State of Tennessee v. William Comfort
The appellant, William Comfort, pled guilty in the Warren County Circuit Court to attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's imposition of an eight-year sentence and the denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chris Jones v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Chris Jones, appeals his denial of post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of sale of cocaine in an amount more than .5 grams, a Class B felony, and one count of sale of cocaine in an amount less than .5 grams, a Class C felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner received sentences of 12 years for each of the Class B felonies and 6 years for the Class C felony. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently with one another but consecutively to a ten-year sentence imposed in a separate case. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his guilty plea hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Patrick M. Lonie
The defendant, Patrick M. Lonie, was charged by presentment with twelve counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and ten counts of aggravated sexual battery. In an open plea, he pled guilty to four counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced as a Range I offender to one term of eleven years and three terms of ten years, with two of the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-one years. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in its application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35- 115 to the Tennessee Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1990, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17-1001, et seq., and that, as a result, he should not have received consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of corrected judgments to reflect the conviction offenses as especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joe Clark Mitchell v. James Fortner, Warden
The Petitioner, Joe Clark Mitchell, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dawn Fox Newhouse
The Defendant, Dawn Fox Newhouse, pleaded guilty to theft of services over $10,000, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-14-105(4). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years and six months and was placed on probation. The trial court subsequently found that the Defendant violated her probation and sentenced her to serve 180 days in the Robertson County Jail. The trial court later modified its order and allowed the Defendant to serve her 180 days on weekends. Several months later, the Board of Probation and Parole alleged that the Defendant violated her probation again by incurring a new arrest. After a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant violated her probation a second time and ordered that she serve the remainder of her sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking her probation. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the Defendant's probation. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darrell John Penner v. State of Tennessee
A Perry County grand jury indicted the Petitioner, Darrell John Penner, for two counts of rape of a child. The Petitioner pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years at 100% in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The postconviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Perry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Glynda Shealy vs. Chuong C. Williams, et al
This appeal involves a dispute between adjacent landowners over boundary lines with respect to a fence and ownership of property constituting a substantial portion of a concrete driveway to one neighbor's house. Glynda Shealy ("Plaintiff") sued Chuong C. Williams and Nickie Ann Dunker ("Defendants") for trespass and malicious encroachment, claiming that Defendants' concrete driveway and backyard fence encroached upon Plaintiff's adjoining properties. In response, both Defendants asserted a defense of adverse possession. Upon conclusion of a bench trial, the trial court found, inter alia, that the concrete driveway intruded on Plaintiff's property but that Defendant Dunker had a prescriptive easement in a gravel driveway for ingress and egress. Additionally, the trial court ordered Defendant Dunker to remove her backyard fence to the legally established boundary lines and awarded Plaintiff $50 in nominal damages. After the trial court dismissed Defendant Williams from this lawsuit, Defendant Dunker filed a motion to amend her answer to add a defensive claim of easement by prescription. The trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Margle Ward
A Warren County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Margle Ward, 1 of facilitation of theft of property over $1,000, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a multiple offender to a four-year term of imprisonment and assessed $1,332.50 in fines. On appeal, Margle claims (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude a statement he made to Jeff Panter; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude the testimony of Jason Ward; and (4) his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Brandon T., et al
Parents appeal the trial court's termination of their parental rights. Because we find that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it had made reasonable efforts to address the problems preventing the reunification of the children with their parents, we reverse. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Steven Farmer
This appeal involves the registration of a foreign order. In 1991, the parents of a minor child were divorced in Texas, and the father was ordered to pay child support. Soon thereafter, the mother moved with the child to Kentucky and began receiving public assistance on behalf of the child. Because the mother was receiving public assistance, the father's child support obligation was assigned to the Commonwealth of Kentucky. In 2006, the father moved to Tennessee. Thereafter, Kentucky registered the Texas child support order in Tennessee and sought to enforce it. The father contested the registration of the child support order. The trial court rejected the father's challenges and ordered that the child support order be registered for enforcement in Tennessee. The father now appeals. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Earl McIllwain, Jr.
The Defendant, Billy Earl McIllwain, Jr., was convicted by a Gibson County jury of one count of first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to employ it in the commission of an offense. He received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus six years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant's only challenge is to the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul Wayne Douthit v. Griffin Industries, Inc. et al.
The employee, Paul Douthit, sustained a compensable injury to his left knee, which resulted in an anatomical impairment of 2% of the leg. He was able to return to his prior employment, and his claim was settled for 3% permanent partial disability to the leg, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). He subsequently had a second injury. A committee composed of his peers determined that both injuries were preventable, which led to his termination for violation of a company rule. He filed this petition for reconsideration in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 241(d)(1)(B)(ii). The trial court found that Mr. Douthit’s termination was not the result of intentional misconduct, that his conduct did not rise to the level of ordinary negligence, and that he was eligible for reconsideration. The trial court awarded an additional 9% permanent partial disability to the leg. The employer, Griffin Industries, has appealed, contending that “intentional misconduct” is an incorrect standard, that the findings of the peer committee are not reviewable, and that the trial court, therefore, erred in reconsidering the settlement. We agree that the “intentional misconduct” standard is not in conformity with existing case law, but affirm the trial court’s determination that the employee was eligible to seek reconsideration. |
Giles | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Melvin Hill v. Whirlpool Corporation
After a plant closure, employee sought reconsideration of a prior workers’ compensation settlement for right shoulder and elbow injuries in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 241(a)(2) (2008). Employer denied that he was entitled to reconsideration of the elbow injury because it was a separate injury to a scheduled member. Id. § 50-6-241(a)(1). The trial court found that the two injuries were concurrent and that employee was entitled to receive reconsideration as to both. It further found that employee had proven three of the four factors set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242(a) (2008) by clear and convincing evidence and was therefore not limited by the six times impairment cap. The trial court awarded 57.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal, employer contends that the trial court erred by finding the injuries to be concurrent and by finding that employee had satisfied the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242(a). We affirm the holding that the injuries were concurrent but find that employee did not satisfy his burden of proof under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242(a). We modify the judgment accordingly. |
Coffee | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. David Lynn Sisk - Concurring/Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions. The evidence at trial established that the Defendant lived across the street and two houses down from the victims’ burglarized home. A partially smoked cigarette was found inside the victims’ home, and subsequent DNA testing established that the Defendant’s DNA was present on the cigarette. Detective Grooms described the cigarette as not being crumpled and stated that the cigarette looked as if it had been partially smoked and then forgotten inside the house. Detective Grooms rejected the idea that the cigarette was tracked into the house from the street and stated that the cigarette appeared to have been placed in the house by the perpetrator. When asked on crossexamination whether a cigarette could stick to a person’s shoe, Detective Grooms stated that he has never had a cigarette stick to his shoe. When officers attempted to apprehend the Defendant at his house, the Defendant, who was sitting on his front porch, ran from the officers. The Defendant was found ten minutes later. Given the presence of the Defendant’s DNA on the cigarette, the condition and location of the cigarette, and the Defendant’s flight to avoid contact with law enforcement, a reasonable jury could conclude that the Defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The aforementioned evidence, coupled with Detective Grooms’s testimony, excludes every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Lynn Sisk
A Cocke County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, David Lynn Sisk, of aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, and theft of property valued at more than $10,000 but less than $60,000. The trial court determined that the defendant was a career offender and imposed a total effective sentence of 27 years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, claims that the indictments charging theft are multiplicitous, argues that the trial court erred in its jury charge, and contends that the trial court erroneously declared him a career offender. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's convictions, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the charges in this case. To facilitate any further appellate review, we also conclude that the theft indictments were impermissibly multiplicitous, necessitating the dismissal of the defendant's conviction of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, and that the trial court erroneously classified the defendant as a career offender. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of Zachary G.G.
This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of Father/Appellant's petition to change the primary residential parent or in the alternative to increase his parenting time. Because Father did not demonstrate that a material change of circumstances has occurred, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Walker's, Inc. d/b/a Walker's Quality Cleaners v. Reagan Farr, Commissioner of the Department of Revenue, State of Tennessee
This appeal involves the Retailers' Sales Tax Act. The plaintiff taxpayer is a dry-cleaning business. The taxpayer did not pay Tennessee sales tax for the sale of dry-cleaning and laundering services to a formalwear rental business. After an audit, the Tennessee Department of Revenue concluded that the taxpayer's sales of these services did not qualify as "sales for resale" that were exempt from taxation under the Retailers' Sales Tax Act, and assessed unpaid sales taxes. The taxpayer filed this lawsuit challenging the assessment. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that the taxpayer's sales of dry-cleaning and laundering services qualified for the "sale for resale" exemption and abated the assessment. The Commissioner of the Department of Revenue appeals. We reverse, finding, inter alia, that the sales do not fall within the "sale for resale" exemption from taxation under the Retailers' Sales Tax Act because dry-cleaning and laundering garments does not amount to "processing" under the Act. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Southwest Tennessee Electric Membership Corporation, et al. v. City of Jackson, Tennessee, and the City of Jackson, Tennessee City Council
This is an annexation case. The defendant city decided to annex twelve square miles of land to its northwest. The territory to be annexed was divided into forty-nine subareas. Some of the subareas immediately adjoin the city's existing boundary; all are contiguous to one another. The city prepared a plan to provide services for each of the subareas. The plans of service stated that, upon annexation, the city would deliver services immediately with existing resources. The city simultaneously enacted forty-nine ordinances annexing each of the subareas. Afterward, the plaintiff residents filed the instant quo warranto lawsuit challenging the annexation, arguing inter alia that the city could not annex land that did not adjoin its existing boundary and that the plans of service were fatally deficient under the annexation statutes. After a trial, the lower court concluded that the city could annex all of the subareas and had complied with the statutory requirements for annexation. The residents appeal. We reverse the trial court's decision that the city could annex the subareas that did not immediately adjoin the city's existing boundary, affirm the decision that the city complied with the statutory requirements for annexation with respect to the remaining subareas, and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Haywood
The Defendant-Appellant, Charles Haywood, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of attempted second degree murder, one count of aggravated robbery by use or display of a deadly weapon, and one count of possessing a firearm in the commission of attempted second degree murder. He entered an open guilty plea to one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, as a Range I, standard offender, and the Shelby County Criminal Court sentenced him to twelve years of confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Haywood argues that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Walter Himes v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Walter Himes, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his post-conviction petition in which Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily or knowingly entered. After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Ray Bartlett
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Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nader Daqqaq
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Nader Daqqaq, was found guilty of driving under the influence ("DUI"). The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to eleven months, twenty-nine days. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve nine months in confinement before being eligible for work release or trusty status. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Curtis Lee Majors
We accepted this case to determine whether, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16- 503(a)(1), the proof required to convict the defendant of tampering with evidence is sufficient where the "thing" destroyed during the course of an investigation is not specifically identified. On the facts of this case, we hold that the evidence is sufficient. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Sheryl Ann Marshall, Jessica Pickett, and Monica Butler
Three tenants of the Gallatin Housing Authority were indicted under the theft of services statute, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-14-104, for failing to report to the housing authority earnings that would have increased their rent. On the tenants' motion, the trial court dismissed the indictments, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Applying the canon of statutory construction ejusdem generis, we hold that the definition of services in section 39-11-106(a)(35) does not include public housing. We therefore affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
Mary Duffer, as Executrix of the Estate of Elmer Hamilton Lawson v. Mary Lawson
This appeal concerns the ownership of real property. The decedent acquired the subject property while he was married to the defendant surviving spouse. Years later, the decedent quitclaimed his interest in the property to his grandson. Subsequently, the decedent and the grandson disputed ownership of the property and an ancillary lawsuit ensued. Before the litigation was resolved, the decedent died and his estate was substituted as a party. The surviving spouse filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the grandson, asserting he caused the decedent's death. The grandson settled both lawsuits; the settlement of each involved a transfer of the subject real property. Thereafter, the executrix of the decedent's estate filed the instant lawsuit against the surviving spouse seeking a determination as to the ownership of the property. The surviving spouse counterclaimed, asserting various theories of ownership. On the estate's motion, the trial court entered an order dismissing the surviving spouse's counterclaim to the extent that it sought fee simple ownership. The surviving spouse now appeals. We dismiss the appeal, finding that we do not have subject matter jurisdiction. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals |