James Johnson and wife, Elaine Johnson v. The Torrington Company, et al.
The plaintiff was severely injured while working on the premises of his employer. Because the employer was immune from liability in tort under the Workers’ Compensation statutes, the employee’s negligence suit named as defendants two other companies whose equipment was implicated in his injury. After a five-day trial, the jury found that the employer was solely at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries, resulting in no award. The plaintiff then filed a motion for new trial. The trial court granted the motion ten months after it was filed, declaring that in his capacity as the thirteenth juror he had found the verdict to be against the weight of the evidence. The case was tried before a second jury, which reached a different verdict, finding that one of the defendant companies was 90% at fault for the plaintiff’s injury while the plaintiff himself was 10% at fault. The net verdict for the plaintiff amounted to $2,925,000. The defendant company argues on appeal that the trial court erred in vacating the first jury verdict, that the second jury verdict was “contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence,” and that the amount of the verdict was excessive. We affirm the jury verdict and the judgment based on it. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Laurie Jo Edwards v. Gary Wayne Edwards
Wife was granted divorce on the grounds of Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court distributed the marital property and awarded Wife transitory alimony for four years. Wife appealed, arguing she should have been awarded a larger portion of the marital estate and was entitled to alimony in futuro. She also argued she should have been awarded her attorneys’ fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. The trial court equitably distributed the marital assets and did not abuse its discretion in awarding Wife transitional alimony to help her adjust to living as a single person again. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
City of Maryville, Tennessee v. Wallace Scott Langford
This appeal arises from a dispute over the constitutionality of City of Maryville (“Maryville”) ordinance 16-110 (“the Ordinance”). The ordinance requires the issuance of a permit for certain public meetings and parades in Maryville. Wallace Scott Langford (“Langford”) and two associates engaged in street preaching at a Maryville intersection. Langford declined to apply for a permit and was cited for violating the ordinance. After a default judgment was rendered against him in municipal court, Langford appealed to the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”). Langford challenged the constitutionality of the Ordinance on grounds that it is overly broad and vague. Following a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order upholding the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Langford appeals. We hold that the Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face as it is vague, overly broad, and affords too much discretion to the officials charged with issuing permits. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry L. Crawford Jr.
A Crockett County Grand Jury indicted appellant, Jerry L. Crawford, Jr., for one count of statutory rape and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. A jury found him guilty of both counts, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of four years for statutory rape and eleven months, twenty-nine days for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the State’s evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim “knowing” that she was under the legal age of consent; and (2) whether appellant possessed knowledge of the victim’s age simultaneously with the intent to engage in intercourse with her. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Crockett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Harvey Brian Cochran
A jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Harvey Brian Cochran, of reckless homicide, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to serve three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Cochran argues that the trial court erred at sentencing by allowing the State to introduce unreliable hearsay as proof of a prior conviction for enhancement purposes, by failing to consider the relevant mitigating factors, and by denying him an alternative sentence. Upon review we reverse the trial court’s denial of an alternative sentence and order Cochran to serve a sentence of split confinement, with ninety days to be served in periodic confinement at the county jail and the remainder of his three-year sentence to be served on supervised probation with the terms of his probation and periodic confinement to be determined by the trial court. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Jack B. Hill, Jane Ann Steffey, Executrix
This appeal involves a dispute over the decedent's Codicil to his Will. The Codicil divided decedent's real property between decedent's daughter and Jeff W. Powell. When decedent was on his death bed he asked a lawyer to prepare the Codicil, which described where certain property lines between the parties would be drawn, and the Codicil essentially gave 45 acres to decedent's daughter and 55 acres to Powell. During the administration of the Estate, the parties employed a surveyor to survey the property lines for the purpose of preparing the respective deeds. The surveyor determined that the description of the boundaries in the Codicil gave Powell 80 plus acres and the decedent's daughter 19 plus acres. Essentially, the Trial Court held that the descriptions created patent ambiguities, but he also concluded that even if the ambiguities were latent, extensive governance would be required to validate the Codicil, which is not appropriate. Accordingly, he voided the Codicil altogether. Powell has appealed. We reverse the Trial Court and hold that the decedent's intent was to give his daughter 45 acres and Powell 55 acres, and we reinstate the Codicil with directions to the Trial Court to direct the surveyor to reconfigure the boundaries to carry out the intent of the testator. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Hong Samouth (Sam) Rajvongs v. Dr. Anthony Wright
A patient who alleged that he had been negligently injured by his podiatrist filed a complaint against him for malpractice, and then voluntary dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Less than a year later, he furnished the defendant podiatrist with the sixty day notice of potential claim required by a recently enacted statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26121(a). He subsequently refiled his complaint in reliance on his rights under the saving statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint was time-barred under the saving statute because it was filed more than one year after the dismissal of the original complaint. The plaintiff contended, however, that he was entitled to the benefit of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c), which extends the statute of limitations on medical malpractice claims by 120 days if the plaintiff has complied with the sixty day notice requirement. The defendant responded by arguing that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c) does not apply to complaints filed under the saving statute. The trial court dismissed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, but allowed him to file an application for interlocutory appeal because of the novelty of the legal question involved. After careful consideration of the relevant statutes, we hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26121(c) does apply to the saving statute, and we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Juan Cantu v. State of Tennessee
In June of 2008, petitioner, Juan Cantu, entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to sell more than twenty-nine grams of cocaine.The trial court suspended petitioner’s sentence and placed him on probation for ten years. Agents from the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained petitioner at his home on May 17, 2011, before transferring him to a detention facility in Louisiana. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on September 30, 2011, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel’s failure to advise him that pleading guilty would result in deportation. On the State’s motion, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition based on the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a). In summarily dismissing the petition, the post-conviction court determined that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, — U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), was inapplicable to petitioner’s case, and as such, the petition was untimely filed. To overcome the statute of limitations, petitioner argues on appeal that Padilla should be applied retroactively. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Damon Carter
The Defendant, Timothy Damon Carter, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and three counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -105(3), -403. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to an effective eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) that the trial court erred by ordering his sentence to be served in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamaal Eddie
After a jury trial, the defendant, Jamaal Eddie, was convicted of aggravated child abuse and of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. He is serving an effective life sentence. The defendant appeals, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict of first degree felony murder, that photographs of the victim were admitted into evidence in error, and that the defendant’s confession was admitted in error because it was not given voluntarily. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to uphold the verdict and that there was no error in the admission of the photographs or the defendant’s statement. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. O'Neal Johnson
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to serve twenty years in prison as a Range II multiple offender. The defendant appeals the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for second degree murder, based primarily on his contention that the evidence is not sufficient to show that he acted knowingly or without adequately provoked passion. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Richardson
A jury convicted the defendant, Paul Richardson, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class E felony. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences for the aggravated robbery and aggravated assault convictions; the aggravated burglary and felon in possession of a handgun convictions were to run concurrently with all other counts, for an effective sentence of thirty-nine years. On appeal, this Court overturned the aggravated assault conviction, and remanded to allow the trial court to restructure the service of the remaining sentences to include consecutive sentencing. On remand, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences for all three remaining convictions, for an effective sentence of forty-one years. The defendant appeals the imposition of consecutive sentences. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie Calvin Taylor Jr.
The defendant, who had previously been convicted of a felony drug offense, was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm after a jury trial and sentenced to six years in prison. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdict and that the jury was improperly influenced by information outside the evidence presented at trial. The trial court found that the evidence supported the conviction and the defendant was not prejudiced by any extraneous information. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vincent Love Williams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Vincent Love Williams, appeals the dismissal of his pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus, contending that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without reviewing it or answering the allegations, that his judgment was void because of a defective indictment, and that his right against double jeopardy had been violated. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition for habeas corpus relief. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Beach Community Bank v. Edward A. Labry, III, et al.
This case involves personal guaranties on a loan to purchase real estate. The Appellants entered into a partnership for the purpose of buying and selling real estate. The partnership obtained a loan in the amount of $2,611,000.00 to purchase real property located in Florida. The Appellants each signed a personal guaranty on the loan in favor of the Appellee bank. By the express terms of the guaranties, the Appellants guaranteed “up to a principle amount of $795,600.00.” The partnership defaulted on the loan and the bank sued to enforce the guaranties. The Appellants answered that the guaranties were joint and several and that, because they were only 30% owners of the partnership, they could only be liable for 30% of the amount of the defaulted loan. In addition, the Appellants argued that the bank breached the covenant of good faith in failing to foreclose on the subject property. The trial court found that, under Florida law, the guaranties were not ambiguous, but were separate guaranties holding each Appellant separately liable for $795,600.00. The trial court also awarded interest on the entire debt. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the guaranties unambiguously require each Appellant to be separately liable for $795,600.00, but hold that the term regarding interest is ambiguous. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on this issue and remand to the trial court for the consideration of parole evidence regarding the amount of interest and fees chargeable to the Appellants. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Lee Kailar Cooper v. Christopher Aaron Brown
Upon the Court's inquiry as to whether the order appealed was a final judgment, Appellant filed an application for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Although we must dismiss Appellant's Rule 3 appeal, we grant Appellant's Rule 10 application and vacate in part the trial court's order of October 26, 2011, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bryant Carter
Defendant, Bryant Carter, entered into a negotiated plea agreement and pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), and properly reserved the following certified question of law for appeal: “Whether further prosecution of this case is barred by double jeopardy under the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions when the Defendant was detained under a pro forma policy of the General Sessions Criminal Court while properly out on a misdemeanor citation in lieu of arrest.” After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Hubbard
Christopher Hubbard (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping. He appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lisa Faye Allison
The Defendant, Lisa Faye Allison, pled guilty, pro se, to one count of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine and one count of possessing less than 0.5 ounces of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of three years to be served on probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant alleging that she had violated the terms of her probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that she serve her sentence in confinement On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her request to apply for the community corrections program, improperly basing the denial on her decision to exercise her right to a hearing on the issue of whether she violated her probation. She further contends that the trial court erred because it denied her community corrections request without holding a hearing on her eligibility. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Derrick Brandon Bush v. State of Tennessee
Derrick Brandon Bush (“the Petitioner”) pled guilty to two counts of attempt to commit rape in December 2000. On April 25, 2011,the Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief,alleging that his guilty plea was unconstitutional in light of Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010), and that the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations should be tolled. After a hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief. The State appealed. Upon our thorough review of the record, we hold that the rule announced in Ward does not apply retroactively. Therefore, the Petitioner is not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(b)(1). We also hold that the Petitioner is not entitled to tolling on due process grounds. Thus, the Petitioner’s claim for relief is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darry Lee Mitchell v. State of Tennessee
Darry Lee Mitchell (“the Petitioner”) pled guilty in 1991 to one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated robbery, receiving an effective sentence of fifty-fiveyears in theTennesseeDepartmentof Correction. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief in 1996 and again in 2004; both petitions were denied. Acting pro se, the Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition in July 2011, which the post-conviction court denied without a hearing. The Petitioner appealed. Upon our thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In The Matter of: Jai'Shaundria D.L.R.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child. The trial court found two grounds for termination, abandonment and persistence of conditions leading to the child’s removal from the mother’s home. The finding of abandonment was based on the mother’s incarceration at the time of the filing of the petition to terminate and because the mother engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child, as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). The trial court also found termination was in the child’s best interest due to the fact that the mother lacked a meaningful relationship with the child, that the mother failed to make adjustments to her home and lifestyle to make it safe for a child, and that the child was happy and healthy in her foster home of over two years such that removal would have a detrimental impact on the child’s emotional and psychological condition. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Middle Tennessee State University v. Tracy Sorrell Simmons a/k/a Tray Simmons
A former student who obtained a student loan from Middle Tennessee State University appeals the judgment of the trial court holding him liable on the student loan, including interest that accrued thereon, costs of collection, attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of Lyle L. Lawton - Stephen Lawton v. Lyle L. Lawton
This appeal involves a conservatorship. After the parties announced in open court that they had reached an agreement on a partial conservatorship, the appellant ward stood up in court and asked to speak. The hearing was adjourned and subsequently the partial conservatorship was ordered in accordance with the agreement. The ward now appeals, arguing inter alia that the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, failing to make the requisite findings, and failing to hear from the ward. We find no error and affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Sandi D. Jackson v. Mitchell B. Lanphere
In a previous appeal, this court vacated and remanded the trial court’s order dismissing a petition for an order of protection based upon the trial court’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. On remand, the trial court issued an order making the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law and again dismissed the petition. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court applied an incorrect standard of proof and thereby abused its discretion. We find no merit in this argument. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals |