State of Tennessee v. Curtis Logan Lawson - concurring in part, dissenting in part
For the reasons stated in State v. Welch, No. E2018-00240-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 323826, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2019)(J. McMullen, dissenting), appeal granted (May 17, 2019), I dissent from Part I of the majority conclusion in this case. In all other respects, I concur. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Karen Abrams Malkin v. Reed Lynn Malkin
This appeal involves a former husband’s fourth petition to reduce or terminate his alimony in futuro obligation since the parties were divorced. When considering the appeal of husband’s third attempt, in Malkin v. Malkin, 475 S.W.3d 252 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015), this Court reversed the trial court’s reduction of the award and reinstated the prior alimony obligation. We found that the husband’s retirement was objectively reasonable and constituted a substantial and material change in circumstances, but we concluded that the husband failed to prove that the change in circumstances significantly diminished his financial ability to pay alimony or his former wife’s need for it. Just months after the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the husband’s application for permission to appeal, he filed his fourth petition to reduce or terminate his obligation. The wife filed a counter-petition to increase the award. The trial court granted the husband’s petition, again, and reduced the award to less than half of its previous amount. The wife appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa M. Daffron, As Daughter, Next of Kin To And As The Administrator Of The Estate Of Wiley E. Daffron v. Memorial Health Care System, Inc.
This appeal arises from a wrongful death action based on health care liability. Wiley E. Daffron (“Decedent”) received medical treatment from Memorial Health Care System, Inc. (“Memorial”) in 2013. During his stay at Memorial, Decedent developed a pressure ulcer. Decedent died a few months after he was discharged from Memorial. Teresa M. Daffron (“Ms. Daffron”), Decedent’s adult daughter, obtained Decedent’s medical records from Memorial. Some 13 months later, Ms. Daffron sent pre-suit notice of her intent to sue Memorial. A few months after that, Ms. Daffron filed suit against Memorial in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Memorial filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the statute of limitations, which the Trial Court granted. The Trial Court held that Ms. Daffron knew or should have known of Decedent’s injury and its possible cause more than one year before the pre-suit notice was sent and, therefore, her complaint was filed outside the statute of limitations. On appeal, Ms. Daffron argues that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until an expert informed her that Decedent’s injury was caused by Memorial. We hold that, pursuant to the discovery rule, and, as evidenced by, among other things, her seeking through counsel Decedent’s medical records, Ms. Daffron had constructive knowledge of Decedent’s claim more than one year before she sent pre-suit notice and, therefore, the complaint was not timely filed. Ms. Daffron’s claim brought on behalf of her father is barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis Rasheed Gaye
Defendant, Dennis Rasheed Gaye, appeals from the dismissal of a motion to reduce his sentence, a motion to correct an illegal sentence, and a motion to correct a clerical error. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Howard Melton
Defendant, Howard Melton, was convicted of assault by offensive touching and sexual battery by an authority figure. As a result of the convictions, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve four years in incarceration, consecutively to the sentence Defendant received in a separate case. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly admitted a videotape into evidence. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gerald Brown v. Waddell Wright, Et Al.
This appeal arises from a dispute over an unorthodox, two-page contract pursuant to which the plaintiff sold his home to the defendant and continued to reside in the home, in accordance with a lease-back provision, for “up to five years” with rent “not to exceed $950 a month.” The contract also included provisions for “equity participation,” including the option for the plaintiff to buy the property back “at prevailing market value.” The plaintiff filed a complaint asserting, inter alia, claims for violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, quiet title, and breach of contract. The defendant answered and asserted counterclaims, inter alia, for breach of contract and to remove the plaintiff from the property. Following a trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon the principal findings that the plaintiff lacked credibility and was the first to materially breach the contract. The trial court also ruled that the defendant owned the property and was entitled to immediate possession but denied the defendant’s claim to recover his attorney’s fees. Both parties appeal. We affirm the dismissal of all of the plaintiff’s claims and the trial court’s determination that the defendant owned the property and was entitled to immediate possession. As for the attorney’s fees, we hold that the defendant was entitled to recover his reasonable attorney’s fees based on Section 6 of the contract which provides that in the event suit is filed to enforce the contract, “the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all cost of such enforcement including reasonable attorney’s fees as approved by the Court.” |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Caroline U.
This is a modification of residential schedule case. The father requested an increase in parenting time based on a material change in circumstances. The court ruled that the father failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Latonya Denise Hall v. Sammie Lee Williams, III
This post-divorce appeal concerns the trial court’s modification of a permanent parenting plan. We affirm the parenting plan determination and all other rulings by the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie Thomas Baker
Defendant, Ronnie T. Baker, was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, domestic assault, and interference with a 911 call. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of ten years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of aggravated assault; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s prior consistent statements; (3) the trial court erred in admitting testimony and photos concerning the interior of the victim’s residence that showed destruction of the property by the Defendant; (4) the trial court erred by failing to merge the convictions for aggravated assault and domestic assault; and (5) the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence and by imposing partial consecutive sentencing. After conducting a full review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas J. Elsten, Jr. v. Jeffrey Coker, Et Al.
This appeal arises from a defamation action filed by one mayoral candidate against another for statements made during the City of Hendersonville, Tennessee mayoral race. Accordingly, the issues are to be judged based on the more stringent standards that apply in a defamation action brought by a public figure. After engaging in discovery, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending the plaintiff lacked evidence showing the defendant published the statements with actual malice. To withstand the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff had the burden to demonstrate he would be able to prove clearly and convincingly that the defendant acted with actual malice, which required proof the defendant had knowledge that the facts he published about the plaintiff were false or that he acted with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. The trial court found that the plaintiff “did not produce clear and convincing evidence of actual malice at the summary judgment stage” and summarily dismissed the action. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Li Huang Sullivan v. Eric Jason Sullivan
This appeal is from a final decree of divorce. The Husband challenges several of the trial court’s rulings regarding the parenting plan, division of the marital estate, calculation of child support, and denial of his motion to amend to file a counterclaim for alimony. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon E. Banks
A Davidson County grand jury indicted the defendant, Brandon E. Banks, for five counts of aggravated rape and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. After trial, a jury convicted the defendant of one count of each offense. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his cell phone, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for aggravated rape, and several of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon E. Banks - Concur in Part / Dissent in Part
I join the majority in affirming the defendant’s convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery. But I write separately to dissent from the majority’s conclusions that Detective Gish was qualified to describe and give his opinion regarding what the videos and images appeared to show and that the defendant waived his claim regarding Detective Mayo’s “editorial commentary.” |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Santeriaus D. Lavender v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Santeriaus D. Lavender, pled guilty to second degree murder in exchange for a sentence of thirty years to be served at 100 percent. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. The post-conviction court denied relief, and upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Diontae Smartt
A Hamilton County jury found Defendant, Diontae Smartt, guilty of aggravated sexual battery, for which he received a sentence of eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to admit the video recording of his statement to police in its entirety, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 106, after the State questioned Defendant about inconsistencies between the statement and Defendant’s trial testimony. Defendant further contends that the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury on self-defense as the defense was fairly raised by the proof at trial. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Troy Love v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Troy Love, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jenny Frye
The defendant, Jenny Frye, appeals the order of the trial court revoking her community corrections sentence and ordering her to serve an increased sentence of eight years in confinement. Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant violated the terms of her community corrections sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part. However, because the trial court failed to conduct a sentencing hearing prior to increasing the defendant’s sentence, we remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Mark Sloane v. Tennessee Department of State, Business Services Division
On September 30, 2016, Appellee Tennessee Secretary of State, Business Services Division assessed $25,000.00 in civil penalties against Appellant David M. Sloane for his violations of the Athlete Agent Reform Act of 2011. Mr. Sloane requested a hearing to dispute the penalties, and the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) reduced the penalties to $5,000.00 for each violation and $740.00 in investigatory costs. Mr. Sloane then filed a petition for judicial review with the trial court; the trial court affirmed the ALJ’s order. Mr. Sloane appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Ann Sklar v. Patrick Clancy et al.
This appeal involves a review of the denial of a motion pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm the ruling of the trial court. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Gloria Juanita Milton v. Donald Powell et al.
This case presents a boundary line dispute between the owners of adjacent properties. Gloria Juanita Milton (plaintiff), owner of a roughly 2.44-acre lot in the Morton Acres subdivsion in Campbell County, brought this action against the owners of the adjacent lot to the north, Donald Powell and Donna Powell Fredricks Carson (defendants). The issue at trial was the location of the boundary line between the properties. Each side hired a surveyor. Plaintiff’s surveyor, William Easter, presented a survey of plaintiff’s property that conformed very closely to the calls and boundaries established by the original subdivision plat. Defendants’ surveyor, Dwight Crutchfield, presented a survey of the boundary line that gave defendants property in the amount of about 0.46 acre more than that described in the subdivison plat and Easter’s survey. The trial court credited the survey presented by plaintiff and established the boundary line as presented in the Easter survey. Defendants appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by disregarding wellestablished principles for determining disputed boundaries as prescribed in Thornburg v. Chase, 606 S.W.2d 672 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) and Wood v. Starko, 197 S.W.3d 255 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). We affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
George E. Miller et al. v. TRH Health Insurance Company et al.
An insured sued his health insurance provider, seeking damages for breach of contract and bad faith refusal to pay valid insurance claims after coverage was denied for medical expenses related to the removal of a kidney stone. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on a benefit exclusion rider to the insurance contract that excluded coverage for treatment, surgery, or expenses related to kidney stones. The trial court rejected the insured’s argument that the exclusion rider did not apply and granted summary judgment to the defendants. Because the defendants were entitled to a judgment of dismissal as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Josiah T.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. Before trial, the mother moved to dismiss the petition to terminate her parental rights for failure to join the father of the child as a necessary party. The juvenile court denied the motion. And after a trial, the court found six statutory grounds for termination and that termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest. We discern no error in the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. But we conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing as to one of the statutory grounds relied on by the trial court for the termination of the mother's parental rights. Still, the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the remaining five grounds for termination and that termination is in the child's best interest. So we affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Ugenio Dejesus Ruby-Ruiz v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ugenio Dejesus Ruby-Ruiz, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 convictions for nine counts of rape of a child, two counts of rape, five counts of aggravated sexual battery, and three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and his 121-year sentence at 100% service. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for the entry of an order granting the Petitioner a delayed appeal for the limited purpose of filing an application for permission to appeal to our supreme court. The Petitioner’s remaining allegations shall be held in abeyance in the post-conviction court until the resolution of the delayed appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ugenio Ruby-Ruiz v. State of Tennessee - Dissenting Opinion
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion granting the delayed appeal because I conclude that the Tennessee Supreme Court, in denying the Petitioner’s request to late-file his appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure (“Rule 11 application”), has already reviewed the substantive underlying issues of the appeal in determining not to accept the late-filed appeal in the interest of justice. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Abraham Asley Augustin v. Bradley County Sheriff's Office et al.
Appellant appeals from the dismissal of his complaint seeking damages for the improper forfeiture of his property seized incident to an arrest. The trial court dismissed the action on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claim for the return of his seized property, as the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim. We reverse, however, the dismissal of Appellant’s claim for damages related to a bad faith seizure under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-33-215. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals |