State of Tennessee v. Corinio Pruitt
A jury convicted the defendant of first degree felony murder. The jury imposed a sentence of death based on three aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant had previously been convicted of one or more felonies involving the use of violence; (2) the murder was knowingly committed while the defendant had a substantial role in committing a robbery; and (3) the victim was seventy years of age or older. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (7), (14) (2010). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On automatic appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1) (2010), we designated the following issues for oral argument: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt of first degree felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) whether the trial court erred in determining that the defendant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was intellectually disabled and thereby ineligible for the death penalty; and (3) whether the sentence of death is disproportionate or invalid pursuant to the mandatory review of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1). On December 6, 2012, we ordered re-argument on the following issues: (1) whether the proportionality analysis adopted by the majority of the Court in State v. Bland, should be modified; (2) whether the absence of an intent to kill should render the death penalty disproportionate; and (3) whether the pool of cases considered in proportionality analysis should be broadened. Having carefully considered these issues and the other issues raised by the defendant, we find no merit to the defendant’s arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Corinio Pruitt - Concur and Dissent
We concur fully with the Court’s decision to affirm Corinio Pruitt’s conviction for first-degree felony murder. However, we respectfully disagree with the manner in which the Court has carried out the proportionality analysis required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (2010) because we believe that it is inconsistent with the plain requirements of the statute. After considering “both the nature of the crime and the defendant” in this case and in “similar cases” as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D), we conclude that Mr. Pruitt should be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Norman G. Page
The defendant, Norman G. Page, was convicted by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of theft of property valued over $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to twelve years as a career offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Anthony Dickson, Jr.
The defendant, angry about the quality of the cocaine that he had purchased, procured weapons and ammunition and enlisted the assistance of two other men to help him confront the drug dealers and obtain a refund. After forcing his way into a cabin where the drug dealers were located, one of his compatriots—-whom the defendant had armed with a .45 pistol—shot and seriously wounded two unarmed victims. Following a bench trial, the trial judge ruled that the defendant was criminally responsible for the actions of the shooter and found the defendant guilty of two counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count each of especially aggravated burglary, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The trial judge sentenced the defendant on these convictions, including consecutive twenty-five year sentences for each attempted first degree murder conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals reduced one count of attempted first degree murder to attempted second degree murder, finding insufficient evidence of premeditation with respect to the shooting of one of the unarmed victims, and modified the conviction of especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary. The court affirmed the other convictions and remanded the case to the trial court for re-sentencing on attempted second degree murder and aggravated burglary. We accepted this case to review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions of attempted first degree murder and the propriety of the consecutive sentences for the attempted first degree murder convictions. We affirm both convictions for attempted first degree murder and the consecutive sentences. |
Sevier | Supreme Court | |
Austin Wells, a disabled person, by and through his conservator and natural mother Carron C. Wells Baker v. State of Tennessee and Donald Estes and University of Memphis Foundation
A University of Memphis student fell down an elevator shaft while removing artwork following a required University function at property owned by Donald Estes. The student sued Donald Estes and Estes, LLC, the University, and The University of Memphis Foundation. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the Foundation. The jury returned a verdict of $4,103,720.00, and the fault was ultimately allocated as follows: the State 40%; the student 15%; Estes 45%. Based upon an indemnification agreement, the trial court found the State liable for Mr. Estes’ share of the jury verdict, or $1,436,215.20. We find that the trial court erred in concluding that the indemnification agreement indemnified Mr. Estes for his own negligence and in granting summary judgment in favor of the Foundation. However, we affirm the trial court’s admission of testimony regarding $410,000 in medical bills, its exclusion of evidence regarding the student’s alleged drug use, and its capping of the State’s liability at $300,000. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer E. Patterson v. Natalie D. Grant-Herms
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer E. Patterson v. Natalie D. Grant-Herms - Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gayle Connelly v. Peter Napolitano
The trial court in this case entered two identical final judgments fifteen days apart. The appellant filed her notice of appeal within thirty days of the second judgment, but not the first. Because the thirty day time limit for filing a notice of appeal runs from the entry of the first judgment, the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Although the appellant may seek relief from the trial court pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P.60, the failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Kathleen Baker and Rick Baker v. Deborah A. Snedegar
Plaintiff filed suit against a medical legal examiner alleging the medical legal examiner was negligent in failing to inform her of certain preventative medications. The medical legal examiner contended she was a government employee protected from liability by the Governmental Tort Liability Act and moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion because the medical legal examiner could not prove she was paid by the payroll department of the governmental entity at issue, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20107(a)(2). The medical legal examiner appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nora Hernandez
Appellant, Nora Hernandez, was convicted by a jury of two counts of felony failure to appear. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced her to two years, suspended after service of twenty-five days. On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) her action in failing to report to the jail to serve a delayed sentence did not constitute the criminal offense of failure to appear; (2) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the indictment based on prosecutorial vindictiveness; (3) her conviction should be dismissed because the jury only found her guilty of the elements of misdemeanor failure to appear, an offense for which the statute of limitations had passed; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm appellant’s convictions, but we vacate the two failure to appear judgments and remand the case for entry of a single judgment reflecting the merger of these convictions |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. Karen Lesley and City of Memphis Civil Service Commission
A Memphis police officer’s employment was terminated without a pre-termination hearing because the City of Memphis was of the opinion that she was a probationary employee and not entitled to a hearing. The officer sought review of her termination, and the Memphis Civil Service Commission agreed with the City’s position that the officer was a probationary employee and not entitled to a hearing. The officer filed a petition for review before the chancery court, and the chancery court reversed the Commission, finding that the officer had already completed her probationary period, and as a non-probationary employee, she was entitled to due process protections including a pre-termination hearing. This order was not appealed. On remand to the Commission, the City stipulated that the officer was not given a pre-termination hearing and sought to relitigate the issue of whether she was a probationary employee. The Commission declined to reconsider the issue and determined that the officer was denied procedural due process. The Commission reinstated the officer to her previous position of employment. The chancery court affirmed. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie Joe Stokes
The defendant, Ronnie Joe Stokes, was convicted by a Cumberland County Criminal Court jury of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced to twelve years as a persistent offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for new trial because a juror was exposed to extraneous prejudicial information. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zachary Carlisle
The Defendant, Zachary Carlisle, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-211, 39-17-1324 (2010). The trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years’ confinement for the voluntary manslaughter conviction and to a consecutive fifteen years’ confinement as a violent offender for the firearm conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the indictment for the firearm conviction failed to charge an offense, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense, and (4) the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that the Defendant’s statements could qualify as a confession. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Adcock, et al. v. Cheatham County Board of Education
This is an appeal from a summary judgment order awarding the plaintiffs an easement across the defendant’s property. Because the order does not dispose of the plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Martha Elaine Weaver Carter v. David Ray Carter
Mother appeals the trial court’s decision on her petition to modify parenting time. While we find no error in the trial court’s ruling on parenting time, we have concluded that the trial court erred in disqualifying mother’s attorney from representing her in future proceedings and in ordering mother to produce bank records. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth L. Anderson
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Kenneth L. Anderson, was convicted of one count of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years as a Range III, persistent offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that his right to confront one of the State’s witnesses was violated; (2) that his right to present witnesses in his defense was violated; (3) that one of the State’s witnesses, Penny Webber, was not competent to testify at trial; (4) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a recorded phone conversation between himself and Ms. Webber and video recordings of the drug buy; (5) that he was denied his right of access to the courts; (6) that the jury venire did not represent a fair cross-section of the community; (7) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (8) that he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence; and (9) that his sentence was excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marco Blanch
In 2011, the Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Marco Blanch, for aggravated rape based upon bodily injury sustained by the victim. A jury convicted Appellant of the lesser included offense of rape. Appellant was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to an eleven-year sentence at 100 percent. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence presented by the State at trial was insufficient to support his conviction because the victim consented to sexual activity. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Malcolm McKoy
The Defendant, Malcolm McKoy, pled guilty to theft of property valued over $500 and burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent four-year and six-year terms, suspended to be served on unsupervised probation. These sentences were to run consecutively to another sentence unrelated to this appeal. After two subsequent probation violations based on new arrests, the Defendant was arrested for aggravated assault. A probation violation warrant was issued based upon this arrest, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a revocation of his probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Mary E. P. et al
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother and father on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and willful abandonment by failure to visit, and upon the determination that termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Both parents appeal. Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Mark A. L.
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Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darrell Johnson
The defendant, Darrell Johnson, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of facilitation of attempted aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated burglary, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of his sentences. We affirm the convictions and sentences. On remand, however, we direct the trial court to correct the judgments to properly effectuate merger of the alternative counts of aggravated burglary. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pamela Moses v. Jayanta K. Dirghangi, MD
This case involves allegations of medical battery and medical malpractice surrounding an exam performed on a patient while she was admitted to a hospital to give birth. The trial court dismissed any allegations for medical battery for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, finding that the patient’s complaint failed to include allegations that the exam was performed without the patient’s authorization. The trial court further dismissed any remaining malpractice claims for failure to comply with the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act notice requirements. Discerning no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Johnie Jefferson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Johnie Jefferson, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. He argues that he is entitled to coram nobis relief because the State suppressed exculpatory evidence that became known to him after the limitations period had expired. After review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Amanda Turner (Short) v. Jessie Lee Short, Jr.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Clarence D. Schreane v. State of Tennessee
In this consolidated appeal, the pro se appellant, Clarence D. Schreane, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s orders denying relief from his 2004 convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Prior to this court’s consolidation of the case, the State filed motions to dismiss the appeals or, alternatively, to affirm the trial court’s denials of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. In light of the complexities of the issues raised in this appeal, we conclude that the State’s motions should be treated as responsive briefs. Following our review, we affirm the orders of the Hamilton County Criminal Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals |