State of Tennessee v. Travis King
The defendant, Travis King, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joe McKnight
The defendant, Joe McKnight, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to ten years as a Range I offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to question defense witness, Dr. Joseph Angelillo, about the defendant’s prior criminal history; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to lead its witness, Stanley Johnson; (3) the trial court erred in admitting co-defendant Stanley Johnson’s statement to authorities into evidence; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Juan Manuel Coronado, II
Upon finding a violation of probation, the trial court revoked the probationary sentence the appellant, Juan Manuel Coronado, II, was serving for a rape conviction and ordered him to serve his original eight-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and in ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Justin Wright, by next friend and Mother, Karen Pryor v. City of Lebanon, Tennessee
In a Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) action, the City of Lebanon appeals the trial court’s decision to hold it liable for an accident that occurred on a swing in a city park. The City asserts that the court erred in failing to find that the swing was in a dangerous or defective condition or that the City had notice of such a condition. Additionally, the City insists that any defective condition was latent and governmental immunity was therefore not removed under the GTLA. The City also challenges the trial court’s denial of its motion for involuntary dismissal, its characterization of the case as “hybrid” in nature, its reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in establishing negligence, and its admission of the plaintiff’s expert testimony. We conclude that the swing was in a dangerous or defective condition, which was not latent, and that the City had constructive notice of that condition. We find against the City on its remaining issues. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert H. Goodall, Jr. v. William B. Akers
Buyer of real property brought suit against seller for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and breach of express warranty. The trial court determined that the buyer’s reliance upon the seller’s representations was reasonable. On appeal, the seller argues that the evidence does not support the trial court’s decision and that the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony offered by the seller. Because we have determined that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony in question, we reverse and remand. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Robert H. Goodall, Jr. v. William B. Akers - Dissenting
Unlike the majority, I do not believe the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Mr. Akers’ two expert witnesses from giving their opinions on whether Mr. Goodall’s reliance on Mr. Akers’ representations was reasonable. Furthermore, even if the exclusion of this testimony was error, I find it to be harmless error. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Raymond E. McNeil v. State of Tennessee
Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Raymond E. McNeil, was convicted of Class D felony evading arrest and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-603(b)(3), 55-50-504(a)(1). This Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See State v. Raymond McNeil, No. M2007-01566-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4170330 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Sept. 10, 2008), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2009). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner raises the following issues for review: (1) Trial Counsel was ineffective for putting a police officer’s unredacted incident report on the overhead projector; (2) Trial Counsel was ineffective for acquiescing in the admission of the incident report into evidence; and (3) The trial court erred when it allowed the entire incident report into evidence. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nathan E. Steppach, Jr. v. Wiliam H. Thomas, Jr., et al.
This is the second appeal of this case, which arises from the grant of a writ of certiorari by the Shelby County Chancery Court. Upon review of the Memphis City Council's record, the trial court found that the Appellee City had not acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or illegally in either approving a planned development, or in approving the companion street closure. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the City, thereby affirming the City Council’s action in approving the planned development. The issue of the companion street closure proceeded to hearing, with the trial court ultimately affirming the City Council’s decision. Appellant appeals, arguing that the City Council’s decision was made in violation of the Memphis City Charter and ordinances, and that the decision was the product of corruption within the City Council. Discerning no error, we affirm the action of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Pesce v. East Tennessee Construction Services, Inc. - Concurring
Given the record presented to us on appeal, I concur fully in the majority’s Opinion. I write separately, however, to express my concern as to the diminution in value damages of $382,000 awarded to the Owner. I agree with the majority that, given the record presented to us, this result is correct. I also agree with the majority that the Owner is “in possession of a fully operational, profitable, dental office...” which the Owner had used for several years by the time of trial. As stated by the majority, the Owner incurred “construction cost of approximately $460,000...” in constructing this building. The diminution in value award of $382,000, with which I concur given the record presented to us, means that the owner will end up with construction costs of only approximately $78,000 for “a fully operational, profitable, dental office.” |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
City of Murfreesboro, Tennessee v. Lamar Tennessee, LLC, d/b/a Lamar Advertising of Tennessee, Inc., et al.
The trial court dismissed the City’s request for injunctive relief to enforce a permit revocation on the common law grounds of prior suit pending based on a pending certiorari action challenging the revocation. Because an original action for injunctive relief cannot be joined with a certiorari action that is appellate in nature, the rule of prior suit pending does not apply. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Dean G. Hafeman v. Protein Discovery, Inc., a Tennessee Corporation
This is a breach of employment contract action filed by Dean G. Hafemen (“the Employee”) against Protein Discovery, Inc., a Tennessee corporation (“the Employer” or “the Company”) after the Employer terminated the Employee’s employment before the expiration of the term of his “Amended and Restated Employment Agreement” (“the Agreement”). The complaint alleges that the Employee is entitled to certain severance benefits provided for in the Agreement for any termination that does not qualify as a “Termination For Cause” as defined in the Agreement. After a bench trial, the court found that the termination was for cause and entered judgment in favor of the Employer. The Employee appeals. We reverse. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Antonio D. Richardson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Antonio D. Richardson, appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner asserts that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Nirvanna S.
This is a dependent and neglected case concerning Nirvanna S. (“the Child”), the minor child of Heather S. (“Mother”) and Mark S. (“Father”). Following the death of the Child’s infant sister, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in juvenile court alleging that, in the care of Mother and Father, the Child was dependent, neglected and severely abused. The juvenile court held an adjudicatory hearing and determined that the Child was dependent and neglected – but not severely abused – by her parents. The juvenile court awarded temporary custody of the Child to DCS and charged the department with undertaking reasonable efforts toward reunifying the Child with Mother and Father. DCS appealed the order to the trial court. Following a bench trial, the court found that both parents had committed severe abuse against the Child’s sister pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(23)(A) and that the Child was dependent and neglected and “severely abused” within the meaning of the law. The court ordered DCS to retain custody of the Child; it relieved DCS of its obligation to work toward reunifying the Child with Mother and Father. Mother appeals. Following our review, we modify that part of the trial court’s opinion finding that the Child was “severely abused.” In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Skyler J. H.
The father of a young child born out of wedlock petitioned the juvenile court to be awarded custody of the child. The mother responded by asking the court to award custody to her. After many delays, the juvenile court referee conducted a lengthy hearing and granted the father’s petition, holding that although it was a close question, it was in the child’s best interest for the father to exercise custody. The mother appealed to the Juvenile Court Judge, who reached the same conclusion after another hearing. The mother now appeals to this court, contending that custody should have been awarded to her for several reasons, including the operation of the tender years doctrine. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Gates v. Katie Williams et al.
As this action was pleaded and tried, it was (1) a claim by Nancy Gates (“the plaintiff”) seeking to be declared the owner of a life estate in a tract of property; and, as a consequence of her estate, seeking the removal of Katie Williams (“the defendant”), the widow of the plaintiff’s son, Tony, from the property; and (2) a counterclaim by the defendant alleging that she had become the owner of an interest in the property by adverse possession due to her having lived on the property since the late 1960s or early 1970s. The trial court held that, as to these claims, neither party was entitled to relief against the other. The court found, however, that the plaintiff did, in fact, have a life estate in the subject property, and that the defendant had not proven adverse possession because her entry onto the property was with the plaintiff’s permission. The court then held, sua sponte, that the defendant had a license in the property coupled with an interest therein that had been acquired by building numerous structures on the property with the plaintiff’s knowledge and that it would not be equitable to require the defendant to move. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and reverse in part and remand for a hearing on the issue of what it would take to do equity given the facts of this case. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Paula Kay Franco v. Armando Oscar Franco
The trial court affirmed the Report of a special master interpreting the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement as granting Wife a proportionate share of Husband’s retirement based on the duration of the marriage and not based upon the thirty years he was in the military. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joann Williamson
The Defendant, Joann Williamson, pled guilty to facilitation of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and two counts of child abuse and neglect, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2010); T.C.A. § 39-15-401 (Supp. 2008) (amended 2009). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six months’ incarceration and three years, six months’ probation for the facilitation conviction and four years’ probation for each of the child abuse convictions, to be served consecutively to the facilitation conviction for an effective twelve-year sentence. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the warrantless search of her home. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence and that the State should not be allowed to rely on more than one exception to the warrant requirement. The State contends that the Defendant did not properly reserve the certified question. We hold that the Defendant’s certified question was not properly reserved. The appeal is dismissed. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy D. McGlory v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Timothy D. McGlory, was convicted following the entry of his guilty pleas to attempted second degree murder and possession of a Schedule I drug for resale. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to 12 years for his attempted second degree murder conviction and eight years for the drug offense, and his sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of 12 years. Petitioner now appeals from the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his guilty pleas were involuntarily entered; that the prosecution failed to disclose evidence favorable to Petitioner; and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner is not entitled to relief and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph John Borger
The Defendant, Joseph John Borger, pled guilty to multiple offenses stemming from his driving while intoxicated, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II Offender to an effective sentence of seven years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Juan Markeith Collier v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Juan Markeith Collier, pled guilty to aggravated kidnapping and attempted second degree murder, both Class B felonies, and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of eleven years. The eleven-year sentence for aggravated kidnapping was required by statute to be served at one-hundred percent. In this appeal from the denial of the post-conviction petition, Petitioner asserts that his guilty plea was involuntary because trial counsel and two “loved ones” coerced him into accepting the plea. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jarret Alan Guy v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Jarret Alan Guy, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner contends that (1) counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his statement because Petitioner and is family were threatened by a police detective; and that (2) counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his statement based on Petitioner’s alleged intoxication at the time of the interview. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carol Denice Pettijohn v. Patrick Carl Pettijohn
In this divorce case, the trial court’s judgment ended the relatively-long marriage of Carol Denice Pettijohn (“Wife”) and Patrick Carl Pettijohn (“Husband”). Husband appeals the trial court’s division of the marital property, its award of alimony in solido to Wife, and the duration of the alimony in futuro award. We affirm. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Pesce v. East Tennessee Construction Services, Inc.
Charles Pesce (“the Owner”) is a practicing dentist. He contracted with East Tennessee Construction Services, Inc. (“the Builder”) to build him a new office for his practice on a lot owned by him. The Builder constructed the building, but with numerous undisputed defects. The Owner filed this action which culminated in a bench trial that lasted several days. Based upon diminution in value, the trial court awarded the Owner $282,000 in damages. The trial court expressly found that the cost to repair the structure was an unacceptable measure of damages because it “is disproportionate . . . to the difference in the value of the structure actually constructed and the one contracted for.” The court awarded the Owner discretionary costs of over $10,000. The Owner appeals challenging the measure of damages as well as the amount awarded under the diminution in value measure. The Owner also challenges the trial court’s failure to order the Builder to reimburse him for fees charged by one of the Owner’s experts in connection with his discovery deposition taken by the Builder. The Builder challenges the award of discretionary costs and argues that the damages awarded are excessive. We reverse in part and affirm the remaining judgment as modified. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Avie Aleane Harding et al. v. Donovan Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Captain Video & Tanning
A patron of a tanning salon and her husband filed this action seeking to recover damages for injuries the patron sustained when the lid of a tanning bed fell on her head as she was attempting to exit the tanning bed. The plaintiffs allege that the owner and operator of the tanning salon acted negligently by failing to properly maintain or inspect the tanning bed she used, which caused the lid of the tanning bed to become too heavy for the patron to lift and safely exit, and by failing to have a way for a patron to call for help from within the tanning room in the event of an emergency. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint finding, inter alia, the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate essential elements of a prima facie case, specifically that a defective condition existed or that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of any alleged defective or dangerous condition of the premises. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas M. Gautreaux v. Internal Medicine Education Foundation, Inc.
Plaintiff requested records from a nonprofit foundation pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act. The nonprofit foundation refused the request, stating that the foundation was not a government agency and that the records were not public. Plaintiff filed a Petition for Access to Public Records in chancery court, which held that the records were available because the nonprofit foundation was the functional equivalent of a government agency. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that the nonprofit foundation’s records are not available pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act because it is not the functional equivalent of a government agency. We also hold that its records are not available pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-503(d) (1999) because the nonprofit foundation has no more than two full-time staff members. We therefore reverse the judgment of the lower courts and dismiss the case. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court |