Barbara Beem, v. Robert Alan Beem
02A01-9511-CV-00252
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge George H. Brown, Jr.

Defendant-Appellant, Robert Alan Beem (“Husband”), appeals the judgment of the trial court ordering him to pay child support, alimony, and attorney’s fees to Plaintiff-Appellee, Barbara Beem (“Wife”).

Helen Bond Scofield, v. Stephen David Scofield
02A01-9512-CH-00276
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley, Jr.

This case involves a petition for increase of child support. Petitioner, Stephen David Scofield (Father), appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition to modify the parties’ final decree of divorce to increase child support payments by Respondent, Helen Bond Scofield 2 (Mother).

Leonard L. Rowe v. Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga and Dr. Harry Reynolds, Superintendent of Schools
03S01-9603-CV-00033
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank M. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor R. Van Owens

The Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga and Dr. Harry Reynolds, Superintendent of Chattanooga schools, appeal from the Court of Appeals’ decision finding that Leonard L. Rowe was deprived of liberty without due process of law by a Board policy which renders any employee previously terminated “for cause, inefficiency, or immorality” ineligible for future employment within the Chattanooga school system. The primary issue for our review is whether adoption of Board policy 4117.5 deprived Rowe of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest to which the requirements of procedural due process apply.1 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that due process is not implicated because the Board policy did not deprive Rowe of either a protected property or liberty interest. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

David F. Bush v. Brenda L. Allgood and Mercantile Properties, Inc.
01A01-9605-CV-00207
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Henry Denmark Bell

The Trial Court granted summary judgement dismissing one of the defendants, Mercantile Properties, Inc., and ordered entry of final partial judgment pursuant to T.R.C.P. Rule 54.02. Plaintiff has appealed. The remaining defendant, Brenda L. Allgood, is not involved in this appeal.

Susan Kay Pilger Riggs, v. James Landry Riggs
01A01-9601-CV-00007
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

The plaintiff/wife has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court declaring the parties divorced pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-4-129, placing child custody in the wife and awarding child support. The issues on appeal relate only to support.

Martin Silva v. James A. Crossman, d/b/a Jim Crossman Realty - Concurring
01A01-9604-CH-00153
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

This appeal involves a dispute as to the obligations of the parties under a lease agreement. The lessor of the premises, James A. Crossman,  terminated the lease after discovering that the lessee, Martin Silva, had experienced problems with violence and other criminal activities at the previous location of his nightclub. Silva filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking damages for breach of the lease contract. The trial court heard the case without a jury and awarded damages to Silva. Crossman has appealed and argues that the trial court erred in failing to find grounds for rescission of the lease and in awarding damages to Silva. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment.

Kevin Ryan Mosley v. Tennessee Board of Paroles, et al.
01A01-9604-CH-00162
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Kevin Mosley, a prisoner in the custody of the Department of Correction, was twice considered for parole. On each occasion the Parole Board declined to release him, citing as its reason the seriousness of his offense. Mr. Mosley filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Chancery Court of Davidson County, contending that he was entitled to a more definite statement of the Parole Board’s reasons. The prisoner also argued that the Board erred in failing to consider the results of a psychological study it had ordered. The Chancery Court dismissed the petition. We affirm the trial court.

Mary Alice Bolton Prince, v. St. Thomas Hospital, et al.
01A01-9604-CV-00184
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.

This is an appeal by plaintiff/appellant, Mary Alice Bolton Prince, from the decision of the trial court granting the motions for summary judgment of defendants/appellees. The trial court based its decision on its finding that Mrs. Prince was fiftypercent or more at fault. The facts out of which this controversy arose are as follows.

Richard P. Rienholtz, v. Christine Bradley, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Correction
01A01-9512-CH-00570
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Richard P. Rienholtz, an inmate in the Tennessee prison system petitioned the Chancery Court of Davidson County for a declaratory judgment arguing that the Department of Correction’s decision to extend his parole eligibility date for escape was illegal. The chancellor dismissed the petition and we affirm.

Allen v. Jones
02S01-9512-CV-00127
Authoring Judge: Cornelia A. Clark, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James M. Tharpe
This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the special worker's compensation appeals panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Hazel Maness Flatt v. The Insurance Mart, Inc.,
02S01-9601-CH-00007
Authoring Judge: Hewitt P. Tomlin, Jr., Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris,
This workers' compensation appeal was heard by the Special Workers' Compensation Panel in accordance with provisions of T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3). We have by this opinion reported our findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Supreme Court. Hazel Maness Flatt ("plaintiff") was employed by Gary Wright and his sister Nita Middleton to care for their mother, Lorene F. Wright, at her residence in Chester County. As part of her employment, plaintiff lived in Ms. Wright's home from Monday through Friday. Other sitters provided care for Ms. Wright on weekends. Plaintiff's job duties included fixing meals, cleaning the house, sweeping, vacuuming, washing clothes, taking Ms. Wright on errands, and generally just watching after her. On about October 5, 199, plaintiff injured her back while assisting Ms. Wright into plaintiff's car. The record reflects that Gary Wright served as president of The Insurance Mart, Inc. ("defendant"), a company engaged in the sale of automobile insurance in Nashville. Wright and his wife were the sole shareholders of the defendant company. His sister, Nita Middleton, was an employee of defendant. Plaintiff was paid her weekly checks from defendant's payroll for her services to Ms. Wright. Her W-2 Wage and Tax Statement for 199 listed defendant as her employer. However, defendant listed plaintiff regularly on its Non-Employee Compensation Report. For these apparent reasons, plaintiff filed suit against defendant in the Chancery Court of Chester County. Following a bench trial, the chancell or denied plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that (1) plaintiff was a domestic servant and not an employee of defendant, and (2) that she was also an independent contractor. This appeal followed. 2

01A01-9606-CH-00259
01A01-9606-CH-00259

Mario Harris v. State
M2004-01782-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
The Defendant, Mario Harris, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Charles Thompson And Verico
W1998-00351-CCA-R10-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Chris B. Craft

02C01-9512-CC-00381
02C01-9512-CC-00381

02C01-9601-CC-00030
02C01-9601-CC-00030

Part Upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-Cc-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June
02C01-9610-CC-00340

02C01-9503-CC-00095
02C01-9503-CC-00095
Trial Court Judge: John Franklin Murchison

02C01-9503-CC-0095
02C01-9503-CC-0095

03C01-9510-CC-00320
03C01-9510-CC-00320
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

Harley R. Rucker v. Rockwood Electric Utilities
03S01-9511-CH-00127
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Frank V. Williams,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff was injured when he fell and hit his arm on a buzz saw while cutting trees along utility lines as an employee of Woodland Tree Service, which had a contract to cut the trees for Rockwood Electric Utilities. The trial judge dismissed plaintiff's complaint, finding that Rockwood Electric Utilities was not plaintiff's statutory employer under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6- 113. However, he found plaintiff to have sustained a 45% permanent partial disability to his right hand. We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court. Plaintiff was hired by Woodland Tree Service to help fulfill Woodland's contract with Rockwood Electric Utilities. The agreement between Woodland Tree Service and Rockwood Electric Utilities was in the form of a written contract which was introduced at trial. Plaintiff reported every morning to Rockwood Electric Utilities where he met with Don White, a supervisor at Rockwood, to learn whether he should continue working on the present job or if he needed to work on some emergency project. He would also pick up a "bucket truck" owned by Rockwood to be used in cutting trees. Woodland provided all of the other equipment used by its employees. Occasionally, Rockwood supervisors would come to the site where Woodland employees were working to check on the progress of the work, occasionally telling the employees to hurry up or moving them elsewhere to a "hot spot." Woodland had absolute authority to hire and fire its own employees. Under the contract between the parties, Rockwood reserved the right to provide equipment and materials at a lower cost if those provided by Woodland were too high. Woodland paid its employees directly but according to a schedule of wages set by Rockwood. Woodland was required to notify Rockwood of changes in wage rates. Under their contract, Rockwood reserved the right to inspect Woodland's work and audit its books. The contract also provided that Woodland employees could not enter the area where power lines were located unless 2

Charles Leroy Stafford v. Mid-America Corporation and Larry Brinton, Jr.
03S01-9512-CH-00132
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Frederick D.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue presented by this appeal involves the extent of the claimant's permanent disability. The panel concludes thejudgment should be modified as provided below. The employee or claimant, Stafford, is forty-eight with a ninth grade education. On December 23, 1993, he suffered a compensable injury to his neck and arm, for which he received medical treatment and lost time from work. The treating physician assigned a permanent impairment rating of 3% to the whole body and released him to return to work in August of 1994 with no restrictions. From a previous injury, the claimant had received an award based on ninety-five percent to the body as a whole. The chancellor awarded permanent partial disability benefits on the basis of five percent to the body as a whole, reasoning that the claimant had not yet become rehabilitated from his previous injury. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings of the trial court, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). Conclusions of law are subject to de novo review without any presumption of correctness. Presley v. Bennett, 86 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1993). This tribunal is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

Barbara Wallace v. Cadillac Curtain Company
02S01-9510-CH-00099
Authoring Judge: Cornelia A. Clark, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John Hill Chisholm
This worker's compensationappeal has been referred to the special worker's compensation appeals panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Trial in this matter was conducted February 9, 1995. On May 22, 1995, the Chancellor entered a final judgment denying compensation to plaintiff and dismissing her lawsuit.

Brian Matthew Woosley v. Townsend Electric Company
02S01-9505-CH-00040
Authoring Judge: Janice M. Holder, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Mo Rris
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Our scope of review of findings of fact by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-22 5(e)(2). The sole question raised on appeal is whether the evidence preponderates against the chancellor's holding that the employee's injury arose out of the course and scope of his employment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court. The plaintiff, Brian M. Woosley ("Woosley"), was employed as an electrician's he lper for To wnsend Electric. Du ring the sev eral month s of his employment with Townsend, he worked at a series of job sites. The method by which he would arrive at the site varied. For two of the jobs, he met the foreman at the Townsend "shop"on the first day of the job; thereafter he drove his own vehicle to the job site. At a third job location, he met the foreman at the Townsend shop and rode with him to the job site. While at the shop, he sometimes loaded material for use on the job. At a fourth site, the foreman drove to Woos ley's home an d transporte d him to the job. Woo sley was nev er paid until he arrived at the job site and he was never reimbursed for transportation expenses when he drove his own vehicle. On July 13, 1992, Woosley was working at a fifth job in Brownsville when he was injured en route to the job site. For the two weeks prior to his injury, he met Harold Matlock ("Matlock"), the job foreman, at the shop each day and the two went to the Brownsville job together. While working in Brownsville, Woosley was not required to pick up or load materials; he received no instructions 2

03C01-9509-CR-00291
03C01-9509-CR-00291
Trial Court Judge: Ray L. Jenkins