Marty Holland v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Marty Holland, appeals from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues generally that “the postconviction court erred in finding [the Petitioner] received effective assistance of counsel.” Based on the issues developed at the post-conviction hearing and the order of the post-conviction court, the issue presented is whether the Petitioner’s guilty pleas are constitutionally infirm due to trial counsel’s failure to investigate (1) a coerced confession; (2) the validity of a bench warrant concerning an unrelated offense; and (3) a search warrant executed at the Petitioner’s home concerning an unrelated case. Following our review, we deem it necessary to remand this matter to the post-conviction court for a hearing to determine whether the Petitioner was advised of the circumstances attendant to entering a guilty plea based upon an agreement that his state sentence would be served concurrently to a previously imposed federal sentence. In all other respects, the judgment of the post-conviction court it affirmed. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin McDougle
The defendant, Kevin McDougle, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Upon our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Venture Express v. Jerry Frazier
Jerry Frazier alleged that he sustained a compensable injury in the course of his work as a truck driver for Venture Express. The trial court held that Mr. Frazier’s January 29, 2014 accident at work caused his neck, back and mental injuries, that the 1.5 times cap on permanent disability benefits did not apply, and that Mr. Frazier was permanently and totally disabled. Venture Express has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Ahmon Watkins and Peter Dodson, IV
In a joint trial, a Rutherford County jury convicted Ahmon Watkins of two counts of aggravated rape, four counts of rape, and two counts of sexual battery, and Peter Dodson, IV, of one count of aggravated rape, one count of rape, and two counts of sexual battery. The trial court sentenced Defendant Watkins to an effective sentence of twenty years and Defendant Dodson to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, Defendant Watkins and Defendant Dodson assert that: (1) the trial court erred when it did not grant a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence; (2) the trial court erred when it did not grant a new trial based upon the victim’s false testimony; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (4) the trial court made improper “introductory comments” to prospective jurors during voir dire; (5) the trial court improperly excluded impeachment testimony; (6) the trial court failed to order the deposition of the victim; (7) the trial court erred when it gave jury instructions on the law before jury selection was complete; (8) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on reckless conduct; (9) the trial court improperly addressed a jury question during deliberations; (10) the defendants are entitled to relief based upon cumulative error; and (11) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the defendants’ convictions. Defendant Watkins additionally raises issues related to sentencing. After review, we reverse for cumulative error and remand for a new trial. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lisa Lyon Williams v. Lane Edward Williams
This is a divorce case. Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s: (1) award of alimony in futuro to Wife; (2) award of alimony in solido for Wife’s attorney’s fees; and (3) classification of certain jewelry as Wife’s separate property. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Dominic Stevenson
The defendant, James Dominic Stevenson, appeals his Marshall County Circuit Court jury convictions of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment involving the use of a deadly weapon. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the element of identity. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Susan Knight as Executrix of the Estate of Elton M. Johnson v. Horse Creek Rock, Inc.
This is a dispute over a lease agreement for property upon which the lessor permitted the lessee to mine limestone. After the original lessor died, his estate demanded that the lessee provide weight tickets as provided in the lease agreement. When the lessee failed to comply, the estate filed suit and the lessee counterclaimed. The trial court granted summary judgment to the estate on its claim for declaratory judgment and declared that the lease agreement was terminated. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the estate on the lessee’s counterclaim for intentional interference with a business relationship. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re E.Z. et al.
This appeal arises from a finding of dependency and neglect. S.Z. (“Mother”) is the mother of both E.Z. and B.G. (“the Children,” collectively). C.G. (“Father”) is the father of B.G.1 In the wake of certain non-accidental injuries sustained by B.G., Father’s father filed a petition seeking custody of the Children. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) intervened, and the Children’s maternal grandfather filed a petition, as well. Mother and Father both denied abusing B.G. The Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) found the Children dependent and neglected. The Trial Court found also that Mother or Father abused B.G. and the other parent knows who committed the abuse, but the Trial Court held it could not determine which parent committed the abuse. Consequently, the Trial Court declined to find severe child abuse. DCS appeals to this Court, and Mother raises additional issues. We find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual finding that Mother or Father abused B.G. and the other knows who committed the abuse. Given that and other findings, we hold that the Trial Court erred in concluding that it could not find severe child abuse. We, therefore, reverse that aspect of the Trial Court’s judgment and hold that severe child abuse was proven by clear and convincing evidence. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Volha Purswani v. Krish Purswani
This action involves petitions for orders of protection filed by a wife against her husband. Following a hearing on the merits, the trial court entered an order of protection against the husband and in favor of the wife on May 23, 2018. The order of protection prohibited the husband from having contact with the wife and granted the husband co-parenting time with his four children every other weekend. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Lequita Nix Hilliard v. Dolgencorp, LLC
Lequita Nix Hilliard (“Plaintiff”) sued Dolgencorp, LLC (“Defendant”) alleging discrimination in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103, of the Tennessee Disability Act, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-311, of the Tennessee Human Rights Act; and retaliatory discharge for filing a worker’s compensation claim. The Chancery Court for Polk County (“the Trial Court”) granted summary judgment to Defendant. Plaintiff appeals. We find and hold that there is no genuine disputed issue of material fact with regard to the fact that due to her medical restrictions Plaintiff is unable to perform the essential job functions of a store manager. Given this, Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on both of Plaintiff’s claims. We, therefore, affirm. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Innerimages, Inc. v. Robert Newman et al.
Innerimages, Inc. (“Innerimages” or “the developer”) filed suit against homeowners Robert Newman, David and Melba White, and David and Susan Schilt as trustees for the David Schilt and Susan Schilt Trust. It sought to recover unpaid maintenance fees required by the restrictive covenants governing their real property. The homeowners filed a counterclaim, seeking various forms of relief. The homeowners also joined the following third-party defendants: Sandra Gunn, the president of Innerimages, homeowners David and Joan Barrett, and property owner Cupid’s Rose, LLC.2 After a bench trial, the court dismissed the collection action filed by the developer. The court determined: (1) that the restrictive covenants are unenforceable as to the four homeowners and their successors in title; (2) that the developer is liable for breach of fiduciary duty for its failure to honor its obligations under the restrictive covenants; and (3) that Sandra Gunn is personally liable under an alter ego theory of piercing the corporate veil. Finally, the court awarded the homeowners damages in the amount of all fees paid since taking ownership of their property or, in the case of the Schilt family, fees paid over the last three years. In a subsequent order, the trial court clarified that only Mr. Newman was entitled to money damages because the other homeowners had not paid fees to the developer during the relevant time period. The court also denied the homeowners’ request for attorney’s fees. Innerimages, Sandra Gunn, and Cupid’s Rose, LLC appeal. Because this appeal presents novel issues relating to the enforceability of restrictive covenants, we take this opportunity to adopt the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 6.19(1)-(2) (Am. Law Inst. 2000). We modify the trial court’s judgment pursuant to the principles set forth in the Restatement. As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Ramone Lawson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Ramone Lawson, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel which led to his convictions of one count of first degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After reviewing the briefs of the parties and the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ricky Benson v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County grand jury indicted the Petitioner for two counts of burglary of a building. In March 2018, before being convicted of the charges, the Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition seeking appointment of counsel and “an updated trial in another courtroom.” The habeas corpus court denied the petition because the Petitioner had not yet been convicted of the charged offenses and based upon the numerous procedural deficiencies in the petition. The Petitioner appeals the habeas corpus court’s denial. After review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Auto Glass Company of Memphis, Inc. d/b/a Jack Morris Auto Glass v. David Gerregano Commissioner, Department of Revenue, State of Tennessee
This is a taxation dispute between the Commissioner of the Department of Revenue and a Tennessee corporation. The primary point of contention concerns the proper tax classification of the corporation under Tennessee’s Business Tax Act. After paying an amount of taxes that it deemed improper, the corporation filed a claim for refund. The Department of Revenue subsequently denied the claim for refund, and the corporation thereafter filed suit seeking a refund in the Shelby County Chancery Court. The litigation quickly advanced with the filing of competing cross-motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the chancery court ruled in the corporation’s favor, specifically rejecting the Commissioner’s tax classification of the business. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rosalyn Small v. Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority
This is the second appeal of this wrongful termination of employment case. Appellant/Employee appeals the amount of post judgment interest awarded. Because the trial court’s order does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we cannot conduct a meaningful review. As such, we vacate and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Penklor Properties, LLC v. Jo Ellen Buehler, et al.
Appellant Mid South Title Services, LLC agreed to act as escrow agent for a real estate transaction in which Appellee Penklor Properties, LLC was the buyer. Appellee tendered earnest money, which, under the Purchase and Sale Agreement, was to be held by Appellant unless and until the parties to the Purchase and Sale Agreement submitted a signed written agreement changing the terms of the escrow. Very shortly after the Purchase and Sale Agreement was signed, Appellant received a purported amendment from the seller’s former attorney and real estate broker. The amendment requested that Appellant release $53,000.00 of the escrowed funds in satisfaction of the attorney/broker’s “former legal fees.” Without inquiring further, Appellant issued the requested check. Appellant later discovered that the amendment was not, in fact, authorized by the parties to the Purchase and Sale Agreement. Appellee filed suit against Appellant for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, and the trial court entered judgment against Appellant. Appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Louis Dane Devillier
The Defendant, Louis Dane Devillier, pleaded guilty to misdemeanor theft, driving under the influence (“DUI”), and perjury, in exchange for concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the agreed-upon sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contests the manner of service of the sentence, contending that the trial court failed to find specific facts supporting enhancement factors and failed to give “due weight” to mitigating factors. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Louis Dane Devillier - Concurring Opinion
I concur in the conclusion that the judgments of the trial court should be affirmed if the decision of this court must be made addressing the merits of the case. However, I would dismiss the appeal because, as the State correctly points out, the notice of appeal was not timely filed, and Defendant has failed to seek a waiver of the timely filing of the notice. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Gunn Et Al. v. Jefferson County Economic Development Oversight Committee, Inc.
Because appellants’ notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days following the trial court’s final, appealable judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Christy Keller Elrod Church v. Darrell Gene Elrod
In this post-divorce petition to modify, the Appellant (former Husband) contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his obligation to provide life insurance for the benefit of Appellee (former Wife) was part of a property settlement and therefore not subject to modification. The trial court’s order included an upward deviation for support of the parties’ youngest child for the twelve month period prior to her emancipation. The trial court also ordered Appellant to pay college tuition equal to that of the University of Tennessee at Knoxville without providing any allowance for scholarships and sponsor fees received by the parties’ daughter. The trial court further found that Appellant was not guilty of civil contempt for failure to make payments into Appellee’s retirement account under the terms of the parties’ Agreed Order of Legal Separation (AOLS). However, the trial court refused to relieve Appellant of his obligation to continue funding Appellee’s retirement account at the same level as he funds his own retirement account. We conclude from our review that the life insurance policy obligation constitutes spousal support, which is subject to modification. We vacate the trial court’s judgment concerning college tuition and hold that Appellant is obligated to pay the cost of tuition and books, less scholarships and sponsor fees received by the parties’ daughter. All other aspects of the trial court’s order are affirmed. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Cynthia P. Et Al.
In this parental termination case, the juvenile court found four statutory grounds for termination of a mother’s parental rights and that termination of parental rights was in her children’s best interest. We conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support all four grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interest. So we affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Ernest Ray Laning et al. v. Johnny Lawrence et al.
This case arises out of a dispute involving conflicting claims to the charter of a local affiliate of a national veteran’s service organization, the ownership of real property held by the local affiliate, and the right to manage a clubroom being operated on the property. The appellants, plaintiffs in the trial court, seek review of an order setting aside the deed upon which their claim to ownership derives and dismissing their claim for damages. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Beckwith, Et Al. v. LBMC, P.C. Et Al.
A business retained a professional accounting firm to value its common stock and stock options. Almost four years after the requested valuation report was provided, the president of the business claimed that one of the firm’s accountants had disclosed confidential information about the valuation to a third party. The president and the accounting firm entered a tolling agreement for his individual claim. But after attempts to resolve the dispute failed, the president and the business filed a complaint against the accounting firm for breach of contract, accounting malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty. The accounting firm moved for summary judgment, claiming the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. Applying the one-year statute of limitations for accounting malpractice actions and concluding that the tolling agreement established a filing deadline for the president, the trial court ruled that the plaintiffs’ claims were untimely. Upon review, we conclude that the tolling agreement paused the running of the statute of limitations on the president’s confidentiality claim. So we vacate the dismissal of the president’s confidentiality claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca M. Little v. The City Of Chattanooga, Tennessee
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint, which ostensibly alleged declaratory judgment, inverse condemnation, and due process violations. We vacate the dismissal of Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim because that claim was not actually addressed in the trial court’s order of dismissal. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Candance Gooch Spight v. Deangelo M. Spight
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court’s ruling regarding retroactive child support. The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence for our review as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, the trial court’s order contains an inconsistency regarding the amount of the retroactive child support award. Specifically, the amount of arrears ordered does not comport with the accrual date for arrears listed in the trial court’s order. Because there are no findings, to resolve the inconsistency, we vacate the trial court’s award of retroactive child support. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Appeals |