Marcus Johnson v. Kevin Genovese, Warden
Marcus Johnson, Petitioner, sought habeas corpus relief for the third time after his convictions for one count of felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault. See State v. Marcus Johnson, No. W2002-00987-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22080778, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 26, 2004); Marcus Johnson v. State, No. W2007-02664-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 WL 4866817, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2008), no perm. app. filed. The petition was dismissed without a hearing after the habeas corpus court determined that Petitioner was merely raising issues that had previously been litigated. We determine that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition and affirm the judgment of that court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Rimmel, III
Defendant, William Rimmel, III, was indicted by the Marion County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault, two counts of reckless endangerment, one count of false imprisonment, one count of vandalism over $2,500, and one count of burglary of an automobile. The charge of false imprisonment was dismissed prior to trial. A jury found Defendant guilty of attempted aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, attempted reckless endangerment, vandalism under $1,000, and attempted burglary of an automobile. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed an effective sentence of two years on probation following service of 11 months and 29 days in confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence and in ordering consecutive sentencing, that his convictions should be vacated due to the State’s failure to preserve evidence, and that the trial court gave confusing jury instructions. Based on the record, the briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a judgment in Count 4 and amended judgment in Count 3, reflecting that those counts were dismissed, and for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 5 and 6. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vondell Richmond v. City of Clarksville, Tennessee
This case involves a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the plaintiff, then a member of the Clarksville City Council, was entitled to a declaration of rights concerning alleged communications between the Clarksville City Attorney and the local District Attorney General potentially pertaining to plaintiff. The trial court dismissed the action, concluding that the plaintiff was seeking an impermissible advisory opinion because there was no justiciable controversy. Having reviewed the record, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Kristie M. Haun v. Jason B. Haun Et Al.
This is an appeal regarding the final decree of divorce for this couple. The husband’s inlaws |
Court of Appeals | ||
Heidi Pendas v. Christopher J. Irizarry et al.
This case involves an intrafamily dispute over a home and the alleged indebtedness thereon. The trial court found that the son committed promissory fraud with regard to the conveyance of the home and awarded the mother $180,000.00 in damages as the value of the home at the time of the conveyance. The trial court further dismissed a claim against the daughter related to a loan on the property. Both the son and the mother appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
William Rolandus Keel v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, William Rolandus Keel, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief from his convictions for two counts of rape of a child, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in not admitting relevant evidence consisting of a recorded phone call (“Phone Call Recording” or “recording”) between the victim and her mother, in limiting the Petitioner’s testimony at the remand evidentiary hearing, in finding that the Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel, and in denying post-conviction relief when the Petitioner is “one hundred percent innocent and [was] wrongfully convicted.” Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Garen Wright
Defendant, Garen Wright, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his previously ordered probationary sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by not considering alternatives to placing Defendant in custody for the full term. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Maryam Sobhi (Soryana) Mikhail v. George Aziz Mikhail
A wife sought a divorce after a long-term marriage. The trial court granted the wife a default judgment for divorce as a sanction for the husband’s discovery abuses. After a trial, the court also valued and divided the marital estate and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. On appeal, the husband challenges the court’s decisions on multiple grounds. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Tracy Bailes
The Defendant, Paul Tracy Bailes, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Byron Black v. State of Tennessee
At the heart of this appeal is a narrow procedural question: whether the 2021 amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203 permits the Defendant, Byron Black, to move for a hearing on whether he has an intellectual disability and is therefore ineligible for the death penalty. The trial court dismissed the motion after determining that the Defendant was procedurally barred from bringing the issue. On appeal, we hold that because the issue of the Defendant’s intellectual disability has been previously adjudicated, he may not file a motion pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203(g)(1). We also hold that the General Assembly’s decision not to entitle the Defendant to a second hearing does not subject him to cruel and unusual punishment, nor does it deny him due process of law or the equal protection of the law. Accordingly, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy O. Reynolds
Defendant, Randy O. Reynolds, stands convicted by a Dickson County jury of aggravated vehicular homicide (Count 1), vehicular homicide (Count 2), reckless homicide (Count 3), vehicular assault by driving under the influence (Count 4), simple possession of a schedule II controlled substance (Count 5), leaving the scene of an accident (Count 6), evading arrest (Count 7), and driving on a revoked license (Count 8). On appeal, Defendant argues (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present expert testimony regarding the effects of intoxication; and (3) the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his all of his felony convictions, and his misdemeanor evading arrest conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Jahen v. Aer Express, Inc. Et Al.
An injured truck driver brought suit against his alleged employer seeking to recover worker’s compensation benefits. The alleged employer did not appear at trial, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Eight months later, the alleged employer moved the trial court to set aside the judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, on the grounds that it did not receive notice of the trial date. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the alleged employer failed to notify the court and the plaintiff of its change of address and that plaintiff would be severely prejudiced if the court set aside the judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Michael R. Adams v. Edwin Brittenum ET AL.
A pro se petitioner seeks accelerated interlocutory review of an order denying a motion for |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Patton Et Al. v. Anita Pearson
After a fire at a rental home, suit was brought against the tenant. During discovery, the tenant sought admissions related to the landlords’ insurance coverage and as to whether the suit was actually a subrogation action by the insurer brought in the names of the insured. As a result of resistance to disclosure, the tenant moved to compel. The trial court granted the motion. Following admissions indicating that this suit is a subrogation action by the insurer brought in the names of the insured, the tenant moved for summary judgment asserting that under the Sutton Rule she is an implied co-insured under the landlords’ insurance policy. Opposition to summary judgment was advanced based upon the purported inapplicability of the Sutton Rule and the purported applicability of the collateral source rule. The trial court granted summary judgment to the tenant. This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court’s grant of the motion to compel and summary judgment in favor of the tenant. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lyon Roofing, Inc. et al. v. James H. Griffith, Jr. et al.
This appeal involves the denial of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion. In the original action, |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Floyd Hall, III v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Floyd Hall, III, appeals the Haywood County Circuit Court’s denial of his |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Oberton Curry, Jr.
A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Oberton Curry, Jr., of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, reckless driving, driving while unlicensed, violation of the registration law, and disobeying a stop sign. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for felony possession of a weapon and that an item of evidence was erroneously admitted. He further contends that the jury instructions were inaccurate and incomplete. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas Builders, Inc. v. CKF Excavating, LLC
An arbitrator awarded a subcontractor damages against a general contractor. In chancery court, the general contractor moved to vacate the award on the basis that the arbitrator exceeded his powers. The chancery court denied the motion to vacate and, at the request of the subcontractor, confirmed the arbitration award. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Builders, Inc. v. CKF Excavating, LLC
I respectfully disagree with the majority's holding that the doctrine of prior suit pending is inapplicable here. The majority's discussion of prior suit pending is contained in footnote one of its opinion. Therein, the majority notes that the Rogers Group commenced an action (the "Cheatham County case") in Cheatham County against CKF Excavating and TBI. However, the majority omits the fact that TBI filed a cross-claim against CKF in the Cheatham County case. For the reasons discussed below, it is my opinion that TBI's cross-claim triggered the doctrine of prior suit pending and vested jurisdiction in the Cheatham County court. As such, the Davidson County court did not have authority to conduct a review of the arbitrator's decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Tywan James
The Appellant, Antonio Tywan James, appeals as of right from his convictions of firstdegree |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Leah Gilliam v. David Gerregano, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue Et Al.
Citizens of Tennessee may apply to the Tennessee Department of Revenue (the “Department”) for license plates featuring unique, personalized messages. Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-4-210(d)(2) provides that “[t]he commissioner shall refuse to issue any combination of letters, numbers or positions that may carry connotations offensive to good taste and decency or that are misleading.” After her personalized plate featuring the message “69PWNDU” was revoked by the Department, Leah Gilliam (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against David Gerregano (the “Commissioner”), commissioner of the Department, as well as the then-Attorney General and Reporter. Plaintiff alleged various constitutional violations including violations of her First Amendment right to Free Speech. The Department and the State of Tennessee (together, the “State”) responded, asserting, inter alia, that the First Amendment does not apply to personalized plate configurations because they are government speech. The lower court, a special three judge panel sitting in Davidson County, agreed with the State. Plaintiff appeals, and we reverse, holding that the personalized alphanumeric configurations on vanity license plates are private, not government, speech. We affirm, however, the panel’s decision not to assess discovery sanctions against the State. Plaintiff’s other constitutional claims are pretermitted and must be evaluated on remand because the panel did not consider any issues other than government speech. This case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Duane Dominy Et Al. v. Davidson County Election Commission
Plaintiffs brought an action against the Davidson County Election Commission, asserting that the Election Commission violated the Tennessee Open Meetings Act and Metro Code 2.68.020. The chancery court granted judgment on the pleadings to the Election Commission, concluding no violation occurred and that even if there had been a violation it was cured by a subsequent public meeting. Plaintiffs appealed. Defending the chancery court’s judgment, the Election Commission argues that the trial court’s ruling was correct on the merits and that the Plaintiffs are also not entitled to relief because they lack standing and because the matter has become moot. Because the Election Commission presented a well-developed and well-supported argument in favor of mootness and because the Plaintiffs have failed to respond to that argument, we conclude that opposition to the Election Commission’s mootness argument has been waived. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Noah B. Et Al.
A mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights based on the |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Aaron Solomon v. Angelia Solomon et al.
Plaintiff sued several defendants over social media posts and the unauthorized use of his and his child’s name, image, and likeness. Plaintiff requested both damages and injunctive relief. In response, defendants petitioned to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. Plaintiff then filed notice of a voluntary nonsuit, which defendants opposed. The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice. Because we conclude that nothing in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41 precludes the voluntary dismissal, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sebakire Crode
A Rutherford County jury found Defendant, Sebakire Crode, guilty of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with Defendant to serve 150 days in jail and the balance on probation. On appeal, Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him of driving under the influence and that he received an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals |