Cameo Bobo v. City of Jackson, Tennessee
Appellant filed suit against the City of Jackson after her home was demolished, asserting causes of action for trespass and inverse condemnation. The City of Jackson filed an answer denying any liability and later moved for summary judgment on all claims. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the trespass claim should be dismissed due to governmental immunity. Moreover, the trial court concluded that Appellant had failed to timely assert her inverse condemnation claim. Appellant appeals only the dismissal of her inverse condemnation claim. Having reviewed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on that issue, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Jamell Faulkner v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jamell Faulkner, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of second degree murder and especially aggravated burglary and the accompanying effective sentence of fifteen years. The Petitioner alleged that his lead counsel and his co-counsel were ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tavarus Detterio Griffin
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Tavarus Detterio Griffin, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the entire jury pool was tainted when, during voir dire, a juror mentioned that she had been called for jury service at the Defendant’s first trial on these charges; (3) the jury foreman’s comment, prior to the beginning of deliberations, that he knew the Defendant was guilty constituted juror misconduct; and (4) the prosecutor’s use of testimony from the Defendant’s allocution at his first trial to impeach him with a prior inconsistent statement constituted reversible error. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Dwayne Mitchell
Following his arrest at a sobriety checkpoint on October 7, 2011, the Defendant, Kenneth Dwayne Mitchell, was indicted for driving under the influence (“DUI”), possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving with a blood alcohol content (“BAC”) of .08% or greater (“DUI per se”). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-425 & 39-17-425. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of DUI per se and acquitted of the remaining charges. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, arguing that his seizure at the sobriety checkpoint was unreasonable because adequate notice of the roadblock was not provided. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deborah Bray v. Radwan R. Khuri, MD
This is a health care liability action arising from decedent's death. Appellant filed this action against Dr. Radwan Khuri. Dr. Khuri moved to dismiss this action for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 et seq. Specifically, Dr. Khuri challenged whether the medical release provided with the pre-suit notice letter was compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”). The trial court agreed with Dr. Khuri and dismissed the action with prejudice. Appellant timely appealed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kermit Penley
The petitioner, Kermit Penley, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence. He argues that he received a sentence of “life with the possibility of parole” with his parole eligibility occurring after service of eighty-five percent of his sentence, and he contends that this sentence is not authorized by statute. Following our review, we conclude that the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment and that his sentence is not illegal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Kirkpatrick v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jerry Kirkpatrick, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction from his convictions for burglary and theft of property over $1,000, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Corey McKinnie v. State of Tennessee
Appellant appeals the Tennessee Claims Commission’s dismissal of his healthcare liability claim against the Appellee, State of Tennessee. Appellant failed to include a certificate of good faith with his complaint, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122. Accordingly, the State filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss Appellant’s complaint. The Claims Commission granted the State’s motion. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Byrge
Defendant, Christopher Lee Byrge, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and received a nine-year sentence. He appeals his conviction, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his admissions; (2) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to elect the specific date on which the alleged offense occurred; (3) the trial court erred by giving a sequential jury instruction; (4) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's request for a special jury instruction on corroboration of admissions against interest; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a careful review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul J. Walwyn v. Board of Professional Responsibility Of The Supreme Court of Tennessee
A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility (the “Hearing Panel”) found that an attorney’s handling of three separate criminal appeals violated certain ethical rules. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, and 8.4(a), (d). The Hearing Panel suspended the attorney from the practice of law for six months and ordered him to serve thirty days’ active suspension and five months’ probation. The attorney appealed, and the trial court affirmed the Hearing Panel’s judgment. On appeal to this Court, the attorney contends that the Hearing Panel abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Additionally, the attorney argues that the attorney disciplinary process in Tennessee is unconstitutional. After carefully reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court upholding the Hearing Panel’s decision. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Cayetano Flores v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Cayetano Flores, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by operating under a conflict of interest, inadequately discussing various aspects of the case and the details of the plea agreement, and failing to file a motion to sever. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the prost-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James D. Wooden
We granted this appeal to determine whether a party filing a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 (“Rule 36.1”) states a colorable claim for relief for correction of an illegal sentence by alleging that the trial court increased his sentence above the statutory presumptive minimum sentence but failed to find enhancement factors justifying the increase. Answering this question requires us to determine the meaning of two terms used in Rule 36.1—“colorable claim” and “illegal sentence.” We hold that the definition of “colorable claim” in Rule 28, section 2(H) of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court applies to the term “colorable claim” in Rule 36.1. Additionally, we conclude that the definition of “illegal sentence” in Rule 36.1 is coextensive with, and actually mirrors, the definition this Court has applied to the term for purposes of habeas corpus proceedings. Compare Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a), with Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 452 (Tenn. 2011). Taking the allegations of the Rule 36.1 motion in this case as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the moving party, we conclude that the moving party has failed to allege a colorable claim for correction of an illegal sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the trial court’s denial of the Rule 36.1 motion is affirmed. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Adrian R. Brown
We granted this appeal to determine whether Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 (“Rule 36.1”) permits parties to seek correction of expired illegal sentences. We hold that Rule 36.1 does not expand the scope of relief available for illegal sentence claims and therefore does not authorize the correction of expired illegal sentences. We also conclude that a Rule 36.1 motion alleging that a trial court failed to award pretrial jail credit is insufficient to state a colorable claim for relief from an illegal sentence. Applying these holdings, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s Rule 36.1 motion. |
McMinn | Supreme Court | |
Timothy Messmaker v. Heather L. Messmaker
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a motion for recusal filed by Timothy Messmaker ("Former Husband") in the parties' post-dissolution modification proceedings. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Former Husband, and finding no error in Trial Court's ruling, we affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Dejuan Webster v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Joseph Dejuan Webster, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. The Petitioner appealed, arguing that there was newly discovered evidence. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction. State v. Joseph Dejuan Webster, No M2007-00050-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2229208, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 29, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2008). In May 2014, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that one of the key witnesses against him at trial had recanted her trial testimony in a sworn statement. The coram nobis court held a hearing, and, after expressing doubt as to the witness’s testimony, dismissed the petition for writ of error coram nobis. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred and asserts that he is entitled to coram nobis relief on the basis of the witness’s recanted testimony. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authority, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Virginia Louise Burke et al v. Huntsville NH Operations LLC d/b/a Huntsville Manor
The notice of appeal in this matter was filed with the trial court after expiration of the thirty-day deadline provided in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. This Court subsequently ordered the appellants to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. In response, the appellants filed a motion with the trial court, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.01, seeking alteration of the filing date on the notice of appeal. The trial court granted such relief while the appeal was pending in this Court, despite the absence of a remand. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which was deferred to the panel deciding this case. We conclude that absent a remand from this court, the trial court was without jurisdiction to act on the Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.01 motion while this appeal was pending. We therefore dismiss this appeal as untimely. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Steve Hollar v. Deicy C. Hollar
In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s decision to invalidate the parties’ antenuptial agreement and the trial court’s classification and division of the marital estate. The trial court declined to enforce the antenuptial agreement because, inter alia, Wife could not read the agreement - she could not speak or read English - and she was not represented by counsel. Finding that the evidence does not preponderate against any of the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Pickett | Court of Appeals | |
Cassidy Lynne Aragon v. Reynaldo Manuel Aragon
Father and Mother were divorced in April 2010; a parenting plan was entered into providing that the parties would share equal parenting time. In March 2012, pursuant to the parental relocation statute at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108, Father notified Mother that he intended to relocate to Tucson, Arizona, for an employment opportunity and filed a petition requesting to modify the parenting plan and relocate. Mother filed a petition in opposition to relocation, stating, inter alia, that Father’s proposed move served no reasonable purpose. The trial court determined that Father’s move served no reasonable purpose; the court did not make the best interests determination as required by the relocation statute. Father appealed and this court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for the court to consider the best interests of the child and to make findings in that regard. On remand, the court made findings relative to the factors as designated in the relocation statute and concluded that relocation was not in the best interests of the child. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In re Andrea R.
This is the second appeal from a 2008 petition filed by Mother to set Father’s child support obligation for the parties’ five-year-old child, to make an upward deviation to pay for private school, and to determine the amount of retroactive support owed. Father responded, contending that an upward deviation for private school was not appropriate. He also contended that he should be credited for voluntary payments he made throughout the retroactive period. The trial court established Father’s current support obligation, which included an upward deviation for private school; however, the court made no findings to justify the deviation as required by Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-2-4-.07(2)(a)(1). Father appealed the upward deviation. We reversed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to “make the requisite findings of fact to determine, inter alia, whether private schooling for the child is appropriate based upon the facts of this case.” In re Andrea A.R., No. M2011-00574-COA-R3-JV, 2012 WL 397475, at *7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2012). On remand, Mother sought to introduce additional evidence about the appropriateness of private school. The trial court declined to accept additional evidence, relied on the evidence introduced in the first trial, and, based on its written findings of fact, concluded that deviating from the child support guidelines was not appropriate because the parties could not afford private school. The trial court also established Father’s child support obligation for each of the six years preceding the filing of the petition to set support, calculated Father’s total obligation for the retroactive period, determined that Father’s voluntary payments exceeded that obligation, and held that no arrearage was owed. Because Mother filed a new petition to modify the current support obligation, which was consolidated with the above petition, the trial court allowed each party to introduce evidence of their current income. Based on that evidence, the court imputed income to Mother because she failed to provide reliable evidence of her income and modified Father’s child support obligation, which was established pursuant to the guidelines without a deviation. Mother appealed, raising several issues. We affirm in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Darius S.
In this post-divorce custody dispute, Father challenges the trial court’s decision to make Mother the primary residential parent. Because Father failed to file a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Carl Tomlin, et al v. Betty Baxter, et al
This appeal arises from a judgment for a post-foreclosure deficiency owing on a promissory note. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Defendants’ motion for relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 from the final judgment. After Defendants filed an answer to the complaint, they subsequently failed to comply with orders of the court, and, upon motion of Plaintiffs, a default judgment on liability was entered in 2012. The hearing on damages, which was set to be heard four weeks later, was continued by agreement more than a dozen times over two years while the parties attempted to reach a settlement. No settlement was reached, and the hearing on damages was held in May 2014, during which Plaintiffs introduced evidence to establish their damages; however, neither Defendants nor their counsel appeared. Following the evidentiary hearing on damages, the court awarded Plaintiffs damages of $153,328.26, and a final judgment was entered. Three months later, Defendants filed a “Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment” under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, seeking to set aside the May 2014 order on the grounds of excusable neglect. The trial court denied relief. On appeal, Defendants contend the court erred in denying their motion because their failure to attend the damages hearing can be justified by confusion and lack of notice. They also contend the court erred in awarding default judgment because they filed a joint answer to the complaint. We conclude that the damages judgment Defendants sought to have set aside was not a default judgment, but was a final judgment following an evidentiary hearing. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 60 relief from the damages judgment because Defendants failed to establish excusable neglect for not attending the 2014 hearing. We also hold that, although Defendants filed an answer to the complaint, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering a default judgment as to liability because Defendants failed to defend the claim in the time frame as ordered by the court. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.01. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven J. Ballou
The defendant, Steven J. Ballou, pled guilty to one count of evading arrest, a Class D felony, and received a sentence of five years to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. As part of his guilty plea, the defendant reserved two certified questions of law. In the first question, he argues that an eighteen-month pre-indictment delay caused substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial and was an intentional delay by the State to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant. In the second, he contends that the loss of police cruiser dashboard camera videos that contained potentially exculpatory evidence violated his right to a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the first certified question of law and conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to consider the second certified question. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Teresa Patterson v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP
This appeal arises from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant-property owner in a premises liability suit. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Theodore Franklin Davis v. Knox County, Tennessee
We granted this interlocutory appeal in order to consider whether Knox County can rely upon the defense of quasi-judicial immunity with respect to the allegations against it in the complaint filed by the plaintiff Theodore Franklin Davis. At an earlier time, Davis entered into a plea agreement in criminal court. In the agreement, he consented to comply with all of the requirements of the Knox County Pretrial Services Office during his six-month probation. One of the requirements was that he would wear a Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitoring unit (the SCRAM) to track his alcohol consumption. Pretrial Services – a department of the Knox County Sheriff's Office and an agent of Knox County – installed and monitored the device. Davis alleges that the agents of Pretrial Services were negligent in the installation of, and their refusal to adjust, the SCRAM. He alleges that the SCRAM exacerbated his diabetic condition. Knox County raised the defense of quasi-judicial immunity and later moved to dismiss. The trial court denied Knox County's motion, holding that it was not entitled to raise the defense of quasi-judicial immunity. We hold that Knox County is entitled to assert the defense of quasi-judicial immunity under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-206 (2012). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Jack Parks et al v. Sun Belt Management Company et al.
The plaintiffs voluntarily non-suited an action against the defendants. Later, this suit against the same defendants for the same cause of action was filed. The plaintiffs in their second suit failed to have process issued and served on the defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss based upon this failure. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit. They appeal. We affirm. |
Washington | Workers Compensation Panel |