State of Tennessee v. James Douglas Black
A Greene County jury convicted the Defendant, James Douglas Black, of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder of Courtney Thompson and Terrance Stewart. The trial court imposed concurrent life sentences. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments, but we remand for entry of corrected judgments reflecting the merger of certain counts. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen Douglas Smith
The Defendant-Appellant, Stephen Douglas Smith, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of one count of rape of a child, four counts of aggravated statutory rape, and forty counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, for which he received an effective sentence of forty-one years. T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522, -506; 39-17-1005. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court improperly admitted a thumb drive and the photographs from it into evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to cross examine the victim regarding her sexual history. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Ewing Clemmons
The defendant, John Ewing Clemmons, appeals from the entry of an order denying his “Petition/Motion for Modification and/or Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.” In denying the defendant’s motion, the trial court determined it no longer had jurisdiction over the defendant’s sentence. Following our review of the record, we affirm the ruling of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rashunus B. Pearsons
Defendant, Rashunus B. Pearsons, was indicted for two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of harassment. Defendant was uncooperative with his appointed attorneys, and the trial court allowed Defendant to represent himself at trial. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of all counts. On appeal, Defendant argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated, that the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude mention of the victim’s immigration status, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault, and that the trial court deprived him of his right to counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that proper procedure was not followed to secure a waiver of the right to counsel from Defendant and that Defendant did not forfeit his right to counsel. Therefore, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason Paul Baker
The Defendant, Jason Paul Baker, appeals his conviction for premeditated first degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In imposing the sentence, the jury found one aggravating circumstance: the Defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies with statutory elements involving the use of violence to the person. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2). On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence established that he was insane at the time of the offense; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (3) the trial court erred during the penalty phase in allowing the State to rely upon the Defendant’s prior aggravated assault conviction to establish the (i)(2) aggravating circumstance. The State concedes that the trial court erred during the penalty phase, and we agree. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and remand the case to the trial court for entry of a judgment reflecting a sentence of life imprisonment. We otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Little Hurricane Properties, LLC v. Ralph Cafaro, et al.
Little Hurricane Properties, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed its Complaint to Remove Cloud on Title and for Injunction against Ralph Cafaro and Margetta Langlois (“Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”). The properties at issue are located in Cumberland and DeKalb Counties. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Plaintiff. Defendants appealed. We hold that, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to quiet title to land in DeKalb County, Cumberland County is not the proper venue. We vacate that element of the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for this case to be transferred to an appropriate court in DeKalb County to address Plaintiff’s action to quiet title to land in that county. Otherwise, we affirm the Trial Court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Orlando Carter
The Defendant, Eric Orlando Carter, was indicted on one count each of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and attempted first degree murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-202. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charge of first degree felony murder. A mistrial was declared on that charge, and it was subsequently dismissed by the State. The trial court then imposed a total effective sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Decarlos M. Murphy
The Defendant, Decarlos M. Murphy, appeals as of right, from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probationary sentence and order of incarceration for the remainder of his twelve-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering his sentence into execution instead of reinstating him to community corrections or probation with a mental health and substance abuse treatment. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Allison Franklin
The Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted Robert A. Franklin, the Defendant-Appellant, for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI by impairment), driving while the alcohol concentration in his blood or breath was 0.08% or more (DUI per se), violating the financial responsibility law, and violating the vehicle registration law. Prior to trial, Franklin filed a motion to suppress evidence from his search, seizure, and arrest on the basis that the sobriety checkpoint where this evidence was obtained was unconstitutional. After the trial court denied this motion to suppress, Franklin filed a motion to reconsider, which was also denied. Franklin next filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, or in the alternative, to exclude the evidence from his blood test, arguing that Code section 55-10- 413 is unconstitutional because it creates a fee system that violates the right to due process and a fair trial. Although Franklin’s request to dismiss the indictment or exclude the evidence was denied, the trial court granted his request for a jury instruction regarding the fee in Code Section 55-10-413(f). Thereafter, during voir dire, Franklin asserted that the State engaged in purposeful discrimination in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), when it used its peremptory challenges to exclude two African-American individuals from the jury pool. At the ensuing trial, the jury convicted Franklin of DUI per se and violating the vehicle registration law but acquitted him of DUI by impairment, and the State dismissed the charge for violating the financial responsibility law. On appeal, Franklin argues that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to suppress because the checkpoint was unconstitutional; (2) overruling his Batson challenge; and (3) denying his motion to dismiss the indictment, or in the alternative, to exclude the evidence based on the unconstitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-413(f) (2017). Because the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress given the unconstitutionality of the checkpoint, we reverse the judgments of the trial court, vacate Franklin’s convictions, and dismiss the charges. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kevin D. Buford v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Kevin D. Buford, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court found that although Petitioner’s appellate counsel was deficient for not timely filing his application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, Petitioner was not prejudiced because the Tennessee Supreme Court would have ultimately denied the appeal. On appeal, the State concedes that Petitioner was entitled to a delayed appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings in compliance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Benny S. Towns
The defendant, Benny S. Towns, appeals from the entry of an order denying his “Motion to Discharge Community Supervision.” On appeal, the defendant asserts the trial court erred in not conducting a hearing on the motion and requests the matter be remanded for the same. Following our review of the record, we conclude the defendant’s motion is premature and he is not entitled to relief. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Les Stiers
This appeal stems from an ouster proceeding that was commenced against the former mayor of Jellico, Tennessee. When the mayor was defeated in his bid to seek reelection, the trial court dismissed the ouster complaint as moot. Notwithstanding this outcome, the defendant argued that the trial court should consider his “Counter- Complaint” that he filed in connection with the underlying proceeding. The trial court, however, ultimately dismissed the “Counter-Complaint.” For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Carpenter v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Larry Carpenter, appeals from the Hawkins County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2015 guilty pleas to attempted second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an effective twenty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) his guilty pleas were involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Howard v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Christopher A. Howard, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark London
Defendant, Mark London, was convicted by an Obion County jury of aggravated assault and simple assault. At sentencing, the trial court merged the convictions, sentencing Defendant to one count of aggravated assault for three years as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant appeals his conviction, alleging that the evidence was insufficient. Because we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Neas Welding & Steel Fabricating, Inc. v. Patricia Neas
This appeal involves a corporation’s debt collection action. The corporation, a steel welding and fabricating company, was previously owned jointly by husband and wife. After nearly thirty years of marriage, husband filed for divorce, after which he was awarded sole ownership of the company. Following the divorce, the corporation brought a separate suit in a different court against the former wife for money she had taken from the company and which the divorce court had determined was a debt she owed to the company. The former wife argued the debt was for rent money the company owed to her. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the money was a debt that the former wife owed to the corporation. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Taylor C.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and willful failure to visit. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1- 102(1)(A)(i). Mother also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ava H.
Adam R. P. (“Father”) appeals the order of the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating his parental rights to the minor child Ava H. (“the Child”) after finding and holding that clear and convincing evidence had been proven that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights for abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We find and hold that grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate Father’s parental rights and that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We, therefore, affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Koczera, Et Al. v. Christi Lenay Fields Steele, Et Al.
This negligence action primarily concerns a failed attempt at service of process in an underlying healthcare liability action filed in 2008. After the dismissal of a defendant doctor in the underlying suit, the plaintiffs filed the present case asserting that the defendants prevented the doctor from being served with process in the healthcare liability action. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court, among other rulings, granted the motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s various rulings. In an opinion filed on April 28, 2017, we affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs’ motions for default judgment, to dismiss their own complaint as moot, and for additional time to conduct discovery; however, we vacated the order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for entry of an order that complied with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04. On remand, the trial court again granted summary judgment explaining that its decision was based on its conclusion that no duty of care was owed by the defendants to the plaintiffs. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Kristin McKenzie Et Al. Women's Health Services-Chattanooga, P.C. Et Al.
Kristin McKenzie and her husband, Joshua McKenzie, filed this health care liability action individually, and on behalf of their infant child, Jacob, who sustained injuries during his birth. As a result of these injuries, Jacob has limited use of his left arm. The plaintiffs allege that defendant Dr. Matthew A. Roberts was negligent in the delivery of Jacob. They assert that he applied a vacuum extractor during the delivery without first obtaining mother’s informed consent. Following a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Roberts and his employer. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court committed several errors that entitle them to a new trial. They claim that the court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence that violates the collateral source rule. Specifically, they argue that the defendants were allowed to extensively cross-examine plaintiffs’ witnesses regarding possible health insurance benefits under the Affordable Care Act and other benefits under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants pursued this line of interrogation in an attempt to show that some of Jacob’s needs would be covered by these collateral sources. The plaintiffs state that the trial court also erred in restricting the scope of the plaintiffs’ argument. Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. Finally, they argue that the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding the concepts of “foresight” and “hindsight.” Plaintiffs appeal, arguing reversible errors on the part of the trial court. We vacate the trial court’s judgment on the jury verdict. We affirm some of the actions of the trial court, actions that are challenged by plaintiffs. We vacate the trial court’s order awarding the defendants $81,343.47 in discretionary costs. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Devin Buckingham
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Devin Buckingham, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; that the trial court erred by ruling that defense counsel’s notes, taken during counsel’s interview of a defense witness, qualified as Jencks material; and that the trial court erred by prohibiting defense counsel from questioning a defense witness about the victim’s prior bad acts. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lloyd Rush Pratt, Jr.
Defendant, Lloyd Rush Pratt, Jr., appeals from his convictions for driving as an habitual motor vehicle offender, driving under the influence, and failure to exercise due care, for which he received an effective sentence of one year with 120 days to serve followed by supervised probation. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial, that the State committed a Brady violation, and that the trial court allowed statements of a witness to be admitted despite her unavailability at trial. For the following reasons, we determine that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial and improperly admitting hearsay evidence. The judgments of the trial court are reversed and remanded. |
Perry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lavelle Moore
The Defendant, Lavelle Moore, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of theft of merchandise over $1000, a Class D felony, under alternate theories. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to twelve years at 60% in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence in another case. The sole issue the Defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jermel Brown
Defendant, Jermel Brown, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court convictions for aggravated robbery, criminal attempt to commit aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault, for which he received a total effective sentence of twenty-six years’ incarceration. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, arguing that the State failed to adequately prove his identity as a perpetrator of the offenses. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert L. Smith
Defendant, Robert L. Smith, was convicted of two counts of reckless aggravated assault in case number 18093 and of failure to appear in case number 18094 and received a total effective sentence of thirteen years with release eligibility after service of thirty-five percent of the sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient for a rational juror to have found him guilty of two counts of reckless aggravated assault and that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals |