Jean Meadows, etc. v. Tara Harrison, etc., et al.
In this case, Partner and Decedent created Double J Company for the purpose of buying and selling real estate. One month following the creation of Double J Company, Decedent personally purchased the Property, which he thereafter deeded to Double J Company. Following Decedent’s death, Partner filed a complaint against Heirs and the estate for partition. Heirs objected, arguing that Partner and Decedent never formed a valid partnership and that the Property was subject to the administration of Decedent’s estate. Following a hearing, the trial court deemed the Property partnership property and ordered the sale of the Property. Heirs appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Pirtle v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board et al
Petitioner, an inmate of the Tennessee Department of Correction, was charged with the prison disciplinary offense of Refusing a Drug Test because he failed to provide an adequate amount of urine for testing. Following a disciplinary hearing he was found guilty of the offense. He filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which was granted, and Respondents filed a certified copy of the record of Petitioner’s disciplinary proceedings. The trial court found the disciplinary board did not act in an illegal or arbitrary manner, and dismissed the case. We affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Rosalyn L. Caffey v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee Board of Zoning Appeals and Elizabeth W. Blair
Neighbor of property owner who received a variance from a side yard setback requirement in zoning ordinance filed an action seeking certiorari review of the Board of Zoning Appeals’ grant of the variance. The trial court determined that the Board’s action was within its authority pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-7-207(3) and affirmed the grant of the variance. We concur with the trial court and affirm the Board’s action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Steve Van Duyn d/b/a Steve's Old Junk v. Electronic Innovations, LLC, et al
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the denial of a motion to recuse the trial court judge from presiding over a civil action in which one of the Defendants served on a non-profit board with the trial court judge. Having reviewed the Plaintiff’s petition for recusal appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, we affirm the Trial Court’s denial of the motion to recuse. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Terrell Church
Defendant, Marcus Terrell Church, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. His first trial ended in a mistrial. At a subsequent trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years as a Range II offender for aggravated robbery and twenty-five years as a Range I offender for especially aggravated kidnapping. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress identification evidence; (2) the trial court improperly admitted evidence that Defendant committed an unrelated purse-snatching during the kidnapping in this case; (3) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony concerning Defendant’s nickname; and (4) the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Terrell Church-separate concurring opinion
I concur in the results reached and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I do not believe, however, that this court’s standard of review of hearsay in State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008), was "repudiated" or rejected by our supreme court in Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 871 n.26 (Tenn. 2008). In fact, the supreme court noted that the trial court’s ruling was error under either standard of review. Id. This is certainly not a rejection of Gilley. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Terrell Church-separate concurring opinion
I write separately to express my belief that in Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 871 n.26 (Tenn. 2008), the Tennessee Supreme Court indeed "repudiated" or rejected the de novo standard for review of hearsay issues adopted by the Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739, 759-60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). The word "repudiate" means "to reject as having no authority or binding force." Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1636 (2nd ed. 1996). When I first joined Judge Witt’s decision in Gilley, I believed that we were setting forth a new and correct standard of review for hearsay issues and that we were providing a clear first step for any such analysis in the trial court. I still have nothing but respect for both Judge Witt’s reasoning and his conclusion in that case. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wesley Dawone Coleman
Appellant, Wesley Dawone Coleman, was indicted by the Obion County Grand Jury for aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at over $500, and evading arrest. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of theft of property valued at over $500, aggravated burglary, and evading arrest. As a result of the convictions, Appellant received an effective sentence of ten years. Appellant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for the theft and aggravated burglary convictions as well as his sentence. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender, to ten years in incarceration. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lee Weaver Jr.
Appellant, Lee Weaver, Jr., was indicted by the Hardin County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault based upon an altercation with his wife which resulted in her broken arm; one count of felony evading arrest; one count of reckless endangerment; and one count of resisting arrest. He entered a negotiated plea to the charges which resulted in an effective sentence of three years. Appellant requested alternative sentencing. After a hearing, the trial court denied his request. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to serve his sentence in Community Corrections or in the alternative to some form of probation. After a review of the record, we conclude: (1) that Appellant is not eligible for Community Corrections because he committed aggravated assault which is an offense against a person; and (2) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying probation because it was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael D. Boone
This direct appeal presents a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, the Defendant, Michael D. Boone, entered a guilty plea in the Davidson County Criminal Court to possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, a Class B felony, and possession with intent to sell or deliver not less than one-half ounce or more than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony. The trial court ordered the agreed sentence of twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Boone properly reserved the following certified question of law: “Does the affidavit of probable cause in the warrant . . . contain sufficient information to establish a nexus between the residence to be searched and criminal activity; and, if so, does the affidavit further contain reliable information of ongoing criminal activity so as to establish probable cause . . . ?” After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it determined the affidavit provided sufficient probable cause to support the search warrant. As such, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress, and we affirm the Defendant’s judgments of conviction. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael D. Boone - concurring opinion
Because of the great deference afforded to a magistrate judge when making a probable cause determination, I concur with the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. I write separately, however, to express my reluctance in affirming the Defendant’s convictions. As an initial matter, there are several concerns with the affidavit. It contained a single introductory statement that the detective “received information that illegal narcotics were at the premises of 1409 Jackson Street.” However, it failed to provide the source of this information, the point in time when this information was received by the detective, or any specific details regarding the target residence or the illegal narcotics activity. Nothing in the affidavit established that the confidential informant knew that “John” was engaged in the sale of illegal narcotics from the target residence, that the target residence had been under police surveillance, or that any surveillance had uncovered illegal narcotics activity at or around the target residence. There is simply nothing in the affidavit connecting the confidential informant to the Defendant or the target residence. Finally, the affidavit failed to show any effort by law enforcement to identify the Defendant or establish that the target residence was, in fact, the Defendant’s home. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffrey Patterson v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Company
In this workers’ compensation case, the employee alleged he suffered a ruptured cervical disk while lifting metal plates at work. His employer denied the claim, contending the neck injury was caused or worsened by a subsequent motor vehicle accident. The employee filed this action in the Chancery Court of Hardeman County, seeking workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court ruled in favor of the employee, awarding temporary and permanent disability benefits plus future medical benefits. The employer has appealed, contending the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hardeman | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company v. W. Phillip Reed, et al.
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”) sued W. Phillip Reed, Personal Representative of the Estate of Carol LaRue; Rufus Everett; Delight Everett; and Lilla Farner seeking a declaratory judgment with regard to rights and obligations under a commercial general liability insurance policy. Tennessee Farmers filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing the Trial Court entered its order on June 12, 2012 granting Tennessee Farmers summary judgment after finding and holding, inter alia, that the insurance policy was not ambiguous, that the phrase “property damage” in the insurance policy did not include the type of loss allegedly suffered by the Everetts and Ms. Farner, and that the commercial general liability insurance policy provides no coverage to W. Phillip Reed as Personal Representative of the Estate of Carol LaRue for the claims filed by the Everetts and Ms. Farner. Rufus Everett, Delight Everett, and Lilla Farner (“Defendants”) appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Anne Kraus v. Barry Martin Thomas
In this appeal from the Final Decree of Divorce, the father of the parties’ four minor children challenges the division of marital property, the permanent parenting plan, an upward deviation in child support of $16,875 per year to help pay for private school for three of the children, and a $50,000 judgment for the mother’s attorney’s fees. We affirm the division of the marital property and the parenting schedule. As for requiring the father to pay up to $16,875 per year toward private school costs of three of the children, we have determined that the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard for such an upward deviation and find that the father does not have the financial means to pay an upward deviation. As for requiring the father to pay $50,000 of the mother’s attorney’s fees, we have determined that she was given 60 percent of the marital assets and her income is substantially more than that of the father’s, thus, applying the ability to pay and the need standard, we find no basis for requiring the father to pay the mother’s attorney’s fees at trial or on appeal. Thus, we reverse the award for attorney’s fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Richard C. Taylor v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Richard C. Taylor, pled guilty to first degree premeditated murder and agreed to a life sentence. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief making several contentions regarding his competency. The Petitioner then filed a motion requesting a mental evaluation. The trial court held a hearing wherein it determined that the Petitioner had filed his petition beyond the statute of limitations. The trial court further determined, however, that the statute of limitations should be tolled if the Petitioner was, in fact, incompetent. It ordered the Petitioner to provide an affidavit from a treating physician saying he was incompetent at the time he entered his plea. The Petitioner failed to so do, and the trial court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his petition because he was mentally incompetent to enter his guilty plea. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the judgment of the post-conviction court. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roy Demond Duncan
Defendant, Roy Demond Duncan, was convicted by a jury for attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony. The trial court merged Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction with his attempted second degree murder conviction and sentenced him to ten years, and Defendant received a sentence of ten years in Count 3 to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of 20 years. Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: 1) the trial court erred by giving a jury instruction as to Count 3 that unduly influenced the jury to find Defendant guilty of attempted second degree murder; 2) Defendant could not properly be convicted of both attempted second degree murder and employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony; and 3) the trial court erred by not bifurcating the trial to allow the jury to determine if Defendant had a prior felony conviction at the time of the offenses for the purposes of determining Defendant’s sentence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions but remand this case for a jury determination regarding Count 3 as to whether Defendant had a prior felony conviction pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(f). Upon remand, the trial court shall also enter a corrected judgment in Count 3 to reflect that the offense for which Defendant was convicted in Count 3 is a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gerald Sanford v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Gerald Sanford, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not hiring DNA and blood spatter experts to testify at his trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Clevenger
The appellant, Charles Clevenger, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of felony evading arrest, three counts of misdemeanor simple possession, three counts of felony simple possession, possession of a legend drug, failure to obey a traffic control device, and violation of the financial responsibility law. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective forty year sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the aggravated robbery convictions, that the trial court erred by ruling he could be impeached with prior convictions if he decided to testify, and that some of his convictions violate double jeopardy protections. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the appellant’s conviction for aggravated robbery by violence and that the conviction must be reversed. Moreover, we conclude that his convictions for misdemeanor simple possession of oxycodone, felony simple possession of oxycodone, and possession of a legend drug are multiplicitous with his remaining aggravated robbery conviction. Therefore, those three convictions are vacated and the charges are dismissed. The appellant’s remaining convictions and resulting effective forty-year sentence are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael J. Fryar
The defendant, Michael J. Fryar, appeals a certified question of law from the Sumner County Criminal Court, where he pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary. Because the prosecution of the aggravated burglary charge began before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel., Herbert S. Moncier, et al., v. Nancy S. Jones, et al.
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his complaint, which asserted numerous claims relating, inter alia, to the practice monitor condition of his suspension from the practice of law. The trial court dismissed the complaint finding the defendants in the action were immune under either sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, quasi-judicial quasi-prosecutorial immunity, qualified immunity, or Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, Section 27 immunity. The trial court further found that the action was a collateral attack on the ruling by the Tennessee Supreme Court regarding Petitioner’s suspension; thus, it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to rule on matters in the disciplinary proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on all claims except for the Public Records Act, which we remand to the trial court for a determination of whether the records requested are subject to inspection and whether they have in fact been made available for inspection. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State ex re. Herbert S. Moncier, et al v. Nancy S. Jones, et al
Attorney disciplined by the Board of Professional Responsibility filed suit against the Board’s counsel seeking damages for her conduct of the disciplinary proceeding and her removal from the position of Disciplinary Counsel; Attorney appeals the dismissal of his action. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Herbert S. Moncier v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
An attorney disciplined by the Board of Professional Responsibility brought suit against the Board asserting violations of the Open Meetings Act and the Public Records Act. We have concluded that the trial court properly determined that the Open Meetings Act does not apply to the Board. Furthermore, we find no error in the trial court’s determination regarding the attorney’s right to records from certain Board meetings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State ex rel. Tanya Aina-Labinjo v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Public Education, et al
Metropolitan Nashville Board of Education appeals the issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling it to hear an appeal of the termination of a non-teaching employee. The Board contends that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ and that state law preempts the right to a hearing granted to employees of the Board under the Metropolitan Charter. We affirm the holding that the chancery court has jurisdiction under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-102(a) and 29-25-101 to issue the writ; we vacate the judgment issuing the writ and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing as to whether the Board has developed a policy with respect to the dismissal of employees as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2301(b)(1)(FF) and whether such policy preempts the pertinent provisions of the Metropolitan Charter. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State ex rel. Tanya Aina-Labinjo v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Public Education, et al. - Dissent
I concur in the majority’s holdings affirming the trial court’s jurisdiction and vacating the mandamus. However, I do not agree with the decision to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the declaratory judgment claim. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Hubanks
This case presents an appeal to this Court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Defendant, Kenneth D. Hubanks, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at his residence. The Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendre to his charges, felony cocaine possesion, felony marijuana possession, and possession of drug parahernalia but reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). In this appeal, the Defendant raises the issue of whether the affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued established probable cause to search his residence. After review, we hold no error occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals |