Keith Lemont Farmer v. Shawn Phillips, Warden
The Petitioner, Keith Lemont Farmer, appeals from the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2012 conviction for attempt to commit first degree murder and his twenty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Desmond Simpson
The Defendant, Christopher Desmond Simpson, was convicted by a Lawrence County Circuit Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2018). The Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion to sequester the jury, (4) the trial court erred by admitting autopsy photographs, (5) the trial court erred during jury instructions, and (6) the trial court erred during sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Angela Charlene Iveson v. Jeffrey Wayne Iveson
This appeal concerns a post-divorce effort to modify a residential parenting schedule. Angela Charlene Iveson (“Mother”) filed a petition against ex-husband Jeffrey Wayne Iveson (“Father”) in the Chancery Court for Sumner County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to modify the permanent parenting plan applicable to their minor daughter (“the Child”). The petition proceeded to a bench trial. Afterward, the Trial Court entered an order reducing and restricting Father’s parenting time as well as increasing his child support obligation. Father appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that the restrictions placed upon his parenting time are unwarranted and that the Trial Court erred by using his income for the most recent one year rather than a three year average of his income for child support purposes. We find that the Trial Court’s decisions with respect to these discretionary issues have a sufficient evidentiary basis and are consistent with applicable law. Thus, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Teague Et Al. v. Shane Bruce
This is an appeal from a final order granting the petition, filed by the appellees, Stephen Teague, M.D., Mark Rasnake, M.D., University Infectious Disease, Lori Staudenmaier, D.O., and UT Family Physicians LaFollette, which sought a permanent restraining order against the appellant, Shane Bruce. The final order denying the pro se appellant’s motion to set aside the judgment, which the Trial Court treated as a motion for new trial, was entered on January 22, 2018. The appellant did not file his Notice of Appeal until November 21, 2018, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the final order. The appellees filed a motion to dismiss this appeal arguing that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. We conclude that the appellees’ motion is well-taken and that we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Tiffany "Whitaker" Kramer v. Phillip John Kramer
In this appeal, the wife challenges the trial court’s division of the marital assets and liabilities. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gerardo Juarez aka Gerardo Juarez-Ortega
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Gerardo Juarez, of two counts of reckless endangerment, one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, three counts of aggravated assault, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his aggravated assault and attempted voluntary manslaughter convictions. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for corrected judgment forms in Counts one, four, and five. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Fabian Claxton v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Fabian Claxton, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Shelby County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because newly discovered evidence exists in his case. After our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Ramel Cole-Pugh
A Madison County grand jury indicted the defendant, Brandon Ramel Cole-Pugh, with aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000. Following trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated criminal trespass, a lesser-included offense of aggravated burglary, and theft of property over $1,000, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his theft of property conviction and requests plain error review of the prosecutor’s closing argument. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we modify the defendant’s theft conviction from a Class D felony to a Class E felony based on the criminal savings statute and impose a sentence of four years’ confinement as a Range II offender. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Thomas
Aggrieved of his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the defendant, Antonio Thomas appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence certain Facebook messages in the absence of sufficient proof of the authenticity and reliability of the messages. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Montague v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Charles Montague, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged the judgments for his 1993 misdemeanor convictions of possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daniel Earl Gentry
The defendant, Daniel Earl Gentry, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sharles Johnson
The defendant, Sharles Johnson, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of theft. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the element of intent. We affirm the jury verdicts but remand the case for the entry of corrected judgments reflecting that the alternative counts of theft are merged. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Terry Johnson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Harry Gilley
The Defendant, Harry Gilley, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; four counts of burglary of a habitation under construction, Class D felonies; five counts of felony theft of property, Class E felonies; two counts of misdemeanor theft of property, Class A misdemeanors; and one count of vandalism of property, a Class A misdemeanor, stemming from charges in eight indictments. In exchange for his pleas, the Defendant received an effective Range III sentence of fifteen years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement, which the Defendant appeals. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Enhanceworks, Inc. v. Dropbox, Inc.
This appeal involves the issue of personal jurisdiction over Appellee, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. The trial court, on Appellee’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, decided it lacked personal jurisdiction and dismissed the case. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Emil John Ford v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Emil John Ford, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he was not informed “that he could be on the sex offender registry for life.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Clayton Thompson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Timothy Clayton Thompson, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (2) that trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for the Petitioner’s sentencing hearing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Ex Rel. Herbert H. Slatery, III, Et Al. v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Et Al.
At issue in this appeal is the breadth of federal preemption under Title II of the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521 to 7590, for claims that pertain to: (1) the initial manufacture and installation of “defeat device” software in emissions control systems in automobiles, and (2) post-sale software updates of emissions control systems during manufacturer recalls. The State of Tennessee brought this action against several automobile manufacturers for violating state anti-tampering laws by tampering with the emissions control systems in more than 8,000 of their “clean diesel” vehicles that were registered and operated in Tennessee from 2008 to 2015. The manufacturers responded by filing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motions to dismiss arguing that all of the claims were preempted by the federal Clean Air Act. The trial court dismissed the claims that pertained to the initial manufacture and installation of emissions control systems for automobiles as expressly preempted by Section 209(a) of the act; however, the court denied the manufacturers’ motions to dismiss the claims that pertained to the post-sale software updates of emissions control systems during manufacturer recalls. We have determined that all of the State’s claims are preempted by the federal Clean Air Act. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of the claims related to the initial manufacture and installation of emissions control systems, reverse the decision to deny the Rule 12 motions to dismiss the post-sale software updates and installations, and remand with instructions to dismiss all claims. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Country Mile, LLC, Et Al. v. Cameron Properties
Cameron Properties, LLC (“Landlord”) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court for Williamson County (“the Trial Court”), which, inter alia, found Landlord in breach of a lease agreement with Country Mile, LLC (“Country Mile”) and awarded a judgment against Landlord of $18,037.75. Landlord raises issues, among others, regarding standing, whether Country Mile breached the lease agreement by failing to pay rent, and whether Landlord is entitled to an award of all of its attorney’s fees. We find and hold, that Country Mile, Well North, LLC, and Dean Pennington all had standing; that the Trial Court did not err in finding the tenants in breach but that Landlord had breached the lease agreement first; that the tenants proved $18,037.75 in damages from Landlord’s breach; and that pursuant to the lease agreement Landlord is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees due to the tenant’s breach. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Sallie Lunn Tarver v. John Taylor Tarver, et al.
This appeal involves a unique divorce proceeding. Throughout most of the parties’ 29-year marriage, the husband worked as vice president of his father’s railroad construction business. Numerous properties, assets, and accounts were jointly titled in the names of the husband and his father over the years. When the wife filed a complaint for divorce, she named as defendants not only the husband but also his father. Shortly thereafter, the husband’s father drastically reduced the amount of money the husband was receiving from the company. The divorce trial was conducted over the course of twelve days. The trial court classified some of the disputed assets as belonging solely to the husband’s father. It found that the husband had an ownership interest in other property and included it in the marital estate subject to equitable division. The trial court imputed income to both the husband and the wife and ordered the husband to pay alimony and child support. The parties raise various issues on appeal regarding the classification, valuation, and division of marital property, the imputation of income for purposes of alimony and child support, and the alimony award. The wife also seeks an award of attorney’s fees on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects and deny the request for attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Glenn R. Funk v. Scripps Media, Inc., Et Al.
We granted review of this interlocutory appeal arising from a defamation action to address whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that (1) a showing of malice cannot defeat the fair report privilege and (2) an assertion of the fair report privilege exempts the defendants from part of the protections of Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-1-208, Tennessee’s news media shield law. With respect to the first issue, we conclude that neither actual nor express malice defeats the privilege; the only limitations on the fair report privilege are that a report of an official action or proceeding must be fair and accurate. With respect to the second issue, we conclude that the fair report privilege is a defense based upon a source of information that renders the source of the statements the plaintiff alleges to be defamatory unprotected by Tennessee’s shield law. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the separate grounds stated in this opinion and remand this case to the trial court. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Patrick Durkin v. MTown Construction, LLC
This is the second appeal from a trial court’s award in a case dealing with damage to real property. The plaintiff’s home had been damaged by a rainstorm while a construction company was in the middle of repairing the roof. The trial court entered an award in favor of the plaintiff for the reasonable costs of repair and remediation in the amount of $118,926.12 by totaling the damage estimate of the defendant’s insurance adjuster with the estimates provided by the plaintiff’s experts. While we affirm the trial court’s method of awarding damages based on the reasonable costs of repair, finding duplication in its award, we vacate the amount of the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a new calculation of damages. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerome Antonio McElrath
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Obion | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua D. Johnson
The petitioner, Joshua D. Johnson, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerome Antonio McElrath - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
I write separately in this case because I concur with part of the majority’s analysis and disagree with other parts of it. |
Obion | Supreme Court |