State of Tennessee v. Montreal Portis Robinson
The defendant, Montreal Portis Robinson, appeals the twenty-five-year sentence imposed by the trial court upon resentencing for his second-degree murder conviction arguing the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Upon our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, our review has revealed a possible issue as to the sentences imposed in Counts 5 and 6, and we remand for the trial court to make further findings. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marlon McKay v. Brandon Watwood, Warden
The pro se petitioner, Marlon McKay, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court for Lake County, arguing the habeas court erred in finding the petitioner was not entitled to relief as a matter of law and summarily dismissing his petition without appointing counsel. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cordaro Dywon Black
A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Cordaro Dywon Black, of four counts of rape of a child and one count of incest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty-four years and six months in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Theodore Menard v. State of Tennessee
A Knox County Jury convicted the Petitioner, James Theodore Menard, of one count of rape of a child, one count of exhibition of pictures depicting sexual conduct harmful to a minor, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court, and our supreme court denied review. State v. Menard, No. E2021-00164-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 1498767, at * 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 9, 2022). The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his attorney was ineffective for failing to disclose a plea offer and failing to review discovery. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clyde E. Willis - Concur in part/Dissent in part
I concur with my colleagues’ reasoning and judgment in affirming Defendant’s convictions in Counts 2 and 3 for patronizing prostitution from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor and solicitation of a law enforcement officer posing as a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape. I depart, however, from the majority’s opinion regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support Defendant’s conviction in Count 1. I dissent on this point alone. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lanora Henry v. Jeffery W. Henry
Husband and wife divorced. In dividing the parties’ marital assets, the trial court granted Husband significantly less equity than Wife in the parties’ marital residence. In its oral ruling, the trial court also set a five-year horizon before Wife needed to sell or refinance the home. On appeal, Husband challenges both the amount of the equity in the home that he was awarded and the failure to order a quicker sale or refinancing by Wife of the marital residence. Both parties agree the trial court inadvertently failed to memorialize in its written final order a sale or refinancing requirement for the end of this five-year horizon. We remand to the trial court for modification of its order in accordance with the parties’ agreed understanding; otherwise, we affirm the trial court’s order. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Quality Motors, LLC v. Motohaven Automotive Group, LLC Et Al.
Quality Motors, LLC, a defunct used car dealership owned by Chris Yousif, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) against Ali Hussein Khalil and Motohaven Automotive Group, LLC (“Motohaven”), pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 30-101 to -111. Quality Motors claimed that Khalil had converted for his personal benefit fourteen of its cars, four of which had been sold to Motohaven. At the conclusion of Quality Motors’ proof at trial, the Trial Court granted Motohaven’s motion for directed verdict, which we construe as a motion for involuntary dismissal. At the conclusion of trial, the Trial Court found that Quality Motors had failed to meet its burden of proof against Khalil and entered a judgment dismissing Quality Motors’ case. The Trial Court granted Khalil’s and Motohaven’s respective motions for exemplary damages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-30-110. Quality Motors appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Clyde E. Willis
The Defendant, Clyde E. Willis, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of trafficking for a commercial sex act from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor, a Class B felony; patronizing prostitution from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor, a Class A misdemeanor; and solicitation of a law enforcement officer posing as a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-309(a)(3) (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended) (trafficking for a commercial sex act from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor), 39-13-514(a)(2) (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended) (patronizing prostitution from a law enforcement officer), 39-13-528(a)(7) (2018) (solicitation of a law enforcement officer posing as a minor to commit statutory rape). The trial court merged the patronizing prostitution conviction with the trafficking conviction and sentenced the Defendant to an effective nine-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of trafficking for a commercial sex act and that his convictions for patronizing prosecution from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor and for solicitation for a commercial sex act from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor violate double jeopardy and must be merged. Because we agree that the evidence is insufficient to support the trafficking conviction, we vacate the conviction, reverse the judgment, and dismiss the charge. We affirm the Defendant’s remaining convictions, and we remand for completion of sentencing for the patronizing prostitution conviction and entry of an amended judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jane Doe v. John David Rosdeutscher, M.D., et al.
This is the second appeal arising from a lawsuit in which the plaintiff alleges the defendants engaged in tortious conduct and committed breach of contract when they filed certain medical records into the record of a separate healthcare liability lawsuit. The plaintiff is the same in both cases as are two of the defendants. The defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted, and sanctions were imposed against the plaintiff’s attorney. The plaintiff appealed to this Court, and we affirmed. We also deemed the appeal to be frivolous and awarded the defendants attorneys’ fees and costs incurred litigating the appeal. Upon remand, the trial court calculated the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred and the plaintiffs subsequently filed this appeal. Finding that our award of fees in the prior appeal became the law of the case, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Brecker v. Virginia Story et al.
The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against his former attorney and her law firm, alleging legal malpractice and related claims. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by the affidavit of the defendant-attorney and various other documents. Just days before the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed an untimely response to the motion for summary judgment along with voluminous exhibits. The defendants asked the trial court to disregard the late-filed exhibits and grant them summary judgment. The trial court found that the plaintiff’s response was untimely and deemed it stricken. In the absence of a response, the trial court also took the defendants’ statements of undisputed material facts as true. It then examined each of the causes of action asserted by the plaintiff and concluded that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Guary Wallace v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Guary Wallace, appeals the post-conviction court’s order denying his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions for attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault and his effective 100-year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the prosecutor made improper comments during closing arguments at trial and that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor’s comments. Because Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal, we dismiss the appeal. |
Crockett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Janett Galloway v. Earl Scott Et Al.
In this boundary dispute, the plaintiff brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment to establish the boundary line between the plaintiff's improved real property and the defendants' improved real property. Following a bench trial, during which the court heard expert testimony from two competing surveyors, the trial court declared the property boundary to be established according to the survey prepared by the plaintiff's expert witness. The defendants have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. The plaintiff's request for attorney's fees on appeal is denied. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Barbara Jean Huff
The probate court declared a will executed on September 5, 2021, to be the decedent’s last will and testament and admitted it to probate. The beneficiary under an earlier will contested the validity of the 2021 will. In moving for summary judgment, the beneficiary argued that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to make the will. Based on the undisputed facts, the trial court agreed. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Sands v. Robert Williard, et al.
The Plaintiff, who was injured by tripping on a sidewalk, filed suit against the private property owners and city but failed to properly serve the city. In their original answer, the private property owners asserted the city’s comparative fault but not in express terms. The Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the city as a defendant. In an amended answer, the private property owners expressly asserted comparative fault against the city. The Plaintiff promptly amended her complaint to add the city as a defendant under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119, which provides a plaintiff 90 days after the filing of an answer asserting comparative fault against a non-party to add that non-party as a defendant, even if doing so would otherwise be barred by a statute of limitations. The city asserted this was not in accordance with the statute because the private property owners asserted comparative fault against the city in the original answer. The trial court determined that, although the original answer did raise comparative fault of the city, this did not trigger the 90-day window under the statute because the city was a party at the time. The trial court concluded that the amended answer was timely filed within 90 days of the filing of the first answer alleging comparative fault against a non-party, which was the amended answer. The city appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of James A. Price
In this estate case, appellant, decedent’s son, and appellee, decedent’s partner of twenty-seven years, are the beneficiaries of decedent’s will. The will appointed the parties co-executors, and they served in this capacity for several months until disputes arose between them and this litigation ensued. In its final order, the trial court found in favor of appellee on every disputed issue. On appeal, appellant raises issues concerning the trial court’s: (1) rulings during trial; (2) final order; and (3) award of attorney’s fees to appellee. Both parties ask for an award of appellate attorney’s fees. Because the evidence does not support the attorney’s fee amount awarded to appellee, and because the trial court failed to consider the relevant reasonableness factors, we vacate this award and remand for a new determination of reasonable attorney’s fees owed to appellee. The trial court’s orders are otherwise affirmed. We grant appellee’s request for appellate attorney’s fees, and we deny appellant’s request for same. Appellee’s request for frivolous appeal damages is denied. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Gray v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
Mark Gray (“Employee”) reported injuries after falling from a ladder while working for Tyson Foods, Inc. (“Employer”). The claim was accepted as compensable, and the parties entered into a settlement agreement providing permanent partial disability benefits. After the initial compensation period ended, Employee filed a petition for increased benefits. Following a hearing, the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims (“trial court”) denied the request for increased benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (“Appeals Board”) affirmed. Employee has appealed, and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the Appeals Board and adopt its opinion as set forth in the attached Appendix. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Charles Youree, Jr. v. Recovery House of East Tennessee, LLC et al.
Charles Youree, Jr. filed a lawsuit against two business entities seeking to hold them liable, under the theory of piercing the corporate veil, for a judgment he previously had obtained against another business entity. When the two entities did not answer, he was awarded a default judgment. The entities moved to vacate the default judgment before it became final. They argued that the trial court should not have entered judgment in the first place because the complaint did not plead the elements required for piercing the corporate veil. They also argued that their failure to respond was due to excusable neglect, but they later withdrew that argument. The trial court denied the motion to vacate. In determining that the complaint stated a claim for piercing the corporate veil, the trial court evaluated the factual allegations under the so-called Allen factors. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Allen, 584 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals reversed. The court looked not to the Allen factors, but rather to a three-element standard set forth in Continental Bankers Life Insurance Co. of the South v. Bank of Alamo, 578 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. 1979). We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of the applicable law, we hold that it was proper in this case to address whether the complaint pleaded the elements for piercing the corporate veil even absent a claim of excusable neglect. We further hold that the Continental Bankers elements provide the correct framework for piercing the corporate veil and that the complaint failed to plead the elements sufficiently. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred in denying the motion to vacate the default judgment. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Clayton D. Richards v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center
In this health care liability action, Clayton D. Richards asks us to consider whether the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint. Previously, Mr. Richards sued Vanderbilt University Medical Center alleging negligence. That lawsuit ended in a voluntary nonsuit. Mr. Richards refiled his complaint, which became the current action, over a year later. The trial court dismissed his complaint, holding that he had not complied with the terms of the saving statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-105. On appeal, Mr. Richards argues that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) offers him a 120-day extension of the one-year saving statute, making his lawsuit timely. We disagree and conclude that section 29-26-121(c) does not extend the saving statute. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s order granting Vanderbilt University Medical Center’s motion to dismiss. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Victor Hugo Hernandez v. Jodie L. Land
A father moved to set aside two court orders as absolutely void. See TENN. R. CIV. P. 60.02(3). The trial court denied the motion. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jim Spangler et al. v. Mack McClung
At issue in this appeal are claims for unjust enrichment and breach of a limited liability company’s operating agreement. The plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the LLC, filed the complaint against his business partner. The complaint alleged that the defendant breached the LLC’s operating agreement by executing a promissory note to satisfy a foreclosure deficiency and by securing that note with a deed of trust on the LLC’s remaining real estate. After a bench trial, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. The court found that the promissory note was an extension or renewal of the LLC’s existing loan and that the defendant’s actions were authorized by a “written consent,” which allowed the defendant “to do any acts, including but not limited to the assignment, delivery, pledge, or hypothecation . . . of any or all assets of this LLC to secure such Loan, renewals and extensions.” Thus, the court concluded that the defendant did not breach the operating agreement. And because the parties had a valid and enforceable contract, the court determined that the plaintiff had no claim for unjust enrichment. But the court denied the defendant’s request for an award of attorney’s fees under the operating agreement’s fee-shifting provision. The court reasoned that the action was not “to secure enforcement” of the operating agreement, as required by the operating agreement. We affirm the court’s judgment on the plaintiff’s claims, albeit for different reasons with respect to the unjust enrichment claim but reverse the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for attorney’s fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Eugene Sanders
A Davidson County jury convicted Defendant, Timothy Eugene Sanders, of two counts of carjacking and one count of robbery. Defendant contends on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court failed to properly charge the jury regarding use of force. We find all of Defendant’s issues waived for insufficient briefing and therefore affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Howard Hawk Willis v. State of Tennessee
In 2010, a Washington County jury found Petitioner, Howard Hawk Willis, guilty of two |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Colten B.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights of a mother and father to their young son. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that a ground for termination existed due to a prior finding of severe child abuse and that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The parents appeal. We affirm. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kyle J. Frey
The pro se Defendant, Kyle J. Frey, was convicted by a Williamson County jury of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI); DUI per se; resisting arrest; and speeding. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401 (DUI) (2024); 39-16-602(a) (2018) (resisting arrest); 55-8-152 (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended) (speeding). The trial court merged the DUI convictions. The Defendant received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to supervised probation after service of sixty days’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant alleges that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. We conclude that the Defendant’s brief fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 10(b) and that the appellate record is incomplete. See T.R.A.P. 24(b). Accordingly, the Defendant’s issues are waived, and his appeal is dismissed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Uhl
A Dickson County jury convicted the Defendant, Jimmy Uhl, of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial and when it sentenced him. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We remand to the trial court to make the requisite findings with respect to the fine imposed by the jury. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals |