Rhonda L. (Hall) Greer v. John Bradley Greer
This is a divorce appeal involving parenting issues. The parties are the parents of three minor children. Prior to trial, the parties went through mediation and arrived at an agreement on many of their issues. The trial court then conducted a trial, taking testimony from the parties on a range of issues, including some that were the subject of the mediated agreement. The divorce decree and the parenting plan entered by the trial court adopted some of the parenting provisions in the mediated agreement, but not others. The father filed a motion to alter or amend this final decree, and a subsequent motion to enforce the parenting plan. The trial court modified the parenting plan in part and issued a final order. The father now appeals. We affirm, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the number of parenting days allocated to the parties or the decision-making authority on the children's medical decisions. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky N. Berry
The Defendant, Ricky N. Berry, was convicted after a jury trial in the Hamblen County Criminal Court of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days and ordered that the Defendant serve fifty-five percent of his sentence, 200 days, in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence was excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Edward Brown, III
The Defendant, Charles Edward Brown, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's order revoking his probation for domestic aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and ordering the remainder of his eight-year sentence into execution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Montea Wilson (A.K.A. Marcus Floyd) v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Montea Wilson, appeals from the Criminal Court of Shelby County's denial in part of his petition for post-conviction relief and simultaneous order of a delayed appeal. After a hearing, the post-conviction court determined that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to "protect[] the petitioner's right to litigate the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury on [second degree murder as a lesser included offense of felony murder] by raising that point in the motion for new trial" and granted a delayed appeal. The postconviction court further determined that trial counsel were effective in their representation of petitioner and, at the time of the petitioner's trial, had no obligation to request second degree murder as a lesser included offense to felony murder. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by not setting aside his conviction for felony murder and granting a new trial because (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction on second degree murder and for failing to allege in the motion for new trial that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on second degree murder as a lesser included offense; and (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on direct appeal that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on second degree murder as a lesser included offense constituted plain error. For the reasons set forth within this opinion, we reverse the post-conviction court's determination that trial counsel provided effective assistance of counsel, vacate the petitioner's conviction, and remand for a new trial. In regard to the petitioner's delayed appeal, our decision pertaining to trial counsel's performance renders it moot. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Curtis Wix
The defendant, Curtis Wix, appeals the trial court's revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentence, arguing that a sentence of split confinement followed by a return to supervised probation or community corrections would have been more appropriate under the circumstances of his case. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court revoking the defendant's probation and reinstating his original sentence. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Jones
Defendant-Appellant, Carlos Jones, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of voluntary manslaughter and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Jones to consecutive sentences of seven years at thirty-five percent for the voluntary manslaughter conviction and thirty-three years at one hundred percent for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, for an effective sentence of forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Jones argues that the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify about out-of-court statements made by a non-testifying co-defendant in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968). Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brenda Johnson Head v. Michael Allen Head
This is a divorce action in which Husband appeals the valuation and division of marital property, and the trial court's awards of alimony, discretionary costs, and attorneys' fees to Wife. The trial court awarded 54 percent of the marital property to Wife and 46 percent to Husband, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro of $6,400 per month until July 2013, at which time the alimony payments will be reduced to $4,400 per month until either party's death or Wife's remarriage. The trial court also awarded Wife discretionary costs and attorneys' fees. We have modified the trial court's valuation of certain items of marital property, which caused a modest decrease in the value of marital property awarded to Husband; however, we affirm the trial court's division of the marital property because our modification of the value of certain property is relatively modest. We affirm the trial court's award of alimony to Wife and the award of attorneys' fees; however, we reverse the award of discretionary costs and remand for a new determination of the costs that may be awarded under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2). We deny both parties' requests for the costs of their attorneys' fees incurred on this appeal. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Kerry Jordan v. YMCA of Middle Tennessee, et al.
A young woman was thrown from a horse at a camp operated by the YMCA of Middle Tennessee, breaking her arm. Unbeknownst to the woman, the same horse had thrown two experienced riders ten days earlier. She filed a suit for negligence against the YMCA and the camp, alleging that their employees and volunteers knew the horse to be dangerous, but that they nonetheless failed to ascertain whether she was sufficiently experienced to handle such an animal. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that they were immune from liability under the provisions of the Equine Activities Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 44-20-101 et seq. The trial court granted the motion. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James M. Roderick
A Bradley County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, James M. Roderick, of rape, a Class B felony, and the trial court imposed a sentence of 10 years' incarceration to be served at 100 percent as a violent offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chanda Dawn Langston
The Defendant, Chanda Dawn Langston, pled guilty to six counts of forgery between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony, and to one count of theft of property over $60,000, a Class B felony. On August 20, 2009, the defendant was sentenced as a Range I offender to four years' confinement for each of the six forgery convictions and twelve years' confinement for the theft conviction, all to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant contends that her sentences are excessive and that the trial court erred in denying her request for alternative sentencing. Although we conclude that the trial court erred in applying one enhancement factor, we hold that the sentence imposed by the trial court is appropriate. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry J. Patterson
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Larry J. Patterson, of driving under the influence ("DUI"), first offense, and he was convicted after a bench trial of violation of the implied consent law. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days, thirty of which were to be served in jail, and it ordered that the defendant's driver's license be revoked for a period of one year. The defendant appeals, contending: (1) that the vehicle stop that led to his arrest was unlawful; and (2) that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edna N. Zulueta v. Winfred Lassiter, M.D., of The Lassiter Clinic
Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of her medical malpractice complaint against Winifred Lassiter, M.D. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Lassiter breached her duty of care by negligently performing a physical Fitness for Duty Examination. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint finding that plaintiff failed to establish the elements of her claim or show a genuine issue of material fact. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Patrick Henretta
This capital case involves the 1988 rape, murder, robbery, and kidnapping of a thrift store employee in Cleveland, Tennessee. A Bradley County jury convicted the defendant of premeditated murder, felony murder, two counts of robbery with a deadly weapon, two counts of aggravated rape, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court merged the premeditated murder and felony murder convictions into a single conviction for which the jury imposed a sentence of death after hearing proof of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The trial court merged the remaining convictions into a single conviction for each offense and imposed concurrent sentences of forty-five years for robbery with a deadly weapon, fifty years for aggravated kidnapping, and fifty years for aggravated rape, all concurrent with the sentence of death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentences. On automatic appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1), we have considered all issues raised by the defendant, including the following issues, which we designated for oral argument: (1) whether the trial court erred in having insufficient regard for the heightened standard of due process in capital cases by failing to grant a mistrial, by allowing prosecutorial argument on future dangerousness while not instructing the jury on the effect of their failure to agree or ensuring that the jury knew the defendant would never leave prison alive, and by not sua sponte instructing the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication; (2) whether the defendant is entitled to relief for pre-indictment delay in filing the notice of intent to seek the death penalty and/or for the trial court's refusal to dismiss the indictment with prejudice because the State violated the anti-shuttling provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers; (3) whether the search of the defendant at the federal penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas was defective such that its fruits should have been suppressed; and (4) whether the sentence of death is disproportionate under the review mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1) (2006). We conclude that none of the issues presented entitle the defendant to relief and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Rita Gayle Lewis vs. Matthew Wayne Rader
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Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Rand, Inc. vs. Automation Industrial Group, LLC
In the apt words of the trial court, this case is a "complex business divorce case." The "divorced" and now adverse entities are Tennessee Rand, Inc. ("Rand"), and Automation Industrial Group, LLC ("Automation"), formerly Tennessee Rand Automation, LLC. Rand builds automated robotic equipment such as that used in the automobile industry. Automation was formed by the principals of Rand and some skilled collaborators for the purpose of doing the electrical and computer aspects of Rand's work. The entities fell out of favor with each other when the principals in Rand _ Randy Nunley and Richard Roach_ each a 50% shareholder in Rand, began to have conflicts. Nunley ended up as the sole owner of Rand and Roach acquired Nunley's interest in Automation. Rand initiated this litigation (1) to enjoin Automation from using the name, Tennessee Rand Automation, LLC," (2) to recover the value of assets that Rand had transferred to Automation, and (3) to recover payments of rent and taxes that Rand had made on buildings occupied by Automation. Rand also named as defendants numerous principals and officers of Automation, including Roach. Automation filed a counterclaim seeking an award against Rand for some $6,000,000 in unpaid labor and expenses. In the bench trial that followed, the counterclaim accounted for 20-plus days of the 25-day trial. By the time the trial court announced its decision in a written memorandum opinion, the only parties remaining in the case were Rand and Automation, Roach having previously been dismissed by Rand with prejudice. The trial court found that the names of the entities were confusingly similar and ordered Automation to change its name. This was accomplished and is not an issue on this appeal. The trial court found that Automation was unjustly enriched by Rand's contribution of assets to Automation in the amount of $500,000. Also, the trial court found that Automation had been unjustly enriched in the amount of $162,818.80 by Rand's payment of rent and taxes on buildings used by Automation. Despite the prior dismissal of Roach as a defendant, the trial court held Roach liable to Rand for the rent and tax payments made out of Rand's account. On Automation's counterclaim, the trial court initially awarded it $2,270,759.22 plus prejudgment interest. Both parties filed a motion to alter or amend. The trial court determined that Automation was guilty of fraud in the pursuit of its counterclaim and set aside that part of the judgment with the result that Automation recovered nothing on its counterclaim. Automation and Roach have appealed raising issues as to the counterclaim, the unjust enrichment award against Automation based upon the assets it received from Rand, and the unjust enrichment award against Automation and Roach based on the rent and tax payments. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Cooper
The appellant, Robert Cooper, pled guilty to one count of possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell and one count of possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. As a condition of his pleas, the appellant reserved the following certified question of law: Whether the stop of the [appellant] for a minor "cite and release" traffic violation which provided for a fine only, the detention of the [appellant], the placement of the [appellant] in the secured area of the officer's patrol car, the use of a drug dog "run" around the [appellant's] vehicle, and the subsequent search of the [appellant's] vehicle violated the rights of the [appellant] under the federal and state constitutions and, therefore, all evidence resulting from the seizure and search should be suppressed. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Lee Arp - Concurring
I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. However, I would affirm the trial court because of the defendant’s failure to include the trial transcript in the record and the attendant presumption that the trial court’s determinations were correct. See State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (holding trial court’s ruling presumed correct in the absence of an adequate record on appeal). The 1989 Sentencing Act, as amended, requires a sentencing court to consider evidence received at the trial. T.C.A. § 40- 35-210(b)(1). Absent the trial transcript, it is impossible for us to do a de novo review of the matters relevant to sentencing.ts of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Lee Arp
The defendant, Joshua Lee Arp, was convicted by a Sevier County Circuit Court jury of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; attempted robbery, a Class D felony; and public intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range III offender to fifteen years on the attempted aggravated robbery conviction and twelve years on the attempted robbery conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Jarrod Alexander
Appellant, Christopher Jarrod Alexander, was convicted by a Davidson County Jury of robbery. As a result, the trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender, to a sentence of ten years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. The timely filing of the notice of appeal was waived. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of robbery; (2) whether Appellant's sentence is excessive; and (3) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant an alternative sentence. After a review of the record, we conclude that the evidence supports the conviction and that the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terrance Forrest v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Terrance Forrest, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his 2008 guilty-pleaded convictions of three counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated burglary. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. Because the petitioner has failed to establish his claims by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Reginald Fowler
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Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry Paul Koffman v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Larry Paul Koffman, appeals from the Robertson County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After reviewing his issues, we hold that his first issue has been previously determined and that all other issues are waived, and we affirm the order of the circuit court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert M. Linder
The Appellant, Robert M. Linder, filed a motion in the Blount County Circuit Court seeking a reduction in his sentence. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellant filed an appeal contesting the trial court's ruling. In response, the State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's ruling pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the motion was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodney E. Howard
Appellant, Rodney E. Howard, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for first degree murder. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal ensued. Appellant seeks resolution of the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of first degree murder; and (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to admit the transcript of the preliminary hearing testimony of a defense witness. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of first degree murder. Additionally, we determine Appellant waived the issue regarding the admission of the transcript for failure to move for the introduction of the transcript under the rule of completeness. Moreover, any error with respect tot he transcript was harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank Edward Nixon
Appellant, Frank Edward Nixon, Jr., was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for attempted first degree murder. Pursuant to Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 1997); he pled guilty to attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony, in exchange for a negotiated, out-of-range sentence of eight years as a Range I, standard offender,. The trial court held a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service of the sentence. After the hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing, finding that confinement was necessary: (1) to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense; (2) to protect society from Appellant's conduct; and (3) because measures less restrictive than confinement had been unsuccessfully applied to Appellant. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court improperly denied alternative sentencing. After a thorough review, we determine that the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. However, the matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect that Appellant pled guilty to attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |