Lindsey Brooke Lowe v. State of Tennessee
M2022-01490-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dee David Gay

Petitioner, Lindsay Lowe, was convicted by a Sumner County jury of two counts of first
degree murder and two counts of aggravated child abuse for killing her newborn twin sons
shortly after their birth at her parents’ home and concealing their bodies in a laundry basket.
State v. Lowe, 552 S.W.3d 842, 846-48 (Tenn. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1204 (2019).
Her convictions and resulting life sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and the
Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. Id. Petitioner unsuccessfully sought rehearing.
Petitioner then sought a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was
denied. Id. Petitioner ultimately filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief in
which she made innumerable allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel as well as
several constitutional violations that she argued necessitated reversal of her convictions.
Petitioner also requested due process tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations
based on erroneous legal advice about when the statute of limitations commenced.1 The
post-conviction court determined due process tolling was warranted and permitted
Petitioner to have a lengthy hearing on the merits of the post-conviction petition. After the
hearing, the post-conviction court granted post-conviction relief on the basis that a juror
was presumptively biased against Petitioner, violating her right to a fair trial, and that trial
counsel’s failure to remove the juror violated Petitioner’s right to effective assistance of
counsel. The post-conviction court did not address the merits of any of the remaining
claims in the petition. In this timely State appeal, we determine first that the postconviction
court improperly granted due process tolling of the statute of limitations for
post-conviction relief. Additionally, because the post-conviction court went on to grant
post-conviction relief, we review those findings of fact and conclusions of law and
determine that the post-conviction court also erred in finding that the juror was
presumptively biased and that trial counsel was ineffective. As a result, we reverse and
remand the judgment of the post-conviction court. All of Petitioner’s convictions are
reinstated and her petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed.

Brian C. Frelix v. State of Tennessee
M2023-00291-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph A. Woodruff

Petitioner, Brian C. Frelix, appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief related to his convictions for four counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of aggravated assault, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, but less than $10,000.  Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based upon his claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to (1) raise a Double Jeopardy issue at trial or on direct appeal related to two of his aggravated robbery charges; and (2) raise a Brady issue on direct appeal related to the State’s failure to disclose three letters sent to the police by a jailhouse informant.  Petitioner also raises a freestanding claim that the State improperly withheld the letters in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Hayden Jennings Berkebile
E2022-01700-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven Wayne Sword

In this case, the State relied exclusively upon online communications sent between
the Defendant, who resided in Indiana, and the suicide decedent, who resided in Tennessee,
to establish a conviction of criminally negligent homicide. In my view, the State failed to
establish the essential elements of territorial jurisdiction and proximate cause. No matter
how “dark” or “diabolical” the online communications leading up to the decedent’s death
may have been, there is simply no law in Tennessee making it a crime to verbally persuade
or coerce someone to commit suicide.1 Because Tennessee has yet to criminalize
incitement, inducement, or encouragement to commit suicide, words alone cannot serve as
the basis for a criminal conviction.2 Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent

State of Tennessee v. Jonathan E. Woodruff
W2023-01446-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph T. Howell

The Defendant, Jonathan E. Woodruff, pled guilty to the offense of tampering with evidence. The trial court imposed a five-year sentence to be served in a community corrections program and later on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant was alleged to have engaged in new criminal conduct by possessing fentanyl, and following a hearing, the trial court fully revoked the Defendant’s suspended sentence. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that a violation was not established by a preponderance of the evidence and that he was denied the opportunity to review a video of the alleged misconduct. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In Re Estate of Jerry A. Dunn
W2023-00686-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe Townsend

This is a probate matter which concerns whether a decedent devised his widow a parcel of real estate in fee simple absolute or whether the real property at issue was to be placed in trust for the benefit of decedent’s children. The probate court rendered a declaratory judgment determining that decedent devised his widow the parcel in fee simple absolute. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

Mary McCabe Peirce v. Lee Wesson Hope
W2023-00621-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gina C. Higgins

This is a grandparent visitation case brought by the maternal grandmother of the child at issue. When the trial court dismissed the grandmother’s petition following a trial, it held, among other things, that there was no danger of substantial harm to the child in the absence of visitation. Although the trial court ruled in favor of the child’s father on the merits of the underlying case, it ultimately rejected the father’s request to recover attorney’s fees for his defense of the lawsuit. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the grandmother’s petition and also affirm the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees to the father.

State of Tennessee v. Edward Honeycutt, Jr.
E2023-00908-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Zachary R. Walden

The Defendant, Edward Honeycutt, Jr., pleaded guilty to one count of initiating the process to manufacture
methamphetamine and two counts of child endangerment, in exchange for an effective eight-year sentence,
suspended to ten years of probation, after service of sixty-one days in confinement. After multiple violations
and revocation hearings, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation sentence and ordered it into
execution, granting “street time” credit from October 25, 2021 to May 6, 2022. The Defendant filed a Rule 36
motion, claiming “clerical mistakes in the judgment orders” related to whether the Defendant’s sentence was a
probation sentence or a sentence served on community corrections. The Defendant argued that he was
entitled to time served in community corrections from September 4, 2012, rather than October 25, 2021,
because his sentence was a community corrections sentence. The trial court denied the motion, and the
Defendant appeals, maintaining that he has been deprived of time served in community corrections. After
review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Teonnia Sykes v. Bristol Park at Riverchase
M2024-00706-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph P. Binkley, Jr.

The plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint against her former landlord. Because
the plaintiff did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the dismissal
order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Abigail Lynn Sevigny v. Warren Maxwell Sevigny
M2023-00325-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phillip R. Robinson

This is the second post-divorce contempt case between the parties. While Mother’s petition
for contempt was pending in the trial court, Father filed a petition alleging that Mother was
guilty of 29 counts of criminal contempt for various violations of the parties’ permanent
parenting plan and the mandatory “Parental Bill of Rights” incorporated into the plan. The
trial court: (1) found Mother guilty of seven counts of contempt; (2) sentenced Mother to
29 days in jail; and (3) awarded Father a portion of his attorney’s fees and costs. Mother
appeals. Because Father failed to meet his burden to show, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Mother was in criminal contempt of the parenting plan, we reverse the trial court’s
order.

Charles Thomas Jonhson v. State of Tennessee
M2023-00049-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Ross Dyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Forest A. Durard, Jr.

The petitioner, Charles Thomas Johnson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Hidden Lake Resorts Homeowners Association, Inc v. Charles Z. Moore, Et AL
M2022-01323-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor David D. Wolfe

This appeal arises out of a dispute between the homeowners’ association for a planned
development and the successor owner of the development over the obligations of the
successor owner. We agree with the trial court’s ruling that the successor owner assumed
all of the previous owner’s rights and responsibilities as the declarant under the
development’s recorded restrictive covenants. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all
respects.

State of Tennessee v. Tory Keith Mote
M2023-00959-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert T. Bateman

Tory Keith Mote, Defendant, appeals his convictions for aggravated assault, domestic
assault, and interference with a 911 call after a bench trial. On appeal, Defendant argues
that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for aggravated assault. Because
the evidence was sufficient, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Alysha J. Barr
M2023-00581-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge James A. Turner

The Appellant, Alysha J. Barr, was convicted of vehicular assault, driving under the influence (“DUI”), and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon.  On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence resulting from a blood draw at the scene of the collision because: (1) it was obtained pursuant to an unconstitutional search; and (2) she did not sign the waiver form as statutorily required at the time of the offense.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406 (2017) (amended 2019).  She also argues that the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony based on an untrustworthy experiment.  After review, we conclude that no reversible error occurred and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher C. White
M2023-00964-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Matthew J. Wilson
Trial Court Judge: Judge David D. Wolfe

After a bench trial, Defendant, Christopher C. White, was found guilty of one count of theft valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. The trial court imposed a four-year sentence, suspended to probation, and ordered Defendant to pay $10,228 in restitution. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s appeal; and (3) collateral estoppel required the trial court to dismiss the case. After review, we conclude the evidence is insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for theft. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate Defendant’s conviction, and dismiss the case.

Cedric Crutcher v. Johnny B. Ellis, Et Al.
M2023-00283-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynne T. Ingram

This appeal concerns the denial of a motion to set aside default judgment and the award of
damages in a premises liability action. After sustaining injuries from a shooting in a
Nashville nightclub, Cedric Crutcher (“Plaintiff”), filed a premises liability action against
various co-defendants, including the owner and operator of the nightclub, Paul Eichel
(“Defendant”), and the owners of the building where the nightclub was located (“the
Ellises”). The Ellises filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint and a cross-claim against
Defendant. When Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff filed a
motion for default judgment, which the trial court granted. When Defendant failed to
respond to the Ellises cross-claim, the Ellises also filed a motion for default judgment,
which the court granted. Thereafter, the only remaining issues were the amount of damages
that the Ellises and Plaintiff were entitled to recover from Defendant. Following a hearing
on damages, the court awarded Plaintiff $300,000 against Defendant for his pain and
suffering, and awarded the Ellises $31,745.76 against Defendant for the attorney’s fees
they incurred in defending the action as authorized under their lease agreement. Defendant
filed a motion to set aside the default judgment pertaining to Plaintiff’s premises liability
claim, which the court denied. Defendant then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment
relating to Plaintiff’s damages, which the court granted. Following a second evidentiary
hearing on Plaintiff’s damages, the court awarded Plaintiff a judgment against Defendant
in the amount of $15,014.19 for medical expenses and $300,000 in noneconomic damages.
Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside default judgment in
favor of Plaintiff, as well as the award of damages to Plaintiff. Finding no error, we affirm.

In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone
W2024-00134-SC-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: PER CURIAM
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe Townsend

This is the second interlocutory recusal appeal in this conservatorship action, filed by two attorneys in the case. In the first recusal appeal, the Court of Appeals entered an order staying all trial court proceedings. The Court of Appeals then issued an opinion affirming denial of the recusal motion, stating that the stay was lifted, and remanding the case to the trial court. Before the appellate mandate issued, the attorneys filed a second motion for the trial court judge to recuse; this was denied as well. The attorneys then filed this second petition for recusal appeal. They later filed a motion in the Court of Appeals arguing that trial court orders entered after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in the first recusal appeal, but before the mandate issued, are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals agreed and held the orders were void. The counterpetitioners and co-conservators have filed an accelerated application for permission to appeal in this Court, and we ordered the attorneys to file a response. Having reviewed the application for permission to appeal, the answer, all appendices, and the applicable law, we grant the application, and dispense with additional briefing and oral argument. We hold that the stay imposed by the Court of Appeals in the first recusal appeal did not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case. We further hold that the attorneys waived any other argument that orders entered by the trial court should be vacated because they were entered prior to issuance of the mandate. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

State of Tennessee v. Tony Lamons Gooch, III, a.ka. Tony Lamons Gooch
M2022-01395-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Tony Lamons Gooch, III, of two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal; (2) whether the stop and seizure were adequately supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion and whether the length of the stop exceeded the scope of the stop; (3) whether the preliminary hearing was improperly conducted; (4) whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (5) whether the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department and the City of Nashville are liable for implementing unconstitutional policies; and (6) whether the United States District Court committed plain error by holding that the Defendant’s federal false imprisonment claims were untimely. Upon our review, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support his convictions. We also hold that we lack jurisdiction to entertain an original civil action or to review federal court proceedings. Finally, because the Defendant has waived plenary review of the remaining issues and has not requested plain error review, we respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments.

State of Tennessee v. Vernice Darlene Farrar
M2023-01440-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Ross Dyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James A. Turner

A Rutherford County jury convicted the defendant, Vernice Darlene Farrar, of three counts of first-degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and three counts of fraudulent use of a debit card, for which she received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her convictions for first-degree felony murder during the perpetration of a kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, and fraudulent use of a debit card. She also contends that the trial court erred in affirming her convictions as the thirteenth juror and that her sentence was excessive. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Richard Rand, Jr.
M2023-00845-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bradley Sherman

The Defendant, Richard Rand, Jr., was convicted of the possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver. The trial court sentenced him to a term of four years on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant violated the terms of his probation by absconding from supervision. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked his suspended sentence in full and ordered the original sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his conduct amounted only to a technical failure to report rather than an absconsion. We respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jackie L. Jones v. Unrefined Oil Company, Inc. Et Al.
E2023-00272-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom McFarland

Upon competing motions for declaratory judgment in this action involving an oil and gas lease, the trial court granted declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiff, who owned the mineral rights to the real property on which the oil well was located. The court found that although the oil well had been in production as required by the lease, the defendant corporation had failed to comply with the lease’s requirement that it make at least one oil sale within a one-year period. The court thereby found that the lease had terminated pursuant to its own terms. The defendant has appealed, and the plaintiff has raised an issue regarding the trial court’s finding that the well was in production as required by the lease. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Camden A. Miller
M2023-01067-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge William R. Goodman, III

The Defendant, Camden A. Miller, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery of a victim under the age of thirteen and was sentenced to serve an effective sentence of twenty years. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, seeking to have his aggregate sentence declared illegal because it contravenes his status as a Range I, standard offender. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion, and the Defendant appealed to this court. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Gustavio Rousseau
M2023-01320-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson
Trial Court Judge: Judge William R. Goodman, III

The Circuit Court for Montgomery County sentenced the Defendant, Gustavio Rousseau, as a Range I offender to twenty-four years at thirty percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction following his guilty-pleaded conviction for attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to one year less than the maximum sentence in the applicable range. The Defendant specifically argues that the trial court erred in applying the enhancement factor of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-114(2), finding that the Defendant was a leader in the commission of an offense involving two or more criminal actors. The Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in not giving due consideration to sentencing principles since the Defendant had accepted responsibility in entering an open plea and had no prior felonies. The State contends that the Defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion because the Defendant did not overcome the presumption of reasonableness accorded to the trial court’s sentencing decision. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

John Milton Arledge v. Darl Smith, Et Al.
M2022-01471-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge Robert E. Lee Davies

John Milton Arledge (“Arledge”) filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to property he purported to own and the ejection of Darl Smith (“Smith”) from the disputed property. Smith filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Warren County Circuit Court (“the Trial Court”) granted. Arledge appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In Re Azay C., et al.
W2022-01156-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jerry Stokes

In this case, Mother appeals the trial court’s severe abuse finding, after one of her children was killed in a car accident while she was driving. The trial court found that Mother failed to protect her children when she failed to ensure that the children were properly restrained in the automobile. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Mario Rogers
W2023-01310-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carolyn W. Blackett

Defendant, Mario Rogers, appeals his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator or that he acted with the requisite mental state. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.