State of Tennessee v. Cornelius Williams, IV - Concur in Part/Dissent in Part
I fully concur with my respected colleagues reasoning and judgment as it relates to Parts I through IV of the majority opinion. As it relates to Part V, however, I must depart from the majority regarding the remedy for the trial court’s imposition of an illegal sentence. I believe the Defendant has the right to a sentencing hearing upon remand. On this point alone, I dissent. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cornelius Williams, IV
The defendant, Cornelius Williams IV, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second-degree murder and convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court committed plain error in providing the jury with an erroneous instruction; (3) the trial court committed plain error by allowing the State to introduce a pro se pleading purportedly filed by the defendant; (4) the defendant is entitled to relief based on cumulative error; and (5) the defendant’s sentence for convicted felon in possession of a handgun is illegal. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but we remand for entry of a corrected judgment in count two indicating the statutorily authorized release eligibility of eighty-five percent on the handgun conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jarmie Alonzo Hill
The Defendant, Jarmie Alonzo Hill, whose first trial with a codefendant before a Davidson County Criminal Court jury ended in a mistrial, was convicted in a second Davidson County Criminal Court bench trial of aggravated assault with serious bodily injury. The Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by not sua sponte recusing itself based on a prejudicial finding it made against the Defendant in the codefendant’s unrelated drug case; (2) whether the State committed a Brady violation by not providing the Defendant with the transcript of an unavailable witness’s jury trial testimony until the first day of the retrial; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Houston-Polk, III
The Defendant, John Houston-Polk, III, was convicted in a Rutherford County Circuit Court bench trial of simple possession of methamphetamine, a Class A misdemeanor; resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to six months in the county jail with the first 30 days to be served at 100% and the sentence to be served consecutively to the Defendant’s sentences in two general sessions court cases. The sole issue the Defendant raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his vehicle parked in the driveway of his parents’ home. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Danielle Wright v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Danielle Wright, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Skinner v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Steven Skinner, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his fourth untimely petition for writ of error coram nobis and his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. He argues on appeal that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition because he presented newly discovered evidence in support of actual innocence; therefore, the statute of limitations should be tolled. Alternatively, he argues that the lower court improperly denied his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. After review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the coram nobis petition and conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the denial of the motion to reopen and dismiss the appeal in that respect. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Theus
The pro se Defendant, Brandon Theus, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion to correct a clerical mistake in his judgments of convictions for simple possession of methamphetamine and driving on a suspended license. The Defendant argues the trial court should have granted his motion to award pretrial jail credit on his sentence in the instant case, which had been ordered to run consecutively to separate cases that were pending parole revocation proceedings at the time of the Defendant’s sentencing. The State contends that the Defendant’s appeal was untimely, that the record is inadequate for review, and, nonetheless, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Defendant’s motion to correct a clerical mistake. We conclude that the appeal is timely and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Ray Niles
The Defendant, Kenneth Ray Niles, appeals from his convictions in the Dickson County Circuit Court for two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and one count each of aggravated arson, a Class A felony; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; theft of property, a Class D felony; and aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2014) (subsequently amended) (first degree felony murder), 39-14-302 (2018) (aggravated arson), 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft of property), 39-14-406 (2014) (subsequently amended) (aggravated criminal trespass). He received an effective sentence of life plus fifty years. The Defendant contends that (1) the jury’s verdict was contrary to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, (2) the trial court erred by failing to exclude evidence found in the Defendant’s wife’s truck, and (3) the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the victims. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Foutaine Shaw
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Shawn Foutaine Shaw, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant claims that his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. He also raises an evidentiary issue regarding the testimony of a witness at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment in count 2 and corrected judgments in counts 3 through 6. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenyon Demario Reynolds
The Petitioner, Kenyon Demario Reynolds, appeals from the Knox County Criminal |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher R. Smith
A Lake County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher R. Smith, of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to consecutive fifteen-year sentences for each conviction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in Count 1 for aggravated assault, modify Count 2 to a conviction for assault, and remand for entry of an amended judgment and sentencing on Count 2. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Geri McBride, Individually and D/B/A The Real Estate Shop v. Cynthia H. Allison
Geri McBride, individually and d/b/a The Real Estate Shop (“Buyer”), sued Cynthia H. Allison (“Seller”) for breach of contract with respect to a real estate purchase and sale agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Seller had breached the agreement and granted Buyer specific performance but denied Buyer’s request for attorney’s fees. Seller filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, or alternatively for a new trial. The trial court denied Seller’s post-judgment motion, and Seller appealed to this Court. We affirm the trial court’s grant of specific performance to the Buyer and reverse the trial court’s denial of Buyer’s request for attorney’s fees. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Melba P. Mershon, Surviving Spouse of Rondell M. Mershon, ex rel. Hyland M., et al. v. HPT TA Properties Trust et al.
This is a wrongful death negligence action arising out of a fatal automobile collision that occurred on Long Lane, a public road in Franklin, Tennessee, which abuts a TA Travel Center. On October 6, 2016, Kenneth Page (“Mr. Page”) was traveling northbound on Long Lane in a vehicle with his wife as passenger. As he began to turn left into the entrance of the TA truck stop marked for semi-trailer trucks (“the trucks only entrance”), where there was a limited view of oncoming traffic due to a hill that crested shortly ahead, Mr. Page was hit by Rondell M. Mershon (“Mr. Mershon”), who was traveling southbound on Long Lane on a motorcycle. The collision occurred on Long Lane before Mr. Page could enter the TA Travel Center. Mr. Mershon died soon after the collision. Mr. Mershon’s wife, Melba P. Mershon, brought a wrongful death negligence action on behalf of herself and her two daughters (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) against Mr. Page. She later amended the complaint to add the owner and operator of the TA Travel Center, HPT TA Properties Trust and TA Operating LLC d/b/a Travel Centers of America (collectively “the TA Defendants”), alleging that the TA Defendants created a hazardous condition by failing to display clearly visible signage at the “trucks only” entrance of the TA truck stop directing passenger vehicles to the proper entrance located a short distance down Long Lane. Thereafter, Plaintiffs settled their claims against Mr. Page, leaving the TA Defendants as the only defendants in the case. In 2017, the trial court granted the TA Defendants’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that they owed no duty of care to Mr. Mershon. Plaintiffs appealed. In the first appeal of this action, we reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the TA Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs could not come forward with any evidence to show that they “owed a duty of care to Mr. Mershon related to the applicable sight distances and visibility of signs on TA’s property and that TA Defendants breached that duty.” The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that Plaintiffs failed to present any genuine issues of material fact, and that the TA Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiffs could show no evidence that the TA Defendants owed a duty to Mr. Mershon or that any act or omission of the TA Defendants constituted a cause in fact or proximate cause of Mr. Mershon’s injuries. Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the TA Defendants. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
John Jason Moore v. Amanda Jean Heilbrunn
Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s entry of a parenting plan naming Appellee/Father primary residential parent, awarding him sole decision-making authority, and awarding Mother 80 days of visitation. Because the trial court did not engage in a best-interest analysis as required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106, and because the trial court’s orders are too vague to allow this Court to conduct a meaningful review of its decisions, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
John Jason Moore v. Amanda Jean Heilbrunn (concurring)
I concur in the Majority Opinion’s conclusion that the trial court’s ruling should be vacated in this case. Because I conclude that the record clearly reflects that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in this case, however, I write separately. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Lacy L. Austin v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Lacy L. Austin, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief related to his convictions for two counts of possession of twenty-six grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver within 1,000 feet of a school zone; possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony drug offense; possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony involving the use of force or violence; simple possession of marijuana; and possession of drug paraphernalia. Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based upon his claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tanna Gordon, et al. v. State of Tennessee
The State appeals a judgment against it for an injury caused by the gross negligence of its employees in the creation or maintenance of a dangerous condition on state-owned property. Because we conclude that the Tennessee Claims Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims for gross negligence, we reverse. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Ryan Leath
In 2015, the Defendant, Ryan Leath, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued over $10,000, and the trial court sentenced him to six years, suspended, and ordered him to supervised probation. In May 2023, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation for being arrested for driving under the influence, driving on a revoked license, and harassment. The trial court returned the Defendant to probation, extending it by six years, and ordered him to sign up and attend a mental health treatment program. In October 2023, the Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit alleging that the Defendant had not attended the program. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation after a hearing, and on appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it revoked his probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joey Lasean Scribner
In 2018, the Defendant, Joey Lasean Scribner, pleaded guilty to possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years to be served on probation. The Defendant violated his probation, and the trial court reinstated his probation. In April 2023, the Defendant was stopped by law enforcement for speeding. Law enforcement determined that he was intoxicated. After a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant had again violated his probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court failed to place adequate findings in the record to support its decision to fully revoke his probation. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lonnie K. Cody
Defendant, Lonnie K. Cody, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Bobby B. Et Al.
In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1); (2) persistent conditions, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3); and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Because there is clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds relied on by the trial court and its determination that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Erin Mishkin v. Robert Cole Gordon
Appellant filed this petition for recusal appeal after the trial court denied a motion to recuse. Because we can find no evidence in the record of any bias that would require recusal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert E. Lee Flade v. City of Shelbyville, Tennessee et al.
In this appeal, we examine the intersection of the rule governing the voluntary dismissal of a civil action, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01, and the statutory scheme of the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-17-101 to -110 (2021). Robert E. Lee Flade filed suit against several defendants over what he considered to be disparaging remarks that were made on social media. Two of the defendants, Stephanie Isaacs and the Bedford County Listening Project (“the BCLP”), each filed not only a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, but also a petition to dismiss pursuant to the TPPA. The TPPA petitions sought dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, an award of attorney’s fees and costs, and an award of sanctions. Mr. Flade filed responses, and both the motions and the petitions were set for hearing. However, before the trial court conducted the hearing, Mr. Flade voluntarily nonsuited his complaint. As a result, the trial court entered an order of dismissal without prejudice. Ms. Isaacs and the BCLP sought to have the trial court adjudicate their TPPA petitions notwithstanding the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court determined that Mr. Flade’s nonsuit concluded the matter and declined to adjudicate the TPPA petitions. On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Flade v. City of Shelbyville, No. M2022-00553-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2200729, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2023), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Aug. 9, 2023). We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of applicable law, we conclude that although the right to take a voluntary nonsuit is subject to certain limitations, the mere filing of a TPPA petition is not among them. Thus, we hold that the trial court correctly declined to adjudicate the pending TPPA petitions after Mr. Flade voluntarily nonsuited his complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Bedford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Sidarius Jackson
A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Sidarius Jackson, of multiple drug, gang, |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Quincy D. Scott v. State of Tennessee
In 2016, Petitioner, Quincy D. Scott, was convicted by a McMinn County jury of |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals |