Gregory Griffin v. Margaret Smith, et al.
This is an appeal from a detainer warrant action originally filed in the general sessions court by the purchaser of residential property at a foreclosure sale. The defendant in the detainer action appealed the general sessions judgment to circuit court and filed a third party complaint against the mortgage company. The trial granted the mortgage company's motion to dismiss. After a trial de novo, the trial court awarded the purchaser of the property possession of the premises. Because Appellant failed to comply with Rules 24 and 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, we dismiss this appeal. |
Shelby | State Court Clerks | |
Courtney R. Logan v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Courtney R. Logan, filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his extradition from Tennessee to Mississippi nearly four years after the extradition. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Joe Campbell
The Defendant, Bobby Joe Campbell, entered guilty pleas to two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and two counts of failure to appear, a Class E felony, with the manner and service of his sentence to be determined by the trial court. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102, -13-111, -16-609(e). The trial court merged the aggravated assault convictions and imposed a consecutive term of five years’ incarceration for aggravated assault and one and a half years’ incarceration for each count of failure to appear. Each count of failure to appear was also ordered to be served consecutively to the other for an effective sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the Defendant’s sentence is excessive and contrary to law. Upon our review, we must remand this matter to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing for the limited purpose of considering the factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995), and determining the propriety of consecutive sentencing for the failure to appear convictions. In all other respects, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Felisha Robinson v. University of Tennessee Health Science Center
This is a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 interlocutory appeal. Appellant The University of Tennessee appeals the trial court's denial of its Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1) motion to dismiss Appellee's Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) claim for discrimination. Appellee, a student enrolled in The University of Tennessee Health Science Center's College of Nursing, was dismissed from the program after receiving a failing grade in the clinical portion of her studies. She filed suit in the Chancery Court of Shelby County for racial discrimination under the THRA and for alleged violation of the equal protection and due process protection provisions of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court dismissed Appellee's equal protection and due process claims, but determined that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 4-21-311(a) evinced a legislative intent to waive the State's sovereign immunity for Appellee's THRA claims. Section 4-21-311(a) governs THRA claims for employment discrimination. However, Appellee's THRA claim is for alleged discrimination by a funded program. As such, Appellee's claim is governed by Part 9 of the THRA (specifically, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 4-21-905). Part 9 contemplates only administrative remedies for such violations, and we cannot find a clear legislative intent to waive sovereign immunity so as to allow Appellee to file her initial lawsuit in the chancery or circuit court. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand for entry of an order of dismissal as to Appellee's THRA claim. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Homer McCaig, et al. v. Roy L. Whitmore
This is a premises liability case. Appellant Homer McCaig sustained multiple injuries while operating an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on Appellee Roy Whitmore‘s property. The trial court determined that Mr. Whitmore owed no duty to the McCaigs based on the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (―TRUS‖), Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 70-7-101 et seq. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee based on its determination that no exceptions to the statute were applicable. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Tri-Cities Holdings, LLC v. Tennessee Health Services and Development Agency
An attorney from Georgia, who had been admitted to practice pro hac vice in a contested case hearing before the Tennessee Health Services and Development Agency, had his privilege to practice revoked by the Administrative Judge based upon representations he made as to the status of related federal litigation. On review by the Chancery Court, the revocation was affirmed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the Chancellor. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zachary James Pence
The Defendant, Zachary James Pence, was found guilty by an Anderson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated rape of a child, a Class A felony, aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, and child abuse, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-531 (2014), 39-15-402 (2010) (amended 2011, 2012), 39-15-401 (2010) (amended 2011). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of sixty years for the aggravated rape of a child conviction, twenty-five years for the aggravated child abuse conviction, and two years for the child abuse conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erroneously permitted inadmissible hearsay evidence, (3) the trial court improperly commented on the evidence, (4) the trial court permitted improper opinion testimony, (5) the trial court improperly instructed the jury, (6) his sentence for the aggravated rape of a child conviction is excessive, and (7) the cumulative effect of the errors entitle him to relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leslie Kennedy
The defendant, Leslie Kennedy, appeals her Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of second offense driving under the influence and reckless driving, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alicia Williams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Alicia Williams, appeals the summary dismissal of her petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged her 2012 Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Thomas
The defendant, Joseph Thomas, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute and by instructing the jury on criminal responsibility, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the trial court erred by classifying the defendant as a career offender. We affirm the convictions and sentences but remand for correction of a clerical error in one of the judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
H & J Ditching & Excavating, Inc. v. Cornerstone Community Bank
Plaintiff H & J Ditching & Excavating, Inc. (Contractor) was hired by JRSF, LLC (Developer) to perform excavating and grading work on a subdivision construction project (the project) in West Knox County. Defendant Cornerstone Community Bank (Lender) provided financing for the project with a $2,512,500 construction loan. Complications arose, including the bankruptcy of one of Developer's primary members. Developer defaulted on the construction loan. Lender foreclosed and took possession by bidding on the property at the foreclosure sale. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Phillip I.P., Jr. et al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Michelle P. (“Mother”) to her children Phillip and Emily (“the Children”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court found that clear and convincing evidence established the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistent conditions, and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
John E. Carter v. Herbert H. Slatery III, In His Official Capacity As Attorney General And Reporter
Father filed a petition to reduce child support. Mother sought to have their almost eighteen-year-old daughter testify that she did not intend to exercise visitation with Father to the extent previously ordered by the court after she turned eighteen. The court refused to let her testify. The trial court used the number of days of parenting time previously ordered in calculating child support instead of zero. The trial court also ordered Mother to pay a portion of Father’s attorney’s fees. Mother appeals these issues. We affirm the trial court as to the testimony of the child and the calculation of child support. We reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Alleyanna S.
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Smith | Court of Appeals | |
In re Ava B.
The petitioner in this parenting dispute appeals the trial court's order entered September 17, 2015. Having determined that the order at issue is not a final order, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keith Trammell
The defendant, Keith Trammell, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of theft over $1000, a Class D felony; vandalism over $500, a Class E felony; and two counts of coercion of a witness, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced him as a career offender to twelve years for the theft conviction, six years for the vandalism conviction, and twelve years for each of the coercion convictions. The court ordered the theft and vandalism sentences to be served concurrently to each other and the coercion sentences to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the theft and vandalism sentences, for a total effective sentence of twenty-four years at 60% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him as a career offender and by allowing the State to introduce evidence of uncharged crimes. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald Wayne McCall v. State of Tennessee
Donald Wayne McCall (“the Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Crockett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keyvin Lanier Glass
Appellant, Keyvin Lanier Glass, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and failure to appear. He received an effective sentence of four years, one year in confinement with the remainder suspended to supervised probation. His probation officer filed a probation violation report based on his breaking three probationary rules, and the trial court subsequently entered an order revoking appellant’s probation and ordering him to serve his full sentence in confinement. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby J. Croom v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Bobby J. Croom, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery convictions. The petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief because: (1) the State failed to make a proper election of offenses at trial; (2) his convictions violate double jeopardy; (3) his conviction for aggravated sexual battery violates due process; and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Lambert
Defendant, Timothy Demond Lambert, appeals from the trial court's dismissal, without an evidentiary hearing, of Defendant's motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Curtiss Carlos Talley v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Curtiss Carlos Talley, pled guilty in 2002 to aggravated assault and was sentenced to serve five years concurrently with a federal sentence which, apparently, was later imposed. Twelve years later, in 2014, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, asking, as we understand, that the court “vacat[e] his state judgment/conviction on the merits and in the interest of justice.” The trial court determined that he had failed to state a claim for coram nobis relief, and we agree. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the petition, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aurora Loan Services LLC, et al. v. Linda S. Elam, et al.
This is an appeal of a grant of summary judgment. Defendant Linda Elam conveyed property owned by her individually to Defendant Trust. This property was then pledged as collateral to secure a construction loan for the Trust. Defendants Fred and Linda Elam then obtained another loan in their individual capacities. Appellee’s predecessor in interest obtained ownership of the Defendants’ individual loan and brought suit seeking to have the conveyance of the property to the Trust declared void. On the Appellee’s first motion for summary judgment, the trial court found the conveyance of the property to the trust to be valid. On Appellee’s second motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that the property owned by the trust had been pledged as collateral for the second loan made to Defendants Fred and Linda Elam. Appellant, Fred Elam, appealed in his individual capacity. We conclude that Appellant cannot prosecute the appeal, and the appeal is dismissed. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Cecil McNatt, et al. v. Jane Vestal (Kanizar); Henderson Villa Inc. v. Cecil McNatt, et al.
This is a construction case. Appellee, Cecil McNatt, contracted to build and obtain the required licensing for an assisted living facility for Appellant Jane Vestal. The facility was constructed and licensed according to the parties' contract. Following completion, Appellant refused to pay the balance of the contract amount, citing the Appellee's lack of a contractor's license and numerous construction defects. Appellee filed suit against Appellant for breach of contract, and Appellant counterclaimed for violations of the Contractors Licensing Act and Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court concluded that Appellee did not violate the Contractors Licensing Act or the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, dismissed Appellants' counterclaims, and awarded Appellees a judgment in the amount of $96,280.11. We conclude that trial court erred in concluding that the Appellee did not violate the Contractors Licensing Act, but we affirm the judgment to Appellee, with some modification of the amount awarded. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
National Public Auction Company, LLC v. Camp Out, Inc., et al.
An auctioneer filed suit against a recreational vehicle dealer for injunctive relief and damages; the dealer counterclaimed for fraud and other causes of action. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the dealer. Distribution of funds held by the court clerk was held in abeyance. This appeal is a post-judgment dispute as to whether the trial court erred in allowing the purchaser of a recreational vehicle at the auction to intervene after the trial court entered its judgment on the jury verdict to seek the return of money deposited with the court clerk, and whether the trial court erred in dismissing the dealer’s counterclaim against the purchaser and awarding the purchaser the return of his purchase price. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the purchaser to intervene, but that the trial court erred in failing to allow the dealer to conduct discovery to determine whether the purchaser contributed to the loss in value of the vehicle. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of John Paul Lewis, Sr.
The plaintiff in this action and the decedent were formerly husband and wife. Before they married, the decedent husband and the plaintiff executed an antenuptial agreement, which provided, inter alia, that the decedent would maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy with the plaintiff as beneficiary until his death. When the parties divorced in 2009, the divorce court determined that their antenuptial agreement was enforceable, including the life insurance provision. Although the decedent appealed certain issues in that action regarding alimony and arrearages, the divorce court's determination regarding enforceability of the antenuptial agreement and the life insurance provision contained therein was not appealed. Furthermore, no relief was sought pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60. At the time of the decedent's death in 2014, he had not maintained the required life insurance, and the plaintiff filed a claim against the decedent's estate for $500,000. The personal representative of the estate filed an exception to the claim. The probate court allowed the claim to proceed, concluding that the issue regarding the life insurance provision in the antenuptial agreement had been previously litigated in the divorce action, which judgment had since become final and nonmodifiable. The personal representative has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals |