01A01-9607-CH-00287
01A01-9607-CH-00287
Trial Court Judge: William B. Cain

Hall, 847 S.W.2D 208, 211 (Tenn. 1993); Clifton v. Bass, 908 S.W.2D 205, 208
01A01-9605-CV-00210

01A01-9606-CV-00283
01A01-9606-CV-00283

01A01-9607-CH-00296
01A01-9607-CH-00296
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray

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X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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03C01-9511-CC-00356
03C01-9511-CC-00356

03C01-9506-CR-00170
03C01-9506-CR-00170

Nancy Buchanan, Mother et al., Next of Kin of Corwendell D. Perkins, Deceased, v. Hardemen County Tennessee and Hardeman County Highway Dept.
02A01-9411-CV-00257
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood

This matter appears appropriate for consideration pursuant to Rule 10(b) of the Rules of the
Court of Appeals of Tennessee. The plaintiffs/appellants in this cause, Nancy Buchanan, et al., (“Buchanan”) appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants/appellees, Hardeman County, Tennessee, et al., (“Hardeman County”). After a serious automobile accident on Minnie Hill Road in Hardeman County, Buchanan filed suit against Hardeman County for wrongful death, alleging that the road was not properly maintained by the County. Buchanan alleged that the accident would not have occurred had a lower speed limit been posted, a warning sign been erected, the curve properly delineated by road markings, and guardrails been installed. Buchanan argues that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply to Hardeman County in this case and that the road was unsafe, dangerous, and defective under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-203(a).

Angie Brooks, v. Kimberly Quam Davis and Gayle Schaal, and Erica Brooks, a minor B/N/F Angie Brooks, mother and natural guardian, v. Kimberly J. Quam Davis and Amy Schaal
01A01-9509-CV-00402.
Authoring Judge: Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer

This appeal is from the dismissal of the separate, but consolidated, suits of a mother and daughter for their personal injuries sustained while guest-passengers in a vehicle owned by Gayle (Amy) Schall and operated by Kimberly J. Quam Davis (hereafter "Ms. Davis"). Allstate Insurance Company (hereafter "Allstate") was served with process as an uninsured motorist insurer.

Carolyn S. Todd v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Company
02S01-9603-CV-00023
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. J. Steven Stafford,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer's insurer contends (1) benefits should be denied because of a false application for employment, (2) the trial court erred in awarding medical expenses not authorized by it, (3) the trial court erred in awarding temporary total disability benefits from the date of the injury until September 13, 1993 and (4) the award of medical benefits based on ten percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole is excessive. The employee contends the award of permanent partial disability benefits is inadequate. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award of temporary total disability benefits should be modified and the judgment otherwise affirmed. The employee or claimant is thirty-four and has an eighth grade education. She first completed a job application on September 25, 1989 and was hired as a flagman at Ford Construction Company, but performed other jobs, including driving a truck and shoveling or sweeping asphalt. Because the work was seasonal, she signed three subsequent applications. In her applications, the claimant denied any previous back injury or workers' compensation claim. In both respects, the application was false. She had in fact received in the past benefits for a back injury, from another employer. On July 2, 1992, the claimant injured her back while shoveling asphalt at work. She continued working until July 16th, when she was referred to Dr. J. Canale. Dr. Canale diagnosed myositis and muscle inflammation, for which he treated her conservatively until August 27th, when he released her to return to work without restrictions, limitations or permanent impairment. The claimant informed the employer that she was dissatisfied with Dr. Canale and asked to be referred to another doctor. In her testimony, she said the insurance company failed to provide her with the name of another doctor or a list from whom she could have made a choice. The trial judge apparently believed her. On the advice of her attorney, she saw Dr. James McAfee on September 11, 1992. Dr. McAfee diagnosed cervical strain, for which he prescribed physical therapy and nerve blocks. The doctor opined the injury was related to the injury at work and estimated the claimant's permanent impairment at eight percent to the whole body, from appropriate guidelines. The claimant incurred medical expenses for care prescribed by Dr. McAfee totaling $5,974., which the trial court found to be reasonable and reasonably necessary. 2

Louis A. McRedmond, Patrick J. McRedmond, Jr., and Monica McRemond Terry, on behalf of Elk Brand Mfg Co., v. Andrew Marianelli, Walter Marianell, David Manning, et al.
01A01-9412-CH-00594
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

The captioned plaintiffs have appealed from a summary judgment dismissing their suit against the captioned defendants.

Knott's Wholesale Foods, Inc., v. Billy L. Azbell and J & R Foods, Inc.
01A01-9510-CH-00459
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John W. Rollins

In this case, Defendant Billy Azbell (Azbell) appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff Knott’s Wholesale Foods, Inc. (Knott’s), finding that Azbell breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty as an employee. The trial court issued injunctive relief against Azbell and subsequently found that Azbell and defendant J & R Foods (J & R) engaged in a civil conspiracy to circumvent the injunction. Injunctive relief was issued against Azbell and J & R, and both defendants were held liable for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. Azbell and J & R appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Charles E. Greer v. Correction Corporation of America, et al.
01A01-9604-CH-00150
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Robert S. Brandt

An inmate in a Tennessee prison operated by Corrections Corporation of America filed a complaint which alleged that prison guards employed by the corrections company had converted his personal property. The chancery court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We reverse and reinstate the complaint.

Dixie Millburn Selby, v. Landon Selby
01A01-9604-CH-00159
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Don R. Ash

This is an appeal by defendant/appellant, Landon Selby, from a decision of the chancery court which granted appellant and plaintiff/appellee, Dixie Millburn Selby, a divorce and distributed the parties' marital and separate assets. The facts out of which this case arose are as follows.

Dixie Millburn Selby, v. Landon Selby - Dissenting
01A01-9604-CH-00159
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.

I concur with the court’s conclusion that the increase during the marriage of the equity in Ms. Selby’s six Glaze Court duplexes is marital property. However, I have prepared this separate opinion to address an issue concerning the valuation of this marital property that is not addressed in the main opinion. Since the trial court undervalued this interest, I would remand the case for further proceedings.

Dixie Millburn Selby, v. Landon Selby - Dissenting
01A01-9604-CH-00159
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.

I concur with the court’s conclusion that the increase during the marriage of the equity in Ms. Selby’s six Glaze Court duplexes is marital property. However, I have prepared this separate opinion to address an issue concerning the valuation of this marital property that is not addressed in the main opinion. Since the trial court undervalued this interest, I would remand the case for further proceedings.

Freddy Lee Jones v. Michael Greene, Commissioner Tennessee Department of Safety
01A01-9505-CH-00187
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This appeal involves over $45,000 seized during the search of a house in Memphis for illegal drugs. After the Commissioner of Safety ordered the forfeiture of the money, the person claiming the funds filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court for Davidson County asserting that the forfeiture statutes deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury trial and violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. The trial court upheld the forfeiture statutes and the forfeiture, and this appeal followed. We have determined that Tennessee’s forfeiture statutes are constitutional and that the record contains substantial and material evidence supporting the commissioner’s forfeiture order. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Allen D. Curtis, and Carolyn June Rice, v. William M. Rice, and Rice & Papuchis Construction Company, Inc.
01A01-9605-CH-00211
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray

This is an appeal by plaintiffs/appellants, Allen D. Curtis and his wife, Carolyn June Curtis, from a decision of the chancery court which dissolved the partnership formed between Curtis and defendant/appellee, William M. Rice, and which distributed the partnership's assets.1 The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows.

Colemill Enterprises, Inc., v. Joe Huddleston, Commissioner of Tennessee Department of Revenue
01A01-9605-CH-00218
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This is an appeal by plaintiff/appellant, Colemill Enterprises, Inc. ("Colemill"), from a decision of the chancery court which affirmed the determination of defendant/appellee, Joe Huddleston, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue ("Commissioner"), that Colemill owed certain state and local sales and use taxes. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows.

Elizabeth Ann Boutin, v. Francis John Boutin
01A01-9601-CH-00014
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Henry Denmark Bell

This appeal involves a provision in a marital dissolution agreement requiring the father to prepay his child support. Upon discovering that one of his children had decided not to complete high school, the father stopped paying the agreed amount of child support and filed a petition to terminate his child support obligation on the ground that the prepayment agreement was premised on the children’s continued enrollment in high school. The Chancery Court for Williamson County denied the petition, and the father perfected this appeal. We have determined that the trial court correctly enforced the amended marital dissolution agreement and accordingly affirm the judgment as modified herein.

Cynthia Albright v. Joseph L. Mercer, III
01A01-9607-CH-00333
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Henry Denmark Bell

This is an appeal by defendant/appellant, Joseph L. Mercer, III, from a decision of the Chancery Court for Williamson County awarding plaintiff/appellee, Cynthia Albright, attorney's fees of $1,000.00.

Sandra L. Garfinkel, v. Charles Leonard Garfinkel
02A01-9511-CH-00265
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John Walton West

This is a divorce case in which the trial court awarded custody of the parties’ minor children
to Plaintiff/Appellee, Sandra Garfinkel (Wife), with standard visitation to Defendant/Appellant,
Charles Garfinkel (Husband). Husband was ordered to pay child support and rehabilitative alimony for a period of one year. The trial court also held that Wife had not established any appreciation in the value of Husband’s separate property during the course of the marriage. Husband appeals the trial court’s rulings on child custody, child support and alimony. Wife appeals the trial court’s decision regarding Husband’s separate property. We affirm on all issues.

Rainbo Baking Company of Louisville, a Delaware Corporation, v. Release Coatings of Tennessee, Inc.
02A01-9510-CH-00223
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Hewitt P. Tomlin
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. D'Allisandratos

Rainbo Baking Company of Louisville (“Rainbo”) filed suit in the Chancery Court of Shelby County against Release Coatings of Tennessee, Inc. (“Release”) seeking compensatory damages from Release for damages allegedly sustained by Rainbo as a result of the improper straightening of a large quantity of baking pans used by it in its bakery business. The suit contained a count in negligence and a count in breach of contract. Release filed a counter-claim seeking to recover from Rainbo the balance due it for work performed. Following a bench trial, the court issued an opinion from the bench. In this opinion the court found that upon the evidence presented, Release was liable to Rainbo. However, the court specifically stated that it did not find that Rainbo had carried its burden of proof as to damages. The court ordered a reference to the Master to give Rainbo an opportunity to present additional proof as to damages, with Release being given an opportunity to present countervailing proof if desired. Following the Master’s hearing, a report was submitted to the chancellor in which the value of Rainbo’s pans was stated. The Master’s report was affirmed and judgment entered thereon in favor of Rainbo. The chancellor dismissed the counterclaim of Release against Rainbo. Release has raised three issues on appeal: did the 2 chancellor err in: (1) awarding a judgment against Release when Rainbo failed to prove its case; (2) the manner of determining the amount of damages sustained by Rainbo; and (3) failing to find for Release on its counter-claim. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we modify and affirm the trial court.