State of Tennessee v. Charles E. May, Jr.
Appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to suspend the balance of a six-year sentence he was serving in the Rutherford County jail. He claims that the trial court erred; (1) in limiting Appellant’s opportunity to present proof at the motion hearing; (2) denying his motion to suspend sentence because of a waiver included in a probation violation agreement; (3) denying Appellant’s motion on an improper basis; and (4) that Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel at the motion hearing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Ray Hoggatt v. Lori Ann Hoggatt
The divorce in this case brought to an end the thirteen-year marriage of David Ray Hoggatt (“Husband”) and Lori Ann Hoggatt (“Wife”). The trial court classified, valued, and distributed the parties’ property. On this appeal, Husband challenges aspects of the division of marital property. We modify the amount that the trial court ordered Wife to pay Husband in the property division. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dustin Mark Vaughn
Defendant, Dustin Mark Vaughn, entered guilty pleas to the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture and the initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of four years for the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture conviction and twelve years for the methamphetamine initiation process conviction. The trial court denied Defendant’s request for alternative sentencing. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Allen Gentry
The Petitioner, Kevin Allen Gentry, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for rape of a child. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Ray Hoggatt v. Lori Ann Hoggatt - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion affirming the trial court’s division of the marital property as modified by the majority. I believe the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s property division, even as modified by the majority, as being an equitable division of the marital property. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah R. Smith v. John P. Stanley, et al.
Deborah R. Smith (“Plaintiff”) sued John P. Stanley and Dinah Stanley (“Defendants”) with regard to injuries Plaintiff suffered when she fell down stairs while visiting a cabin (“the Cabin”) owned by Defendants. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) granted Defendants summary judgment after finding and holding that Defendants owed no duty to Plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment. We find and hold, as did the Trial Court, that there are no genuine disputed issues of material fact, and that Defendants have shown that Plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of her claim, specifically duty. We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher D. Seals
The appellant, Christopher D. Seals, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, and the trial court imposed a sentence of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant asserts that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion and in determining the amount of restitution. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Selwyn Forbes George v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Selwyn Forbes George, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. Petitioner entered a negotiated plea agreement in which he pled guilty to possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine for resale in exchange for a twenty-year sentence to be served as a Range I, standard offender. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that trial counsel was ineffective. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals. After a review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that his guilty plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered. As a result, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Garvin M. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Garvin M. and Brianna M., the minor children (“the Children”) of Ryan M. (“Father”) and Jennifer M. (“Mother”). In July 2012, the Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and placed in foster care. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father on February 26, 2013. The petition alleged as statutory grounds for termination: (1) severe child abuse, (2) abandonment by the parents’ failure to provide a suitable home, (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, (4) persistent conditions, and (5) abandonment by an incarcerated parent who exhibits wanton disregard for the Children’s welfare prior to incarceration. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to both parents upon finding that DCS had proven all of the grounds alleged by clear and convincing evidence. The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Jack Wayne Turner
This is a conservatorship modification case. Appellant/Mother sought modification of the trial court’s previous order, naming Appellee/Father as the conservator over the parties’ mentally-disabled, adult son, and mandating that Mother’s visitation with the Ward be supervised. Because Mother had made numerous, unfounded allegations of sexual abuse against the Ward by his older brother, the trial court enjoined Mother from making any future allegations of sexual abuse against the Ward by his older brother, and further enjoined her from discussing, with the Ward, any purported sexual abuse by his older brother. Although the trial court modified its previous order to grant Mother four additional hours of visitation per month, it ordered that her visitation would continue to be supervised. The court further modified the conservatorship by holding that Father, at his discretion, would be allowed to tape record any telephone conversations between the Ward and Mother. On appeal, Mother contends that the injunction constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on her free speech. We adopt the “modern rule,” holding that defamatory speech may be enjoined after a determination that the speech is, in fact, false, and upon the condition that the injunction be narrowly tailored to limit the prohibited speech to that which has been determined to be false. We conclude that the injunction in this case satisfies both of these criteria such that it does not constitute a prior restraint on Mother’s free speech. Mother also appeals the trial court’sorder concerning the amount of visitation, the fact that the visitation is to be supervised, and recording of her telephone conversations with the Ward. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Mother eight hours of visitation per month. Furthermore, because of Mother’s behavior during the pendency of this litigation, we further conclude that the imposition of supervised visitation and the recording of her telephone conversation serve two functions. First, these requirements preserve the Ward’s best interest by providing safeguards against future negative impacts from Mother’s actions. Second, because Mother has shown a propensity to disregard the orders of the court, the requirements ensure that the court’s orders will be followed. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, and there is no abuse of the trial court’s discretion, we affirm and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William Artel Townsend aka Abdullah R.S. Ashanti v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, William Atrel Townsend aka Abdullah R.S. Ashanti, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his conviction for attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an eight-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vincent Garrard v. Tennessee Department of Correction
This appeal involves the trial court’s denial of relief to an inmate based upon a writ of certiorari.The inmate raises several issues regarding violations of the Tennessee Department of Correction Uniform Disciplinary Procedures, as well as basic due process. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Antonius Harris, et al. v. Tennessee Rehabilitative Initiative in Correction et al.
Inmates in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction who are housed at Riverbend Maximum Security Institution in Nashville, Tennessee, filed various claims related to their “prison jobs,” inter alia, for wages and damages under the Tennessee Wage Regulation Act, specifically Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-2-101 and 50-2-104, and for breach of oral contract,promissory estoppel ,unjust enrichment, and conversion.The Tennessee Claims Commission dismissed all of the inmates’ claims upon the defendants’Tenn.R.Civ.P.12.02 (1) and (6) motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Alan F. Watson
Appellant, Alan F. Watson, was indicted by the Houston County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery. Prior to trial, Appellant sought to suppress the evidence seized after execution of a search warrant at his home. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. At the conclusion of the jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of the aggravated robbery of Crystal’s Check Cashing. As a result, he was sentenced to nine years in incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. Appellant appeals, arguing: (1) that the trial court improperly denied the motion to suppress; (2) that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court excluded evidence; and (3) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. After a review of the evidence, we determine that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress where the affidavit in support of the search warrant established probable cause and did not contain false and misleading information. Additionally, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding irrelevant evidence and that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for aggravated robbery. As a result, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Houston | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Kason K. C.
This is a dependency and neglect case. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the minor child was dependent and neglected under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 37-1-102(b)(23)(A)(i) due to Appellant/Father’s knowing use of force upon the child, which force was likely to cause the child serious bodily injury. Father appeals this finding. We conclude that the evidence clearlyand convincingly establishes that Father did knowingly “use . . . force on [the] child that [was] likely to cause serious bodily injury or death.” Affirmed and remanded. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Malone v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Steven Malone, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel pretrial and at trial. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Lee Hutcherson
The Defendant, David Lee Hutcherson, pled guilty to one count each of possession of less than .5 grams of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, and possession of drug paraphernalia. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417, - 17-433, -17-425. He received an effective sentence of three years on all counts. As a condition of his guilty plea, the Defendant sought to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Following our review of the record, we dismiss the appeal because the Defendant failed to properly certify his question of law in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Deshawn Crawley
In two indictments, the Defendant, Steven Deshawn Crawley, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced him to serve an effective sentence of forty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him because it misapplied enhancement factors, failed to apply applicable mitigating factors, and failed to follow the sentencing guidelines set forth in Tennessee Code annotated sections 40-35-102, -103, and -115. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude no error exists in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Keith Whited v. State of Tennessee
Keith Whited (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, driving under the influence, and driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-three years’ incarceration. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. See State v. Keith A. Whited, No. M2010-00134-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4684468, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 25, 2011). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief. |
Fentress | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Leroy Williams v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Leroy Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus regarding his conviction for being a habitual drug offender pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-6-417(d). The trial court sentenced petitioner as a Range II offender to a forty-five-year sentence to be served in confinement. Petitioner argues that the judgment of the trial court was void due to a defective presentment. He also claims that the trial court had no jurisdiction because it erroneously classified him as a habitual drug offender and because it erroneously applied a sentencing enhancement. Following our review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s denial of the petition. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Alexander J. G.
In this termination of parental rights case, Mother appeals the trial court’s determination that she abandoned her son by failing to support him and that termination was in the child’s best interest. Finding clear and convincing evidence in support of the trial court’s determinations, we affirm the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Neal Forster, II
Appellant, Ricky Neal Forster, II, pleaded guilty to two counts of theft and received an effective six-year sentence, suspended to probation. A probation violation warrant and an amendment thereto were issued, alleging violations of the terms and conditions of probation by: (1) testing positive for marijuana; (2) using controlled substances; (3) failing to complete a drug rehabilitation program as instructed; (4) failing to make payments toward court costs and restitution; and (5) garnering new criminal convictions. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation, which appellant now claims was an abuse of discretion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lee C. Palmer
Lee C. Palmer (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of felony reckless endangerment and one count of driving under the influence. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that she is entitled to a new trial because the trial court afforded her only three peremptory challenges instead of the statutorily required eight. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brenda Dianne Cook Rayfield v. Tony Dale Rayfield
This appeal arises from a divorce action. The husband appeals the trial court’s division of marital property and debt and the award of compensatory and punitive damages to the wife for injuries she allegedly sustained at the hands of the husband. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Harold Morris
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Harold Morris, was convicted of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-402, -13-502, -14-403. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the grounds that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals |