Upon the trial of the case, the central issue was causation, since Ms. Estes' carpal tunnel syndrome was evident and not disputed. She testified that she began 2

Darla Gail Farmiloe v. Saturn Corporation
01S01-9610-CV-00199
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This complaint was filed June 23, 1994. The plaintiff alleged that she sustained various job-related injuries arising from her employment, the first being November 21, 1991 involving upper back and shoulder pain which developed gradually. The defendant admitted the report of these injuries. Trial of the case in February 1996 resulted in a finding that the plaintiff's job duties advanced the severity of her pre-existing conditions and that she had sustained a 75 percent occupational disability with benefits payable in a lump sum. The employer appeals, and presents for review the issues of (1) whether the plaintiff sustained a compensable injury to her neck, back and left upper extremity, (2) whether the award is excessive, and (3) whether the award should be paid in a lump sum. W e will consider these issues jointly. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn. 1991). Where testimony is presented by deposition, this Court is able to make its own independent assessment of the proof to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.