Trustmark National Bank v. Sunshine Carwash No. 5 Partners, et al.
W2017-01759-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jim Kyle

In this garnishment case, a judgment creditor garnished funds from the joint bank account of a non-debtor depositor and a debtor. The trial court allowed the garnished funds to be tendered to the judgment creditor because the account agreement showed that the joint account was held with rights of survivorship. Tennessee Code Annotated section 45-2- 703(a), however, allows the non-debtor depositor to prove his rights in the funds held in the joint account. Because the non-debtor depositor provided sufficient evidence to prove his rights to the funds in the joint account, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Herbert S. Moncier v. Nina Harris, Et Al.
E2016-00209-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clarence E. Pridemore, Jr.

This appeal involves a request for access to examine records under Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-505, in which the plaintiff sought the release of civil forfeiture documents from the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security. The trial court held that the plaintiff did not show sufficient cause for release of the sought-after documents in a non-redacted format. Upon our previous review, we found the issue to be moot owing to the legislative enactment of 2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts, chapter 722, § 5. Upon the plaintiff’s appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case for our reconsideration in light of the legislative enactment of 2017 Tenn. Pub. Acts, chapter 113, § 1, which amended the Tennessee Public Records Act. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of trial court.

Knox Court of Appeals

Toniann Whitaker v. James B. Devereaux
E2017-01812-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II

After Appellant’s son violated an order of protection entered against him, Appellant sought relief from the trial court. Although the trial court ruled on some of the issues raised by Appellant, not all of her claims were adjudicated. We therefore dismiss the appeal due to the absence of a final judgment.

Jefferson Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Marcus K. Williams and Corey Zimberlist Rutland, Jr.
M2017-00509-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

Defendants, Marcus K. Williams and Corey Zimberlist Rutland, Jr., were indicted for aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. Defendant Williams was also indicted for aggravated burglary. After a jury trial, Defendants Williams and Rutland were convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, and Defendant Williams was convicted of aggravated burglary. At a sentencing hearing, Defendants Williams and Rutland received identical sentences of eleven years for aggravated robbery and five years for aggravated assault. Defendant Williams received a five year sentence for aggravated burglary. On appeal, Defendant Williams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his aggravated robbery charge. Defendant Rutland argues that the trial court improperly excluded the content of a phone call between Defendant Rutland and Defendant Williams, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions under a theory of criminal responsibility, and that his sentence is disproportionate and excessive. Finding that the only error by the trial court was harmless, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

Roger Chase Hagans v. Rachel Wallock Hagans
M2017-00174-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey F. Stewart

In this divorce action initiated by Father, the chancery court adjudicated the divorce and entered a parenting plan proposed by Father, naming him as primary residential parent and establishing a residential parenting schedule for the parties’ child; Mother had previously initiated a custody proceeding in Scotland. Mother moved to dismiss the Tennessee proceeding, contending that the Tennessee court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the divorce because the parties we not domiciled in Tennessee and did not have jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act to adjudicate the child custody matters. Upon Mother’s appeal, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over the divorce but, due to the pendency of the proceeding in Scotland, did not have jurisdiction over the custody matters. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of divorce to Father, vacate the parenting plan and child support provisions of the final decree, and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.  

Franklin Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Leroy Collins
W2016-01685-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Glenn Ivy Wright

Defendant, Leroy Collins, pled guilty to three counts of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and one count of Class C felony reckless endangerment, all committed during one criminal episode. The offenses involved Defendant shooting three people and shooting into a house occupied by two other people. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement with the State, the sentence for each conviction of reckless aggravated assault is the minimum sentence of two years, and the sentence for the reckless endangerment conviction is the minimum sentence of three years. The State further agreed that the sentences would be served concurrently with each other, for an effective sentence of three years for four felony convictions committed with a handgun involving three victims being shot. However, the State opposed Defendant’s request for judicial diversion or probation for the effective three-year sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied both requests for alternative sentencing and ordered Defendant to serve the entire sentence by incarceration. Defendant appeals from the trial court’s ruling. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Wendell Guinn v. State of Tennessee
W2016-02152-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Robert Carter, Jr.

The Petitioner, Wendell Guinn, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that his constitutional rights were violated by prosecutorial misconduct during the jury voir dire and the State’s closing arguments; (2) that the trial court committed several errors in the jury instructions; and (3) that he received ineffective assistance from his trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

David R. Fitzgerald v. Hickman County Government, Et Al.
M2017-00565-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph Woodruff

Former county employee appeals the dismissal of his claims against the county and the county mayor related to the termination of his employment. In his complaint, the employee raised claims of violations of due process, indemnification, restitution, negligence, invasion of privacy, workplace harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and misrepresentation. After the county and county mayor filed a motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that it would decide the motion without the benefit of a hearing. The trial court eventually dismissed all the claims; some claims, however, were dismissed on the basis of summary judgment after the trial court considered a county personnel manual. We conclude that the trial court was entitled to consider the personnel manual as part of the pleadings for purposes of the motion to dismiss under Rule 10.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of all claims raised by the employee under the motion to dismiss standard, with the exception of the employee’s claim against the county mayor for false light invasion of privacy. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Hickman Court of Appeals

Charles Michael Kincade v. Amanda Wooldridge Kincade
M2017-00797-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Joseph A. Woodruff

This appeal arises from a divorce; the primary issues on appeal pertain to the permanent parenting plan. During the pendency of the divorce and following a successful mediation, the parties entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement and a Permanent Parenting Plan. Six weeks later, Father filed a notice of withdrawal of his consent to the mediated parenting plan. Subsequently, an order was entered approving the Marital Dissolution Agreement and declaring the parties divorced, reserving the issue of a permanent parenting plan for trial. Following the trial, the court established a permanent parenting plan similar to the mediated plan with four modifications. When Mother’s counsel submitted the final order for the court’s approval, it contained three alternatives for the “right-of-first-refusal” provision, which was one of the four modifications. The trial court approved one of the “right-of-first-refusal” alternatives and entered the final order. Father appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in its formulation of the parenting plan and in awarding Mother her attorney’s fees. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. We also award Mother the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees she incurred on appeal.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Jay Dee Garrity v. State of Tennessee - Rehear
M2016-01463-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Monte Watkins

The Petitioner, Jay Dee Garrity, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of three counts of aggravated sexual battery and resulting effective forty-eight-year sentence to be served at 100%. On appeal, he contends that he is entitled to a new trial because trial counsel was presumptively ineffective under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). In the alternative, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel under the usual Strickland standard. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel under Strickland. Therefore, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, the judgments of conviction are vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

Russell Leaks v. State of Tennessee
W2016-01609-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner James A. Hamilton, III

This appeal involves a suit filed in the Tennessee Claims Commission against the State of Tennessee. The claimant alleged that he was seized without a warrant or probable cause, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The State sought dismissal, alleging that the Claims Commission did not have the requisite jurisdiction to hear such a claim. The Claims Commissioner agreed and dismissed the claim. The claimant appeals. We affirm.

Court of Appeals

Marcus T. Johnson v. Darren Settles, Warden
E2017-01848-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven Wayne Sword

Marcus T. Johnson, the Petitioner, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“the Petition”) claiming that he was being illegally restrained of his liberty because the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (“the Parole Board”) violated his due process rights by failing to timely serve him with a parole violation warrant and failing to conduct a preliminary hearing within fourteen days of the service of the warrant. The State moved to dismiss the Petition for failure to state a cognizable claim. The habeas corpus court granted the State’s motion and summarily dismissed the Petition. We affirm.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

In Re: Maya R. Et Al.
E2017-01634-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy E. Irwin

Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights to two children on the grounds of (1) persistence of conditions, (2) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the children. She further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

Knox Court of Appeals

Converging Capital, LLC v. Michael Matthews
M2016-02352-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kelvin D. Jones, III

This appeal involves the attempt of Converging Capital, LLC, to collect an alleged credit card debt of Michael Matthews. Converging Capital alleged that it owned the debt as a result of a sale of certain accounts receivable from Pilot Receivables Management, LLC, which had earlier bought the debt from Citibank, the issuer of Matthews’s alleged MasterCard account. During the trial, Converging Capital presented the testimony of its records administrator. Matthews objected to the introduction of the bills of sale and assignment, and several credit card statements, on hearsay grounds. He also argued that Converging Capital failed to establish that his debt, if any, was included in the sales of the accounts receivable. The trial court overruled these objections and entered judgment against Matthews in the amount of the alleged debt, $55,684.88. We find that Converging Capital failed to meet its burden of proving that it owned the debt. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss Converging Capital’s complaint with prejudice. Costs are assessed against Converging Capital. 

Davidson Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Samuel Huffine
E2016-02267-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Goodwin, Jr.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Samuel Huffine, pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, reckless aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, driving under the influence of an intoxicant, driving under the influence of an intoxicant per se, driving left of center, and speeding, for an effective sentence of nine years, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied an alternative sentence. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Sullivan Court of Criminal Appeals

In Re: Authur R.
E2017-00782-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert D. Philyaw

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on the minor child, Authur R. (“the Child”), of Lola R. (“Mother”) and Authur D. (“Father”). The Child was placed in protective custody on June 13, 2013, after Mother was discovered to be under the influence of illegal drugs while the Child was in her custody. The Hamilton County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected on November 26, 2013. On November 25, 2015, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father. An amended petition to terminate was subsequently filed on May 6, 2016. DCS alleged as a basis for termination against both parents the statutory grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit, (2) abandonment by willful failure to support, (3) abandonment by an incarcerated parent, and (4) substantial noncompliance with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans. Concerning Mother only, DCS also alleged the additional statutory grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and (2) persistence of the conditions leading to removal of the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its determination by clear and convincing evidence that DCS had proven as to both parents the statutory grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent and substantial noncompliance with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan. With regard to Mother only, the trial court determined that DCS had also proven by clear and convincing evidence the ground of persistence of the conditions leading to the Child’s removal. The trial court further determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother and Father have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Ugenio Dejesus Ruby-Ruiz v. State of Tennessee
M2017-00843-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

Following a trial, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Ugenio Dejesus Ruby-Ruiz, of three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor; five counts of aggravated sexual battery; nine counts of rape of a child; one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor; and two counts of rape, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of 121 years in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied following a hearing. Upon review, we conclude that the pro se petition was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations applicable to post-conviction proceedings. However, because we are unable to determine from the record whether due process requires the tolling of the statute of limitations, we vacate the post-conviction court’s order and remand the case to the post-conviction court for a determination of whether due process tolling applies.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Lee Alan Sprague
E2017-00721-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael Pemberton

The defendant, Lee Alan Sprague, appeals his Roane County Criminal Court jury convictions of reckless driving and driving on a suspended license, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new preliminary hearing. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Roane Court of Criminal Appeals

Ladarius L. Reffegee v. Blair Leibach, Warden
M2017-01153-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge John D. Wootten, Jr.

Pro se Petitioner, Ladarius L. Reffegee, appeals from the Trousdale County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his judgments of conviction and sentences are void because an arrest warrant was not issued prior to his arrest, divesting the court of jurisdiction to sentence and convict him. The State asserts that the Petitioner failed to show that his judgments were void. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Trousdale Court of Criminal Appeals

Tracy Lebron Vick v. State of Tennessee
E2017-01333-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don W. Poole

The Petitioner, Tracy Lebron Vick, pleaded guilty to second degree murder and received a forty-year sentence. Nineteen years after his sentencing, he filed a petition for postconviction DNA analysis. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. 

Hamilton Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Carlos Prather
W2016-01234-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris Craft

Defendant, Carlos Prather, pled guilty to two counts of vandalism over $1,000 and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of ten years as a Range III offender, to be served on supervised probation. As a condition of probation Defendant was ordered to complete the Jericho Program. On February 5, 2016, a probation violation warrant was issued alleging that Defendant violated the terms of his probation by being arrested for passing bad checks, failing to report the arrest, non-compliance with the Jericho Program, and being arrested for contempt of court on February 4, 2016. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his original ten-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Javon Webster v. State of Tennessee
W2016-01473-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris Craft

Petitioner, Javon Webster, appeals from the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the post-conviction petition filed approximately twelve years after expiration of the one year statute of limitations for post-conviction petitions. Petitioner alleged facts in his petition which he claims justify tolling of the statute of limitations based upon due process grounds. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

John Pierce Lankford v. City of Hendersonville, Tennessee
M2016-02041-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe Thompson

This case involves the seizure of the plaintiff’s cellular telephone and other items of personal property by police officers employed by the defendant city during a criminal investigation in October 2012. The plaintiff pled guilty in August 2013 to one count of aggravated assault and three counts of simple assault before the criminal division of the Sumner County Circuit Court (“criminal court”). While subsequently incarcerated, the plaintiff initiated this action on March 2, 2016, by filing a motion requesting, inter alia, a “property hearing” in the civil division of the Sumner County Circuit Court (“trial court”), averring that his cellular telephone and other personal property had been illegally seized without notice and that his telephone had ultimately been destroyed by order of the criminal court. The plaintiff asserted that city police officers had violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court subsequently entered an order, inter alia, determining that the plaintiff’s pleading was in substance a complaint alleging conversion. The city filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that it had governmental immunity from the plaintiff’s constitutional and conversion claims. The city also asserted that any negligence claim was time-barred under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-305(b) (2012). Upon consideration of additional pleadings filed by the parties, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, finding that the city possessed immunity from claims that its employees had violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights or committed conversion. The trial court further determined that any negligence claim against the city was time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Sumner Court of Appeals

Janie Marie Marcum-Bush v. Kevin Patrick Quinn
M2017-01732-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clara W. Byrd

As part of a divorce proceeding, the trial court awarded one party a monetary judgment against the other. The judgment debtor’s obligation to pay the judgment did not arise until the sale of certain real property or after two years from the date of the judgment. Although the real property was sold, the judgment debtor made no payments on the judgment. The judgment creditor later moved to extend the judgment. The motion was filed within ten years of the date of the sale of the real property but more than ten years from the entry of the judgment. The trial court granted the motion to extend, concluding that the judgment creditor’s cause of action on the judgment did not accrue until the real property was sold. Because the motion to extend the judgment was untimely, we reverse.

Wilson Court of Appeals

Mark W. Givler v. State of Tennessee
E2017-01517-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: William O. Shults, Commissioner

This case originated when the plaintiff, who was incarcerated in the Tennessee Department of Correction facility at Mountain City, Tennessee, filed a claim against the State of Tennessee (“the State”), alleging that medical professionals at the correctional facility had provided him with untimely and inadequate medical care for a serious heart condition. Finding that the plaintiff’s allegations concerned individuals who were not employed by the State, the Claims Commission (“Commission”) initially dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff subsequently attempted to file a proposed amendment naming State employees as defendants and then a second claim, resulting in the instant action. The State filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the defense of res judicata. Finding that the plaintiff had misnumbered his proposed amendment to the original claim, the Commission treated the proposed amendment and second claim together as an amended claim. Ultimately determining that the plaintiff had alleged a health care liability action but failed to comply with the statutory prerequisites for such a suit and that he had failed to establish the Commission’s jurisdiction over intentional or criminal acts allegedly committed by State employees, the Commission entered a final order dismissing the action. The plaintiff has appealed. Determining that the plaintiff has failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we dismiss this appeal.

Davidson Court of Appeals