Brittany Noel Nelson, et al v. Charles W. Myres, et al.
The primary issue in this appeal is whether a surviving spouse maintains priority to file a wrongful death action when the decedent’s child has also filed a wrongful death action in which the child alleges that the surviving spouse negligently caused the decedent’s death. The trial court dismissed the daughter’s wrongful death complaint, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, ruling that under the circumstances presented in this case, the surviving spouse was disqualified from filing the wrongful death action. Because the wrongful death statutes do not include an exception to the spousal priority rule and because the surviving spouse did not waive his right to file the wrongful death action, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed the daughter’s wrongful death action. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
In Re Estate of Eloise J. Storey
Following eleven years of litigation, Appellant appeals the trial court’s award of both attorney’s fees, executor’s fees, and expenses charged to the estate. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Melody Crunk Telfer v.George Curtiss Telfer
This appeal arises from a divorce case that was appealed and remanded and now once again is back before us. Melody Crunk Telfer (“Wife”) filed for divorce from husband George Curtiss Telfer (“Husband”) in 2010. A final decree of divorce was entered in 2012. Husband appealed the finding that he lacked a marital interest in two of Wife’s business entities. This Court found that the appreciation in value of the entities at issue was marital property subject to equitable division. On remand, the Chancery Court for Williamson County (“the Remand Court”) valued the appreciation, divided the marital estate, and awarded Husband attorney’s fees. Husband appeals to this Court. We find, inter alia, that the approximately 84/16 division of the marital estate in favor of Wife rendered by the Remand Court is inequitable in light of the evidence and the relevant statutory factors. We vacate that portion of the Remand Court’s order and remand for a fresh division of the marital estate on a 65/35 basis in favor of Wife. We otherwise affirm the Remand Court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Fredrick R. Ross, Jr.
Defendant, Frederick R. Ross, Jr., appeals the trial court’s decision to revoke his probation and place his twelve-year sentence into effect. Defendant argues that the State violated his due process rights by failing to give proper notice of the alleged violations of probation and by failing to disclose the evidence to be used against him. Additionally, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by placing Defendant’s full sentence into effect. Upon review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand the case for the correction of clerical errors on the judgment forms. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ryan Michael Ramey
The Defendant, Ryan Michael Ramey, was convicted by a jury of rape, a Class B felony; and theft of $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-503, -14-103, -14-105 (2015). The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and (2) that the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s “single photo identification” and in-court identification of the Defendant. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Unicoi | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Orlando Glenn
Defendant, Ronald Orlando Glenn, was convicted of domestic assault following a bench trial. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be released on supervised probation after serving ten days, and to complete a Batterer’s Intervention Program. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Demond Starks
After a jury trial, the defendant, Michael Demond Starks, was convicted of one count of second-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, four counts of attempted second-degree murder, and two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because he was suffering from severe mental delusions. Additionally, the defendant argues the jury was improperly instructed on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter and that the trial court improperly excluded hearsay statements from a defense witness. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Waylon Hanson
A Marshall County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, William Waylon Hanson, of violating an order declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender, failing to provide evidence of financial responsibility, and passing another vehicle in a no passing zone. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion in limine to prohibit the Appellant from collaterally attacking the order declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender, by limiting the defense’s closing argument, and by admitting the Appellant’s driving record into evidence through an employee of the Department of Safety and Homeland Security. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sidney B. Ray
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Sidney B. Ray, entered a guilty plea to ten felonies and one misdemeanor and received an effective sentence of fourteen years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence and ordered his sentence to be served in confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in determining the manner of service of his sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dawn W. Kinard, et al. v. NationStar Mortgage, LLC, et al.
This appeal involves various issues related to a mortgage loan transaction and loan modification efforts. The plaintiffs’ complaint, which was filed just a few days before a scheduled foreclosure, asserted multiple claims for relief, including breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of the Truth-in- Lending Act. The trial court ultimately dismissed all claims at summary judgment in the defendants’ favor. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Langlinais
A jury convicted the Defendant, Joseph Langlinais, of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and attempted rape of a child, and he received an effective sentence of twenty eight years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The Defendant also challenges the admission of his recorded statement to law enforcement, alleging that the recording was inadmissible due to its poor quality, that the recording contained inadmissible evidence of the Defendant’s bad acts, and that the recording violated his right to confront witnesses. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Bell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Bell, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated rape and two counts of aggravated robbery and received an effective sentence of twenty-one years with community supervision for life. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not voluntarily and knowingly entered. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry Lea Bunch v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Terry Lea Bunch, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleaded conviction for third offense driving under the influence (“DUI”). The pro se petition alleged a defect in the charging instrument and was summarily dismissed by the post-conviction court for failure to state a colorable claim. Petitioner argues on appeal that the post-conviction court should have allowed him the opportunity to amend his petition to include an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barbara Jarnigan Et Al. v. Claude Moyers
This case involves allegations of fraud and undue influence with respect to the estate of Brenda Vargo (the deceased). Following the deceased’s death, four surviving family members discovered that they were no longer designated as “payable-on-death” beneficiaries on several of the deceased’s bank accounts. These family members filed suit against Claude Moyers (Mr. Moyers), alleging that Mr. Moyers’s wife, Wanda Moyers (Mrs. Moyers), persuaded the deceased, “through fraud or undue influence,” to close some of her bank accounts and to name Mr. Moyers as the sole payable-on-death beneficiary on the remaining accounts. Following a bench trial, the court determined that Mrs. Moyers had a confidential relationship with the deceased; hence, creating a rebuttable presumption of undue influence. The trial court imputed the undue influence of Mrs. Moyers to Mr. Moyers. Ultimately, the trial court determined that Mr. Moyers failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence by clear and convincing evidence. Consequently, the court divested Mr. Moyers of his interest in the disputed funds. Mr. Moyers appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Calvin Douglas v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Calvin Douglas, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and the denial of his motion to reconsider, in which he argued that the facts presented at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing supported a writ of error coram nobis on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Pursuant to an order by this court, the Petitioner was permitted to file an untimely notice of appeal. After a review of the record, we hold that this court’s order allowing the Petitioner to late-file his notice of appeal was improvidently granted. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald Douglas v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Donald Douglas, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a direct appeal in exchange for a sentence of eight years and that his trial counsel was ineffective. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the postconviction court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brent Dewayne Carr v. Kellie Renea Carr
This is an appeal in a divorce proceeding wherein the Mother of the parties’ child appeals the trial court’s designation of Father as primary residential parent and designation of the residential parenting schedule, contending that the trial court failed to properly consider Father’s history of domestic violence and abuse against her. Upon our review we have determined that the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial court did not include a discussion of the impact of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-406 on the finding of domestic violence; accordingly, we vacate the decision and remand the case for the court to make appropriate findings in that regard. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, TN v. Jeremy Brittenum
This is an animal cruelty case. The circuit court entered an order finding Appellant guilty of numerous violations of the city’s animal cruelty, animal hoarding and vaccinations ordinances. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact as required under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we vacate the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James William Sherrell, Jr. v. Lisa Daniela Schnur
The Trial Court in this custody proceeding attempted to certify as a final judgment, pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the order entered on March 31, 2017, which resolved all issues in the proceedings below except those related to the payment of child support for the benefit of the parties’ minor child. Because the order fails to expressly determine in accordance with the rule that “there is no just reason for delay,” the order is not appealable as a certified final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02. See Fox v. Fox, 657 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tenn. 1983). We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal and it is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a new appeal once a final judgment or appropriately certified final judgment has been entered. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kimberly Johnson Hart
A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Kimberly Johnson Hart, of facilitation of possession with intent to sell one-half ounce or more of marijuana and facilitation of possession with intent to sell less than two pounds of tetrahydrocannabinol, a schedule VI narcotic. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each conviction, thirty days to be served in jail, with the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court erred when it denied her request for judicial diversion. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Teffeteller
In February 2013, the Defendant, Joshua Teffeteller, pleaded guilty to identity theft, and the trial court granted judicial diversion and ordered him to serve three years on Community Corrections. On September 17, 2015, the Defendant was charged with numerous offenses and, the following day, the Defendant’s Community Corrections officer filed an affidavit, alleging that the Defendant had violated his Community Corrections sentence on multiple grounds. The Defendant pleaded guilty to the charges on March 7, 2016, and received additional Community Corrections sentences. On August 25, 2016, another probation violation warrant was issued and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s Community Corrections sentences and ordered the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement rather than reinstating his Community Corrections sentences; and (2) that one of his sentences had expired. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randel Lee Burnett, II
The Appellant, Randel Lee Burnett, II, pled guilty in the Fayette County Circuit Court to vehicular homicide by intoxication, aggravated child neglect, and three counts of vehicular assault. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentences and erred by ordering consecutive sentencing based upon his being a dangerous offender. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court improperly applied two enhancement factors during sentencing but that the length of the Appellant’s sentences is not excessive. We also conclude that the trial court did not err by ordering consecutive sentencing. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lorna Mae Gibson v. Charles William Bikas
This case involves an order of protection sought by the petitioner against the respondent, who is the petitioner’s brother-in-law, on behalf of the petitioner and her two minor daughters. The petitioner previously had obtained an order of protection that had expired in May 2016. On March 24, 2017, the petitioner filed a petition seeking a one-year, no-contact order of protection, alleging that, inter alia, since entry of the prior order, the respondent had repeatedly attempted to influence her by following through on threats to obtain custody of the petitioner’s two minor daughters. The trial court initially granted an ex parte order of protection as to the petitioner but denied the petition as to the children, questioning whether standing existed because the petitioner did not at that time have physical or legal custody of her daughters. Following a subsequent bench trial, the trial court found that the petitioner had standing to petition for an order of protection on behalf of her children pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-602(b). Also finding that the respondent posed a danger to the petitioner and her children, the trial court extended the ex parte order into a one-year, no-contact order of protection against the respondent on behalf of the petitioner and modified the order of protection to include the petitioner’s children. The court also awarded to the petitioner reasonable attorney’s fees. The respondent appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darlene F. Hottiman
A Hardin County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Darlene F. Hottiman, of operating a motor vehicle after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender, a Class E felony, and driving on a revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor, and she received an effective four-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions due to her defense of necessity; that the trial court made improper comments to an alternate juror, made improper comments about the length of jury deliberations, and made improper comments about plea negotiations during the sentencing hearing; and that the trial court improperly enhanced her felony sentence based upon her prior criminal history and should have granted her request for probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cedric Taylor v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Cedric Taylor, filed a post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. In the petition, the Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by calling an alibi witness whose testimony was not favorable to the Petitioner. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |