Tamir Clark v. State of Tennessee
In 2012, the Petitioner, Tamir Clark, pleaded guilty to especially aggravated kidnapping, arson, especially aggravated robbery, and attempted first degree murder. The Petitioner later filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and this Court affirmed the denial on appeal. See State v.Tamir Clark, No. M2014-00618-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 7191536, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 18, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 13, 2015). On February 24, 2016, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis alleging newly discovered evidence. In March 2016, the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition as time-barred. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodney Lee Scott
Defendant, Rodney Lee Scott, was found guilty by a jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, reckless aggravated assault, leaving the scene of the accident, and public intoxication as the result of an incident described as road rage on December 16, 2013. As a result of the convictions, Defendant received an effective sentence of six years. Defendant appeals, challenging: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the denial of a motion to sever; (3) the denial of a motion in limine which sought to allow Defendant to cross-examine the victims about their criminal history; (4) his dual convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault; and (5) the trial court’s denial of a mistrial. After a review of the evidence and authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court with respect to Defendant’s convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, leaving the scene of the accident, and public intoxication. Because reckless aggravated assault cannot be a lesser included offense of aggravated assault based upon fearing imminent bodily injury, we reverse and dismiss Defendant’s conviction for reckless aggravated assault. On remand, the trial court should enter judgment forms dismissing Counts Four and Seven of the indictment. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James S. Schrade v. Cassandra Jean Ament Schrade
This appeal concerns an effort to reduce an alimony obligation. James S. Schrade (“Husband”) filed a petition for reduction of alimony in the Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) against ex-wife Cassandra Jean Ament Schrade (“Wife”). Husband cited changed economic conditions that rendered him unable to meet his alimony obligation without tapping into his separate property. At trial, Husband also presented proof that a rebuttable presumption arose that Wife did not need the alimony as her adult children lived with her. The Trial Court found no material change in circumstances and also declined to find that the rebuttable presumption applied. Husband appeals. Finding the language of the marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”) unequivocal and as market fluctuations are foreseeable, we affirm the Trial Court in its finding of no material change in circumstances. However, Husband presented sufficient proof to trigger the statutory rebuttable presumption for cohabitation with third parties, and we remand to the Trial Court for a determination on that issue. We affirm, in part, and, vacate, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Gerald Rush, et al. v. Jackson Surgical Associates PA, et al.
This is a healthcare liability action. After sustaining injuries as a result of alleged surgical error, Appellant filed this action against the surgeon and his medical group. Appellees moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Norman Eugene Clark
The State of Tennessee (“the State”) attempted to divest Dateline NBC and NBCUniversal News Group of protection provided under Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-208, the press shield law. The Criminal Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) found and held that the State had failed to meet its burden under Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-208 and denied the State’s motion to divest. The State appeals. We find and hold that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence both that “the information sought cannot reasonably be obtained by alternative means,” and that there is “a compelling and overriding public interest of the people of the state of Tennessee in the information.” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 24-1-208(c)(2)(B) and (c)(2)(C). We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court denying the State’s motion to divest. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Richardson
The Defendant, Antonio Richardson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred by admitting in evidence a photograph of the victim from the crime scene. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
City of Chattanooga, et al. v. Tax Year 2011 City Delinquent Real Estate Taxpayers
This appeal was filed by a purchaser who bought a parcel of real property in Hamilton County, Tennessee, at a delinquent tax sale. After the sale, the person who had owned the property at the time of the sale conveyed it to a married couple. The title agency, who assisted with the closing, the original owner, and the couple moved to redeem the property upon learning of the tax sale. The trial court granted their request, divested title from the tax sale purchaser, and vested it in the original owner. The tax sale purchaser appeals. We affirm as modified. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Phyllis Arrington, Et Al. v. B.J. Broyles, Et Al.
This appeal involves the plaintiffs’ complaint for breach of common law and statutory warranties, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and promissory estoppel regarding the purchase of drywall that was later found defective . The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claim for breach of common law and statutory warranties, while the seller sought summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial judge recused himself before ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, he entered an order granting partial summary judgment. The new judge then entered a final order of dismissal, confirming the grant of summary judgment and dismissing the case in its entirety. The plaintiffs appeal , claiming that remand is appropriate because not all issues were resolved by the grant of summary judgment . We agree and reverse. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Rhonda Sue Watkins v. Kenneth Danny Watkins
This is the second appeal of this case. In the first appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of appellee’s petition to modify child custody and child support but vacated the trial court’s judgment with respect to appellant’s petition to modify alimony for lack of findings. On remand, the trial court found that appellant failed to establish a material change in circumstances justifying an increase in the alimony award that she was already receiving. Appellant appeals. Because appellant’s brief failed to comply with the applicable rules, we dismiss her appeal in its entirety. In addition, we deny appellee’s request for attorney’s fees. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Hill
The Defendant, Billy Hill, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class X felony, for the 1986 killing of his mother. See T.C.A. § 39-2-211 (1986) (repealed 1989). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-four years‘ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motions to dismiss based upon lost and destroyed evidence, a due process violation created by the extensive pre-indictment delay, and a violation of his right to a speedy trial, (2) the trial court erred by allowing improper witness testimony, (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after a witness violated a court order prohibiting testimony about the Defendant‘s alleged violent conduct against the witness, (4) the trial court erred by refusing to provide a jury instruction relative to the State‘s obligation to corroborate his statements, and (5) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument. We have also considered whether the statute of limitations for second degree murder had expired before the commencement of the prosecution. Although we affirm the Defendant‘s conviction, we remand for the entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the proper felony classification for second degree murder at the time of the offense. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Pallaria
The Defendant, Travis Pallaria, appeals as of right from the Blount County Circuit Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence. The Defendant cites evidence excusing his violation and contends that the trial court was unduly harsh and abused its discretion in ordering the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the revocation and confinement order of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark George v. Shelby County Board of Education
This is a teacher tenure case. Appellant, a tenured teacher employed by Appellee Shelby County Board of Education, was fired for insubordination and conduct unbecoming. Appellant appealed the Shelby County School Board’s decision to the Chancery Court for Shelby County. In a post-trial motion, Appellee petitioned the court to consider an email notification of the board’s decision that was sent to Appellant’s attorney. Specifically, Appellee argued that the email constituted statutory notice to the Appellant so as to start the thirty-day time period for filing an appeal of the board’s decision in the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. 49-5-513(b). The trial court denied the motion as newly discovered evidence. We conclude that the email goes directly to the question of whether the Appellant’s petition was timely so as to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court erred in treating the motion as one for permission to file “newly discovered evidence.” Because the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in ruling on the admissibility of the email evidence and did not address the question of its subject-matter jurisdiction, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robreka Jay Quan Sullivan
The Appellant, Robreka Jay Quan Sullivan, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court Jury of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, and she received a total effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining her convictions. Specifically, she contends that the victim’s testimony was not credible and that the State proved, at most, that she was involved in the disposition of stolen property. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Joseph Lugiai, Sr. v. State of Tennessee
In July 2012, the Petitioner, Michael Joseph Lugiai, Sr., entered a “best interests” guilty plea to four counts of aggravated assault. He timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was unknowing and involuntary. Following a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eddie A. Medlock v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Eddie A. Medlock, is appealing the trial court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nancy Lynn Hopper v. Anthony Angelo Debboli
Former Husband and Wife owned a business together while they were married. In a post-divorce order, the trial court decreed that the business was to be wrapped up and sold. Former Husband failed to comply with the order and Former Wife filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a petition for civil contempt. The court granted Former Wife a TRO but did not rule on the petition for contempt. Former Wife filed a motion to set a hearing on her petition for contempt two years later, and the trial court dismissed the motion as moot. Former Wife appealed, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. We conclude that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal because the trial court failed to resolve all outstanding issues in the case. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Shameka Rushing v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., et al.
This is a premises liability case. Appellant slipped and fell in a clear liquid on the floor of the St. Francis Hospital emergency room and filed suit against the hospital. In its answer, the hospital denied liability and alleged comparative fault on the part of Appellant and its housekeeping management service, Crothall Healthcare, Inc. Appellant amended her complaint to name Crothall as a defendant. Appellees filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted both motions, finding that Appellant had failed to show that Appellees had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Braylin D.
Mother, who had been designated as the primary residential parent of her eight-year-old child, appeals an order changing the designation to the child’s Father, contending that the material change of circumstances since the entry of the original parenting plan, as found by the trial court, was not sufficient to justify the modification of custody. We have determined that the evidence does not show that the child’s well-being has been adversely affected by the difficulties the parents have encountered in complying with the parenting plan or that the modification is in the child’s best interest; accordingly, we reverse the order changing the designation of the primary residential parent. We reverse the order denying Mother’s request for attorney’s fees for services incurred in securing a judgment for back child support and remand for a determination of the amount of the award. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tiffine Wendalyn Gail Runions, et al. v. Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District, et al.
This is an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. In this health care liability action, we must determine whether the plaintiff properly complied with the pre-suit notice requirement found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1). The original defendants in this matter all filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment alleging that they did not provide medical treatment to the plaintiff/appellee. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a response to the defendants' motion acknowledging that she had mistakenly identified a proper defendant in this suit. The plaintiff also filed a motion to amend her complaint attempting to remedy that mistake by substituting in the proper defendant. After both motions were heard, the trial court denied the original defendants' motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment and granted the plaintiff/appellee's motion to amend her complaint. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Tiffine Wendalyn Gail Runions, et al. v. Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District, et al., Concur in part and Dissent in part
I concur in the majority opinion’s denial of West Tennessee Health Network and West Tennessee Healthcare, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment. Like the majority, I express no opinion whatsoever on whether dismissal of these two parties might be appropriate under other theories. However, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s holding that pre-suit notice was provided to the District and that amendment of Ms. Runions’ complaint was proper. The majority opinion states: “we cannot ignore the unmistakable acknowledgement from Ms. Zamata’s letter that Ms. Runions did, in fact, provide written notice of a potential claim against the District.” Herein lies my disagreement with the majority opinion. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Margaret Cruce v. Memmex Inc. d/b/a Salsa Cocina Mexicana Restaurant
In this premises liability case, the plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant property owner. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Herman Sowell, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
In 2011, the Petitioner, Herman Sowell, Jr., pleaded nolo contendreto attempted aggravated rape, attempted aggravated sexual battery, and incest, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years, at 30%. The trial court ordered a “time served” sentence followed by probation. In April 2013, after the statute of limitations had expired, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, using a separate case number but challenging as ineffective the representation of his counsel for the November 2011 case. At some point thereafter, the trial court revoked the Petitioner’s probation. The Petitioner amended his petition for post-conviction relief to challenge his November 2011 convictions. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the post-conviction petition. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Colton R.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother and Stepfather filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father to the child. The trial court found that the grounds of (1) abandonment for willful failure to visit as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), (2) abandonment for willful failure to visit by an incarcerated parent as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), and (3) abandonment based on conduct demonstrating a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. Father appeals. We reverse the trial court’s finding of abandonment by willful failure to visit as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) but affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Misty Ann Miller
The defendant, Misty Ann Miller, appeals the trial court’s denial of her Rule 35 motion to modify the sentences imposed against her pursuant to a negotiated plea deal. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in finding no new post-sentencing developments exist to justify a modification of her sentences. After our review, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wesley Howard Luthringer
Wesley Howard Luthringer (“the Defendant”) was convicted of two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide by a Bedford County jury. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-four years for each count to be served consecutively as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to find him guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to be served consecutively. After a thorough review of the record and case law, we affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals |